## CONTENTS

### FRONT MATTER
- ABOUT THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL: 1
- ABOUT THE CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH PROJECT: 1
- ABOUT THE AUTHORS: 1
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 2

### INTRODUCTION
- PROJECT DESCRIPTION: 3
  - The China and the Global South Project at the SSRC: 3
  - Themes of the scholarship on China-Africa: 4

### METHODOLOGY
- Literature review: 6
- Mapping: 6
- Critical reflections: 7

### RESEARCH THEMES

#### GEO-ECONOMICS
- Tracking Chinese official finance and aid: 8
- Discussions of African agency: 9
- The debate on “debt traps” and debt sustainability: 10
- China and the West as international donors to Africa: 11
- To what extent do Chinese projects offer jobs, skills, and technology to Africans?: 12
- Land acquisitions in rural Africa: 12

#### PEACE AND SECURITY
- China’s motivation for involvement in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding: 13
- China as norm maker in the global order: 14
- Chinese arms sales in Africa: 18

#### MIGRATION
- The challenge of counting migrants: 20
- Diverse destinations: South Africa, Guangzhou, and beyond: 22
- Diversity within Chinese migration to Africa: 24
- Sociocultural factors for Chinese migration in Africa: 26
- African migrants in China: 28
- Africans in China as students and domestic subjects: 30

#### HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
- How the Ebola crisis changed China-Africa health impact research: 32
- The beginnings of China-Africa COVID-19 engagement research: 34
The role of Traditional Chinese Medicine
Environmental outcomes of extractive industries, hydropower, and climate risks
African agency in environmental outcomes
Forestry and fishing
Wildlife trafficking
Coal, renewable energy, carbon emissions, and climate change

MEDIA, THE INTERNET, AND TECHNOLOGY
What influence does Chinese media have in Africa?
Is China promoting its model of internet governance in Africa?
How is Chinese technology purchased and perceived by African governments and publics?

CAPACITY FOR KNOWLEDGE
GENERATION ON AFRICA-CHINA
OVERVIEW
CAPACITY IN AFRICA
CAPACITY IN CHINA
CAPACITY OUTSIDE CHINA AND AFRICA

MAP OF ORGANIZATIONS INVENTORIED IN THE ANNEX

ANNEX: ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCING
AND PROMOTING CHINA-AFRICA KNOWLEDGE
OVERVIEW OF THE ANNEX
AFRICA
CHINA
Partnership schemes initiated by the Chinese government
Institutions and organizations
OUTSIDE AFRICA AND CHINA

NOTES
REFERENCES
FRONT MATTER

ABOUT THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is an independent, international, nonprofit organization founded in 1923. It fosters innovative research, nurtures new generations of social scientists, deepens how inquiry is practiced within and across disciplines, and mobilizes necessary knowledge on important public issues. For nearly 100 years the SSRC has coordinated the research, policy, and philanthropic communities in the pursuit of evidence-based policies to promote human well-being, emerging as both a pivotal force in the academy and a respected contributor to the public good. The SSRC is guided by the belief that justice, prosperity, and democracy all require better understanding of complex social, cultural, economic, and political processes. We work with practitioners, policymakers, and academic researchers in the social sciences, natural sciences, humanities, and related professions. We build interdisciplinary and international networks, working with partners around the world to link research to practice and policy, strengthen individual and institutional capacities for learning, and enhance public access to information.

ABOUT THE CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH PROJECT

The China and the Global South initiative aims to develop research capacity about China in the Global South and connect institutions and researchers producing knowledge on China in a global network. It builds capacity for knowledge generation and dissemination on China in the Global South by supporting research institutions, linking them to each other in an international network, and giving locally produced knowledge a greater voice in global academic and policy conversations.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Annalisa BOLIN is a research associate at the Social Science Research Council. She works in the China and the Global South program as a member of the Africa-China team, and as part of the Understanding Violent Conflict program, she contributes to projects on rural radicalism in Africa, cultural heritage and violence, and other topics. She is also a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Archaeology and Heritage Studies at Aarhus University (Denmark), where she is a member of the Enduring Materialities of Colonialism project. Her research focuses on the uses and politics of cultural heritage in post-conflict and post-colonial contexts, including Rwanda and St. Croix (US Virgin Islands). She has published articles and book chapters on heritage's intersections with development, diplomacy, justice, and nation-building, as well as on community engagement and research ethics, and writes widely for the public. She holds a PhD in anthropology from Stanford University and was previously a postdoctoral fellow in the UNESCO Chair on Heritage Futures at Linnaeus University (Sweden).

Tatiana CARAYANNIS is director of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) and the SSRC’s Understanding Violent Conflict (UVC) program. She also leads the Council’s China and the Global South initiative and until recently had a visiting appointment at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Africa Centre and Department of International Development, where she also served as a research director for the Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID). Until recently, she convened the DRC Affinity Group, a small brain trust of leading Congo scholars and analysts, and served as the Congo research director of the Conflict Research Programme, an international research collaboration. A scholar of UN intervention efforts and peace operations in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and in Central Africa more generally, her current research focuses on war networks and the shaping of public authority in Central Africa, and the impact of interventions for justice and security on local communities, including those displaced. A seasoned researcher, Carayannis has conducted extensive field work in Central Africa, and written widely on political mobilization, rebel governance (the MLC rebel movement in particular), global-local dynamics of violence, international justice, democratic processes and elections, UN peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy, and on the agenda-setting role of UN human rights and development ideas.

Lucas NIEWENHUIS is the Newsletter Editor at The China Project. Previously, he worked as a research assistant for the China-Africa Knowledge Project at the Social Science Research Council, interned at the Council on Foreign Relations, and studied Chinese language and culture in Shanghai and Beijing. Lucas graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in Political Science, World and Comparative Politics.

Gino VLAVONOU is a Program Officer with the Research Grants Portfolio team of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Gino received his PhD from the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa and his master’s degree from the Institut Québécois des Hautes Études Internationales at Université Laval in Québec. Gino’s research interests are at the intersection of identity discourses in armed conflict, development studies, and peacekeeping. Gino’s professional experiences include working as a Program Officer with the SSRC’s Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) and Understanding Violent Conflict (UVC) programs, and as a Junior Research Fellow in the Nairobi office of the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS). His academic work has appeared in journals such as Islamic Africa, African Security, Africa Today, Revue Tiers Monde, and African Identities. His forthcoming book Autochthony Without Land: Othering, Exclusion, and Conflict in the Central African Republic will be published by the University of Wisconsin Press in the fall of 2023.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is the product of a team effort over the span of several years and funding from the Ford Foundation, for which we are grateful. In addition to the listed authors, this report also includes research assistance from Eric Jiefei Deng, who helped with the sections on migration, health and environment, and Chinese organizational research capacity, and was invaluable in handling the Chinese-language citations; Amira Elsherif, who worked on North Africa, geo-economics, and health and environment; Guangshuo Yang, whose work on the Chinese-language literature appears especially in the section on migration; and Yanqiu Zheng, who weighed in on the introduction, the Chinese-language literature, and various sections throughout. Laura Laderman created the map of organizations inventoried in the Annex.

For helping us understand the institutional landscape of research into China-Africa engagements, we are grateful to the scholars who generously shared their knowledge with us in consultations, including Chris Alden, Caitlin Barker, Pamela Adwoah Carslake, Gilbert Khadiagala, Liu Haifang, Josh Maiyo, Jamie Monson, Guillaume Moumouni, Paul Nantulya, Eric Olander, Maddalena Procopio, Folashadé Soulé, Cobus van Staden, and Bob Wekesa.

Thank you very much to Chris Alden, Pamela Adwoah Carslake, Liu Haifang, and Yoon Jung Park for reviewing this study and providing insightful comments. Thank you also to the participants in the SSRC’s CGS workshop held in New York in November 2022, whose discussion of the report and the issues they raised were invaluable in our revision process. The report’s arguments and any errors remain our own.
INTRODUCTION

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The China and the Global South Project at the SSRC

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is an independent, international nonprofit organization. It fosters innovative research, nurtures new generations of social scientists, deepens how inquiry is practiced within and across disciplines, and mobilizes necessary knowledge on important public issues.

The SSRC is guided by the belief that justice, prosperity, and democracy all require better understanding of complex social, cultural, economic, and political processes. We work with practitioners, policymakers, and academic researchers in the social sciences, related professions, and the humanities and natural sciences. We build interdisciplinary and international networks, working with partners around the world to link research to practice and policy, strengthen individual and institutional capacities for learning, and enhance public access to information. We award fellowships and grants, convene workshops and conferences, conduct research and participate in research consortia, sponsor scholarly exchanges, and produce print and online publications.

The SSRC, through the development of the China-Africa Knowledge Project, the China-Africa Peace Fellowship, and more recently, the China and the Global South Project, together with our earlier partnership with the Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network, is a leading node for a growing, yet fragmented interest in China’s engagement with the world. In addition, our African Peacebuilding Network and Next Generation Social Science in Africa programs have been focused on developing research capacity in the region, while our Drugs, Security, and Democracy program has done related work in Latin America. SSRC’s Abe, InterAsia, and Transregional Collaboratory in the Indian Ocean programs have supported research, capacity-building, networking, and collaboration across the Asia-Pacific region. Our Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum and Understanding Violent Conflict programs work to bridge networks of scholars and international policymakers across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We thus bring a deep commitment and experience to building research capacity in the Global South, as well as expertise on China’s engagement in the Global South.

The China and the Global South project at the SSRC aims to strengthen capacity for knowledge generation and dissemination on China by catalyzing centers of excellence on China in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America; connecting them to each other; and giving locally produced knowledge greater voice in global academic and policy conversations. This project builds upon the SSRC’s earlier activities that situated emergent scholarship on China and Africa within broader scholarly and policy discourses about ongoing global transformations; and the Council’s 100-year history of building research capacity around the world, strengthening interdisciplinary and international networks, and linking research to practice and policy.

This study consists of two major components, a literature review and a capacity assessment, with the former providing the foundation for the latter. This dual purpose distinguishes the CGS project as more than a purely academic study: it profiles both the intellectual and institutional landscapes of a vibrant and diverse field of research. Each of the geographic studies in this project follows a similar structure. Drawing upon the expertise of different authors, in this project, the Global South has been divided into three broad geographic regions: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Separate teams studied each region, and the SSRC has also published scoping studies, similar to this one, for Latin America and Asia. The specific approach of the Africa-China study to this project is examined in more detail below.
Themes of the scholarship on China-Africa

Based on the findings of our research, this review of the literature on China-Africa engagements has been divided into five themes: geo-economics; peace and security; migration; health and environment; and media, internet, and technology. While there are, of course, research publications focusing on Africa-China which do not necessarily fit into these categories, they do reflect the broad trends we have identified in the literature. The methodology for this review is discussed below.

These trends have evolved since the SSRC’s last China-Africa research mapping (Carayannis and Olin 2012). In the 2012 study, we found three major themes, which centered around trade and aid; political and security engagement in multilateral institutions; and diasporas, migration, and identity. There is clear overlap between past and current themes—for example, the category we now call “migration” also covers “diasporas” and “identity” from the 2012 category, while our former “trade and aid” category has broadened into “geo-economics”—but there are also notable changes. The peace and security theme in this report reflects a significant expansion from 2012’s “political and security engagement in multilateral institutions,” with less focus on such institutions and more on China’s many modes of engagement with peace and conflict in Africa, from arms sales to peacekeeping to norm-making. We note these changes to the themes not solely to indicate a change in our report’s scope, but also because such changes reflect wider-ranging shifts in the concerns of the academic literature over time.

The first theme in this report, geo-economics, has long been a core consideration for scholarship on China-Africa. This reflects empirical reality: economic engagements between the two have dramatically increased since the mid-2000s. Here, we consider a few ways in which research has transformed in the last decade. These include efforts to better track official finance and aid from China to Africa; discussions of African agency within bilateral relationships; questions about debt, including debt traps and sustainability; considerations of whether and how China attempts to build capacity and employment in Africa, along with transferring skills and technology; and China’s investments in rural agriculture in Africa.

