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SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL / AFTER SEPT. 11
Women,
War and Fundamentalism in the Middle East
Haideh
Moghissi, Department of Sociology, York University
A constructive
discussion and dialogue about Islam and gender has never been
free of its controversies. The task has been how to explain
the stubborn survival of traditions and practices hostile to
women in Islamic societies without adding to the arsenal of
racist imagery about Islam and Muslim women, targeting diasporic
communities in the West. How to challenge the inferiorizing
stereotypes about Islam and Muslim women without resorting to
apologetic and self-glorifying accounts of Islam and Muslims.
But taking up this subject is a daunting job particularly after
post- September 11 events. No doubt the tragic events of September
11 traumatized many people and the horrifying loss of life of
so many innocents robbed everyone off our sense of security.
But this has been particularly true for those of us who are
of Middle Eastern origin. Many feel that they have all been
implicated in this tragedy in one way or the other. Many of
us have gone through the experience of having lost loved ones
as a result of different forms of violence and terrorism in
our home counties. What was the first direct experience in North
America of feeling that their cities are under attack, has been
a way of life for many people from the Middle East. But the
continued harassment of people who are or appear to be Muslim
or of Middle Eastern origin has forever damaged our sense of
belonging. A feeling of shame and responsibility for what happened
on September 11 has been imposed on all diaspora of Middle Eastern
background. As if it is wrong to be concerned that many innocent
people in Afghanistan have become the target of retaliation
for a crime they did not commit. If you stand against war and
in solidarity with the people of Afghanistan, the citizens of
a poor and devastated country who have for many years suffered
terribly under various brands of Islamic fundamentalism and
foreign intervention, you may risk being accused of supporting
terrorism.
In this context, it is indeed a formidable job for any individual
from Islamic cultures to keep focus. For all this, unfortunately,
has created a sort of defensiveness in many individuals coming
from the region which discourages critical thinking and critical
analysis. As a gender-conscious woman from an Islamic culture
who has experienced, first hand, the consequences of the rise
of Islamic fundamentalism in my home-country, I feel agonized
by this observation. For, as I have argued elsewhere,1
I do not believe the political choice facing intellectuals in
the Middle East is as limited as it is often implied. We can
keep our critical stance against various forms of violence and
terrorism that has engulfed Islamic societies and, against foreign
interests and policies have which in fact nourished and sustained
them. We should be able to clearly and unconditionally condemn
the horrifying loss of life of innocent people in the World
Trade Center as well as the wanton bombing of innocent people
of Afghanistan.
However, what we have heard and seen since September 11, from
the Muslim communities in the West and from anti-imperialist
intellectuals, has been mostly justificatory accounts about
Islam and its practices, including the much popularised concept
of Jihad that has been used abundantly on both sides. Ziauddin
Sardar is right in criticizing Muslims from Egypt to Malaysia
for denying terrorism as a problem in the Islamic world and
for blaming everyone but themselves and not seeing their own
mistakes and shortcomings, such as the absence of political
freedom, open debate, civility, and pluralism as the breeding
ground for Islamic movements.
It should go without saying that I am not disputing the need
for countering the recurrent Islamophobia of media and governments
in the West and the racist imagery about Islam and Muslims -
the imagery that reduces the life experiences of people from
the region to religion and religion alone. Underlying such images
is the assumption that Islam is a blanket under which people
from Islamic cultures are huddled together regardless of their
regional, ethnic, cultural, class and gender differences. However,
the best way to counter this imagery is not to deny the more
punishing features of Islamic practices and traditions, particularly
for women, and to focus, instead, on the positive aspects of
Islamic culture. To unconditionally defend Islam in its totality
is the wrong strategy for countering these views. It is to defend
the un-defendable. In fact, nothing would contrast the stereotypical
images of Islam and Muslims better than raising one's voice
against oppressive features of cultural traditions or the inhumane
practices of Islamist movements and fundamentalist regimes.
To keep an open mind and not fear critiques and self-critique
would discredit the monolithic, static conception of Islam promoted
by both leaders of fundamentalist movements and rulers that
there is one 'true' and 'authentic' Islam based on the 'correct'
interpretation of the scripture. It would also be the best way
to counter the homogenizing perceptions about people from the
Middle East advertised by governments and the media in the West,
which obscure the profound heterogeneity of peoples from Muslim
societies within or without the Middle East and their differing
understanding and interpretations of Islam(s) and Shari'a.
To offer apologetic accounts of Shari'a does the opposite.
Which is to say that to defend Islam and Muslims against the
well-stocked arsenal of anti-Islamic, anti-Arab/Iranian stereotypes
can hardly be done through apologetic accounts of women's rights
in Islamic Shari'a. To argue, for example, that there
are preconditions, including the testimony of four eye witnesses,
for carrying out the Shari'a sentence of flogging or
stoning to death of women and men on charges of adultery, or
that murder of a wife accused of adultery by her husband (honour
killing) is legally sanctioned, can hardly convince us that
the provisions of Shari'a are compatible with the principles
of human rights. If all the pre- conditions of these punishments
are met, they cannot make legally sanctioned violence against
women acceptable and just. And let us not obscure the fact that
the testimony of four eye witnesses required by law is admissible
only from four men or two men and four women,
as according to the Islamic Shari'a: the testimony of
two women equals that of one man. No amount of twisting and
bending can change the fact that if the principles of the Shari'a
are to be maintained, women cannot be treated any better. Indeed,
if religious texts and instructions are taken literally, gender
equality cannot be achieved in any society, Islamic or non-Islamic.
