Roundtable

Six Years Since 9/11

Gil Eyal, professor of sociology, Columbia University

In the six years since 9/11, how has the understanding of "security" evolved, and with what implications?
Today "security" designates and carves out an area of pure state power that is strictly speaking extra-legal (not illegal, but non-legal). Superficially, it may seem that matters of security can be brought within the rule of law, by simply "balancing" them against individual rights, but in reality security can always be used to suspend legal considerations -- e.g., the canonical "ticking bomb" scenario. What this means is that the status and treatment of certain categories of individuals is determined arbitrarily, outside the law, and by reference to their putative "riskiness." The state can eavesdrop on their conversations, hold them in secret detention, torture or kill them, with impunity. From this point of view, 9/11 is not a watershed. States have always laid claim to and practiced this form of power outside the law. But the danger always is when this form of power, which is justified as an exceptional response to an emergency, is made permanent and institutionalized, which is precisely what happened with the "war on terror." This, too, is not unprecedented. The state of Israel, for example, has never suspended the state of emergency declared in 1948.

If one can generalize from the Israeli example, then I would say that the most significant consequence of the 9/11 events is likely to be the formation of multi-tiered citizenship. While the rule of law in liberal democracies guarantees universal and equal rights of citizenship, a security regime that categorizes individuals by their riskiness is likely to differentiate the mass of citizens and residents, on a semi-permanent basis, into a continuum defined by the precariousness of their hold on their rights to mobility, privacy, livelihood, integrity of their bodies -- even their own lives.

Has 9/11 events influenced debates on immigration in both United States and western European countries?
The main influence of 9/11 was not so much on debates about immigration as on practices towards immigrants. Yes, the nativists could add the arguments of potential infiltration by terrorists, defense of the homeland, and the threat of homegrown Islamic radicalism to their arsenal; but they have never lacked for rhetorical weapons. It is at the level of practices -- of real weapons if you will -- where change has been profound. Understood as carriers of risk, immigrants become individuals exposed to pure and potentially arbitrary state power in the form of deportations, physical barriers, security checks that can last years, and so on. Even more importantly, understood as carriers of risk, immigrants, more than ever before, are profiled and treated on the basis of their membership in national, ethnic, racial and religious groups.

President Bush framed the 9/11 events as acts of war and responded with a "war on terror," consisting of invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as persistent rumors of a possible strike on Iran. How might the last six years have been different if from the beginning the attacks had been understood instead as criminal?
I have no sympathy for the idea that one could have understood 9/11 as "criminal," hence that the situation could have been defined any differently. I have no doubt that 9/11 constituted an act of "terror" or "terrorism," as the term is commonly understood. The planners of these acts clearly: a) identified what they considered to be the symbolic centers of American global power; and b) chose a mode of action which was calculated to terrorize decision-makers and ordinary citizens -- i.e., not by defeating them as would happen in a war, nor by directly depriving them of something they value, as in the case of crime, but by acting on public opinion so as to achieve a political end. This is classical terrorism.

But for this very reason, the mode of response to 9/11 was clearly badly miscalculated, just as a "war on terror" is an oxymoron (and with it came other oxymorons such as "unlawful combatants"). The U.S. reaction:

• was vengeful, bringing larger circles of non-combatants into the fray (not least by the resort to the language of "clash of civilizations");
• destabilized state structures and borders; and
• involved suspending civil liberties at home.

This is precisely what terrorists the world over have always sought to achieve, and what the U.S. government's moronic (pun intended) "war on terror" simply handed over to them on a silver tray.

Instead, the last six years could have been dedicated to prudent reaction, which would have involved, no doubt, ruthless pursuit of the terrorist masterminds and destruction of their networks, but with the understanding that this is not a "war" that one wins decisively but a long- term struggle over hearts and minds. The last six years could have been used to address some of the major sources of unrest and grievance in the Middle East -- most importantly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- to have half a chance of succeeding in this struggle over hearts and minds.

