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SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL / AFTER SEPT. 11
Responses
to 9.11: Individual and Collective Dimensions
Rajeev Bhargava, Professor of Political Theory and Indian
Political Thought, University of Delhi
In India, as elsewhere, every person understood that cry for
help, the horror and fear writ large on terror stricken faces,
the trauma in the choked voices of people who saw it happen,
the hopeless struggle to control an imminent breakdown in
public, the unspeakable grief. For one moment, the pain and
suffering of others became our own. In a flash, everyone recognised
what is plain but easily forgotten: that inscribed in our
personal selves is not just our separateness from others but
also sameness with them, that despite all socially constructed
differences of language, culture, religion, nationality, perhaps
even race, caste and gender, and over and above every culturally
specific collective identity, we share something in common.
Amidst terror, acute vulnerability and unbearable sorrow,
it was not America alone that rediscovered its lost solidarity
but across the globe, almost everyone who heard, saw or read
about these cataclysmic events seemed to reclaim a common
humanity.
As we empathised with those who escaped or witnessed death
and relived the traumatic experience of those who lost their
lives, we knew of a grave, irreparable wrong done to individuals,
killed, wounded or traumatised by the sudden loss of family
and friends. These individuals were not just subjected to
physical hurt or mental trauma, they were recipients and carriers
of a message embodied in that heinous act: from now on they
must live with a dreadful sense of their own vulnerability.
This message was transmitted first to other individuals in
New York and Washington, then quickly to citizens through
out the democratic world. The catastrophe on the U.S. east
coast has deepened the sense of insecurity of every individual
on this planet.
However, this was not the entire text of messages sent by
the perpetrators. The rest is revealed when we focus on our
collective identities or rather on the collective dimensions
of the tragedy that unfolded on that terrible, terrible Tuesday.
Unlike the first, which allows a plain and simple good to
be distinguished from unambiguous evil, these messages were
disturbingly ambivalent, morally fuzzy and less likely to
sift good from evil, more likely to divide rather than unite
people across the world. One such message which the poor,
the powerless and the culturally marginalised would always
like to have communicated to the rich, powerful and the culturally
dominant, although not in this beastly manner, is this: we
have grasped that any injustice done to us is erased before
it is seen or spoken about, that in the current international
social order, we count for very little; our ways of life are
hopelessly marginalised, our lives utterly valueless. Even
middle class Indians with cosmopolitan aspirations became
painfully aware of this when a country-wise list of missing
or dead persons was flashed on an international news channel:
hundreds of Britons, scores of Japanese, some Germans, three
Australians, two Italians, one Swede. A few buttons away,
a South Asian channel listed names of several hundred missing
or dead Indians, while another flashed the names of thousands
with messages of their safety to relatives back home.
Hard as it was to acknowledge in the immediate aftermath of
September 11, it must be admitted that the attacks on New
York and Washington were also meant to lower the collective
self-esteem of Americans, to rupture their pride. Not all
intentional wrongdoing is physically injurious to the victim
but every intentionally generated physical suffering is invariably
accompanied by intangible wounds. The attack on September
11 did not merely demolish concrete buildings and individual
people. It tried to destroy the American measure of its own
self-worth, to diminish the self-esteem of Americans. Quite
separate from the immorality of physical suffering caused,
isn't this attempt itself morally condemnable? Yes, if the
act further lowered the self-worth of a people already devoid
of it. But this is hardly relevant in the case of America,
where sections of the ruling elite ensure that its collective
self-worth borders on supreme arrogance, always over the top.
Does not the Pentagon symbolise this false collective pride?
Amidst this carnage, then, is the sobering thought that occurs
more naturally to poor people of powerless countries that
occasionally even the mighty can be humbled. In such societies,
the genuine anguish of people at disasters faced by the rich
is mixed up with an unspeakable emotion which, on such apocalyptic
occasions, people experience only in private or talk about
only in whispers.
The whispering did not continue for long. Soon, left-oriented
intellectuals the world over appealed vociferously to the
Americans to explore the deeper reasons that underlie terrorism,
pointing towards America's dubious foreign policy that has
caused millions to suffer in Vietnam, Chile, Palestine, Iraq
and Sudan, to name just a few countries. Madeline Albright's
infamous remark that justified the suffering and death of
Iraqi children ricocheted from newspaper reports to television
channels. Americans were coaxed to re-examine what their leaders
do in their name. American ignorance and innocence were ridiculed:
if only ordinary Americans cared to look at what was really
going on alongside the American way of life and the rhetoric
of freedom, they would begin to understand what happened on
September 11 and why many ordinary people in the non-western
world were overcome with the feeling that it was more or less
what America deserved.
Naturally, American intellectuals reacted with horror and
disdain toward such 'ideological excuses for terrorism'. They
asked if a grave wrong committed today can be justified by
a wrong committed in the past, in a different context and
time? Could America never do anything right and Americans
never allowed to be victims? Surely, there has to be a deep
rooted anti-American prejudice in most such intellectual responses
from the non-western world. They could respectfully listen
to reasoned political opposition to American foreign policy
but not accept the pathetic ideological reflex that was characteristic
of these anti-American responses.
It is hard to deny the presence of prejudice, rhetoric and
the sledge hammer of ideology in current critiques of America.
And, even harder to accept the view of the skeptic that denies
the very distinction between rhetoric and argument, between
ideology and reasoned political theory. It is true of course
that both reasoned political argument and ideology seek to
win over others, but they do so in dramatically opposite ways.
One, steadfastly committed to transparency, provides every
conceivable reason for its principles and value-based conclusions,
the other short-circuits moral values, reduces principles
to formulae, almost always privileges the use of rhetoric
over reason and permits half-truths, even lies.