To be sure, fundamentalism in all religions is a deadly force
that uses every possible means to carry its messages. In North
America it shows no mercy for the innocent lives lost in abortion
clinics; in Israel it doesn't hesitate to open fire on Muslim
worshipers who stand in the way of the creation of a Jewish
"promised" land; and in Muslim societies Islamic fundamentalism,
which has victimized more people inside the region than outside
it and more women than men, takes its most passionately articulated
mission to be restoring conservative religious doctrine and
teachings on women's status. Indeed, contempt for women's intelligence
and emotional and moral stability is the marker of Fundamentalists'
religious instructions and moral regime. The archaic provisions
of Islamic legal codes and criminal justice, such as the barbaric
form of prescribed punishment (including stoning to death),
violates the basic human rights of both sexes. But Islamic legal
practices are clearly and unapologetically harsher on women.
To such ends, they dig up medieval Islamic texts prescribing
moral codes or invent rules of conducts when the need arise.
Afghanistan under the Taliban and present-day Iran provide numerous
examples of 'Islamic traditions' whose origin, Islamic or otherwise,
cannot easily be traced.
Given these facts, the struggle against this formidable force
cannot be postponed until the situation calms down. Such a strategy
would only help the region's reactionary religious and political
establishments to wall themselves off against internal challenges
and popular demands. When even doubting the rationality of the
application of Islamic Shari'a at this time and age can
be a life-threatening activity (as is the case in many Muslim
countries), are women not justified in refusing to cheer for
"democracy" as one Islamic force replaces another? Should they
not feel "outsiders" to the patriotic and nationalist projects
in the region? The latest show staged by the US-led anti-terrorist
coalition and Afghan male elite and the response to it by Afghan
women's organizations such as Afghanistan Feminist Association,
Afghan Women's Network, WAPHA and RAWA are a clear manifestation
of the future prospects for women in Afghanistan.
Not even fully in control of the state power, the authorities
of Afghanistan's interim government are trying to curb expectations
with regard to women's rights and status in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Indeed the statements such as those made by new Justice Minister
that the country's legal system and new justice will continue
to be based on "traditional Islamic law, not an imported, Western-style
system"2 leaves no room for speculation as to what
will survive and what will change in "liberated" Afghanistan.
Time and time again we have seen that Western governments concern
themselves with violations of women's rights in Muslim societies
whenever a defiant client state has to be punished by the stick
of women's rights, as presently is the case in Afghanistan.
It is then reasonable to assume that once the US-led strikes
in Afghanistan come to an end and the Northern Alliance forces
are fully and firmly in control, rhetoric about Afghan women's
human rights will also end. Chilling statements by the "moderate"
fundamentalists now in power confirm a reality already known
to women living under rigid Islamic rule - that women will continue
to be brutalized and caught in a deadly crossfire between competing
Islamist forces who each claim to be the bearer of "true" Islam.
Today, the fallacy of the promise that women's demands will
be met, automatically, when the movement for democracy succeeds
is clear to many women. Women's experiences of the last two
decades in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region have made
it abundantly clear that meaningful change for women only will
begin when the clerical grip on political institutions and law-making
processes is broken and a clear separation of state from religion
is materialized. Only with such developments (which include
the removal of Shar'ia from the legal system), will women
begin to gain full citizenship status and legal equality with
men. The same is true for religious minorities against whom
Shari`a-based laws un-apologetically discriminate. In
this context, a most urgent question would be, What is the most
reasonable and effective way to defend the rights of women in
Islamic cultures to autonomy, dignity and self-fulfillment?
We may not have a response to that question. But we know for
sure that defending out-dated practices and traditions because
they are home-grown, non-Western and non-Eurocentric will not
take us in that direction.
Within this context, the choice of gender-conscious women from
the region is clear. That is to go beyond "us" and "them" and
to refuse self-glorification or self-pity. The choice is to
free ourselves from "unreal loyalties" which spring from pride
of nationality, religious pride, family pride and all other
sorts of pride, as Virginal Woolf wrote over half a century
ago.3 Writing from the stand point of an "outsider"
to social, political and cultural life in England of her time,
she declared that her sex and class had very little to do with
patriotic and nationalist projects of the "educated" men who
were preparing for the Second World War in her country.
[I}f
you insist upon fighting to protect me, or 'our' country,
let it be understood, soberly and rationally between us, that
you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct which I cannot
share; to procure benefits which I have not shared and probably
will not share..... [I]n fact, as a woman, I have no country.
As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the
whole world.4
This statement is as true now as it was then.
Footnotes
1 H. Moghissi (1999) Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism,
The Limits of Postmodern Analysis, (London: Zed Press).
2 The Globe and Mail, Toronto, December 27,
2001.
3 Virginal Woolf,(1977) Three Guineas, London,
The Hogarth Press, p. 146.
4 Ibid, pp. 196-197.
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