http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/02/14/urbanization-and-the-future-of-sudan-new-perspectives/ Tue, 02 Dec 2008 12:29:44 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5.1 http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/02/14/urbanization-and-the-future-of-sudan-new-perspectives/#comment-1463 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban Fri, 15 Feb 2008 23:48:51 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2008/02/14/urbanization-and-the-future-of-sudan-new-perspectives/#comment-1463 Dear all, The rapid pace of Sudan's urbainzation and hypercentralism is indded worthy of much more analysis than it has been given. With a current population conservatively placed at 7 million, and perhaps as large as 8-9 million surely Khartoum has become one of Africa's great connurbaitons, although it is not recognized as such. Resuming research in Sudan in 2005 after a long hiatus I was stunned by the urban growth and transformation that is popularly described as the city where one-third of the country now resides. What I want to add to the discussion is consideration of the dialectical relationships that are newly emerging as "the nation" meets in Khartoum and some old relationshps are reinforced, but some entirley new ones are being created. Time is short at the moment, but I will return to the blog at another time to develop more the idea of the demographic and social transformations that are occuring in Khartoum as a result of this mega-growth of Sudan's primate city. Til the next time, cfl. Dear all, The rapid pace of Sudan’s urbainzation and hypercentralism is indded worthy of much more analysis than it has been given. With a current population conservatively placed at 7 million, and perhaps as large as 8-9 million surely Khartoum has become one of Africa’s great connurbaitons, although it is not recognized as such. Resuming research in Sudan in 2005 after a long hiatus I was stunned by the urban growth and transformation that is popularly described as the city where one-third of the country now resides. What I want to add to the discussion is consideration of the dialectical relationships that are newly emerging as “the nation” meets in Khartoum and some old relationshps are reinforced, but some entirley new ones are being created. Time is short at the moment, but I will return to the blog at another time to develop more the idea of the demographic and social transformations that are occuring in Khartoum as a result of this mega-growth of Sudan’s primate city. Til the next time, cfl.

]]> http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/02/14/urbanization-and-the-future-of-sudan-new-perspectives/#comment-1461 Richard Lobban Thu, 14 Feb 2008 20:49:47 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blog/2008/02/14/urbanization-and-the-future-of-sudan-new-perspectives/#comment-1461 Dear Friends: Well this is certainly a very thoughtful and stimulating posting. As a veteran student of urbanization in Sudan in ancient, medieval and modern periods myself, there is so very much that one could say, but with too much on my platter today, let me just add a few points. 1. There are many definitions and routes to urbanization. "Normally" (since the rise of the state), urbanization takes place in a relatively balanced relationship to a rural productive hinterland. The present urbanization of the Sudan. i.e., the "Three Towns" is not normal by this historical standard. It is a deformed process of urbanism, with rural to urban migration (the usual demographics of urbanization) being driven more by fear than hope, and more desperation than inspiration; as a consequence... 2. Modern Sudanese urbanism is skewed and degraded by a substantial influx of ecological, economic and conflict-based refugees. They are not adequately or productively incorporated into urban life and if the factors that expelled them from rural areas are resolved they would go back to their places of origin (as with southerners who have returned to the post-CPA south). 3. Another important skew in modern Sudanese urbanism lies in the process of class formation, or really, in marked class polarization that descends from the above circumstances. Thus, without transparent mechanisms to allow for negotiating political space and power transfer, the urban arena is more and more contentious and "requires" more and more coercive applications of force to maintain order. For the short term this can function, even for decades, but..... 4. for the longer term these collective circumstances will create boom-bust cycles of urban instability that typify Sudan's very long urban history with major towns and cities rising and falling (Kerma, Napata, Meroe, Shendi, Juba, Sennar, etc.) without major successor cities. This gives some longer term ... 5. cause for alarm as the potentially volatile mixture of class competition and internal ethnic diversity is hidden and does not allow for a few "canaries in the mine" that could sense how close the situation really is to breakdown or dialectical transformation. Also noting that 6. the previous military regimes (Abboud, Nimieri, Sawar al Dahab) are not succeeeded by military regimes, but by periods of weak multi-party democracy, one can anticipate that this half century pattern would continue, indeed the provision of the CPA for democracy is already there and it is clear that this would be highly contested in urban space in one way or the other. The regional capitals of Addis Ababa, N'Djamena, Nairobi and Kampala suggest that this also might not go smoothly. 7. In short, the demographic composition, and perilously functional features of the Three Towns (human and infrastructure) should not support complacency about the period ahead, but instead humantarian and other forces and elements should also think about the serious possibility of unmanageble Sudanese urban conflict. Already there have been a number of incidents in the Three Towns that were controllable and relatively small scale, but 8. With about one third of the entire national population now residing in the massive sprawl of the Three Towns, some models of urban furturology should, at the very least, put this topic on the discussion board for further consideration. Thank you for stimulating these briefs thoughts, now back to my other work, Richard Lobban Dear Friends:
Well this is certainly a very thoughtful and stimulating posting. As a veteran student of urbanization in Sudan in ancient, medieval and modern periods myself, there is so very much that one could say, but with too much on my platter today, let me just add a few points.
1. There are many definitions and routes to urbanization. “Normally” (since the rise of the state), urbanization takes place in a relatively balanced relationship to a rural productive hinterland. The present urbanization of the Sudan. i.e., the “Three Towns” is not normal by this historical standard. It is a deformed process of urbanism, with rural to urban migration (the usual demographics of urbanization) being driven more by fear than hope, and more desperation than inspiration; as a consequence…
2. Modern Sudanese urbanism is skewed and degraded by a substantial influx of ecological, economic and conflict-based refugees. They are not adequately or productively incorporated into urban life and if the factors that expelled them from rural areas are resolved they would go back to their places of origin (as with southerners who have returned to the post-CPA south).
3. Another important skew in modern Sudanese urbanism lies in the process of class formation, or really, in marked class polarization that descends from the above circumstances. Thus, without transparent mechanisms to allow for negotiating political space and power transfer, the urban arena is more and more contentious and “requires” more and more coercive applications of force to maintain order. For the short term this can function, even for decades, but…..
4. for the longer term these collective circumstances will create boom-bust cycles of urban instability that typify Sudan’s very long urban history with major towns and cities rising and falling (Kerma, Napata, Meroe, Shendi, Juba, Sennar, etc.) without major successor cities. This gives some longer term …
5. cause for alarm as the potentially volatile mixture of class competition and internal ethnic diversity is hidden and does not allow for a few “canaries in the mine” that could sense how close the situation really is to breakdown or dialectical transformation. Also noting that
6. the previous military regimes (Abboud, Nimieri, Sawar al Dahab) are not succeeeded by military regimes, but by periods of weak multi-party democracy, one can anticipate that this half century pattern would continue, indeed the provision of the CPA for democracy is already there and it is clear that this would be highly contested in urban space in one way or the other. The regional capitals of Addis Ababa, N’Djamena, Nairobi and Kampala suggest that this also might not go smoothly.
7. In short, the demographic composition, and perilously functional features of the Three Towns (human and infrastructure) should not support complacency about the period ahead, but instead humantarian and other forces and elements should also think about the serious possibility of unmanageble Sudanese urban conflict. Already there have been a number of incidents in the Three Towns that were controllable and relatively small scale, but
8. With about one third of the entire national population now residing in the massive sprawl of the Three Towns, some models of urban furturology should, at the very least, put this topic on the discussion board for further consideration.
Thank you for stimulating these briefs thoughts, now back to my other work, Richard Lobban

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