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The
September attack is the backside of globalization, the first and
fiercest reaction of its kind. It was reverse globalization in
two senses. First, it was a reaction to the pervasive and invasive
presence of Western influence, and its core substance, American
influence, on the most sensitive parts of the external world.
It is not surprising that that reaction came from the Arabo-Muslim
world, which has long felt put upon not just as part of the Third
World but as God's community on earth, defeated by infidels parading
as modernizers. In one of many surprising reverses, al-Qaeda sees
itself in a Clash of Civilizations, where compromise and tolerance
are impossible, war and hatred separate dar al-islam (the land
of submission, salvation) from dar al-harb (the land of war),
and basic values are irreconcilable. It would take a movement
with ideological, indeed inspirational, coherence to mount a well-organized
attack, not just resistance, against the more subtle encroachments
of globalization. The necessary source of that coherence means
that the movement's spearhead will be narrow, but that the potentiality
of a broader, if more passive, support will be present.
Second, the al-Qaeda attack had all the characteristics of globalization
itself--a transnational organization peopled by diverse nationalities
operating across boundaries with only a skeletal territorial base,
a professional culture, and a disregard for the distinction between
domestic and international conflict and society. Such characteristics
have been the earmark of globalization and suddenly they become
the identifying elements of a new, self-declared, anti-globalist
enemy. Therein, of course, lies its strength and its weakness.
For, on one hand, globalization still needs a state base and the
negative globalism of al-Qaeda is no exception. If globalization
is one trait of the contemporary, post-Cold-War world, the resiliency
of the state is another. The September Attack against Humanity
showed the momentary impotence of the state, but it also showed
its importance, and in the longer run, its resilience. Far from
either disappearing or withering away, as various theories would
indicate, the state is actually becoming stronger, extending its
activities into new areas, remaining the aspiration of even anti-state
rebellions, and serving as the necessary base for even the forces
of anti-globalization. The state base of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
is weak and collapsing, and its likely quest for an alternative--in
Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan or Somalia--poses a danger but one against
which counter-measures are already taken. The fight against al-Qaeda
will not end with the elimination of the Taliban movement, but
such an outcome will nonetheless greatly weaken al-Qaeda's operational
capabilities.
On the other hand, not only was the globalism of al-Qaeda based
on a collapsed state under the protection of a movement that did
not function as a government, but its whole message is a negative
one of rage and hate, without any positive program. That kind
of message is great for a social protest movement, a demonstrative
expression of frustration and scape-goating, but it is of no help
in building a lasting political organization or even a sustained
social following. It is a bigoted, racist, destructive message,
not of a religion but of a religious parody and, worse, religious
hijacking, the very opposite of what the Free World fought for
in the Cold War and World War II, the absolute reverse of Christianity's
message of love (whatever its imperfections of human application).
However, a lot of damage can be done before the movement's vacuity
can be demonstrated, as the days of the Taliban have shown.
Social protest movements are symptoms of a problem, but it is
important to keep the symptom and the problem separate. Road rage
is fully understandable in the frustrating conditions of beltway
driving, conditions that are the subject of repeated attempts
at alleviation. But no matter how understandable the frustrations,
no one condones road rage. A number of problems are cited--by
both Osama bin Laden and by Western analysts--as the "root causes"
of al-Qaeda's reaction, sometimes with a tone of self-inculpation
by the analysts. Such problems--the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, conditions within Iraq, American troops in
Saudi Arabia--deserve attention in varying degrees but they do
not excuse the road rage that is the soul of al-Qaeda.The
September attack is the backside of globalization, the first and
fiercest reaction of its kind. It was reverse globalization in
two senses. First, it was a reaction to the pervasive and invasive
presence of Western influence, and its core substance, American
influence, on the most sensitive parts of the external world.
It is not surprising that that reaction came from the Arabo-Muslim
world, which has long felt put upon not just as part of the Third
World but as God's community on earth, defeated by infidels parading
as modernizers. In one of many surprising reverses, al-Qaeda sees
itself in a Clash of Civilizations, where compromise and tolerance
are impossible, war and hatred separate dar al-islam (the land
of submission, salvation) from dar al-harb (the land of war),
and basic values are irreconcilable. It would take a movement
with ideological, indeed inspirational, coherence to mount a well-organized
attack, not just resistance, against the more subtle encroachments
of globalization. The necessary source of that coherence means
that the movement's spearhead will be narrow, but that the potentiality
of a broader, if more passive, support will be present.