Our second theme is one of the fastest-growing areas of scholarly interest: China’s involvement in peace and security in Africa. China has been increasingly involved in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations on the continent, and its engagements with multilateral institutions like the UN have produced research on its role as a norm-maker, sometimes complicating China’s long-standing position of non-interference. At the same time as some Chinese scholarship has been elaborating the concept of “developmental peace,” scholarship has also considered the impact and significance of extensive Chinese arms sales to Africa. Finally, scholarship has also focused on specific events, such as China’s reaction to the Libya crisis in 2011 and its involvements in Mali and South Sudan.

The third theme of our study is migration, both from Africa to China and from China to Africa. This category was noted in our 2012 report, but in the decade since, numerous publications indicate its maturation as an area of study. At the same time, challenges remain: counting migrants is tricky, and there has historically been an overemphasis on studies of African migrants in Guangzhou and Chinese migrants in South Africa. However, recent years have seen a push toward examining the diversity of migration destinations, migrants’ lives, and their motivations for moving. Chinese-language scholarship, in particular, has a policy orientation; this directs its focus to the major topics of African students in China and the management of African migrants as domestic subjects.

Two linked elements appear in the report’s fourth theme, health and environment: health diplomacy and medicine, and the impacts of environmental intervention. In the first, we trace Chinese health diplomacy in Africa from Ebola to COVID-19, a clearly growing area of scholarship; we also...
consider research into Traditional Chinese Medicine. In the second, China’s engagement in extractive industries and infrastructure is examined in terms of its effect on environment and health. Topics covered include African agency in this relationship (as within the section on geo-economics), forestry and fishing, wildlife trafficking, and energy considerations, from coal to renewable energy and climate change.

Finally, we consider media, the internet, and technology. This is a less-developed area of research, but it is growing quickly. (It is worth noting, however, that this growth holds more for English-language works rather than for Chinese-language scholarship, which lags behind.) The growth of research in English is driven by China’s expansion of its media presence on the continent, along with an increased footprint in the information, communications, and technology sector, and investment in tools of digital governance and surveillance. This section considers research on the influence of Chinese media in Africa, the impact of the Chinese model of internet governance, and the purchase and perception of Chinese technology by African governments and publics.

While much of our review for this report is derived from English-language scholarship, we also include works in Chinese. These can be found noted throughout the document; certain themes have a higher concentration of Chinese publications, reflecting that scholarship’s priorities. For example, much work on the China-Africa relationship in Chinese focuses on migration, and so there is an extensive survey of this literature in our migration section. As elsewhere, academic scholarship from China needs to be understood within the historical and political dynamics in which it is produced. For example, the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership, a network pairing Chinese and African research institutions (discussed further in the Annex), came into being during the Hu era as an attempt to increase global partnerships, and coincided with other outward-focused efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese domestic politics plays an important role in shaping which research priorities, institutions, and connections are supported, as do the country’s political priorities in terms of developing relationships and pursuing particular goals abroad.

In the twenty-first century, China-Africa connections have become the most prominent topics in African studies in China because of China’s growing influence in the region (Zhang Hongming 2020, 133; Li Anshan 2016, 48-49). Chinese language research on such connections generally focuses on diplomacy, international development, economic cooperation, and migration. It thus broadly aligns with the themes of geo-economics, peace and security, and migration in our literature review, while there is also a certain amount of Chinese-language scholarship which appears in our health and environment section. As for the theme of media, the internet, and technology, Chinese scholars of communication studies lament the lack of systematic research in Chinese despite China’s significant media presence in Africa (Li Jiafang and Wang 2021).

Many scholarly publications in Chinese are implicitly designed for policymakers, indicating the intertwined priorities of producing research and contributing to shaping policy. (This parallels the situation in, for example, the United States, where policymakers are preoccupied with China’s inroads in Africa and the United Nations, and much research on this topic is consumed by policymakers even if it is not written explicitly for them.) There is no consensus as to whether China has a coordinated strategy in Africa, although some scholars argue that this strategy exists in practice; in any case, Chinese scholars underscore development as a key goal in political and economic engagement in Africa and affirm China’s positive role (Li Anshan 2016, 51). China’s increasing influence in Africa in the past decade or so coincided with the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) massive infrastructural project under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. It is worth noting that even before the official unveiling of the BRI, Xi had already introduced the concept of mingyun gongtongti 命运共同体 (variously translated as "community of a shared future" or "community of common destiny") in describing China-Africa relations. The slogan has since expanded to other corollaries such as liyì
gongtongti 利益共同体 (community of common interest) and zeren gongtongti 责任共同体 (community of common responsibility) in an attempt to account for China’s status as a great power in Africa (Zhang Chun 2014). It has also made its way into the constitutions of both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the state. Although there are lingering reservations about the phrase among foreign observers (e.g., Akharuddin 2020), the director of the Center for National Soft Power Research, Yao Yao 姚遥, writes that the concept reflects both Chinese and African dissatisfaction with the Western-centric liberal world order and international relations theories (Yao 2021). In other words, it is not supposed to be a Chinese imposition on China-African relations, but rather a genuine effort toward building social scientific concepts rooted in the realities of non-Western societies.

METHODOLOGY

Literature review

Our review of the qualitative social science literature on China-Africa engagements used database searches with a variety of keywords as well as the snowball method. Our searches were conducted primarily in English and Chinese. This reflects the relevant languages mostly broadly used in the regional scholarship and the status of English as, for better or worse, the language most privileged in global academic scholarship. Our review focuses on social scientific research, broadly defined, produced in the current millennium on China’s engagement with the Global South. We do not claim to have surveyed every publication produced on this topic in the last ten years, nor does this literature review aim to cover the empirical context in great detail. Rather, we attempt to present a fairly representative discussion of the topics that preoccupy social scientists working in this area and the trends within their research. Relatedly, inclusion in or exclusion from this report does not indicate a judgment of the quality of scholarship.

As we conducted the literature review, our focal questions included:

- **Who** is writing about China’s engagement with Africa, and for which audiences? **Where** is the knowledge being produced? In this, we attempted to develop a global scope. We looked for publications from researchers working in Africa, China, and elsewhere in the world. However, our review also reflects the larger dynamics of the politics of knowledge production (see below).

- What are the **key topics** that people are writing about? What are their **research questions**? These findings drove our organization of the literature review into five thematic buckets. Advantaged by the existence of our earlier report on China-Africa scholarship (Carayannis and Olin 2012), we also note the ways that these research priorities have changed over time.

- What are the **gaps** in the literature? What sub-topics of research in this area are underdeveloped, or is the research on any sub-topic covered disproportionately from a single point of view? Throughout the literature review, we note where we believe there are particular opportunities for further research. In addition, we discuss how certain research areas have grown and matured, or peaked and declined, since our 2012 study.

- How does the literature align with the **empirical reality**? While this is not an analysis of every shift in the engagement between China and Africa, but rather a review of the scholarship on
this relation, we note where trends in the research seem to be driven by empirical factors. The rise of Chinese migration to African (and African migration to China), for example, as reflected in actual numbers of migrants and changes in migration dynamics, provokes a concomitant growth in research on migration.

The material that we draw on for our review includes academic books and journal articles; academic conference topics and paper presentations; grey literature, including reports from think tanks, research NGOs, international organizations, and governments, and some theses and dissertations; and media coverage.

Mapping

This report includes an Annex which maps the institutions, networks, and platforms that we find to be the most relevant in terms of research on Africa-China engagements. We have sought to understand which ones have the capacity to do research, support scholars, facilitate networks, convene meetings, and conduct other forms of activity in this space. Our mapping focuses on the entire continent of Africa, including North Africa, which expands the analysis from our earlier mapping report (Carayannis and Olin 2012), given the increasing interest in China’s involvement across the continent.

To assemble this, we began with online searches. We examined the research institutes, centers, and networks that we could find via keyword searches and by locating where scholars publishing on relevant topics were based. We traced events, conferences, and research outputs listed on major research center websites; we looked into major universities in the region to find Asia-, China-, and Africa-related study departments. We also undertook consultations with people possessing expert knowledge of this area of study, which helped to point us toward numerous institutions, platforms, and researchers, and highlight the ones that are most relevant for this report.

An issue here is the existence of paper institutions. That is, there are institutions that claim to focus on relevant topics or are part of networks and affiliations which would appear to be germane to our study, but are in fact not producing research, do not possess any resources or affiliated researchers, and indeed may exist in name only. In our inventory, for example, we list networks such as the Chinese government’s Think Tank 10+10 program, which affiliates Chinese and African universities, but many of these affiliated institutions are not actually significant producers of knowledge in the research landscape. A few such institutions are noted briefly in the inventory. However, we dedicate most of the inventory to mapping the landscape of institutions, platforms, networks, and other actors most active and significant in research production and otherwise shaping this area of work.

Critical reflections

While fully exhaustive coverage of a growing and dynamic cluster of research is impossible, our work provides a solid overview of the major intellectual currents and institutional underpinnings. Nevertheless, we acknowledge several potential methodological biases which, in a study of this scope, may affect the major takeaways of our analysis.

One of the challenges for our project derives from the politics of knowledge: the capacity and resources available to researchers and research production. This is reflected in the space between the inventory—which notes the capacity for knowledge production within the region—and the literature from which our review is derived. That is, while in the inventory we survey a number of institutions and scholars who are active in Africa and in China on the study of Africa-China connections, the majority of the published research we draw on in the literature review portion of this report comes from elsewhere,
especially North America and Europe. While we note the existence of institutions that are active in some way—they are the institutional homes for researchers or host convenings relevant to this project, for example—their activity may stop short of producing research that is accessible for the purposes of our literature review. This drives home a particular problem with scholarship on the China-Africa relationship: it is often produced outside the region, by scholars who have the resources, support, and capacity to do so. Research production within the region is constrained by the same factors. The existence of a fair number of institutions in Africa concerned with studying these engagements is a positive indicator, but the scholarship produced by these institutions remains limited.

This poses both practical and ethical problems. Research from “outside” can certainly be empirically sound and theoretically rigorous. But it is unavoidably inadequate: we will never have a fully rounded picture of China-Africa relations without the participation and perspectives of scholars from within both China and Africa. Moreover, where African and Chinese scholars are working on these topics, they sometimes lack the institutional support and material resources that their colleagues abroad may possess, limiting the ability to conduct research, especially in the form of fieldwork, and to contribute to global scholarly conversations. This deprives the scholarly community, and decisionmakers and observers who would benefit from research, of their perspectives and further contributes to imbalanced interpretations. Importantly, too, this reinforces troubling practices in terms of the coloniality of research—where the Global South is an object of research extraction for the benefit of Global North-based scholars—and perpetuates exclusionary practices of knowledge production. At the same time, for research by African and Chinese scholars as for research by scholars elsewhere in the world, it is necessary to consider the social and political context of research production and how research may be affected by dynamics such as nationalism.

We further note that our extensive reference to institutional websites in the mapping efforts carries the risk of privileging those institutions which have the resources to maintain their online presence, and these institutions tend to be located in wealthier countries and regions. Various sociocultural contexts affect how strongly institutions prioritize their web presence, which in some cases limits our visibility in the mapping study. We try to overcome this potential bias via in-depth consultations with scholars on the ground who are able to nuance and complexify our understandings of the intellectual and institutional landscape.

RESEARCH THEMES

GEO-ECONOMICS

Geo-economic questions about topics such as trade and aid have consistently been core research themes in academic scholarship about the China–Africa relationship. Not surprisingly, research interest in economic issues has paralleled the rapid and exponential growth of economic connections between African countries and China since the mid-2000s. Data from the United Nations Comtrade Database shows that bilateral China-Africa trade in the first decade of the millennium grew from less than US$10 billion in 2000 to $120 billion in 2010, and in 2020, even with the impact of COVID-19, it was $176 billion. In 2009, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner and it continues to hold this spot. China’s trade connections with Africa have continued to grow in recent years, with China’s General Administration of Customs reporting that China-Africa trade totaled $208.7 billion in 2019 (Nyabiage 2020). While growth in trade has been the largest and most visible economic trend driving research
interest over the past decades, other trends, like increasing official financing and debt loads, have also sparked research interest.