What books or studies have you read recently that have affected your thinking on any of the above questions?
Carl Schmitt's Political Theology (1922) and Ernst Kantorowicz's The King's Two Bodies (1997). Put together, these two books demonstrate the profoundly theological and metaphysical nature of the most basic concepts of political liberalism, such as democracy, popular sovereignty, and most importantly, the "rule of law." They also clarified to me why concepts of political liberalism have been so ill equipped to deal with the new permanent state of emergency into which we were thrown by the U.S. "war on terror." This is illuminated by Slavoj Žižek's reaction to the debate about torture. The consistent liberal would undertake to specify when torture could be used legitimately, but this is to misunderstand the strategic situation. What point is there in setting boundaries when the power of "security" consists in precisely deciding when have they been crossed AND in keeping that decision secret? In my view, it would be better to resist all such talk from the get go: to keep the finger in the proverbial crack in the dam.

Kanishka Jayasuriya, principal senior research fellow at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia

In the six years since 9/11, "security" has become the overriding concern of national governments and of a wide range of international actors and agreements. What do you see as the most important implications?
I am greatly concerned about the framing of counterterrorism legislation in the Western world in terms of the balance between security and liberty -- signalling a decisive shift in the conventional understanding of the constitutional relationship between states and their citizens. The "war on terror" has acted as a catalyst to a putative new constitutional order based on an enhanced role for security in political reasoning about constitutional values and practices. Security questions have become intertwined with the defence of "core political values." The upshot is a weakening of the power of political contestation and an enhancement of executive power. By explicitly appealing to values of legitimacy, our leaders have undermined the commitment to formal processes of legality and to the principles of political equality that supposedly underpin the liberal constitutional order. All of this raises an interesting question: Do these post-9/11 trends have echoes in earlier "law-and-order campaigns" in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia?

As a real and symbolic event, 9/11 instilled a sense of risk and insecurity in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. How has it affected social life?
The most debilitating effect has been the anxiety arising from real or perceived terrorist threats -- accounting in large measure for the public endorsement or support for a range of security-related policies and programs. We have seen political leaders mobilize this anxiety into a politics of fear. We have also seen them use the politics of fear to pursue their political agendas. To reiterate the insightful argument of the distinguished legal theorist, Franz Neumann, when fear becomes the animating principle of democratic politics, then that politics is no longer about the contestation or the conflict of political interests but rather it is about the annihilation of an enemy. (Nowadays, of course, our anxiety is no longer directed at an ideological enemy as during the cold war but at a set of generalized threats to our way of life.) As a result, Neumann says, politics can no longer be geared towards social transformation.

Can you comment on the ways the 9/11 events influenced debates on immigration in both United States and western European countries?
The most evident effect of the 9/11 events -- along with cognate events such as the 7/7 London bombings, the 3/11 Madrid train bombings, and the 2002 Bali bombings -- has been an anti-immigration backlash. The past six years have brought a marked departure from nondiscriminatory immigration policies as well as the rejection of diversity and multiculturalism. I discern three broad trends worthy of note:

• Immigration and refugee policies have become securitized, leading to greater coordination with internal or "homeland" security policies. This is evident in the European Union where immigration and refugee policies are now seen in terms of a broader management of risk.
• Intriguingly, the securitization of immigration policy has led to a securitization of identity, such that some cultural identities are now thought to pose a threat to social and political order. One consequence of this has been a quixotic search for the moderate voices -- a search that is itself driven by the same "culturalist" logic.
• Finally, there has been a more active assertion of citizenship in terms of a nation's "core values." A good example of this is Australia's mandatory citizenship test, requiring applicants to demonstrate an understanding of the nation's core values, history, and traditions -- which has gained endorsement even from the opposition Labor Party.