Second, the al-Qaeda attack had all the characteristics of globalization
itself--a transnational organization peopled by diverse nationalities
operating across boundaries with only a skeletal territorial base,
a professional culture, and a disregard for the distinction between
domestic and international conflict and society. Such characteristics
have been the earmark of globalization and suddenly they become
the identifying elements of a new, self-declared, anti-globalist
enemy. Therein, of course, lies its strength and its weakness.
For, on one hand, globalization still needs a state base and the
negative globalism of al-Qaeda is no exception. If globalization
is one trait of the contemporary, post-Cold-War world, the resiliency
of the state is another. The September Attack against Humanity
showed the momentary impotence of the state, but it also showed
its importance, and in the longer run, its resilience. Far from
either disappearing or withering away, as various theories would
indicate, the state is actually becoming stronger, extending its
activities into new areas, remaining the aspiration of even anti-state
rebellions, and serving as the necessary base for even the forces
of anti-globalization. The state base of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
is weak and collapsing, and its likely quest for an alternative--in
Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan or Somalia--poses a danger but one against
which counter-measures are already taken. The fight against al-Qaeda
will not end with the elimination of the Taliban movement, but
such an outcome will nonetheless greatly weaken al-Qaeda's operational
capabilities.
On the other hand, not only was the globalism of al-Qaeda based
on a collapsed state under the protection of a movement that did
not function as a government, but its whole message is a negative
one of rage and hate, without any positive program. That kind
of message is great for a social protest movement, a demonstrative
expression of frustration and scape-goating, but it is of no help
in building a lasting political organization or even a sustained
social following. It is a bigoted, racist, destructive message,
not of a religion but of a religious parody and, worse, religious
hijacking, the very opposite of what the Free World fought for
in the Cold War and World War II, the absolute reverse of Christianity's
message of love (whatever its imperfections of human application).
However, a lot of damage can be done before the movement's vacuity
can be demonstrated, as the days of the Taliban have shown.
Social protest movements are symptoms of a problem, but it is
important to keep the symptom and the problem separate. Road rage
is fully understandable in the frustrating conditions of beltway
driving, conditions that are the subject of repeated attempts
at alleviation. But no matter how understandable the frustrations,
no one condones road rage. A number of problems are cited--by
both Osama bin Laden and by Western analysts--as the "root causes"
of al-Qaeda's reaction, sometimes with a tone of self-inculpation
by the analysts. Such problems--the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, conditions within Iraq, American troops in
Saudi Arabia--deserve attention in varying degrees but they do
not excuse the road rage that is the soul of al-Qaeda. |
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Instead, they require renewed attention, not
as a response to al-Qaeda's reaction but as a continuation of
American efforts to help the parties to the conflicts resolve
their own problems. The problem most frequently cited is the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the subject of efforts at resolution
almost as long as the conflict itself. It should be remembered
that the Middle East Peace Process, with all its successes and
failures to date, is an American invention. It dates from the
Israeli withdrawals in the Sinai and the Golan Heights brokered
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the October War
of 1973 and then the Camp David Agreements of 1978 and the Washington
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel of 1979 brokered by
President Jimmy Carter, and after the flawed Israeli-Lebanese
Peace Treaty of 1983 continues through the Madrid Peace Process
started in 1991 by Secretary of State James Baker. When Madrid
stalled, the Norwegians provided the auspices for the Oslo Agreements
of 1993, but the US returned in various degrees to mediate follow-up
agreements at Wye Plantation and then to attempt a last-minute
effort at Camp David in 2000-2001. Even the Israeli-Jordanian
Peace Treaty of 1994 enjoyed some American assistance and the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations some American encouragement.
These efforts have often been imperfect in some way and have
fallen short of anticipated results, but such is the nature
of politics (if not life), where perfection is a rarity. The
important fact is that American efforts have been repeatedly
present and necessary. Neither Israel nor the Arab states and
territories around it have been able to win war or produce peace
by themselves. Yet the parties agree on (only) one thing: they
do not want an imposed peace. The US has deployed major efforts
to bring the horses to water, but it cannot make them drink.