We have identified the following dominant sub-themes in research on broad economic engagement between China and Africa since our earlier mapping study (Carayannis and Olin 2012): efforts to better track Chinese official finance and aid to African countries; the debate about African agency in the Africa-China relationship; “debt traps” and debt sustainability; competition with Western and other traditional international donors in Africa; debates about China’s capacity building, employment generation, and skills and technology transfer in the region; and China’s investments in rural agriculture.

Tracking Chinese official finance and aid

Flows of foreign aid and other types of developmental assistance from China to Africa are significantly more complicated to track, calculate, and contextualize than trade numbers. As Deborah Bräutigam wrote in 2011, China’s overseas finance is often provided in the form of export credits, non-concessional state loans, or aid used to foster Chinese investment, none of which neatly fit into the OECD definition for Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Bräutigam 2011). Nonetheless, these finance flows usually have “developmental” goals, so many scholars consider them important to examine in the context of aid. Making the tracking of Chinese finance flows to Africa harder, there is no single, official source in the Chinese government that reports these numbers (see Schwarzenberg 2020, 4).

To address the major challenge of examining official flows of finance from China to Africa, two US-based institutions have created and maintained databases that researchers can draw on to test claims about China’s financial influence in Africa. The most rigorously vetted database was formerly maintained by the China–Africa Research Initiative at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-CARI), led by Deborah Bräutigam; it is now managed by the Boston University Development Policy Center. This loan database makes clear that the US remains the top source of ODA to African countries, but that Chinese aid and loans, with varying degrees of concession, have risen along with increased trade engagement. Researchers from China, Africa, and around the world have written dozens of policy briefs and working papers that rely on this loan database.6

The other database, published by AidData, is maintained by researchers affiliated with the College of William & Mary, but it uses crowdsourcing and a more cursory examination of media reports to compile initial data. Senior researchers at SAIS-CARI and AidData have critiqued each other on the methods they use to count Chinese loans and financial flows (Bräutigam 2013a, 2013b; AidData 2013). A unique advantage of AidData is that it has become a global database of Chinese official finance, allowing for more cross-regional comparisons in its own series of publications.7 AidData’s database shows that China’s foreign aid globally consists largely of flows of development-focused financing that do not meet the OECD definition for Official Development Assistance (ODA), but rather are in the OECD category of Other Official Flows (OOF).8

More information on the databases, including explanations, defenses, and applications, is provided by Dreher et al. (2015) (on AidData) and Eom (2016) (on SAIS-CARI).

Discussions of African agency

Perhaps the most significant trend in new research on the economic engagement of China and African countries since the SSRC’s preliminary mapping study in 2012 is the “African agency” debate. When launching its China–Africa Knowledge Project at a conference at Yale University in 2013, the Social Science Research Council noted that scholars researching engagement between China and Africa were
grappling with the question of how to prioritize African agency as a central topic. Many of the twenty-one think pieces that came out of the conference also addressed this issue.

A 2013 paper by Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert on "Reinserting African Agency into China–Africa Relations" is an early, prominent example of the argument that African countries have agency, meaning that government, business, and civil society actors in Africa have much more control over China’s actions in Africa than commonly assumed (Mohan and Lampert 2013). The scholar Ross Anthony has written that these new arguments effectively challenge traditional assumptions of "Africa as the passive recipient of Chinese economic and political engagement" (Anthony 2016). An early example of an in-depth case study that uses the "agency" lens is Lucy Corkin’s (2013) book, Uncovering African Agency: Angola’s Management of China’s Credit Lines, which found that "the Angolan government was remarkably successful in the negotiation of key terms of financing from China" (Corkin 2015). By 2015, the line of argument was widespread enough that a collection of essays featured a diversity of scholars engaging with it (Gadzala 2015).

Other scholars, however, like Padraig Carmody and Peter Kragelund, argue that African control over China-Africa relations has been overstated in some of the recent literature, and that the success of some countries in their "renegotiation of resource contracts on more favorable terms," for example, only happens in an "overall contract of extraversion," defined as an inability to distribute economic or institutional benefits to society at large (Carmody and Kragelund 2016, 21-23).

Nonetheless, applying the lens of "African agency" has become a common practice in academic writing about China-Africa engagement. The lens has been utilized even to look at African countries whose power asymmetry with China is massive and would perhaps traditionally be regarded as overwhelming. For example, Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou found that even in the small and poor country of Benin, government bureaucrats "do not remain passive and [instead] exert agency" in negotiations with China (Soulé-Kohndou 2018). Soulé-Kohndou situates African agency in dealings with China in the context of a larger and older body of work examining African agency in global politics. The form of governance in a country may also affect this agency: Carslake (2018) argues that in authoritarian regimes, political elites, not civil society or other individuals, retain the power to shape agency in engagement with China.

In order to emphasize African agency and African perspectives, many scholars and analysts have begun to prefer the term "Africa-China" to "China-Africa," and at least one important institution producing knowledge about China’s engagement in Africa has changed its name as a result of this shift. In November 2016, the Wits China-Africa Reporting Project officially became known as the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP), in order to "illustrate clearly the Project’s African home and orientation, and an emphasis on placing Africa and the welfare of the African people first." Other scholars take a more neutral approach to the terminology; for example, in their book New Directions in Africa-China Studies, Chris Alden and Daniel Large intentionally use "Africa-China" and "China-Africa" interchangeably (Alden and Large 2018, 20).

The "African agency" lens is most often applied in studies of negotiations of loans and financing, though scholars have also applied the lens to other topics in Africa-China research, such as the environmental effects of Chinese projects; China’s influence in media and communications in Africa; and the COVID-19 pandemic, as examined in other sections of this report.

The debate on “debt traps” and debt sustainability

Several African countries have become highly indebted to China as they have ramped up spending on infrastructure or resource extraction. Kenya’s debt-to-GDP ratio stood at a relatively high 65.9% as of early 2021, with much of the debt owed to China, and Angola owed over US$22 billion to China as of
January 2021 (Arnold and Strohecker 2021). Djibouti, with one of the smaller economies in Africa, owes about $1.3 billion to China (Bräutigam 2018).

Partially in response to the empirical trend of rising debt loads, there is now more active research on debt financing and debt sustainability for China’s projects abroad, including in Africa (see, for example, Hurley et al. 2019; Eom et al. 2018; Malm 2016, 2019; Ma 2019). In general, there are not enough case studies to determine any overall trends (Kratz et al. 2019). One interesting finding, from the consultancy Development Reimagined (2019), is that there have been at least ninety-six cases of debt cancellations or restructurings by China since 2000, with the largest numbers occurring in East Africa. Moreover, and in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, China has further worked on increasing debt restructurings as more countries request adjustments to their agreements given the economic hardships the pandemic brought on (Acker and Bräutigam 2021, 6).

Much of this research has also referenced, or even emerged in response to, arguments about “debt traps” that have been fiercely debated in recent years. After December 2017, when the Sri Lankan government ended up leasing the Hambantota Port to China Merchants Port Holdings for ninety-nine years—effectively ceding sovereignty over a piece of its territory—fears spread of China engaging in “debt trap” diplomacy. Multiple Sri Lankan economists later refuted the idea that China was engaging in predatory lending to exert influence over developing countries (see, for example, Moramali 2019; Weerakoon and Jayasuriya 2019), but the narrative persisted.

The “debt trap” debate came to Africa most visibly in December 2018, when details leaked of the $3.2 billion contract for the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, indicating that the Port of Mombasa’s escrow account could become Chinese-controlled if the project defaulted. Fear of a “debt trap” spread rapidly in Kenya, causing a media frenzy. Further reporting, however, indicated that China would be extremely unlikely to take control of the Port of Mombasa, even in the worst-case scenario (Olander 2019a).

With the economic upheaval of the COVID-19 pandemic, academic literature has turned to examining what to expect for the future. As Yun Sun has written, “Precedent tells us that, for China, even if debt relief is to be provided, China will look at individual African countries case by case and design individual strategies with various methods of debt relief … Short-term relief is expected but massive debt forgiveness in the long run may not be in the cards” (Yi Sun 2020). Deborah Bräutigam has commented that China is likely to delay the repayment of, but not forgive, most of its loans in Africa (Villamil 2020).

China and the West as international donors to Africa

In 2012, we noted (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 11-13) that there was considerable worry among Western policy analysts and academics that China was upending traditional norms in international development through its “minerals-for-infrastructure” deals in Africa. An early example of this debate dates back to the 2007 Sicomines agreement between China and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in which many Western stakeholders, such as the International Monetary Fund, raised concerns about China’s plan potentially causing an increase in the DRC’s already large financial burden (Jansson 2013). Many argued that such deals were far more attractive to African countries than loans from traditional Western donors, who would end up being pushed out. As Woods (2008, 1220) mentions, this growing trend is a “silent revolution” in international development. Woods further emphasizes this idea by explaining how emerging donors, like China, are carefully positioning themselves not so as to forcefully replace Western donors, but rather in order to present a more appealing package to African countries. In more recent years, multiple studies have indicated that Chinese trade and aid in Africa is not pushing out traditional donors, either Western or international (Swedlund 2017; Dreher et al. 2017). Still, sociologist Ching
Kwan Lee (2017, xii) argues, based on ethnographic research in the Zambian mining and construction sectors, that Chinese state capital is indeed “a different kind of capital” which brings “unique potential and perils” to development efforts.

To what extent do Chinese projects offer jobs, skills, and technology to Africans?

Our 2012 study noted “a prevailing popular narrative, particularly within the African continent, [that] Chinese infrastructure and extractive projects are imported into Africa wholesale, complete with a Chinese workforce, creating resentment with local communities” (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 11).

In 2015, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong found that the reality is more complex than “wholesale” importation of Chinese labor. Their research demonstrated that while Chinese labor is used in some projects, there is significant variation between countries, and most Chinese firms in Africa overwhelmingly hire local workers (Sautman and Yan 2015). The literature suggests that given the diversity among Chinese firms in the region, the skills learned and their transferability can vary; but overall, the trainings focus on manufacturing and assembly roles, whereas top-level, managerial positions are reserved for Chinese nationals (Oya and Schaefer 2019; Ofosu and Sarpong 2022).

Transfer of skills (knowledge) and technology within Chinese projects in Africa has become a research focus in more recent years, raising many rich opportunities for further research (see, e.g., Tsui 2016; Agbebi 2019). For example, Chinese technology giant Huawei operates eight training centers across Africa. Research by Henry Tugendhat has indicated that these centers have “facilitated knowledge transfers and spillovers to the local telecommunications sector[,] particularly through subcontractors hired for ‘managed services’ contracts,” even if “Huawei, like its competitors, treads a fine balance between training local engineers and keeping control of its intellectual property” (Tugendhat 2020).

Broader research on Chinese investment in Nigeria by Yunnan Chen found “positive cases of technology transfer initiatives and skills training, particularly in non-homogenous product sectors such as furniture.” However, Chen adds, “low linkages to domestic Nigerian firms has hindered the development of industrial clusters and local supply chains” (Yunnan Chen 2020). Tang Xiaoyang has examined Chinese manufacturing investments in Ethiopia, and suggested that knowledge transfer for industrial work may have different dynamics than the technology sector:

> Learning of industrial knowledge seems to have a paradox: skill development requires more manufacturing activities, whereas manufacturing investments tend to flow to where a skilled work force and administration already exist. This chicken-and-egg like paradox suggests that knowledge transfer requires synergy development. (Tang 2019)

These are just samples of research in the large and dynamic topic of scholarship on geo-economics within China-Africa engagement. The specific dynamics of jobs, skills, and technology transfers as China invests in a multitude of sectors in different African countries will continue to merit and draw in-depth research.

Land acquisitions in rural Africa

Our 2012 mapping study noted that Chinese investments in African agriculture, and associated conflicts with land rights, were understudied at the time, especially compared with debates over oil and other resources (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 12). In their widely read 2009 article, for instance, Deborah Bräutigam and Tang Xiaoyang noted that “very little research has been done on this issue, and there are as many myths as realities in stories about China’s current engagement in rural Africa” (Bräutigam and
Tang 2009, 67). Today, oil and other resource debates still dominate the conversation, but land rights and agriculture appear to be gaining more attention.