As we all know, President Bush framed the 9/11 events as acts of war and responded with a "war on terror" -- and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as persistent rumors of a possible strike on Iran. Was another sort of response possible? How might the last six years have been different if from the beginning the attacks had been understood instead as criminal?
Responding to terrorism by categorising it as a criminal act would not necessarily be viable or effective. The significant challenge for democratic polities is how an emergency regime can be limited, monitored, and regulated by due process of law. The only way to achieve these limits is through strong political debate in our legislative bodies. Yet, and as explained above, the public sphere remains muted by the pervasive politics of fear and a disincentive to robust contestation. Representative institutions in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia have failed to contest the drift towards executive and administrative discretion over emergency powers. On the contrary, opposition parties in all three countries have readily conceded to the new policy regime. Moreover, in Australia and Britain we have seen a politicization of criminal law through such instruments as control orders. To monitor the legality of such counterterrorism measures will require a reinvigorated public sphere, as well as more assertive legislative institutions. Furthermore, responses merely at the national level will not be enough: 9/11 was a global emergency that led to the creation of extraterritorial prisons and legal categories such as 'enemy combatants' for terrorist suspects.

What books or studies have you read this summer or in the past six months that have affected your thinking on any of the above questions (can be anything at all: old or new works, for an academic or popular audience, etc.)? In addition, are there any films, documentaries or Web sites you would recommend?
One useful book not directly connected to 9/11 but harking back to an earlier liberal empire -- that of Great Britain -- is A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law, by Rande Kostal (OUP, 2005). Kostal analyzes the consequences of Jamaican Governor Edward Eyre's brutal suppression of an uprising in 1865 and his decision to execute a prominent black leader under martial law. Eyre's actions reverberated in England with questions raised about the extent and limits of martial law. The political and legal controversy bears a striking similarity to the American government's treatment of "enemy combatants" at Guantànamo. While there are marked differences between Victorian times and our own, a common thread links Guantànamo and Jamaica in the 19th century: the way liberal empires negotiate the competing claims of martial law and the rule of law. This question demands further exploration -- perhaps a future project for the SSRC to consider.

Luis Rubio, Presidente de Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (CIDAC), A.C. [Center of Research for Development], Mexico City, Mexico

In the six years since 9/11, "security" has become the overriding concern of national governments and of a wide range of international actors and agreements. What do you see as the most important implications?
Security has rightly become an overriding concern, but it is not obvious to me, both as a frequent visitor as well as friend of the United States, that security measures have been implemented in the smartest or most effective way. Clearly, installations throughout the United States have become more secure, and bridges and ports have seen a major overhaul in security -- all of which may explain the lack of repeat terrorist attacks. However, the security measures at major entry points have also given the United States a bad face by creating a perception among many foreigners that the United States does not want visitors. Tourists and businesspeople alike have been burdened with unnecessary delays. Much could be accomplished by introducing profiling mechanisms and even a system whereby individuals could voluntarily choose to be previously screened and their background checked, thus freeing them from waiting on long lines and wasting their time.

As a real and symbolic event, 9/11 instilled a sense of risk and insecurity in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. Has this changed at all in the six years since?
Social life was much changed immediately after 9/11, but it has gradually come back to normal. Having said that, my work entails attending many meetings, conventions and conferences, many of which used to take place in the United States. They have now moved elsewhere -- to Europe or Asia. It has become much easier for non-Americans to travel to third nations than to the United States for conventions and meetings. As a result, the U.S. has lost big potential business -- not to mention intellectual -- opportunities. The long-term political consequences of this will surely be extraordinary.

Can you comment on the ways the 9/11 events influenced debates on immigration in both United States and western European countries?
In the United States, 9/11 has become an excuse for having a very partisan debate on immigration. While there can be no doubt that law-abiding societies should not accept as flagrant a violation of the law as an illegal border crossing, the fact is that migratory flows are part of a deeply integrated labor market across the Americas. Europe differs from the United States in this regard, primarily because of the religious component associated with immigration, which does not exist in the U.S. Indeed, analytical evidence shows that immigration is a key component of the strength of the U.S. economy, thus that the link between immigration and terrorism is non-existent. It would be much better to establish legal paths to immigration that correspond with the labor needs of the U.S. economy than to continue pretending that the phenomenon does not exist or else is associated with terrorism.

