Russia actively sought supremacy in the existing
and newly created institutions of integration. Thus, in May
1992, the Collective Security Treaty was signed, strongly
reminiscent of the notorious Warsaw Pac; almost all CIS countries
joined, except Turkmenistan and Ukraine. In February 1999,
when the treaty was to be renewed by all its parties, Tashkent
refused further membership, seeking an alternative in cooperation
with NATO.
In response Russia took actions aimed at the political and
economic isolation of Uzbekistan from the Central Asian countries.
It proposed the idea of an asymmetric integration process
and, for its mechanism, initiated the creation of a triplet--Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan,
as well as the Customs Union comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan in its turn drifted more and more
in the direction of the United States and NATO, and continued
on that course until Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia.
Compared to his predecessors, he has been an even greater
champion of integration between the former Soviet republics
under Russia's leadership. Russia has always regarded Central
Asia as a zone of its influence, imposing itself as curator
and coordinator in matters concerning foreign policy and defense
strategy.
Putin's new strategy was to pursue the foreign policy of carrots
and sticks: on the one hand, disobedient republics were pressured
directly and indirectly-up to supporting separatist and opposition
forces; on the other hand, care about the well-being and security
of these countries was demonstrated. For example, Russia promised
military and technical assistance to Uzbekistan to counter
radical extremism and terrorism, but proved to be unconcerned
when the Uzbek government actually did turn to it for help.
Eventually it was China that provided the sharp-shooting rifles
needed for the antiterrorist operation against the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan.
Russia's new aggressive foreign policy doctrine manifested
itself in the creation of the so-called Shanghai Five that
encompassed Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Originally this union was aimed at settling border issues
between these countries, but later its objectives focused
on regional security. For Russia it was, among other things,
the means for neutralizing the Central Asian Union and any
other regional formations created without its involvement.
Uzbekistan, having sensed the danger of remaining in total
political isolation and being in need of military and technical
assistance from Russia and China to face the threat of terrorism
coming from Afghanistan, was compelled to join this union-renamed
the Shanghai Forum-in July 2001. This organization was expected
to be rather influential on the regional level due to the
involvement of the two superpowers. There was even talk about
including India, Iran, and Mongolia. However, the events of
September 2001 have confused the plans of the Forum architects.
Russia, itself afraid of being isolated not only from the
West but also from its allies in Central Asia, instead of
playing the "Asian" card--and to the obvious disappointment
of China--went for rapprochement with the NATO countries,
hinting at the possibility of joining.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan had become the key geostrategic partner
of the United States and their protégé in the region. Other
Central Asian countries were ready to follow suit, even Russia's
most loyal ally, Tajikistan. In this situation, Russian leadership
tried at least to save face, sending the message that it was
only by its consent that the Central Asian countries offered
their airfields to host U.S. and NATO air forces. It was this
infidelity of its "younger brothers" in the CIS family that
provided the impetus for Russia's rapprochement with NATO.
Under the circumstances it had no choice but to align itself
with the West and try to insert itself as mediator between
it and Central Asia.
As a consequence, any activity within the framework of the
Shanghai Forum was frozen for an indefinite time. Appropriately,
Russia's geostrategic position in Central Asia has been de
facto substantially undermined. To restore it to the former
level would now be possible only under two conditions. The
first would be the withdrawal of the United States and NATO
from the region, which is unlikely to happen, at least in
the next few years, given the inevitable diversification of
tasks they will need to tackle there. Although the priority
today is antiterrorist, peace-making, and humanitarian campaigns
in Afghanistan, in the future the focus is expected to shift
toward protecting the interests of the West with regard to
Caspian oil and gas reserves.
The second condition required to restore Russia's position
would be the demand for its role as arbiter in disputes among
the Central Asian countries themselves, and such disputes
are very probable, given the status and prospects of their
relationships. Some of the factors contributing to their worsening
can be mentioned here.
First, Russia, whose pride has no doubt been hurt by the apostasy
of the Central Asian governments, will certainly continue
its policy of "dividing and ruling" through the same process
of asymmetric integration, letting some be close and keeping
others at a distance. It is quite possible that it will produce
a foreign policy doctrine that will take into account new
realities in the balance of power in global politics and aim
at restoring its weight in Central Asia. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
and Kyrgyzstan will again follow in the wake of this policy;
Uzbekistan, on the contrary, will seek to preserve its alliance
with the United states while trying, to the extent possible,
not to spoil its relationship with Russia.
Further, there are a number of unsettled interstate and regional
problems, such as the distribution of water and energy resources,
the transport infrastructure and cross-country transit, and
the problems of borders and visa regimes. As of today, none
of these issues has been resolved. Moreover, all parties seem
to be deaf to the arguments of their neighbors and unable
to maintain a dialogue or join forces to tackle conflicts.