Not long after our 2012 mapping study was released, The Journal of Peasant Studies published two prominent articles on land grabs, both challenging dominant framings on the subject: Irna Hofman and Peter Ho’s article (2012) contested narratives about China’s land grabs worldwide, and Borras et al. (2012) did the same with reference to Latin America and the Caribbean, with a focus on Chinese practices. Bräutigam and Zhang followed up with an article that found “land acquisitions by Chinese companies have so far been quite limited, and focused on production for African consumption” (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013, 1676). Then, in 2015, Bräutigam published a book called Will Africa Feed China?, which disputed prevailing narratives about Chinese neocolonialism in rural Africa (Bräutigam 2015).

One phenomenon that has attracted greater attention in recent years is the emergence of agricultural training sessions at the twenty-three so-called Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) that China has set up in Africa as of early 2016 (Xu Junfang et al. 2019). The Chinese government suggests that Chinese engagement through these centers and other means might help African states increase relatively low crop yields, though research on this subject is still relatively new. An academic paper found that at ATDCs in Mozambique and South Africa, “agro-technology transfer proves to be beneficial but at a very localized level” (Lu Jiang et al. 2016). A more recent Development Reimagined analysis finds that the “jury is still out” on whether ATDCs have a significant impact on food security and indicates that there is substantial opportunity for further study on the impacts of ATDCs (Development Reimagined 2020). Studying these impacts, scholars emphasize, will mutually benefit both Chinese and African counterparts to improve the model’s functionality and set priorities (Mgendi et al. 2021).

**PEACE AND SECURITY**

China’s influence on peace and security in Africa has, in recent years, become one of the fastest growing areas of scholarly interest in the China-Africa relationship. As with research on economic issues, interest in China’s peace and security engagements in Africa is driven by empirical trends, most notably China’s increased involvement in UN peacekeeping operations over the last decade—China’s contributing share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget has nearly quintupled, from 3.15% in 2009 to 15.21% in 2020—but also China’s growing role in the global arms trade, especially in Africa, where more than two-thirds of national militaries were using Chinese equipment as of the last decade (Cowburn 2016). Other events and trends, like China’s strong reaction to the use of Western military force in Libya and China’s involvement in conflict resolution in South Sudan and Mali, have also attracted research interest.

Scholars have grappled with two key research questions about China’s motivations for and influence on issues of African peace and security, particularly through multilateral channels like UN peacekeeping operations. What are the motivations for China’s growing involvement in African security? And how much has China shifted from norm-taker to norm-maker? This section considers the literature on these two questions, including a discussion of the development-security nexus and specific instances of engagement, and provides a brief overview of the research exploring China’s role in arms sales to African governments.
China’s motivation for involvement in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Though has China traditionally objected to UN peacekeeping operations as violations of sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs by the West (International Crisis Group 2009), it gradually shifted its view in the post-Cold War era (Zhang 1996). Chinese scholars such as Xue Lei of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies have noted that China has taken a more flexible approach to its policy of non-interference in other countries, especially as its number of overseas interests has increased (Xue 2014). Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess wrote in 2015 that China’s policy of non-interference “has become increasingly varied and contextualized in reaction to Africa’s ever-more diversified political and economic landscape since the early 2000s” (Aidoo and Hess 2015).

Much of the research on China’s engagement in peace and security in Africa has sought to examine the motivation behind its shift from its traditional noninterventionist policy to increased participation in UN peacekeeping in Africa. Some scholars argue that Beijing’s opposition to interfere in others’ domestic affairs became more elastic due to its growing economic interests in Africa, the scene for most UN peace operations (International Crisis Group 2017). Others, like Barton (2018), do not see a fundamental change in Beijing policy: for Barton, the fact that China chooses peacekeeping operations for intervention confirms the non-interference policy. Others highlight additional considerations that shape China’s behavior in peace operations: the image of being a responsible power, operational benefits, protection of national interests, and the One China policy (International Crisis Group 2009; Zürcher 2019).

One event had a significant effect on China’s non-interference policy. As protests erupted in 2011 against longtime Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, China was quick in its efforts to minimize the number of losses on its own end. The Chinese government performed a mass evacuation, its largest mission ever, of roughly 35,000 PRC nationals over concerns about violent protests (Benabdallah 2018, 7). Additionally, due to the crisis, China abandoned many of its investment and development projects in Libya. Although China continued importing Libyan oil throughout the civil war, it maintained its traditional approach of neutrality in hopes of returning to Libya for future investment projects without repercussions (Wehrey and Alkoutami 2020). China took this approach even further by abstaining from voting on UN Resolution 1973, which called for a no-fly zone for Libya, citing that China “is always against the use of force in international relations” (Garwood-Gowers 2012, 386). This resolution had emphasized pillar three of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—“the responsibility of the international community to protect when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations” (UNSC 2011). China’s decision to abstain from voting was met with criticism from both inside and outside the country, as it highlighted China’s reluctance to accept all the pillars of R2P (Fung 2016a).

Scholars emphasize the realities of this non-interference approach, noting that if the Chinese government wants to continue this method, it may come at the cost of losing protection of China’s own overseas economic and geopolitical interests (Jian and Méndez 2015). Moving forward, despite China’s interest in Libyan oil reserves and other natural resources, Mordechai Chaziza, an Israeli scholar who has published research on China’s non-intervention policy in intrastate wars, states that there is still hesitation and uncertainty about future investment projects within Libya due to issues surrounding the region’s volatility as a result of domestic and regional threats (Chaziza 2020).

Hodzi (2019) has gone so far as to argue that China has effectively ended its non-intervention policy in Africa. In a thorough analysis of various Chinese policies, he argues that interventionist policies can be viewed not only in terms of actions, but also inaction. Here he notes China’s abstention from using its veto over the imposition of a no-fly zone during the Libya crisis, which paved the way for NATO military actions. In that sense, understanding China’s interventionism requires rethinking
the concept of intervention itself (Hodzi 2019, 55-58). On the other hand, Kuo (2020) considers that China has a distinctive approach to security and its motivations should be analyzed precisely through the lens of such distinctiveness. This approach involves anxiety about outside intervention in domestic affairs; political stability as a nonnegotiable condition of development; and willingness to expand China’s own development model overseas (Kuo 2020, 66-70). It remains unclear whether this approach would directly challenge existing liberal norms (Kuo 2020, 15): “the Chinese approach to peacebuilding focuses on economic reconstruction and sees poverty and unemployment as the source of unrest. It sees immediate democratic reforms, such as holding elections, as a ‘luxury’ that should only be attended to once the basic needs of the citizens are taken care of” (Kuo 2020, 16).

China is now actively engaged in UN peacekeeping; it has become the largest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping operations among the Security Council’s five permanent members (P5) and the ninth-largest overall. China’s contributing share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget has also increased rapidly, from 3.15% in 2009 to 15.21% in 2020-2021, though the US remains the top funder at 27.89%.

As of September 2022, five peacekeeping operations in Africa have Chinese contingent troops or experts. These include the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS; 1,013 contingent troops); the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA; 413 troops); the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO; 218 troops); the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA; 86 troops); and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO; 11 experts).

Furthermore, President Xi Jinping pledged 8,000 troops in 2015 to the UN peacekeeping standby force—approximately one-fifth of the total troops pledged by fifty nations—and committed US$100 million to the African Standby Force and $1 billion to establish the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (Fung 2016b; Gowan 2014). Scholars researching this shift have pointed to the difference this commitment has made in addressing major shortfalls in UN peacekeeping capacity (Fung 2016c).

Scholars Chris Alden and Daniel Large, as early as 2013, questioned whether China’s deepening involvement in peace and security in Africa is an extension of its efforts to protect its national interests (Alden and Large 2013). Research exploring China’s economic projects in Africa has often examined Chinese companies’ economic engagement in the context of the many political and security risks these ventures face, including armed conflict, corruption and weak governance, political instability, and terrorism (Duchâtel et al. 2014, vi). Some researchers, like Sunghee Cho, have found that China’s protection of economic interests generally works as a predictor of its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, especially in relation to a host state’s value as an export market rather than a resource provider (Cho 2019.) The question of Chinese economic interests as a motor driving China’s involvement in international affairs continues to be discussed in the literature (Coutaz 2021).

China’s involvement in South Sudan, for example, is linked to its long-standing engagement with Sudan, which has significant economic overtones. In Sudan, China invested approximately US$20 billion mostly in the oil industry before the country split after a protracted armed conflict. Two-thirds of its investments ended up in the new state of South Sudan” (Hodzi 2019, 4). Some scholars see this as evidence that China’s participation in the UN “is driven by its increasing need for natural resources, such as oil” (He 2019, 254). Hodzi’s work seems to support the claim that economic motivations influenced China’s involvement: “This policy was confirmed by Ma Qiang, the Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, who told Reuters that ‘we have huge interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire’” (Hodzi 2019, 192). On top of engaging bilaterally with the two Sudans, China also leveraged the IGAD regional organization in collaboration with the US, UK, and Norway (Hodzi 2019, 193).

When China sent combat forces to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013, Marc Lanteigne noted that this was seen as a turning point in Chinese foreign
policy and its engagement with the United Nations (Lanteigne 2019). Unlike other objects of Chinese interest in Africa, Mali is not a significant trading partner with China, though China grew increasingly worried that the conflict in Mali would affect the surrounding regions in which China’s economic interests lay. Cabestan writes that Chinese internal debates affected the decision to “play a bigger role in Africa’s security” (Cabestan 2018, 721) through involvement in Mali:

In as early as 2009, some Chinese scholars, such as Pang Zhongying from Renmin University in Beijing, pushed for a more robust participation, including Chinese combat forces in UN PKOs. Since then, Chinese experts have included Mali in the list of countries belonging to an “arc of instability caused by terrorism” (kongbu dongdang hu 恐怖动荡弧), along with countries such a Libya, Somalia, Tunisia, Nigeria and Egypt. (Cabestan 2018, 722)

An additional factor in China’s involvement in MINUSMA may also be that China views Mali as one of its traditional regional partners, given Mali’s historical ideological links to the Chinese regime. This indicates the need to take history into account as a factor in China’s decisions in this arena.21

Arguing for the importance of non-economic factors in explaining China’s motivation for increased involvement in African security issues, a separate body of scholarship has gained traction, especially since 2013. Some scholars point to explanations rooted in China’s global reputation—how the country is perceived on the global stage and its quest to become more of a global norm-setter (Gill and Huang 2013). Fang Songying, Li Xiaojun, and Sun Fanglu have written that the original motivation for China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping in the 1990s was to counter its international diplomatic isolation following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (Fang, Li, and Sun 2018). The distribution of Chinese peacekeeping officers, at that time of writing, was not centered in regions that would directly benefit China most. Sun Meicen in 2014 affirmed a separation between China’s peacekeeping efforts in Africa and its economic interests in several countries there, despite Western suspicion of China’s motives. In that sense, there is still debate in the literature regarding how to accurately analyze China’s security approach in Africa. For Min Ye and Quan Li (2020), China is behaving like a middle power such as Turkey, Brazil, or India, rather than a great power like the other UN P5, or indeed Western middle powers (see also Ghiselli 2018). On the other hand, He Yin (2019) advances that Chinese identity is the most important factor in understanding the country’s security policy. The Chinese state views its identity as that of a rising power, which affects its security involvement. As this identity changes, so do the state’s policies (He 2019).

Although China’s diplomatic overtures in Africa have received extensive attention in non-Chinese scholarship (see for example the work of Ian Taylor, including Taylor 1998, 2006, 2009), the role of China’s ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) therein remains an understudied topic. Among the flurry of activities in commemorating the CCP centennial in 2021, there were also reflections on China-African relations from the inter-party perspective. An associate editorial director of the CCP’s International Department argues that the party’s relationship with political parties in Africa has evolved from an ideologically driven approach before the 1980s to something more pragmatic in the years since (Zhang Kai 2021). Instead of highlighting its Communist priorities, the CCP has been positioning itself as the ruling party of a populous nation able to share experiences of development, and is engaging both ruling and opposition parties to facilitate the implementation of the BRI.

