The African Mission in Sudan has become ineffective, partly through its own internal failings and partly for no fault of its own–because of lack of resources provided by international donors. The most egregious error was the expulsion of the non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission in August 2006 (an act that I strenuously opposed). As time has gone by and AMIS forces have become less mobile and more confined to their posts and less able to venture out and interact with the general population and the armed movements, the perception has also arisen that they are closer to the government. Even if true, however, this cannot justify any attack on them.

It is not only wrong but extremely foolish. It will deter troop contributing countries from playing a role in UNAMID and when they do so, it will place more focus on force protection and less on working with the civilian populace and protecting them.

As for the comparison with the killing of the Belgians in Kigali in 1994, this comparison is intended to shock. A premeditated attack on peacekeepers is a rare event, and the Darfurian armed movements should be aware that this kind of act has repercussions well beyond what they might anticipate. They do not want to belong to this club, but very soon the onus will be on them to demonstrate it. The world’s loyalties are fickle. The solidarity of the grassroots movements for Darfur in the U.S. and elsewhere are with the people of Darfur, and while the rebels have gained advantages from that, they should not take these benefits for granted. They must organize to represent their people politically as quickly as they can and banish the stain of the Haskanita attack before it drags them all down.