It must be recognized that the situation in the region is
such that its countries compete with each other economically
for the same limited resources, which are not evenly distributed.
Agriculture plays a major role in all of the countries except
Kazakhstan; thus, the most important resource is water, which
is needed for both irrigation and power generation. The irrigated
land area has grown 1.5 times over the past 30 years, while
the population has increased more than three times, with a
consequent rise in water claims. By a quirk of fate, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which have rich oil and gas
fields, depend on the water from the mountain areas of Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, which have a shortage of mineral resources,
particularly oil and gas. There would seem to be good grounds
for exchange and cooperation, but it is not so.
Moreover, all countries of the region are landlocked and remote
from the world's trading hubs. They are all extremely interested
in projects aimed at developing cross-country transport links
and reducing transit costs, but in practice they compete with
each other in raising tariff and tax barriers.
Despite a vital need for cooperation, the countries are waging
small-time cold wars against one another over water and energy
distribution, transit and borders. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
have been annoyed and even embittered by certain actions of
the Uzbek authorities. Kyrgyzstan is unhappy about the regular
interruptions of gas supply from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan about
land mines planted by Uzbek frontier guards along the Tajik
border and difficult transit through Uzbekistan's territory.
Uzbekistan, in turn, has unsettled border issues with almost
all the Central Asian countries, with the exception of Kazakhstan.
Similar vexation is caused by the actions of other regions'
countries too. For instance, Turkmenistan conceived an idea
to build a branch canal that would fill the Karashor Depression
with water from Amu-Darya River; the result would be a lake
130 m deep with a total area of 3,460 square kilometers; there
is also a plan to irrigate an additional 4,060 km2 of desert
land.2 Considering the drought of the past two
years (2000 and 2001) and the fact that Afghanistan has essentially
not yet taken its legitimate share of Amu-Darya water and
will soon definitely exercise its right, the unilateral actions
of Turkmenistan cannot but cause concern and protest in Uzbekistan.
In response to the interrupted supply of gas from Uzbekistan
during winter, Kyrgyzstan discharges an excessive amount of
water from the Toktogul reservoir, which results in flooding
a significant area of irrigated land in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
While Uzbekistan cuts off the gas because of nonpayment by
Kyrgyzstan, the latter justifies its actions by saying that
it is compelled to compensate for the gas shortage by increasing
power generation on the Toktogul-Naryn hydropower cascade.
In return for reducing water discharge in the winter and increasing
it in the summer, Kyrgyzstan demands payment for the water
and discounted prices for gas.
Discontent is also created by the Kazakhstan government, which
has imposed inflated tariffs for transit shipments through
its territory. As a result of such tariffs, as well as the
introduction of additional duties by provincial authorities
and extortion by transport police and criminal groups, shipping
goods across Kazakhstan has become not only unprofitable,
but also dangerous in terms of personal safety.
The problem of transit was objectively conditioned in 1924
by the Soviets, who planted "time bombs" under the foundation
of the future regional security when they created the national-territorial
divisions in Central Asia. One such bomb is the enclave problem.
Almost every country in the region has in its territory enclaves
that belong to its neighbors, and vice versa; for example,
there are four Uzbek enclaves and one Tajik enclave in Kyrgyzstan,
and there is one Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan.
The map of the region was drawn so that residents of one province
wishing to reach another province of the same country had
to cross the territory of a neighboring republic. In the Soviet
era, when republican borders were not patrolled and had purely
administrative significance, there was no transit problem,
but with the creation of national states, the enclaves and
transit zones became sources of suffering for many common
people and a cause of permanent conflicts.
Beginning in 1998, and especially in 2000, the regional governments
began to introduce visa regimes for entering their countries.
As a consequence, the transit problem became even more poignant,
sometimes leading to outward confrontations between populations
and the frontier guards and customs officers of the countries
whose territory they had to pass through.
Thus, the absence of effective mechanisms for settling water
and energy problems and transit issues and the egotism of
corporate groups controlling interstate contacts lead to further
mutual alienation among these countries, making them easy
prey for regional superpowers. In these circumstances, instead
of dialogue, regional governments seek to involve powerful
patrons in their interstate disputes and conflicts.
While Afghanistan was the source of terrorist threat, regional
governments were compelled to unite and cooperate for the
sake of repelling potential invasion from the south. But with
the dawn of domestic accord on the horizon, now that the Taleban
have fled Kabul and Kandahar, old grievances and quarrels
will float to the surface; and then not Afghanistan, but the
Central Asian countries themselves will likely be the origin
of regional instability and conflict.
Footnotes
1 Biznes i politika, May 11, 1994.
2 Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 5, 2000. |
Click
here
for the text of the Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Agreement)
|
