Most enlightening to me is the description of the various stages of the formation and consolidation of Islamism in Sudan under Shiekh Al Turabi untill the fallout within the rank and file of the movement in 1999. Galab used to three Cs is illustrative: The camp, which Islamists in ‘70 symbolized it in their as an act reminiscent of Prophet Mohamad’s Fight from Mecca! Students’ Campus politics at the universities are not as significant to the Islamists as it is at the secondary schools where they focus their recruitment and reorientation of the youth they join higher education. In 1970’s during my student days in Northern Sudan, many Darfurian secondary students tended to ditch their Umma Party heritage in favour of Moslem Brotherhood. The explanation given to me was that, disillusioned with the clanist nature of Umma party hierarchy and the neglect to which their region was subjected, promises by the Movement for them as individuals and their communities for social development, under ‘genuine’ Islamic rule, was assured.

But of course once in power, the rhetoric of Muslim equality and justice–words adopted by Darfurian disciples of Al Turabi turned rebels in their movement–fault lines between losers and winners became evident. Winners, mostly from the center, were fast-tracked to power and wealth using the apparatus of the predatory state they set up. Center-periphery dynamics, under the current regime, are now more pronounced to the extreme, ditching the ideology but using other survivalist strategies such as the resort to ethnicity to distract attention. The aftermath of the attack on Omdurman and the way invasion is being described is an example of the use of ethnic difference as handy means for survival.

Alesio