Continuation in those and similar efforts is necessary, for
their own sake and for the reasons, which started the Peace
Process in the beginning.
The problem is, for the moment, that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is in no way ripe for resolution, either mediated or
negotiated directly. The dynamics that produce a willingness
to negotiate or even to be mediated are complex. In the current
situation, there is great and understandable pressure to produce
a ceasefire, but a ceasefire--a conflict management device--may
in fact retard ripeness. The other side of the coin is that
continuing violence may produce such deep and open wounds that
it too may retard ripeness, by strengthening resolve and hostility.
In that dilemma, it is doubtless best for a third party (or
as many as possible) to continue conflict management efforts,
and at the same time work to ripen the situation nonetheless
by encouraging the parties' perception that they are both hurting
in a stalemate. The objective reality is undeniably present,
but ripeness is a perceptional matter and the subjective awareness
needs to be cultivated. This is in fact what previous mediators--Kissinger,
Carter, Baker--did, with success. Success is more elusive at
the present moment.
Efforts at management and resolution are also limited by the
nature of the basic conflict with al-Qaeda. There are some conflicts
that do not resolve readily, or even respond to efforts at management,
and there are some conflicts that need to be fought to the finish.
European efforts to mediate in the bloody US civil war would
certainly have been rebuffed, as were African efforts to mediate
in the Biafran war a century later. Efforts to mediate between
the Allies and the Axis powers in World War II would also have
been rejected, and one may wonder at the course of world events
if Woodrow Wilson's efforts to mediate in World War I had been
pursued to success. Negotiation efforts with the Islamic revolutionary
regime in Iran in 1979 were impossible until the hostages had
no more value for the new regime, and in that case there was
indeed something to negotiate about.
Efforts at management are also limited by the purported nature
of the "root causes." Perverse effects of globalization, poverty,
weakness in international politics, and defeat at the hands
of the infidels are perhaps sad aspects of an imperfect world,
but they are unlikely to be removed this side of Heaven, and
their removal is certainly not a precondition for the elimination
of al-Qaeda-type reactions. Basically, people have to solve
their own internal problems rather than using the last remaining
superpower as a scapegoat; just as the rise of political Islamic
movements at home has been a reaction to the state's shutting
out all other channels for political expression, so the second
wave of political Islam in al-Qaeda is a movement looking for
external causes when their domestic effectiveness is blocked.
It hard to conceive of an effective conflict management or resolution
effort that could be carried out toward al-Qaeda. There is nothing
to negotiate about and no inclination to negotiate; moreover,
as in Iran, hurt as in a hurting stalemate is a sign of commitment
and concession is a sign of weakness. This is not an Islamic
matter but a perception of any ideological movement that sees
ultimate benefit in martyrdom. Conflict management has its limits;
contrary to a popular title, you can't negotiate everything.
In a situation where neither war nor negotiation is the full
answer, what is, and what can conflict resolution suggest? Is
it time to turn the other cheek? I don't think so, although
I would like to. Is it time for World War III, or IV? Not that
either, although some military action is unquestionably necessary.
War is the immediate means of dealing with al-Qaeda; conflict
management and, better, resolution is the only but longer-term
means of dealing with specific, related conflicts such as the
Israeli conflicts with Palestine and Syria.
This leaves only three things to do in the middle run. First,
continuing attention needs to be directed to the broad and delicate
task of making sure that not only the agents of globalization
benefit from it but also the larger populations. Second, it
is crucial for the West to continue to maintain itself as an
open society, whatever the risks: We must not let Them make
Us into Them. Third, the US and its fellow-democracies need
to pursue their problem-solving efforts to help others who cannot
solve their own problems. We need to stick to our efforts, despite
the criticism that the job attracts, but we need to feel humble
and not self-righteous about it. Our own efforts need improvement,
since we are far from full effectiveness in a business that
has no end.
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Click here for the:
Camp David Accords
1979 Washington Treaty
1983
Israel-Lebanon agreement
1994
Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty
Wye
River Memorandum
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