Some earlier research also emphasized a variety of potential non-economic motivations. He Yin wrote in 2007 that China’s strategic shift was also motivated by its increased familiarity with the UN, the UN’s positive reputation (as a “responsible power”), and by the prospect of exposing its military and police to military experience in foreign situations (He 2007). In 2011, Courtney J. Richardson noted that participation in UN peace operations serves as a conduit through which China can promote its
reputation for good citizenship, leadership, and responsibility on the global stage (Richardson 2011). However, at least in the earlier stages of China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping, it is possible that there was no single overriding motivation. In 2009, the International Crisis Group wrote:

China’s support for problem regimes in the developing world has fed suspicions that Chinese peacekeeping is primarily motivated by economic interests. In fact, China’s economic and peacekeeping decision-making tracks operate separately and tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), military and economic actors ensure that there is still no overall strategic approach to peacekeeping. (International Crisis Group 2009)

More recent research has emphasized China’s increasingly long-term view of peacebuilding, which contrasts with earlier assumptions that China was seeking short-term economic benefit from stabilizing countries or regions in which it had interests. Meicen Sun wrote in 2017 that China’s attitude toward peacekeeping, especially in the past two decades, had shifted to an “investment” model of participation (focused on gaining long-term benefits) from a past “purchase” model of participation (focused on avoiding short-term costs) (Meicen Sun 2017). Cedric de Coning and Kari M. Osland (2020) similarly write that China’s approach to peacekeeping is “not prescriptive,” and places greater emphasis on a long-term perspective (working to remedy underlying causes of conflict), the achievement of collective effects, and the use of development and investment for sustaining peace.

Analyzing China’s peacekeeping involvement, Ganchev (2019) coined the term "consultative peacekeeping" to denote the fact that "China’s commitment to peacekeeping moves beyond simply protecting investments and securing natural resource supplies. It revolves around series of consultations which seem motivated by a number of factors such as increasing troop readiness, counter-balancing the influence of Western powers and using peacekeeping as a context for strategically promoting economic cooperation" (Ganchev 2019, 411). Similarly, Mao Ruipeng (2019, 478) finds that "China tends to see multilateralism as a consultation process involving all related members of the international community, so that their fundamental interests and aspirations can be fully heard and considered." On the other hand, Fung (2019) suggests that China wants to deploy combat troops to UN peacekeeping operations in search of real-world fighting experience. This also contributes to China’s status and reputational gains (Fung 2019, 517-518). This pursuit of reputational gain and status seeking are supported domestically with public opinion surveys (Fang and Sun 2019; see also Primiano 2019).

Moving beyond peacekeeping operations, Kuo (2020) emphasizes that China remains mainly interested in national security issues, and that this is separate from questions of human security or non-traditional security issues. Chris Alden and Lu Jiang argue against being overly focused on the peacekeeping dimension, saying that it is inevitable that "China’s deepening engagement in African economies would thrust security to the forefront of its Africa policy" (Alden and Jiang 2019, 652). As an example, they find that Chinese firms operate with private security companies: “[f]ormer soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have themselves set up private security companies such as DeWe which have been providing protection for Chinese companies operating in South Sudan and elsewhere around and beyond the continent since as long ago as 2004” (Alden and Jiang 2019, 654; see also Arduino 2018).

But some scholars focus not only on the breadth of China’s security engagement but also on its complexity. Hirono (2020) has found that China’s humanitarian action and disaster relief differs from its involvement in peacekeeping, and that the coordination of this humanitarian action within the Chinese government is fragmented. In comparison, peacekeeping coordination is more "holistic," indicating that the decision-making process is based on concurrence within the relevant parts of the government, which allows deeper international cooperation (Hirono 2020, 55, 61). However, Kwon
(2020) suggests that the linkage between humanitarian action and Chinese peacekeeping operations is more complex. According to Kwon, Chinese troops do not confine themselves to peacekeeping activities alone but also undertake humanitarian activities, despite UN policy officially discouraging this. Kwon writes that “clear patterns in [peacekeeping troops’] behaviour suggest that their tactics comprise a humanitarian program that is coordinated and managed systematically at the level of China’s national military organization” (Kwon 2020, 422). Across several peacekeeping operations, Kwon finds that military personnel consistently engaged with the population through humanitarian actions, and argues that this evidently coordinated action is based on China’s foreign policy objectives and its model of developmental peace.

Overall, the main takeaway from the literature is that China’s security policy in Africa is changing—but it is unclear what it is changing into. Although China does not officially recognize this, there seems to be a growing consensus among scholars that China’s non-intervention policy has ended (Hodzi 2019; Hirono et al. 2019). Several scholars have assessed China’s non-intervention rhetoric against its policies and found that China has been engaged in a balancing act when it comes to its African security policies. They argue that the closest analogue for Chinese decisions in this field is the actions of other non-Western middle powers (Ye and Li 2020). Some, like Xuetong Yan (2018), are also trying to better understand the role of Chinese values and ideology in shaping China’s role moving forward. Yan argues that a combination of “Chinese traditional values with selected liberalist values, such as benevolence, righteousness and rites with equality, democracy and freedom” could ring in a more peaceful international order (Xuetong Yan 2018, 1). Along these lines, there are discussions about how the rise of China will affect the international order: that is, whether or not this rise will be peaceful (Hodzi 2019; Ghiselli 2018).

China as norm maker in the global order

China’s shift to active participation in UN peacekeeping reflects a growing appreciation in Chinese policy circles of the utility of multilateral peace operations for addressing insecurity through peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Chin-Hao Huang 2011). China’s growing role in peace operations reflects the belief that multilateralism can address strategic threats (Hirono and Lanteigne 2011, 243), and that the UN is the most legitimate forum for international peace and security (Fung 2016b). Research also suggests that China’s increased engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in collaboration with multilateral institutions like the UN and the African Union has exposed it to internationally normative principles concerning conflict resolution and human security, which now appear to be factored into its foreign policy stances (Chin-Hao Huang 2013).

However, China’s acceptance of international norms on peacekeeping in particular has met limits. Although Beijing has contributed to peace operations with robust mandates and even sent an infantry battalion to South Sudan in 2015, it continues to support traditional peacekeeping principles (consent, impartiality, non-use of force). Moreover, although it also endorsed the norm of responsibility to protect (R2P) at the 2005 World Summit and that of the protection of civilians, it has vetoed (with Russia) resolutions about R2P in Syria and refused to endorse the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians. Indeed, in a recent analysis, Coleman and Job find that China does not seem to challenge the globalization of peace operations, but rather targets their liberal aspect with an emphasis on socio-economic rights (Coleman and Job 2021, 1456-1460).

After a couple of decades of following international norms on international security issues, China has shifted in recent years to a more prominent role as a norm-maker. Chinese scholar Zhao Lei noted as early as 2011 that there was a “subtle but significant shift in Chinese strategic culture from passively following international norms to actively making them” (Lei Zhao 2011, 351). Increasingly,
Chinese scholars have sought to explore options for interpreting the international order, security, and development that differ from Western liberal ideals (Li Dongyan 2012). One is the idea of the “developmental peace,” which stands in contrast to the dominant idea of the liberal peace, although Li Dongyan (2012) notes that the concepts can be complementary and not antagonistic. While the liberal peace begins with the assumption that stability must come first before development can advance, the developmental peace idea assumes that development is foundational and will lead to stability.

The idea of the developmental peace grows from China’s own experience of emerging from poverty through rapid economic growth and reflects inadequate development as an underlying cause of armed conflict and political instability. Rather than focusing on liberal values of good governance, democratic institutions, free markets, and human rights, Beijing’s approach—shared by certain others in the Global South—prioritizes economic and social development for conflict-affected states (Lei Zhao 2011). Lina Benabdallah wrote in 2016 that China’s human resource development and capacity building programs in Africa are significant and underexamined, and that Beijing’s idea of a “development-security nexus” has received wide support from African leaders (Benabdallah 2016). However, she also argues that this framework “can have serious flaws, especially when high rates of economic growth do not correlate with a reduction of conflict and insecurity” (Benabdallah 2016, 28).

This question of the developmental peace has emerged in specific case studies, as when Brosig (2020) recently assessed China’s involvement in South Sudan to explore whether, out of all the places where China is involved, this particular involvement can be treated as a model or if it constitutes an exceptional case. He argues that despite China’s rhetoric around developmental peace, its involvement in South Sudan “has not produced favorable outcomes and is unlikely to be replicated” (Brosig 2020, 873). China advances that it prefers non-punitive measures towards countries, and this is consistent with its African security policy. But Brosig finds this problematic: “The notion of developmental peace is not only conceptually simple, de facto Chinese investment [in South Sudan] was feeding a war economy. The continuous fighting was bringing the oil production almost to a complete stand still[,] harming Chinese economic interests” (Brosig 2020, 882).

Chinese arms sales in Africa

At the same time that China has crafted its “developmental peace” concept, it has rapidly expanded its sales of arms to African countries. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, “Chinese arms exports to states in Africa grew the most [of any region;] in 2012–16 they were 122 per cent higher than in 2007–11” (Fleurant et al. 2016). By 2016, more than two-thirds of African militaries used Chinese equipment (Cowburn 2016). There is significant concern about the diversion of these arms to non-state armed groups, which has been a topic of discussion at the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation, or FOCAC (Saferworld 2022). However, in absolute numbers, China remains a relatively minor player in this market compared to other world powers (Wezeman et al. 2019).

Larry Hanauer and Lyle Morris of the RAND Corporation describe Chinese arms sales to Africa as a primarily profit-driven, rather than strategic, endeavor. “Since China reformed its defense industry from a military-operated to civilian-run system in 1999, the market-driven profit incentives of Chinese arms manufacturers have become the primary catalyst for increased Chinese arms sales abroad,” they write (Hanauer and Morris 2014, 41). They note that “Chinese arms transfers to Africa have been controversial, mainly due to reports of Chinese-made weapons turning up in conflict areas and in countries that are under UN-sanctioned arms embargos,” but that there is no evidence China sold arms directly to these rebel groups (Hanauer and Morris 2014, 41). David Shinn writes that these intermediate sales appear to sometimes happen in international arms markets, but “on other occasions they were transferred by African governments that sympathized with the rebel movements” (Shinn 2015, 130).
MIGRATION

The flow of people between China and African countries grew exponentially in the 1990s and 2000s, leading to an explosion of academic interest in the early 2010s. In our 2012 mapping study, we noted that this research theme was developing rapidly, but that large gaps in knowledge persisted, making it an “understudied and under-researched” topic within China–Africa scholarship (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 16).

Three books published after that report marked a maturing of this area of research. These include Africans in China: A Sociocultural Study and Its Implications on Africa–China Relations by Adams Bodomo (2012), which was the first comprehensive study of the subject; Chinese Migrants and Africa’s Development: New Imperialists or Agents of Change? by Ben Lampert et al. (2014), who claimed their book was the first “to systematically study the motivations, relationships, and impact of this migration”; and China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa by Howard French (2014), which touched on a remarkable diversity of African countries and, with the help of its provocative title, greatly increased academic and public interest in this subject.24

The development of, and weaknesses in, the two foci of academic research within this theme—on Chinese in Africa and Africans in China—share some key parallels discussed here. Counting the numbers of migrants in both directions has been an ongoing challenge; studies of migrants in the southern geographies of both regions—South Africa and Guangzhou, China—account for a disproportionate amount of the research body, to the detriment of knowledge about migrants elsewhere; and the diversity of migrants makes it difficult to generalize about their motivations and backgrounds, though investigating these topics appears to be a promising ongoing area of research.

Much of the literature in Chinese on the topic of migration is motivated by policy concerns or implicitly assumes policymakers as its main audience.25 This has produced, especially, works considering how to improve the academic and social experiences of African students, and how to manage Africans in China as an administrative and political issue. The four research projects funded by the National Social Science Fund of China (NSSFC, 国家社会科学基金) reflect these categories (Cui and He 2021; Maimaitijiang et al. 2019; Wang Wenbin and Cao 2019; Huang Zhaokun 2019). Other distinguishing characteristics of the Chinese-language research include a heavier emphasis on history, a different categorization of Taiwanese migrants, and a paucity of studies on Africans in China outside of Guangzhou.

