Comments on: Religious citizens & public reasons http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/02/08/religious-citizens-public-reasons/ Secularism, religion, and the public sphere Mon, 06 Oct 2008 14:05:27 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5.1 By: Michael Perry http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/02/08/religious-citizens-public-reasons/#comment-938 Michael Perry Fri, 08 Feb 2008 17:35:54 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/02/08/religious-citizens-public-reasons/#comment-938 This is a follow up to Chris Eberle's comment. Readers interested in the issues addressed by Christina Lafont and Chris Eberle should turn to the latter's superb book (if they haven't already): Christopher Eberle, <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521812240" title="Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics</a> (Cambridge University Press 2002). To engage these issues without first engaging Eberle's book is, well, misguided. This is a follow up to Chris Eberle’s comment. Readers interested in the issues addressed by Christina Lafont and Chris Eberle should turn to the latter’s superb book (if they haven’t already): Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press 2002). To engage these issues without first engaging Eberle’s book is, well, misguided.

]]> By: Christopher Eberle http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/02/08/religious-citizens-public-reasons/#comment-931 Christopher Eberle Fri, 08 Feb 2008 14:20:27 +0000 http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/02/08/religious-citizens-public-reasons/#comment-931 It seems to me that the position on religion and public reasons that Professor Lafont develops in this post is almost entirely correct. Citizens may support coercive policies on whatever grounds –religious or secular – that they sincerely and responsibly take to be compelling, so long as they open themselves up to the critical insights of their compatriots. No citizen who supports a coercive law, on whatever basis, is free to ignore the critical insights of his or her fellow citizens, if for no other reason than that proper humility requires us to recognize that others – even those who inhabit a mindset we regard as alien – might have something to teach us about the normative propriety of that coercive law. Of course, a citizen might permissibly persist in supporting some coercive law even solely on religious grounds even after sincere and competent attention to the critical insights of others. This seems a sensible view and close to the one articulated in Professor Lafont’s post. It seems to me, however, that Professor Lafont construes a citizen’s obligation to subject her own views to criticism in an unnecessarily crimped manner. If she is correct, citizens do not have any obligation “to engage in a way of thinking entirely foreign to their own cognitive stance.” Most particularly, secular citizens don’t need to take seriously religious criticisms of their secular views, nor do religious citizens have an obligation to respond to secular criticisms of their religious views. Citizens, whether religious or secular, have an obligation to respond only to those reasons that are cast “in terms of public reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens (i.e., reasons based on democratic ideas of citizens as free and equal, of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, etc.” But this vestigial appeal to public reason strikes me as distracting and unmotivated. Distracting: many, many of us are extremely suspicious of the notion of a public reason. (Professor Lafont’s brief explication is little comfort.) We doubt that there are any public reasons – not reasons of the sort that can do the kind of work they are typically conscripted to do. Any view, therefore, that places any serious reliance on ‘public reason’ is therefore immediately suspect. Unmotivated: if we accept Professor Lafont’s claim that citizens have an obligation to respond to criticisms of their reasons for their favored coercive policies, but we deny, with Professor Lafont, that citizens have an obligation “to engage in a way of thinking entirely foreign to their own cognitive stance,” we don’t get an obligation to take seriously criticism cast in terms of ‘public reason.’ Given those two claims, we get a requirement that citizens take seriously criticisms that articulate well enough with their parochial (religious or secular) perspective to leverage that citizen from her existing commitments to some others. For Christians, Utilitarians, Kantians, Muslims, Hindus, Scientologists, agnostics, etc. different reasons will turn the trick. But there needn’t be any kind of ‘public reason’ that is “generally acceptable” and that all have to take seriously. Best, it seems to me, to lay public reason to rest. What would be lost should we do so? It seems to me that the position on religion and public reasons that Professor Lafont develops in this post is almost entirely correct. Citizens may support coercive policies on whatever grounds –religious or secular – that they sincerely and responsibly take to be compelling, so long as they open themselves up to the critical insights of their compatriots. No citizen who supports a coercive law, on whatever basis, is free to ignore the critical insights of his or her fellow citizens, if for no other reason than that proper humility requires us to recognize that others – even those who inhabit a mindset we regard as alien – might have something to teach us about the normative propriety of that coercive law. Of course, a citizen might permissibly persist in supporting some coercive law even solely on religious grounds even after sincere and competent attention to the critical insights of others. This seems a sensible view and close to the one articulated in Professor Lafont’s post.

It seems to me, however, that Professor Lafont construes a citizen’s obligation to subject her own views to criticism in an unnecessarily crimped manner. If she is correct, citizens do not have any obligation “to engage in a way of thinking entirely foreign to their own cognitive stance.” Most particularly, secular citizens don’t need to take seriously religious criticisms of their secular views, nor do religious citizens have an obligation to respond to secular criticisms of their religious views. Citizens, whether religious or secular, have an obligation to respond only to those reasons that are cast “in terms of public reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens (i.e., reasons based on democratic ideas of citizens as free and equal, of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, etc.” But this vestigial appeal to public reason strikes me as distracting and unmotivated.

Distracting: many, many of us are extremely suspicious of the notion of a public reason. (Professor Lafont’s brief explication is little comfort.) We doubt that there are any public reasons – not reasons of the sort that can do the kind of work they are typically conscripted to do. Any view, therefore, that places any serious reliance on ‘public reason’ is therefore immediately suspect.

Unmotivated: if we accept Professor Lafont’s claim that citizens have an obligation to respond to criticisms of their reasons for their favored coercive policies, but we deny, with Professor Lafont, that citizens have an obligation “to engage in a way of thinking entirely foreign to their own cognitive stance,” we don’t get an obligation to take seriously criticism cast in terms of ‘public reason.’ Given those two claims, we get a requirement that citizens take seriously criticisms that articulate well enough with their parochial (religious or secular) perspective to leverage that citizen from her existing commitments to some others. For Christians, Utilitarians, Kantians, Muslims, Hindus, Scientologists, agnostics, etc. different reasons will turn the trick. But there needn’t be any kind of ‘public reason’ that is “generally acceptable” and that all have to take seriously.

Best, it seems to me, to lay public reason to rest. What would be lost should we do so?

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