As everyone knows, President Bush framed the 9/11 events as acts of war and responded with a "war on terror" -- and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as persistent rumors of a possible strike on Iran. Was another sort of response possible? How might the last six years have been different if from the beginning the attacks had been understood instead as criminal?
I don't believe that framing the 9/11 events as criminal would have been better in terms of terrorism, but it may have avoided many of the worst political and diplomatic side effects that the world has experienced during this period. In hindsight, it appears very clear that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were mishandled, poorly planned, and lacked the strategic component that might have made them successful. My own view then was that the United States needed a twofold strategy: both military action as well as a strong political response. In retrospect, it is clear that the military strategy was inadequate (though it need not have been), while the political strategy never came into fruition (if it existed at all). As a result, the U.S. is facing the worst possible outcome: a public relations disaster, new geopolitical strains around the world, and potentially many more terrorist operatives joining splinter terrorist organizations.

What books or studies have you read this summer or in the past six months that have affected your thinking on any of the above questions? In addition, are there any Web sites you would recommend?
Over the past few months I have read a few books and articles, some new, some slightly older, but all illuminating. Among the best were:

• America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies, by George Friedman (Doubleday, 2004);
• Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, by Joseph Nye (PublicAffairs, 2004); and
• What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle East Response, by Bernard Lewis (OUP, 2001).

Also important in my thinking have been Amos Oz's How to Cure a Fanatic (Princeton, 2006) and Tom Segev's 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East (Metropolitan Books, 2007). A great little book that teaches a lot is Bok!: The 9.11 Crisis in Political Cartoons by Chip Bok, the staff editorial cartoonist for the Akron Beacon Journal.

I sometimes visit Web sites that give me perspective -- some more substantive, others more polemic. Among these, the best are:

• www.stratfor.com for global intelligence predictions;
• www.realclearpolitics.com, a portal to the latest political news and commentary across the political spectrum; and
• yama333.tripod.com, a gateway to Web sites rich in information on 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terror."

Saskia Sassen*, professor of sociology and member of the Committee on Global Thought at Columbia University, and the author of Territory, Authority, Rights (Princeton University Press, 2006)

In the six years since 9/11, how has our thinking about "security" evolved, and with what implications?
The meaning of "security" as traditionally understood has changed. Traditional understandings of "security," while they never accounted for the full range of possible sources of insecurity, today account for even less. For instance, in the past, the larger and more powerful the armies, the bigger the open fields they needed to fight. That has not been the case for a long time. Going to war now means civilians and cities are likely to become the target -- both in the "enemy" country and in the war-originating country.

These new asymmetries are acute. When President Bush decided to go into Iraq, we already knew that urban combat -- which means civilian deaths -- was going to be part of it. And we knew about blowback, to use Chalmers Johnson's term. Today, this blowback effect hits civilians and cities disproportionately. There is a profound asymmetry in Iraq between the numbers of dead soldiers and destroyed armament, on the one hand, and the number of civilian deaths and destroyed homes.

Today cities are often the frontline spaces of war. When national states go to war in the name of national security, there is likely to be an inverse relation with human insecurity, especially in cities. That diversity can be seen in Baghdad and Beirut, but also in Madrid, London and New York. Beyond the direct bombing of enemy cities, today's new military asymmetries -- by that I mean conventional militaries taking on terrorist networks -- play out in cities worldwide, in an escalating triangulation of sites of destruction. The vast numbers of soldiers killed in World War II seems so far removed from today's intermediated wars. Yesterday's soldier deaths are today's civilian deaths.

You say that 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terror" have increased the likelihood of innocent people, particularly those who live in cities, to becoming the victims of political violence. Is that one of the main social consequences of the 9/11 attacks: having to cope with a sense of risk and insecurity in our everyday lives that we weren't aware of before?
The 9/11 events, along with others, have contributed to the notion of human insecurity (to use Mary Kaldor's term, which captures so well the effect of the new types of wars we see today). We can extend this to global warming, gang violence, and many other sources of insecurity in today's world. National security is today partly taken over by a more foundational notion of human insecurity -- often at the hands of national states!