The challenge of counting migrants

Similar to how tracking flows of foreign aid and other types of developmental assistance from China to Africa comprises a foundational challenge of research on geo-economics, tracking and quantifying migrants between China and Africa has proven challenging for researchers and governments alike.

In recent years, the numbers of Chinese in Africa and Africans in China are generally regarded as having begun to decline after a period of growth, though the exact sizes of these populations and timing of these trends are probably the most-debated aspects of research on China-Africa migration. French’s book arguably popularized the tally of one million Chinese migrants in Africa, at least for most of the 2010s, though estimates have varied widely and the numbers are reported to have peaked and then decreased over the decade. Similarly, though Guangzhou was optimistically referred to as a booming “trading post” (Bertoncelo and Bredeloup 2007, 94) in academic literature and media in the late 2000s and the number of Africans in China increased rapidly, reductions in economic opportunities and increasingly difficult living situations have caused this population to shrink.
While the number of Chinese migrants in Africa has vastly increased over the past ten to twenty years, their exact number is not known. Although Howard French’s book influenced many to use “a million migrants” as a reference point, the scholar Ronald Skeldon wrote in 2011 that the true number at that time could have been as low as 270,000 (Skeldon 2011), and French had suggested in 2014 that it could be as high as two million. Li Xinfeng of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated the population to be around 1.1 million at that time (Zhou 2014, 84). The Financial Times reported in August 2017 that Chinese migration to Africa had peaked in 2013, with countries such as Angola losing as many as 150,000 Chinese contract workers while Kenya and Ethiopia gained migrants (Hancock 2017), but the uncertainties in the data make this very difficult to verify.

Official records are not much help: China maintains public records of only a fraction of out-migration to Africa, and African countries have generally poor or even virtually nonexistent official records of Chinese immigration across their borders. A central conclusion by Brookings Institution scholar David Dollar in his research on Chinese migration to Africa is that “data on this issue are particularly weak” (Dollar 2016, xii), and one of his top three recommendations for African governments is to improve their data publishing.

Whatever the precise number of Chinese migrants in Africa may be, Yoon Jung Park (2016) has emphasized the importance of contextualizing this figure:

The population of Africa is around 1.1 billion. The number of internally displaced Africans within Africa was approximately 12.4 million at the end of 2015, while the number of Chinese migrant workers in China is around 260 million, and the number of Chinese living overseas globally is likely over 35 million. There are much higher numbers of Chinese in other countries, including the US.

The African migrant population in China is equally, if not more, difficult to verify. Adams Bodomo suggested in his 2012 book that there were approximately 500,000 Africans living in China, with the largest concentration (around 100,000) living in the southern city of Guangzhou. Bodomo later provided a further rough breakdown of the categories of these migrants: “300,000 to 400,000 traders, 30,000 to 40,000 students, 4,000 to 5,000 professionals, 10,000 to 100,000 tourists and 10,000 to 20,000 temporary business travelers” (Bodomo 2015, 7).

The debate about the African population in Guangzhou alone can be used to illustrate the difficulty of establishing these numbers. Hong Kong-based scholar Roberto Castillo (2014) has argued that there are no reliable, established methods for measuring African populations in Guangzhou, or any Chinese city for that matter. In 2008, Li Zhigang of Sun Yat-sen University used hotel records to quantify the African population, and may have re-counted many people (Li Zhigang et al. 2008). Bodomo’s 2012 calculation of 100,000 was “based on his own personal calculations from what he saw in the streets,” Castillo writes, and was “needless to say … less rigorous than Sun Yat Sen University’s hotel based measurement.” Castillo criticizes Bodomo’s calculation of 100,000 Africans in Guangzhou and argues instead that the real African population was more in the range of 10,000 to 15,000.

One impeding factor in the quantification of African migrants in Guangzhou is that many Africans do not live in the city itself. In 2014 and 2015, scholars noted that “there are approximately … 100 000 Africans in Guangzhou but substantial numbers are beginning to be registered in neighboring cities like Shenzhen, Dongguan and Foshan” (Bodomo 2015, 3). This may be motivated by quality of life considerations: in Foshan, for example, Castillo (2014) notes that “life … is reportedly less stressful as authorities there are not that focused on harassing black and brown foreigners, like in Guangzhou.”

There is a debate about how much the African community in Guangzhou may have shrunk, and over what period of time. Media reports have traced a decline in economic opportunity and an increase
in official harassment of Africans in Guangzhou. For example, a June 2016 report by CNN reporter Jenni Marsh on "African migrants giving up on the Chinese dream" (Marsh 2016; see also Watt 2016) inspired Chinese reporters to investigate the scale of the exodus from Guangzhou. As Barry van Wyk confirmed in his subsequent analysis, "All the people interviewed by the Chinese reporters seem to agree that things start[ed] changing around two years ago, and that everyone—both Chinese and African—can now only earn about half of what they used to make” (van Wyk 2016). However, Bodomo (2018) contested the idea that Africans have actually left Guangzhou "in droves," as media reports suggested. He argued that they had rather transformed their way of living in response to crackdowns on the most visible aspects of their lives, like selling goods on pedestrian bridges, making their numbers even more difficult to verify.

The reports in April 2020 of harassment, discrimination, and even evictions of Africans in Guangzhou amid the COVID-19 pandemic again brought to light the difficulties for anyone—not just scholars, but even the Chinese government—in keeping track of the movement and identities of African residents in the city. Castillo (2020b) has written on the implications of the crisis for Africans in Guangzhou:

…this may well be the end of traditional forms of irregular abode, at least in China. COVID-19 may, or may not, be the end of migration as we understood it since the early [20th century], but it may well be the last nail in the coffin of an already declining African population in [Guangzhou].

Diverse destinations: South Africa, Guangzhou, and beyond

In the past, the study of migration as a global phenomenon and a part of globalization has generally focused on East–West and South–North flows. This means that Chinese migrants to North America and Europe, in particular, are well-understood. Indeed, as we noted in our 2012 mapping study, "the current scholarship on Chinese migration to Africa can be seen as an extension" of the literature on Chinese migration to North America and Europe (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 17).

In 2013, scholars began describing China-Africa migration in new ways. The out-migration flows of Chinese had shifted so dramatically since the turn of the century that one scholar, Daouda Cissé, described South–South migration such as that between China and Africa as the new "mainstream of international migration” (Cissé 2013, 17). Yoon Jung Park contended that the class profiles and specific geographic destinations of these new migrants are so different from twentieth-century norms that China to Africa migration can no longer be adequately described within traditional academic frameworks (Park 2013, 133). She wrote that "binary constructions of race relations [such as] black/white, European/African, colonized/colonizer” cannot apply in this context (Park 2013, 133). The study of China–Africa migration can therefore help illuminate new ways of understanding globalization.

The southern geographies in both regions are a focal point of research. In Africa, Chinese in South Africa have been a key focus, to an extent that may undervalue and leave understudied the role that Chinese elsewhere in Africa play; Africans in Guangzhou act similarly within research on China. However, the literature has recently expanded its focus to other cities both in China and Africa.

Historically, the primary destination of Chinese migrants to Africa was South Africa, plus a few other coastal countries like Nigeria and island countries such as Madagascar, Mauritius, and Réunion. Today, nearly all of Africa’s fifty-four countries have a significant number of Chinese migrants. Yoon Jung Park notes a “consensus” in the data available for South Africa, the largest destination for Chinese migrants, indicating between 350,000 and 500,000 migrants arrived there from the early 1990s through 2013 (Park 2013, 136). This accounts for approximately a third of all Chinese migrants in Africa, if one accepts the assumption that the true number is around or slightly above the oft-cited one million mark.
This probably explains the literature’s continued focus on Chinese migration to this country.

By the numbers alone, it might make sense for scholars to focus on Chinese migrants to South Africa. But Park shows that these migrants, particularly in their social status, are a special case among Chinese in Africa, meaning that studies of Chinese here may bear limited relevance to Chinese migration elsewhere in Africa. Park notes at least three factors that have mitigated xenophobic sentiment toward Chinese migrants in South Africa. The first is the number of migrants relative to other foreigners—take the number of Zimbabweans living in South Africa (1-1.5 million), for instance, which far outpaces that of the Chinese migrant community (350-500,000). This helps to explain why other African foreigners, rather than Chinese migrants, have borne the brunt of xenophobia. Second is the establishment of a core Chinese community in South Africa, which has existed for well over a century and occupies a different social space than newer migrant communities. Finally, several decades of cultural interaction with the core Chinese community, including the widespread popularity of kung fu movies—which grew during apartheid due to their themes of strength, endurance, and fighting the “bad white man”—have probably mitigated distrust of new Chinese migrants (Park 2013, 145). These three factors are not usually present in other African countries, so new Chinese migrants are on average less enthusiastically welcomed outside of South Africa.

Studies of Chinese in Africa outside of South Africa tend to focus on anglophone Africa, including Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana (Zi 2017), and Lesotho (Hanisch 2022). There has been some recent work on Chinese migration in Angola and Mozambique (e.g. Lorenzo Macagno 2021). Arabic-speaking countries in North Africa appear to be particularly lacking in research on their Chinese populations. The only ethnographic review of Chinese in Egypt, for example, appears to be a 2010 master’s thesis, despite the likely presence of tens of thousands of Chinese migrants and Egypt’s status as the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1955 (McDonald 2010, 9). Despite the existence of some scholarship on Chinese in francophone African countries such as Senegal and Cameroon (Nshom and Arzamastseva 2021), it is incomplete. Chinese migrants in Mali and the DRC, two important peacekeeping hotspots (see this report’s section on peace and security), have only been studied in detail once (for Mali, see Bourdarias 2010; for DRC, see Tshibambe 2013)—though French (2014) also covered these two countries.

Similarly to migration in other parts of Africa, migration from China into North Africa continues to increase due to the growing bilateral relations between China and the North Africa region. This is particularly true for Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as these countries have a more developed relationship with China than their North African counterparts. As a publication from the Brookings Doha Center highlights, this can largely be attributed to the numerous Chinese-funded construction projects in these three countries, which act as a catalyst for migration (Abdel Ghafar and Jacobs 2019).

Given the multiple construction projects that China has taken on in North Africa, the Chinese, in some cases, prefer sending their own construction workers to the region. Thus, the research suggests that a great number of people-to-people and cross-cultural interactions are occurring (Abdel Ghafar and Jacobs 2019). Many Chinese construction workers are settling in areas near the construction sites and developing their own communities, such as in the outskirts of Algiers due to the recently built, Chinese-funded mosque there. Algeria currently hosts the largest Chinese community in North Africa, with roughly 50,000 individuals, due to the number of long-term construction projects occurring in the country (Hamaiza 2020). Research suggests that these migrants often end up staying in Algeria, creating businesses focusing on products from China for a cheap price (Castel et al. 2011). Similarly, in Morocco, Chinese communities are expanding and establishing themselves near industrial cities such as Casablanca and Rabat as they open restaurants and markets (Abdel Ghafar and Jacobs 2019). Scholars point out that Chinese migration is also growing in Egypt as the country receives multiple, large-scale Chinese investments in projects necessitating a massive labor supply (Calabrese 2020).
McDonald (2010), in a thesis for the American University in Cairo, indicated that at the time, labor flows and investment were both already significant and in need of greater attention; in the years since, the literature has better responded to call, especially in light of an increase in Chinese-sponsored projects in the region. However, the region is often aggregated into research on the rest of Africa or the Middle East, leading to little research about China’s engagement with North Africa specifically.

Turning to China, an overfocus on the southern city of Guangzhou has threatened to leave Africans elsewhere in China understudied. Daouda Cissé in 2013 highlighted a need to shift the focus from Guangzhou to other parts of China: “According to estimates from Guangzhou official immigration bureau, there are 20,000 Africans in Guangzhou ... this overall number remains ‘insignificant’ compared to the rest of Africans present in other Chinese cities for study, work and business” (Cissé 2013, 20).

