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Women,
War and Fundamentalism in the Middle East
Haideh
Moghissi, Department of Sociology, York University
A constructive
discussion and dialogue about Islam and gender has never been
free of its controversies. The task has been how to explain
the stubborn survival of traditions and practices hostile
to women in Islamic societies without adding to the arsenal
of racist imagery about Islam and Muslim women, targeting
diasporic communities in the West. How to challenge the inferiorizing
stereotypes about Islam and Muslim women without resorting
to apologetic and self-glorifying accounts of Islam and Muslims.
But taking up this subject is a daunting job particularly
after post- September 11 events. No doubt the tragic events
of September 11 traumatized many people and the horrifying
loss of life of so many innocents robbed everyone off our
sense of security. But this has been particularly true for
those of us who are of Middle Eastern origin. Many feel that
they have all been implicated in this tragedy in one way or
the other. Many of us have gone through the experience of
having lost loved ones as a result of different forms of violence
and terrorism in our home counties. What was the first direct
experience in North America of feeling that their cities are
under attack, has been a way of life for many people from
the Middle East. But the continued harassment of people who
are or appear to be Muslim or of Middle Eastern origin has
forever damaged our sense of belonging. A feeling of shame
and responsibility for what happened on September 11 has been
imposed on all diaspora of Middle Eastern background. As if
it is wrong to be concerned that many innocent people in Afghanistan
have become the target of retaliation for a crime they did
not commit. If you stand against war and in solidarity with
the people of Afghanistan, the citizens of a poor and devastated
country who have for many years suffered terribly under various
brands of Islamic fundamentalism and foreign intervention,
you may risk being accused of supporting terrorism.
In this context, it is indeed a formidable job for any individual
from Islamic cultures to keep focus. For all this, unfortunately,
has created a sort of defensiveness in many individuals coming
from the region which discourages critical thinking and critical
analysis. As a gender-conscious woman from an Islamic culture
who has experienced, first hand, the consequences of the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism in my home-country, I feel agonized
by this observation. For, as I have argued elsewhere,1
I do not believe the political choice facing intellectuals
in the Middle East is as limited as it is often implied. We
can keep our critical stance against various forms of violence
and terrorism that has engulfed Islamic societies and, against
foreign interests and policies have which in fact nourished
and sustained them. We should be able to clearly and unconditionally
condemn the horrifying loss of life of innocent people in
the World Trade Center as well as the wanton bombing of innocent
people of Afghanistan.
However, what we have heard and seen since September 11, from
the Muslim communities in the West and from anti-imperialist
intellectuals, has been mostly justificatory accounts about
Islam and its practices, including the much popularised concept
of Jihad that has been used abundantly on both sides. Ziauddin
Sardar is right in criticizing Muslims from Egypt to Malaysia
for denying terrorism as a problem in the Islamic world and
for blaming everyone but themselves and not seeing their own
mistakes and shortcomings, such as the absence of political
freedom, open debate, civility, and pluralism as the breeding
ground for Islamic movements.
It should go without saying that I am not disputing the need
for countering the recurrent Islamophobia of media and governments
in the West and the racist imagery about Islam and Muslims
- the imagery that reduces the life experiences of people
from the region to religion and religion alone. Underlying
such images is the assumption that Islam is a blanket under
which people from Islamic cultures are huddled together regardless
of their regional, ethnic, cultural, class and gender differences.
However, the best way to counter this imagery is not to deny
the more punishing features of Islamic practices and traditions,
particularly for women, and to focus, instead, on the positive
aspects of Islamic culture. To unconditionally defend Islam
in its totality is the wrong strategy for countering these
views. It is to defend the un-defendable. In fact, nothing
would contrast the stereotypical images of Islam and Muslims
better than raising one's voice against oppressive features
of cultural traditions or the inhumane practices of Islamist
movements and fundamentalist regimes. To keep an open mind
and not fear critiques and self-critique would discredit the
monolithic, static conception of Islam promoted by both leaders
of fundamentalist movements and rulers that there is one 'true'
and 'authentic' Islam based on the 'correct' interpretation
of the scripture. It would also be the best way to counter
the homogenizing perceptions about people from the Middle
East advertised by governments and the media in the West,
which obscure the profound heterogeneity of peoples from Muslim
societies within or without the Middle East and their differing
understanding and interpretations of Islam(s) and Shari'a.
To offer apologetic accounts of Shari'a does the opposite.
Which is to say that to defend Islam and Muslims against the
well-stocked arsenal of anti-Islamic, anti-Arab/Iranian stereotypes
can hardly be done through apologetic accounts of women's
rights in Islamic Shari'a. To argue, for example, that
there are preconditions, including the testimony of four eye
witnesses, for carrying out the Shari'a sentence of
flogging or stoning to death of women and men on charges of
adultery, or that murder of a wife accused of adultery by
her husband (honour killing) is legally sanctioned, can hardly
convince us that the provisions of Shari'a are compatible
with the principles of human rights. If all the pre- conditions
of these punishments are met, they cannot make legally sanctioned
violence against women acceptable and just. And let us not
obscure the fact that the testimony of four eye witnesses
required by law is admissible only from four men or
two men and four women, as according to the Islamic
Shari'a: the testimony of two women equals that of
one man. No amount of twisting and bending can change the
fact that if the principles of the Shari'a are to be
maintained, women cannot be treated any better. Indeed, if
religious texts and instructions are taken literally, gender
equality cannot be achieved in any society, Islamic or non-Islamic.
