AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON LATIN AMERICA
Monica Hirst, Fundacion Central de Estudios Brasilieros, Argentina

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the numerous countries of Latin America immediately voiced their solidarity with the United States, in grief as well as in the broad-based efforts to combat terrorism. The immediate call for an OAS conference, followed by the activation of the IATRA  (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) [provide link to: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-29.html], however, presented a less than accurate picture of regional cohesion. While both initiatives played a relevant symbolic role, particularly as the US was gathering all the potential political support at hand in order to legitimize the announced military action in Afghanistan, in fact, the attacks came in the midst of a period when political and economic challenges in Latin America have produced fragmentation, rather than coordination and/or integration, within the region.  

This geopolitical reality suggests that Latin American nations will likely position themselves in the post-September 11th world on an individual basis rather than constitute a cohesive regional stance. This tendency does not preclude the fact that countries in the region share common concerns and suffer the same consequences that may well exacerbate the negative prospects already underway in the region before September 11. With this in mind, it is useful to examine the ongoing processes in the region under the shadow of the post-Cold War world order, before placing the region into the post-September 11 context.

Where and how the region stands

Latin America has gone through major transformations over the last 10 years, ranging from domestic politics and economics to regional and hemispheric affairs. After a long period of authoritarian rule as well as institutional and recurrent economic instability, democratic governments began sprouting up in the region along with comprehensive neo-liberal economic reforms. Until the 1997 Tequila Crisis, economic growth was fueled by re-negotiation of foreign debt, increases in foreign direct investment, and expansion of extra and intra regional trade.  While regional trade agreements gave new life to regionalism in the Americas, US hegemony prevailed, led by Washington's hemispheric agenda. 

In the North, NAFTA demonstrated the effectiveness of geo-economics, and highlighted the special status Mexico had achieved in post-Cold War relations between the US and Latin America. In the South, Mercosur was becoming the most successful South-South regional integration initiative. Meanwhile, the ambiguous 1995 launching of a Free Trade Area of the Americas  (FTAA) [link to: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/] simultaneously introduced feelings of seduction, rivalry and defensiveness within the Latin American community.         
	
Regarding the security agenda, peace processes unfolded quite smoothly in the Southern Cone during this period. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which were previously reluctant to such processes, began to yield to international non-proliferation pressure. New civil-military relations under democratic regimes eliminated most of the conflicts that had undermined intra-regional relations for over 150 years. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the region presented limited traditional security threats in comparison to other explosive regions of the Third World. Notwithstanding, non-military threats had reached unknown proportions in the Andean region.  In Colombia, a complex reality dominated by drug trafficking, guerrilla warfare and paramilitary activity led to an endless escalation of violence. The approval, and gradual enforcement, of Plan Colombia by the US Congress opened the door to US military presence, which was more than welcomed by local armed forces.  At the same time, however, the initiative introduced new degrees of instability that deepened the Colombian crisis, the effects of which increasingly began to spill over into neighboring countries. 

Among the many obstacles faced by Latin America, one of the most pressing has been the difficulty of improving intra-regional political coordination. Throughout the 90´s the region demonstrated a limited capacity to act as a unified actor. States hardly moved beyond shallow presidential diplomacy in order to articulate mutual concerns. The most threatening security problem in the region, drug trafficking, was never dealt with through an effective regional policy. In global politics, the region was incapable of presenting a unified front regarding reform of UN Security Council.  Furthermore, the South American presidential Summit called by the Brazilian government in 2000 posed more uncertainties than trade-offs regarding regional leadership by Brazil. Hence, while the United States has shown reluctance, inconsistency and neglect toward the region, it has maintained at low cost an uncontested political and economic pre-eminence. 

In summary, post-Cold War Latin America presented a three-fold scenario: a geo-economic sub-region in the North dominated by the US, which in essence involved only Mexico though it also spilled over into Central America and the Caribbean; an Andean sub-region subjected to burdens imposed by the duality of weakened governments and powerful drug-trafficking and guerrilla groups; and a peaceful area in the Southern Cone with increased sub-regional integration and a mutual sub-regional trust, particularly intense between Argentina and Brazil.  

Facing the new reality

As mentioned earlier, Latin America immediately reactivated the Inter-American systemi after the terrorist attack upon the US despite precarious intra-regional coordination.  Mexico had recently called for the dismantling of the IATRA and at the same time announced its own defection from the Treaty; Argentina insinuated military support in Afghanistan, albeit with some hesitation; and Brazil emphasized the need to avoid irrational reactions. Nevertheless, Washington acknowledged the Brazilian call for an OAS conference and the activation IATRA as an "enough for now" response from Latin America. Support from European nations, NATO and even SEATO, as well as heavy weight world powers such as Russia and China, were far more important in order to legitimize the US led military intervention in Afghanistan.

Though Latin American involvement in military action in Central Asia has been marginal, the changing tides since September 11 have had an inevitable impact upon the region. New and renewed apprehensions have emerged regarding political, security and economic repercussions. Generally there has been a gap between the stances held by Latin American governments and those demonstrated by public opinion in the region. Military involvement has been rejected across the board, while anti-Americanism (not to be mistaken as anti-Westernism) has spread among many communities in the region. 
 