Africans in the commodity-producing city of Yiwu in eastern Zhejiang province have rapidly grown in numbers. The African community in Yiwu, largely made up of migrants from the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa (Bodomo 2015, 3), has been well-established for many years. Cissé observed: “In 2006, there were 20,311 registered Africans in Yiwu; in 2009 the number increased to 54,050 and it is still increasing” (Cissé 2015, 50). The treatment of Africans in Yiwu is reportedly substantially better than in Guangzhou (Cissé 2015), as demonstrated by Africans’ participation in People’s Mediation Committees (where some migrants have participated in local government efforts to resolve disputes in their community), their receipt of longer-term visas, and the creation of special “foreign citizen cards” that can be shown to police in lieu of passports (Roxburgh 2017). Bodomo and Ma (2010, 288) had earlier suggested that Yiwu could become a greater destination for African migrants than Guangzhou, especially due to “efficiency and fairness on the part of Yiwu law-enforcement officers.”

Hong Kong has received sustained attention in recent years and researchers are better accounting for the diversity of African migrants there and considering social factors. Amoah et al. (2020) focus on the psychological wellbeing of African migrants in Hong Kong who face discrimination and racism. Shum (2020) uses Hong Kong as a setting in which to focus on the culinary practices of West African migrants. According to Shum, the discrimination that African migrants face has pushed them to invest resources in restaurant and culinary spaces to create a feeling of homeness (Shum 2020, 302). At the same time, these culinary contexts, restaurants, and African grocery markets offer small spaces where Hong Kong Chinese and African migrants can interact (Shum 2020, 304).

Diversity within Chinese migration to Africa

The study of Chinese migrants overseas has long been a common research theme in the social science departments of Chinese universities. In fact, unlike in the English-language literature, Africa has been a strong focus of Chinese-language studies of the Chinese diaspora for many decades. Dozens of historical accounts of the Chinese diaspora in Africa have appeared in Chinese academic journals over the past few decades, with a number written by Li Anshan, a history professor at Peking University and leading Chinese Africanist. Zhou Haijin, a scholar at Zhejiang Normal University’s Institute of African Studies, cites a rich history of Chinese-language literature on the Chinese diaspora throughout Africa going back to the 1980s (Zhou 2014, 83).

A 2011 PhD dissertation by Yin Honglei, then a student in the Literature and Journalism College at Xiangtan University, which has a highly developed African studies program, noted that Chinese academics generally acknowledge three “pillars” of research on the Chinese overseas population: Chinese newspapers, Chinese education, and Chinese associations (Yin 2011). Documenting the rapid development of educational systems for Chinese living abroad, in particular, has long been a common research theme in the Chinese-language literature. Huang Xiaoyong argued in 2004 that such systems were already quite modernized (Huang Xiaoyong 2004). Another common theme in research on Chinese
migrant communities in Africa is the investigation of their economic development and economic influence. Li Pengtao (2010) noted that these communities face significant challenges in these areas, which in turn makes assimilation more difficult.

Chinese migrants to Africa do not fit a single generalizable profile, and research into their backgrounds, as well as living and working situations in Africa, has led to varied and valuable results. But Chinese migration also depends on structural conditions in the country of migration, and therefore differs depending on the opportunities available for migrants.

While it is standard practice in studies of Africans in China to analyze migration patterns by region and/or country, studies analyzing the regional background of Chinese migrants to Africa are rare. However, the few studies to address this topic have revealed interesting results. Tu Huynh and Yoon Jung Park, for instance, note that “while the vast majority of all late 19th and 20th century Chinese migrants to the Western countries were from one of three coastal provinces (Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian), today’s Chinese migrants to the world are from all over China” (Park 2016, referencing research from Huynh et al. 2010). South Africa is an exception to this rule, as a strong majority—up to three-quarters—of its Chinese migrants are Fujianese (Park 2016). Overall, however, Chinese migration is now so diverse that “it is not possible to generalize about migrant reception across the continent” (Park 2016).

Chinese-language research has focused more on recent immigrants to Africa from mainland China, with the aim of uncovering any differences that exist between contemporary immigrants and the older, more established Chinese communities. One study by Chen Fenglan found that in South Africa, there are significant language barriers, differences in employment, and values gaps between new and established Chinese immigrants (Chen Fenglan 2013, 33). Within the overall theme of migration, the most popular research subject in the Chinese-language literature, as in anglophone scholarship, has been the Chinese population in South Africa. However, it is at least as common, if not more so, to write about the history of Chinese migrants in South Africa or Africa as a whole as it is to write about the contemporary Chinese community in South Africa.35

The ways in which Chinese scholarship divides or agglomerates groups of migrants vary. The Chinese scholar Chen Fenglan has placed Taiwanese South Africans into the same group of immigrants as those from Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland China (primarily Guangdong) in the period from 1910 to 1998 (Chen Fenglan 2013, 34). Park, in contrast, takes care to separate migrants into three groups: Chinese South Africans with roots going back over a century, Taiwanese South Africans whose movement was largely rooted in apartheid-era immigration, and new Chinese migrants from mainland China (Park 2013, 136). Chinese academic literature generally uses three terms to describe Chinese people living abroad: huaqiao (Chinese citizens living abroad), huaren (ethnic Chinese, or anyone with Chinese blood), and huayi (a non-Chinese citizen of Chinese ancestry) (Wan 2007). In addition, while the Chinese-language academic literature generally distinguishes migrants coming to Africa from mainland China, it does not usually consider Taiwanese migrants as a separate category.

When it comes to the jobs of Chinese migrants in Africa, overall, around one-third—and in some countries a large majority—of Chinese migrants in Africa come on fixed-term contracts of one to three years (Chen Fenglan 2013). However, as Park argues, “the very idea of Chinese workers taking jobs from African workers in the context of high unemployment is troubling” (Park 2016). In reality, Chinese migrants, depending on where they settle in Africa, often “fill in” only the job roles that the labor force in a particular country cannot fill, as the more skilled African markets see more localized Chinese enterprises (Park 2016). For example, in their survey of China–Africa labor dynamics, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2015, 1) find:

Those in construction in Angola and Algeria have lower than average (but still majority) proportions of locals, Angola because of de-skilling due to 27 years of war and Algeria because
of migration of skilled workers to Europe. South Africa and Zimbabwe’s higher industrialization and education levels result in especially strong localization at Chinese firms.

In some countries, such as Zambia, as much as 95% of the Chinese population falls into the short-term laborer category (Postel 2015, cited in Park 2016). However, as mentioned previously, this is not the norm for all Chinese migrants across Africa. The idea of Chinese migrant economic competition to host community workers seems rather present and would merit careful attention to address the economic anxieties of host communities in Africa. In Cameroon, the threat of economic competition has been used to justify negative attitudes toward Chinese migrants (Nshom and Arzamastseva 2021).

The jobs of Chinese migrants are increasingly diversifying as waves of migrants successively settle in host communities. In South Africa, Louw (2019) finds that to survive a racial capitalist order, Chinese migrants used similar tactics to those of Chinese immigrants in the US. Louw relies on new historical evidence to claim that Chinese migrants operated lottery games in South Africa that allowed an illicit accumulation strategy, and would subsequently use such accumulated capital to enter the white economy (Louw 2019). In Zimbabwe, Chinese migrants are active in the small-scale economy, owning shops and selling manufactured Chinese goods (Gukurume 2019). In Ghana, scholars found Chinese migrant workers in both the mining sector (Lampert and Mohan 2019; Debrah and Asante 2019; Antwi-Boateng and Akudugu 2020) and small-scale trade (Dankwah and Amoah 2019; Jinpu Wang 2021). In Zambia, Chinese migrants are active in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Beibei Yang 2021).

Some authors have focused on the motivating factors for recent migration from China to Africa. Sullivan and Cheng (2018) advance that “many Chinese are motivated to relocate to Africa to improve their economic circumstances” (1178) although these prospective migrants “still yearn to do it via the security of a job with a SOE” (1180). Recent work on Chinese migrants in Ghana (Wang 2021) supports the argument that they are motivated by improving their economic circumstances. Wang demonstrates that once in Ghana, Chinese migrants have “an upward movement in their social status” (Wang 2021, 11). Similarly, Fei (2022, 9) shows that the Chinese government facilitates the expatriation of Chinese migrants as a “strategy for domestic job creation and poverty alleviation but also a crucial corporate decision to support companies’ overseas ventures.” This finding helps to show why SOEs are attractive pathways for prospective Chinese emigrants.

These studies bring nuance to the motivating factors for recent Chinese migration. Although state policies influence such migrations, these dynamics are not all state-controlled. In this sense, migration factors are linked to China’s internal conditions and its rise as a global power. Yang (2021) argues that it is important to focus on the specific migrant experience of Chinese working in SOEs because this differs from that of Chinese entrepreneurs active in cities. However, this binary distinction—a rural-urban divide in terms of SOE operations—may not hold; some Chinese migrants employed by SOEs are also active in cities, such as those working for Huawei in particular countries (Sullivan and Cheng 2018). It may be more useful to compare the experience of Chinese migrants by activity sector (construction, mining, trade, etc.) and by location (rural vs. urban).36

Sociocultural factors for Chinese migration in Africa

The literature has also been shifting toward better understanding Chinese migrants’ complex relationships with their host communities, which promises to shed more light on “theorizing global inequalities in a South-South context” (Sheridan 2019, 138).37 There are granular micro-level ethnographies showing the social, economic, and political effect of Chinese migration. In fact, Chinese migration inserts itself into broader social and economic dynamics when it comes to trade, labor laws, and other factors (Lampert and Mohan 2018, 150-160; Dankwah and Amoah 2019).
Studies are shifting their focus away from state-to-state relationships. Indeed, both in Ghana (Lampert and Mohan 2018) and Nigeria (Ying-Ying Tiffany Liu 2020) scholars have exposed how Chinese migrants and entrepreneurs work with administrative officials, therefore nuancing how Chinese migrants operate below the state. That is, Chinese migrants forge relationships (which could be positive, negative, contested, trusting, etc.) with other traders, state officials, workers, mine workers, and clients (Gukurume 2019; Lampert and Mohan 2019; Ying-Ying Tiffany Liu 2020; Dankwah and Amoah 2019). In Tanzania, Sheridan (2019) analyzed Chinese migrants’ experience of the Tanzanian state through petty corruption. According to Sheridan, some Chinese migrants are harassed by the state, which leads them to think that “despite China’s rise as a global power, Chinese citizens abroad remain vulnerable” (Sheridan 2019, 140). The same harassment does not happen, for instance, to American citizens. Researchers are also focusing on the Chinese migrants’ perspective within their host communities (Di Wu 2021). Liu (2020) explores the intra-migrant relationship—one of exploitation—in South Africa, where Chinese migrants employ Zimbabwean migrants in the restaurant sector. Chinese migration is evidently changing the social and economic landscape of African host nations well beyond state-to-state bilateral relations (Park 2022).

There is also a recent shift in the literature’s focus toward understanding the construction of “Chineseness” among Chinese migrants overseas. Jinpu Wang and Zhan (2019) analyze this in Ghana in the context of SOEs, private entrepreneurship, and Chinese embassies; Gukurume (2019) focuses on Chinese small-scale traders in Zimbabwe; and Sheridan (2019) considers Chinese migrants’ tactics for dealing with Tanzanian bureaucrats. Park (2020) looks at how Chineseness informs pan-Chinese solidarity in South Africa where Chinese migrants are the targets of anti-Chinese hate speech in a context of racial and social hierarchies. In some instances, Chinese migrants try to capitalize on the China brand both in the economic space and the political space (Park 2020, 469-470), while at the same time coming together in the face of injustice, inequality and anti-Chinese sentiments (476-477). In any case, it seems that the racialized context of South Africa, conditions how Chinese migrants operate: for instance, Chinese employers also perpetuated the racial wage gap regarding their migrant Zimbabwean employees (Ying-Ying Tiffany Liu 2020).

Other scholars are now paying attention to family practices among Chinese migrants in Africa because “[f]amily and kinship are considered as the foundational institution in the organization of Chinese businesses and are celebrated as the reason for their competitiveness in the global arena” (Liang Xu 2020, 508). This family factor has received little attention (although there is now some work on gender and mobility within Chinese migrant communities, e.g. Hanisch 2022). According to Xu, having a Chinese family in the host community (South Africa, in this study) allows Chinese migrants to achieve “business and emotional survival” (Liang Xu 2020, 516). That is, Chinese migrants can enter informal husband-wife relationships and use “factory-generated wealth to support their respective families in China. They would provide education for their children, purchase new apartments in China, and help their elderly parents” but the relationship would not oblige its participants to have children together (Liang Xu 2020, 517).