Yet, for all the validity and usefulness of the distinction
between reasoned political argument and ideology, we must
try not to seal them off altogether or wholly overlook what
they have in common. For a start, the world of the political
theorist is not entirely devoid of rhetoric and emotion, nor
is the universe of the ideologist completely lacking in reflexiveness,
internal coherence or rational thought. Likewise, no matter
how well justified, a rationally defended belief system still
contains an element of extra-rational preference and some
prejudice. For all the justified complaints against ideology,
in the end, we must also acknowledge the grain of truth it
might contain about us and our world. No matter how exasperating
its form and how crude its technique, we must attend to its
content. At any rate, ideologies are shaped by their practical
function, by the inherent logic of what they are meant to
deliver, i.e., a broad conceptual map of the social and political
world without which a political agent can not think, decide
or act. Ideologies are necessarily gestural, uncertain steps
in the dark that may lead to invaluable and indispensable
insights about the social and political world. Surely, it
must be admitted that reasoned political argument is not always
necessary for this purpose and never sufficient. Reason may
fine tune some ideologies or help defeat others but it cannot
replace them. Alas, even those of us who loath the form of
ideology must closely attend to its content. The ideology
of anti-Americanism must not be dismissed as prejudice standing
against enlightened reason.
However, what appears to have invaded the public sphere well
before and certainly after the air strikes is galaxies away
from not only the careful, issue-based reasoned opposition
to US foreign policy but also from the ideology of anti-Americanism.
Way beneath the anti-Americanism of the ideologue lies a magma
of impression, emotion and confused thought of ordinary people
that just a while ago was self-directed and is now suddenly
targetted at the other. It is this chaotic, sweltering, cesspool
that non-western intellectuals are trying to hold in their
hands and then carry into the international public domain.
It is quite wrong to call this ideology. Such mixtures of
impressions and feelings, having settled slowly over the years,
independent of our will, suddenly and unexpectedly reveal
themselves under the impact of cataclysmic events. They are
not content-less, however. Often, they are beliefs masquerading
as feelings, the common man's interpretation of larger social
and political situations based on directly felt experience
and the itsy-bitsy information filtering through to him, the
ordinary person's very own causal account of her suffering,
produced in her view by a chain of oppression that resides
in her home but originates and begins its devious journey
from somewhere in America. The cognitive content of these
feelings is this: the world is governed by two sets of international
laws, one exclusive to American and its allies, and the other
for the rest of the non-western world. A single American life
is worth more than a thousand others. Is it such a remarkable
fact that struggling, harried people, breathing a trifle freely
for the first time, sometimes in an incipient egalitarian
society, wish not to take any personal responsibility for
their own enduring woes? that they overreact with anger, blame
and schadenfreude? Not any more than to discover that people
with excessive wealth and power are generally insensitive
to those without it, that they do not even notice their existence.
Non-western intellectuals are trying to open a chink for people
in America and give them a glimpse of these convoluted feelings.
This is frequently done not in the language of reasoned political
theory but in a somewhat defective, coarse, shockingly brazen
or insensitive form that, alas, is yet another import from
the west. The irony is that many of these non-western intellectuals
are personally committed to the best ethical ideals developed
in the west and are close cultural cousins of a typical western
intellectual. In all probability, they are not even liked
by the people whose message they so earnestly carry. Culturally
estranged, they appear shallow and hypocritical to them. In
aligning themselves with the oppressed, and in trying to communicate
their feelings, these intellectuals sow in themselves the
seeds of a permanent schizophrenia.
I have pleaded with American intellectuals that they should
pay attention to the content of feelings, not obsessively
demand that they be expressed in their preferred form. However,
I have a few sobering thoughts to share with my own non-American
intellectual brethren. Insensitivity and ignorance is not
a unique American fault. Much of the Indian elite is shockingly
insensitive to the appalling conditions under which their
fellow citizens live and alarmingly ignorant of the horrors
in large parts of Africa. How can we then expect the even
more wealthy, powerful and privileged to be any different?
Humans everywhere in the world tend to build a wall around
themselves and the more comfortable they are within these
walls the less likely they are to notice those outside such
walls. Perhaps this is a time for all of us to look within
and catch this ugly, decidedly uncomfortable truth about ourselves.
I had also spoken above of two dimensions to the message hidden
in the mangled remains of the destruction of September 11.
The moral horror of the individual dimension of the carnage
was unambiguous and overwhelming. But as we examined its collective
dimension, a less clear, more confusing moral picture emerged.
How, on balance, after putting together these two dimensions,
were we to evaluate this complicated moral terrain? The answer
had to be swift and unwavering. The focus then had to remain
on the individual and the humanitarian. To have shifted our
ethical compass in the direction of the collective would have
weakened the moral claims of the suffering and the dead. And
this was plainly wrong. Nor was it enough to have merely made
a passing reference to the tragedy of individuals, a grudging
concession before considering the weightier political crimes
of a neo-imperial state. Then, as always in such situations,
the moral claims of individuals are supreme. To have aggressively
emphasised the collective dimension of the tragedy at an inopportune
time was horribly indecent. But equally, to have screened
off the collective dimension, to have ignored what ordinary
people in the non-western world feel, would have obstructed
our understanding of how tragedies of individuals can be prevented
in future; surely, this would only perpetuate another already
existing moral wrong.
An earlier version of this article appeared in Open
Democracy. Rajeev Bhargava is Professor of Political Theory
and Indian Political Thought at University of Delhi and the
South Asian editor of Open Democracy.
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