One way of getting to the social -- always a bit of a fuzzy zone -- is to look at human insecurity in cities today. It has accelerated, intensified, and scaled up to global levels. This is a far larger subject than the "war on terror" launched by the Bush administration after the September 11th attacks. Cities are today the places where we are likely to find the most acute instances of religious, racist -- and now even anti-immigrant -- hatreds. They are also the place where economic insecurity in part due to economic globalization has driven people into despair, hopelessness, and new forms of violence -- from the new types of gang wars we see in São Paulo and in New York to the more political urban violence of the banlieue in Paris. These new forms of insecurity are beginning to circulate through transnational networks -- again, networks of cities.

Another angle into the social is a type of switching process that is taking place: well-established institutions (e.g., freedom of speech) cease being only what they are meant to be (e.g., foundational law) and become merely a sociological condition. I saw this in the big debate about the so-called Danish cartoons that derided the prophet of the Muslim faith, which led to massive demonstrations by Muslim groups all over Europe. It was a tricky situation for defenders of freedom of speech. In the context of a War on Terror, with a disproportionate identification of Muslims as the enemy, it was no longer simply a question of law but also of a particular sociological condition. Hence the response called for a different mix of elements -- where the legal was just one element, no matter how important.

Can you comment on the ways 9/11 has influenced debates on immigration in both the United States and western European countries?
The case I describe above, about the Danish cartoons, captures one change. In the context of a formal declaration of a War on Terror, long-term Muslim residents in Denmark felt marked as the enemy, and to some extent conducted themselves as thus marked. Again, the law defending freedom of speech became a complex sociological condition.

Generally, our image of the immigrant now includes -- I repeat, includes -- the idea that he or she is a possible enemy. This is bad. How can we forget that moment when the government offices in Oklahoma City were bombed and the assumption, and even initial pronouncement, was that Muslim terrorists had done it.

But it is a dialectic: a few Muslims, especially those already alienated -- often for racist reasons or reasons of economic inequality (rather than anything having to do with religion) -- evidently began to respond to the suspicions and accusations. The case of the murderer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh is an extreme example. He lived in the Netherlands for along time but only became a fanatic after the declaration of the War on Terror.

I find all of this tragic. It shows yet another way in which war is destructive. It enters the mind. It worms itself into more and more parts of one's subjectivity.

In addition, President Bush's declared war on terror has generated a whole new set of population flows: Iraqi emigrants, mostly illegal (half a million now in Syria, growing numbers in Lebanon, with Sweden being the main recipient of the developed countries and the U.S.A. being the least generous). And an estimated 2 million people are internally displaced inside Iraq -- one of the largest groups of displaced people in a world that has been marked by massive displacements.

As everyone knows, President Bush framed the 9/11 events as acts of war and responded with the "war on terror"; but was another sort of response possible? How might the last six years have been different if from the beginning the attacks had been understood instead as criminal?
I remember attending a Friday lunch at the New York Institute of the Humanities the week of the 2001 attacks. It was a very special time in the city, a specialness made very concrete in Greenwich Village area, downtown. We had a discussion about what had happened, and one big question was precisely the one you have asked: should this be considered an act of war or a criminal act? We were divided. I held then, and hold today, that it should have been addressed as a criminal act. I recall Ronald Dworkin also saying this -- though I do not know how he thinks about it now. And I recall Elizabeth Holtzman saying no, it should be considered an act of war -- though several months later, she told me she had changed her mind.

My reasons for arguing that the attacks should be seen as criminal were that our response would then rest on discrete, undercover global sleuthing. Declaring war meant a highly visible act, one that would mobilize vast numbers of groups and people that may not have identified in any particular way with the terrorists. In that sense, it meant escalating the matter to a highly visible and provocative event -- the ultimate recruitment tool for the terrorists, a second victory.

The Brits have been far more successful in deflecting potential terrorist attacks using good old-fashioned sleuthing, than we have been by bombing Iraq and making huge pronouncements about a clash of civilizations. In a way, when Bush informed the world you are either with us or against us, he was calling for global war, and that is what we have now.