To be sure, fundamentalism in all religions is a deadly force
that uses every possible means to carry its messages. In North
America it shows no mercy for the innocent lives lost in abortion
clinics; in Israel it doesn't hesitate to open fire on Muslim
worshipers who stand in the way of the creation of a Jewish
"promised" land; and in Muslim societies Islamic fundamentalism,
which has victimized more people inside the region than outside
it and more women than men, takes its most passionately articulated
mission to be restoring conservative religious doctrine and
teachings on women's status. Indeed, contempt for women's
intelligence and emotional and moral stability is the marker
of Fundamentalists' religious instructions and moral regime.
The archaic provisions of Islamic legal codes and criminal
justice, such as the barbaric form of prescribed punishment
(including stoning to death), violates the basic human rights
of both sexes. But Islamic legal practices are clearly and
unapologetically harsher on women. To such ends, they dig
up medieval Islamic texts prescribing moral codes or invent
rules of conducts when the need arise. Afghanistan under the
Taliban and present-day Iran provide numerous examples of
'Islamic traditions' whose origin, Islamic or otherwise, cannot
easily be traced.
Given these facts, the struggle against this formidable force
cannot be postponed until the situation calms down. Such a
strategy would only help the region's reactionary religious
and political establishments to wall themselves off against
internal challenges and popular demands. When even doubting
the rationality of the application of Islamic Shari'a
at this time and age can be a life-threatening activity (as
is the case in many Muslim countries), are women not justified
in refusing to cheer for "democracy" as one Islamic force
replaces another? Should they not feel "outsiders" to the
patriotic and nationalist projects in the region? The latest
show staged by the US-led anti-terrorist coalition and Afghan
male elite and the response to it by Afghan women's organizations
such as Afghanistan Feminist Association, Afghan Women's Network,
WAPHA and RAWA are a clear manifestation of the future prospects
for women in Afghanistan.
Not even fully in control of the state power, the authorities
of Afghanistan's interim government are trying to curb expectations
with regard to women's rights and status in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Indeed the statements such as those made by new Justice Minister
that the country's legal system and new justice will continue
to be based on "traditional Islamic law, not an imported,
Western-style system"2 leaves no room for speculation
as to what will survive and what will change in "liberated"
Afghanistan. Time and time again we have seen that Western
governments concern themselves with violations of women's
rights in Muslim societies whenever a defiant client state
has to be punished by the stick of women's rights, as presently
is the case in Afghanistan. It is then reasonable to assume
that once the US-led strikes in Afghanistan come to an end
and the Northern Alliance forces are fully and firmly in control,
rhetoric about Afghan women's human rights will also end.
Chilling statements by the "moderate" fundamentalists now
in power confirm a reality already known to women living under
rigid Islamic rule - that women will continue to be brutalized
and caught in a deadly crossfire between competing Islamist
forces who each claim to be the bearer of "true" Islam.
Today, the fallacy of the promise that women's demands will
be met, automatically, when the movement for democracy succeeds
is clear to many women. Women's experiences of the last two
decades in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region have made
it abundantly clear that meaningful change for women only
will begin when the clerical grip on political institutions
and law-making processes is broken and a clear separation
of state from religion is materialized. Only with such developments
(which include the removal of Shar'ia from the legal
system), will women begin to gain full citizenship status
and legal equality with men. The same is true for religious
minorities against whom Shari`a-based laws un-apologetically
discriminate. In this context, a most urgent question would
be, What is the most reasonable and effective way to defend
the rights of women in Islamic cultures to autonomy, dignity
and self-fulfillment? We may not have a response to that question.
But we know for sure that defending out-dated practices and
traditions because they are home-grown, non-Western and non-Eurocentric
will not take us in that direction.
Within this context, the choice of gender-conscious women
from the region is clear. That is to go beyond "us" and "them"
and to refuse self-glorification or self-pity. The choice
is to free ourselves from "unreal loyalties" which spring
from pride of nationality, religious pride, family pride and
all other sorts of pride, as Virginal Woolf wrote over half
a century ago.3 Writing from the stand point of
an "outsider" to social, political and cultural life in England
of her time, she declared that her sex and class had very
little to do with patriotic and nationalist projects of the
"educated" men who were preparing for the Second World War
in her country.
[I}f you insist upon fighting to protect me, or
'our' country, let it be understood, soberly and rationally
between us, that you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct
which I cannot share; to procure benefits which I have not
shared and probably will not share..... [I]n fact, as a
woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country.
As a woman my country is the whole world.4
This statement is as true now as it was then.
Footnotes
1 H. Moghissi
(1999) Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism, The Limits
of Postmodern Analysis, (London: Zed Press).
2 The Globe and Mail, Toronto, December
27, 2001.
3 Virginal Woolf,(1977) Three Guineas, London,
The Hogarth Press, p. 146.
4 Ibid, pp. 196-197.
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