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SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL / AFTER SEPT. 11
The
Evolution of 'Jihad' in Islamist Political Discourse:
How a Plastic Concept Became Harder
Farish
A. Noor, Institute for Strategic and International
Studies (ISIS), Malaysia
Islamist discourse, like any other political
discourse, is full of plastic concepts and ideas that are
meant to serve politically utilitarian and instrumental
purposes. But what is important for us to remember is that
the instrumental use of such plastic concepts (including
'democracy', 'human rights',
'justice', etc.) invariably leads to their contestation as
well, as they come to serve as tools for political
mobilisation.
The word 'Jihad' has now entered the space of
international political and media discourse, along with
those other well-known favourites, 'Fatwa', 'Mullah' and 'Shariah'.
Yet this entry has also been a disabling one that has
robbed the word of some of its meaning while stretching
the limits of its signification even further. 'Fatwa' for
instance, has now come to mean 'death penalty' thanks to
the fatwa against the British Muslim author Salman Rushdie.
But those who have some knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence
will tell you that 'Fatwa' really means 'judicial ruling'-
and these rulings can range from grave matters like the
death penalty to mundane everyday concerns like the proper price of sheep in the market. The latest
casualty in the war over meaning is the word 'Jihad'.
That the term 'Jihad' has become such a plastic concept is
hardly surprising. Plasticity is, after all, a normal
feature of language and signifiers invariably lose their
roots as they find themselves translated from one context
to another.
But without falling into the trap of narrow essentialism,
it is nonetheless useful for us to get to grips with the
concept of Jihad itself and understand how it came into
being - If only to see just how far the term has been
abused of late.
'Jihad' can be loosely translated as 'to struggle' or 'to
expend effort' towards a particular cause. The term was
originally used to refer to one's personal struggle
against one's own mortal failings and weaknesses, which
would include battling against one's pride, fears,
anxieties and prejudices. The Prophet Muhammad himself was reported to have
described this personal existential struggle as the 'Jihad
Akbar' (Greater Jihad). Alongside this notion of the Jihad
Akbar was the concept of 'Jihad Asgar' or 'Lesser Jihad'.
This refers to the struggle for self-preservation and
self-defence - which has always been regulated by a host
of ethical sanctions and prerogatives.
The Qur'an does stipulate clearly that Muslims have to
engage in a Jihad when they are under attack, but the
conditions for such a jihad are clearly laid out and are
strictly defined within certain ethical prerogatives.
Muslims cannot engage in conflict for the sake of mere
territorial expansion for instance (which brings into question the legal status
of the early Arab conquests which were motivated mainly by
considerations of realpolitik). Muslims also cannot engage
in acts of terror and indiscriminate violence where
civilians are targeted. (In fact, numerous Muslim leaders
like the early Caliphs even warned their troops not to
burn the fields of their enemies or kill their livestock).
A proper Jihad for the sake of self-defence was therefore
a complicated and highly regulated matter - and the rulers
had to consult the jurists as well as their own
populations before such an enterprise was undertaken.
But Islam, it must be remembered, also happens to be a
faith that does not possess a clerical class or a supreme
leader like the Pope. On the positive side this lends the
creed an egalitarian outlook which puts all Muslims on par
with each other. But on the negative side the absence of a
centralised hierarchy also means that the Muslim world is
full of self-proclaimed 'leaders of the faith' like the
Taliban and their unwanted guest, Osama bin Laden.
It is this absence of a clerical order and the plasticity
of religious discourse that allows concepts like 'Jihad'
to be hijacked by such self-appointed defenders of
orthodoxy. Coupled with this is the predicament of a
Muslim world that feels itself increasingly threatened and
marginalised by the forces of globalisation, leading to the
defensive posture being adopted by many Muslim leaders
themselves.
'Jihad' has now been taken - by Muslims and non-Muslims
alike - to refer to an aggressive attitude that is rooted
in a reactionary discourse of authenticity and purity,
giving it a militant edge that it did not possess. While
it is true that the international media has done some
damage to the understanding of 'Jihad', it is also
important for Muslims to realise that the term itself has
been used and abused by the very same people who have
resorted to the use of violence in their name.
The task that lies before the Muslim community today is to
reclaim the concept of 'Jihad' and to invest it with other
meanings different to those imposed by the Mullahs and
militants. Cognisant of the painful realities that stand
before the Muslim world at present, Muslim intellectuals
must jump into the fray and regain control of the
discourse of Islam which has for too long been regarded as
the exclusive purview of the dogmatic Mullahs. We have to
break down the rigid pedagogical structures that have kept
Islamic discourse in such a static mode by by-passing
traditional institutions of learning and indoctrination.
Everything - from the universities to the media - will
have to be used as the new sites of Islamic thought and
education, in order for us to spread our message across to
the wider public.
Muslim intellectuals need to show that our struggle in the
present-day has more to do with striving for economic
development, modernisation and the creation of civil
society. Rather than thinking of 'Jihad' in exclusive and
defensive terms, we need to redefine the concept in
proactive terms that link it to the actual economic,
social and cultural needs of the Muslims of today.
'Jihad', we need to show, is useless unless it brings us
closer to a more prosperous, liberal and tolerant society
where Muslims are at ease with themselves and the Other.
For liberal and progressive Muslims at least, this Jihad
has only just begun.
Dr.
Farish A. Noor is a Malaysian political scientist and
human rights activist. He has taught at the Centre for
Civilisational Dialogue, University of Malaya and the
Institute for Islamic Studies, Frie University of Berlin.
He is currently associate fellow at the Institute for
Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia.
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