Have you read any books this summer or in the past six months that have affected your thinking on any of the above questions?
Charlie Savage's Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy. I confess that the main reason for this is that he makes an argument I fully agree with -- one that has not been sufficiently recognized or at least highlighted: that is, the systematic effort to grow the unilateral and unaccountable power of the executive branch of the government, a project that began even before the war on terror. I have been working for years on this question, so when the "war on terror" was announced, I saw it not only as war but also as a sort of camouflage for a far deeper transformation that had in fact preceded that war. We are not only living through this terrible military war, we are also living through a highly destructive political war -- no less than a frontal attack on liberal democracy.

* Saskia Sassen commemorated September 11 by attending a forum in Mexico City with other public intellectuals -- including Cornel West, Tavis Smiley and Benjamin Barber -- on "Migration, Human Dignity, and Interdependence." Their talks culminated in declaring September 12, 2007, as Interdependence Day V.

Aristide Zolberg, Walter A. Eberstadt professor of political science at the Graduate Faculty of New School University and director of the New School's International Center for Migration, Ethnicity, and Citizenship

In the six years since 9/11, "security" has become the overriding concern of national governments and of a wide range of international actors and agreements. What do you see at the most important consequences?
In the case of the United States, 9/11 has been made the equivalent of Pearl Harbor and used to justify the war in Iraq, despite the lack of connections between the attack and the Saddam Hussein regime. More broadly, the events of 9/11 and their aftermath have triggered general suspicion of Islam, thereby lending credence to Samuel Huntington's inane "clash of civilizations" argument and turning it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, even some moderate Muslims are now persuaded that the United States is their major enemy (see, for example, the recent public opinion poll in Turkey on that subject).

What has been the most important legacy of 9/11 in terms of its impact on ordinary citizens and their lives?
The events of 9/11 have had the unfortunate consequence of raising the level of tolerance of violations of privacy, due process, and freedom of expression on both sides of the Atlantic.

How have 9/11 and its aftermath influenced the U.S. debates on immigration?
The events of 9/11 have increased concern over border-control and entry of any sort, which has spilled over into concern over undocumented immigration and provided fodder for anti-immigration agitation more generally -- despite the fact that none of the identified 9/11 terrorists was an immigrant, whether documented or undocumented. Surely, no potential terrorist is likely to apply for an immigration visa, which involves delays and additional scrutiny.

As everyone knows, President Bush framed the 9/11 events as acts of war and responded with a "war on terror." How might the last six years have been different if the attacks had been understood instead as criminal?
As I watched the second tower coming down from my rooftop in downtown Manhattan, I screamed: "What an intelligence failure!" Everything we have learned since, including from the recently published memoirs of George Tenet, has confirmed the validity of that judgment. But from what I have seen, very little has been done to improve U.S. intelligence capability -- in particular, by increasing the pool of personnel knowledgeable about the Middle East generally, not to mention versed in written Arabic and the various spoken versions.

What books or studies have you read in the past six months that have influenced your thinking on the above questions?
I am afraid it is more a matter of things I have put on my "to read" list than of things I have actually read. Top of the list is George Tenet's memoir, At the Center of the Storm, and the reviews it provoked. Besides books, I also have a file of newspaper and periodical clippings. On the due process issue, one especially frightening piece is Jane Mayer's "The Black Sites: A rare look inside the C.I.A.'s secret interrogation program" in the 13 August 2007 New Yorker.

For useful suggestions toward an alternative approach, I want to read Ian Shapiro's Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror (Princeton, 2007), mentioned in Samantha Power's "Our War on Terror," an essay that appeared in the 29 July 2007 Sunday Book Review of the New York Times. Other works that Powers recommends, which are on my list, include:

• On Suicide Bombing, by Talal Asad (Columbia, 2007)
• The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation, by Stephen Flynn (Random House, 2007).

I also recently downloaded an interesting 90-page report by the New York Police's intelligence division, called Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.