The first and most visible impact is seen in security relations between the US and Latin America. The expansion of FBI, DEA and CIA operations in direct connection with sweeping "homeland security measures" carried out in the US is already affecting the character of police and intelligence activities in Latin America. In Mexico's case, these circumstances will hasten the border-blurring process already underway since the enactment of NAFTA. Fears of escalating xenophobia, anti-immigration sentiment, as well as the consequences associated with each, have softened previous nationalistic resistance within Mexico, leading to more effective collaboration from both sides of the border. A major expansion of US intelligence presence throughout the region is expected, as the US demonstrates caution regarding military cooperation initiatives. Furthermore, the new set of financial security measures aimed at curtailing money laundry operations, launched along with the US Foreign Assets Terrorist Tracking Program, will introduce new constraints for the Latin American banking system, particularly within the Caribbean.  

The new security priorities of the US will affect hemispheric trade relations as well. Since the inauguration of the Bush administration, expectations have grown regarding the negotiation of the FTAA. US foreign policy in light of the terrorist attack has not only downgraded the importance of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), requested by the President to Congress last June, but has also hardened the US stance toward hemispheric trade negotiations.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that less flexible positions in trade arrangements were to be expected in any case, as a consequence of the visible recessional tendencies of the US economy even before September 11. 

Now recession coupled with war have revitalized nationalism in the US and have contributed to increased political and ideological grounds for economic protectionism, affecting market access concessions and the eventual reduction of unilateral trade barriers sought by Latin American countries. The political rhetoric behind the latest measures undertaken to protect US domestic steel production, affecting Argentine and Brazilian exports, illustrates such tendencies.  If before September 11 President Bush had already emphasized the link between trade and international security, now it is to be expected that this connection will become the keystone of US foreign policy in Latin America.

Latin America after the events of September 11 will most likely display varied reactions and effects, marked by the existing contrasts between the sub-regions. The Andean countries share growing fears of an escalation of violence and political turmoil in Colombia as a consequence of the demonstrative effect of the military and paramilitary activities carried out in Central Asia. The Colombian military are fearful that the US-led operation in Central Asia might result in the reduction of the funding destined to fuel the Colombian Plan. At the same time, the upcoming presidential election in Colombia will create a new wave of politicization involving partisan politics as well as the powerful narco-guerrilla forces in the country. The involvement of narco-business in political campaigns, the escalation of violence meant to affect President Pastrana's political allies and the search for special political deals in Washington are to be expected.

Within the Southern Cone it will be difficult to reverse the dissimilar foreign policy preferences of countries in this sub-region made explicit ever since the end of the Cold War. The Southern Cone nations are more likely to find common ground regarding regional security than the global security agenda. A scenario similar to that observed during the Gulf War is likely, when Argentina and Brazil chose different courses of action as to the level of commitment to US led military operations. 

Currently however, Brazil is taking a more active role in multilateral arenas, most notably the UN, to insist upon the need for a conceptual revision of world politics, based upon a sort of "ethics diplomacy", in order to face global threats. [provide link to: http://mre.gov.br (no www. I don´t know why)] Yet the chance that Brazil could expand its role as a global player has now diminished.ii Regarding the post September 11 agenda, the Brazilian government has simultaneously expanded domestic control over money laundering operations and has become less resistant to the US intelligence presence in the country in general. Ironically, one consequence of the recent expansion of military activities in world politics has been stimulation of the Brazilian arms industry.

Nonetheless, different foreign policy objectives have not kept Argentina and Brazil from expanding cooperative measures to improve intelligence and police controls at the Triple Border area, particularly between the cities of Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), Cuidad del Este (Paraguay) and Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil).  Since the last terrorists attack in Buenos Aires in 1994, this has been considered a hot spot for the hiding of fundamentalist terrorists suspects. Hence after September 11 this has become the most scrutinized area in the Southern Cone. As the FBI has requested information from the three bordering countries regarding the presence of members of the Hezbollah or Hamas movements in the area, local police forces have intensified their presence in the three cities involved.   

The risks at stake
	
From a political standpoint the post September 11 reality may produce three risky areas within the Latin American community. First, it could open a Pandora's box of civil-military relations regarding sensitive areas such as intelligence and police activities. In new democracies, efficient mechanisms to avoid abuses and clarify blurry borders between legitimate and illegitimate repression will be crucial. 

Secondly, the need for regional collaboration between police, intelligence and eventually military actors implies a revision of the non-intervention principles now vehemently defended by such countries as Peru, Venezuela and Brazil. This has been a subject of debate since non-military threats have become a relevant part of the regional security agenda. The entire debate on cooperative security that took place in the early 90´s reflected the pressures to revise established Latin American foreign policy concepts on sovereignty. Under current pressures this revision will most likely be amplified. 

Third and finally, it is important to consider the risks of amplified uni-lateralism, which will deepen the political fragmentation within the region. Solitary decisions regarding military involvement, bilateral negotiations with Washington or regional representation in multilateral arenas will all inevitably have disruptive effects on the Latin America community. Recent difficulties encountered by the Rio Group in negotiating a UN proposal to fight terrorism reveal the constraints on the region in voicing its opinion.iii The lack of intra-regional unity will only aggravate the peripheral position the area now holds in world affairs. On the other hand, in the case of South America and particularly the Southern Cone, the lack of security threats could be an asset, strengthening the notion that being a source of global threats and a "have-not " are not necessarily the same.

  
i A general analysis of the reach and limits of the recent reactivation of the Inter-american system was written by Juan Toklatian.  See  november/2001 Spanish edition of Foreign Affairs.(vol.I, #4).
ii  An example of this kind of consequence is mentioned by Robert Luttwak  when he aknowledges that in the new world setting it will become more difficult for Brazil - together with India, China and even South Africa-to become a member of the G-7 as had been cogitated before. See Veja magazine november  14, 2001.
iii The Rio Group is an inter-governmental  political gathering formed in 1985 which comprises all South America, Mexico and representation for Central America and Carribbean.



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