Scholars have differed slightly regarding the prevalence of Chinatowns in Africa, another important aspect to consider when discussing Chinese migrant communities. Howard French (2014) emphasizes that Chinatowns do not appear to be all that common in Africa compared to other parts of the world, perhaps because no African countries have forced Chinese migrants into segregated communities as much of the West did in the twentieth century. Daouda Cissé notes that Chinatowns in Africa have nonetheless received a fair amount of academic attention, especially those in Johannesburg, South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Port Louis, Mauritius; Antananarivo, Madagascar; and Luanda, Angola (Cissé 2013, 19); Shaonan Liu (2019) also discusses Chinatowns in Nigeria.

This scholarship on African Chinatowns is set against findings on Chinese migration elsewhere,
such as in the US or Europe. It is difficult to grasp why Chinatowns have received such interest if Chinese migrants have not been forced into segregation; in fact, even the "self-segregation" of Chinese migrants has been disproved (Hairong Yan, Sautman, and Lu 2019). Hairong Yan, Sautman, and Lu (2019) find that most Chinese in Africa are not segregated or self-isolated any more than any other Asian migrant. The authors examine "Chinese practices in residence, socialization, and language acquisition in Africa in comparative perspective and conclude that Chinese in Africa are not generally self-isolated. Chinese may be less isolated from black people than are most whites in Africa or the US" (Hairong Yan, Sautman, and Lu 2019, 41). Zhengli Huang (2019, 17) demonstrates how Chinese migrants in, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia engage with their host community through the "Rwanda Market," the "only open-air market in the city that sells Chinese vegetables."

The scholar Zhou Haijin has written that Chinese migrants in Africa can be divided into three categories: "labor migration, entrepreneurship immigrants and transit immigration" (Zhou 2014, 79). French (2014), meanwhile, identifies two main categories of Chinese migrants. One is blue-collar Chinese who know very little about Africa before being brought in on contracts. An estimated 1-3% of these workers stay in Africa after their initial contract, and over time they build up significant communities. The second category is what French claims to be "the bigger phenomenon": Chinese workers who do not like the overcrowded, hypercompetitive, and polluted landscape of China and see Africa as an opportunity to build a better life. For "many" of French's Chinese interviewees, "Africa also seemed relatively lacking in corruption" (French 2014, 6). It is, however, important to flag that this perception of Africa "lacking ... corruption" is precisely a perception: according to some research, Chinese entrepreneurs have been shown to flirt with corruption in their engagement with state officials when necessary, as in Nigeria, for instance (Shaonan Liu 2019).

Despite the comparatively organic nature of migration and the diversity of these migrants, French sees China–Africa migration as part of China's intentional construction of an international sphere of influence through its overseas population. The intentionality and effects of such migration are contested, and scholars' interpretations of these factors may play a role in determining how much research is dedicated to relevant subjects, including: Africans protesting Mandarin curricula in schools; the prevalence of Chinatowns and other Chinese communities with collective action potential; and the level of assimilation of Chinese migrants.

Recently, scholars have been trying to displace altogether the usage of the term migrants in this literature, because it does not inform the reader about the status of the migrants, "their activities[,] or the strategies they develop as people residing in a foreign environment" (Giese et al. 2019, 5). Indeed, studies highlight how some Chinese migrants adapt to their host communities and learn the local language, while others do not; such differences may be related to status, class, or domain of activities of the migrants. A potential area for future research could be in investigating which factors determine such differences depending on the country of residence. Recent studies seem to be disaggregating Chinese expatriate workers to better understand their attitudes toward host communities (Giese and Laurence 2019; Sullivan and Cheng 2018; Beibei Yang 2021; Fei 2022). While some scholars are specifically focused on understanding the migration motives of Chinese small-scale traders (Gukurume 2019), others are focusing on the higher end, Chinese corporate workers in SOEs (Fei 2022).

**African migrants in China**

Africans in China have similarly diverse backgrounds, which are often left unexamined in research. This is a particular challenge for Chinese scholarship on this group. Methodologically, many researchers in China see "Africans" as a general group and pay insufficient attention to the diversity within the group,
especially differences in languages, religious beliefs, nationality, gender, and other crucial dimensions of identity. Although scholars, such as Chen Yupeng’s (2017) research on Nigerian merchants, have noticed this flaw in the past, the essentialist tendency persists.

As with Chinese migrants in Africa, one can reach a deeper understanding of Africans in China by considering their regional background. Castillo (2014) notes: “The figures for transients and overstayers vary a lot depending on different national/cultural practices (and also as a consequence of the obstacles/policies the Chinese authorities impose upon foreigners).” For instance, the majority of Angolans in Guangzhou, he says, are women who regularly travel back and forth between their home country and China on short income-boosting trips; they come to Guangzhou, conduct business, leave without overstaying their permits, and then come back. Migrants from Nigeria are different, Castillo writes, as they are mostly youth who “come to China in ‘suicidal missions’ (success or nothing) and, as it is almost impossible to succeed in China in 30 days, many of them opt to overstay.”

Another trend in the study of Africans in China is that scholars have found it most useful to compare African residents to Chinese internal migrants rather than to other foreigners. A study of health care in Guangzhou by Tabea Bork-Hüffer found that Chinese rural-to-urban migrants and African migrants “face similar challenges in China, especially in regards to limited access to local health insurance schemes, low social status, discrimination, and insecure legal status, which all affect their interaction with the healthcare system” (Bork-Hüffer 2015, 50). In addition to Bork-Hüffer’s article, other publications on Africans’ access to health care in China have come to largely similar conclusions (Hall et al. 2014, Lin et al. 2015, McLaughlin et al. 2014). Roberto Castillo (2016), for instance, likewise found that the social exclusion and economic vulnerability of Africans in Guangzhou were strikingly similar to the experiences of Chinese internal migrants, while their aspirations to break into Asian markets via China were more similar to those of other foreigners.

Guangzhou remains a key area of research, where some scholars are now looking into the specific spatial configuration of neighborhoods such as Xiaobei 小北, an African neighborhood (Niu et al. 2020). These authors are quick to point out that such neighborhoods are not the same as ghettos or immigrant/ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves found in other countries, including the West; they reframe Xiaobei as a “transient neighborhood” instead, highlighting its flexibility. Beyond the structural exclusion that internal Chinese migrants and African migrants face, some recent studies are focusing on daily-life interactions between African migrants and Chinese host communities. In Guangzhou, Lan (2019) finds that “in addition to the language barrier, cultural misunderstandings and racialized stereotypes may also play important roles in impacting grassroots Chinese/African business interactions” (Lan 2019, 484; see also Kelly Liang and Le Billon 2020). A recent national survey of African migrants in China shows that they have a lower quality of life than has the general public in China (Xiong et al 2021).

Liang Yucheng, a Chinese scholar who has published bilingual research on Africans in Guangzhou, studied the African community from the perspective of “cumulative causation theory” during a very active period of migration in 2013 and 2014, and concluded that “a migration network connecting Africa and China is rapidly emerging” (Yucheng Liang 2014, 1). One method Liang used to confirm the establishment of an African migrant community was analyzing the changing class backgrounds of these migrants. Previous research employing cumulative causation theory has shown that once an initial middle-class migrant wave arrives and becomes more established, it is easier and more attractive for others—including lower-class migrants—to follow in a second wave. Liang gathered survey data to show that social networks are developing and the average socioeconomic class of incoming migrants is declining, which suggests that the Africa–China migrant community is becoming well-established. Bodomo remains skeptical of this improvement in African migrants’ situations, arguing that historically (since the Tang Dynasty), Africans have “often lived at the margins of society as
unequal participants in the Chinese social spaces they found themselves in” (Bodomo 2020, 527). Today, for instance, African migrants have unequal access to health care (Bodomo 2020) and African migrants receive low levels of care in China (Xiong et al. 2022).

The literature is slowly moving to considering the specificity of migrants from various African countries in different cities across China. Carling and Haugen (2021) focus on Gambian migrants in Guangzhou, while Obeng (2019) analyzes Ghanaian migrants to the same city. Here, Ghanaians are the second largest group of migrants, behind Nigerians (Bodomo 2018, 68, cited in Obeng 2019, 72). This community includes Ghanaian entrepreneurs, mostly involved in the brokerage and shipping industry, as well as students studying in China; laws complicating economic integration work against the entrepreneurs who wish to settle in China (Obeng 2019, 75-77). Some interesting recent studies are taking stock of the “return migration” of Africans back from China to their respective countries, as this has received less attention (Adebayo 2019). Others are also considering Nigerian-Chinese couples and their children in China (Adebayo and Omololu 2020). Adebayo’s (2019, 257) study of Nigerians in China noted that the policies of the Chinese state and integration problems are among the reasons why some wish to return, but they remain ambivalent towards returning because of family factors. In that sense, African migrants face barriers to settlement in China which impact their long-term prospects and intimate family life (Jordan et al. 2020).

However, Yiming Tan et al. (2022) have focused on factors that can influence the settlement of African migrants due to changes in Chinese migration laws that allow them to obtain longer residence status. Tan et al. find that neighborly interactions between Africans and Chinese can positively affect the settlement intention of student migrants and businesspeople. Even when African migrants do not have easy residence, their intimate entanglements may keep them in China: Su et al. (2022, 189) affirm that the children born out of mixed African marriages in Guangzhou “have a strong desire to identify with China and Chinese culture, but they are forced to develop a hybrid sense of identity and belonging due in large part to the public negation of their Chinese identity.” These children, however, are able to navigate multiple spaces and exert agency so as not to be solely defined by the external Chinese gaze.

**Africans in China as students and domestic subjects**

A significant sub-theme of the Chinese-language literature on African migrants in China focuses on African students. Indeed, in a database search of the Chinese-language literature on the topic of Africa-China/China-Africa migration, research on this topic accounted for about 40% of all Chinese publications. This reflects the fact that students from Africa have become the fastest-growing group among international students in Chinese universities. Most authors on this topic are from Chinese universities hosting African students or exchange programs, who tend to use these students as accessible sample groups with grant support from their home institutions (e.g. Gao and Zhang 2021). Research tends to be motivated by questions of how to improve academic performance and social life in China via general policy recommendations. Pedagogy of Chinese language training is another area of study (Zhu Wenjing 2019). This stands in contrast to the English-language literature, in which African students in China have only recently been studied in more detail, for example by Li Anshan (2018) and Yi Sun (2020). Previously, besides a chapter in Bodomo’s 2012 book, there was only one academic paper in English dedicated to understanding Africans’ educational experience in Beijing (Ferdjani 2012).

Researchers identify challenges students commonly encounter, including homesickness, language barriers, and the difficulty in communicating religious beliefs and other cultural customs. Cui and He (2021) find that most postgraduates in the Beijing area are funded by Chinese scholarship and grants, which helps explain the “satisfactory” outcome for most students. They report that students are most satisfied with coursework, conferences, and other means of academic exchange, but find it more
challenging to participate in research (Cui and He 2021). Outside Beijing, however, things are different. Some scholars identify a greater share of self-funded African students outside the small club of elite Chinese universities and note differences between these students and those with Chinese scholarships. The former group tends to be less prepared for living and studying in China. Their student visa status also limits their ability to work outside the university, which negatively impacts their experiences (Wen 2020).

Qi et al. (2019, 396) report that “statistics released by China’s Ministry of Education show that the total number of African students in China grew in 2018 to 81,562,” making China the “second largest destination for African students to study abroad, after France.” They also note that students seem to be the second largest group of African immigrants in China. But as noted earlier, the literature tends to lump all African students into the same category. This is slowly changing, however. Qi et al.’s own study focused specifically on the adaptation difficulties that Cameroonian students encountered, such as “stereotypes, prejudice and ethnocentrism” (Qi et al. 2019, 410). Delving further into this theme, Mulvey (2021a) has tried to understand the various motivations of African students for undertaking studies in China. Mulvey finds that some students come from an African middle-class background (as Magbondé 2021 also finds), while others have been effectively coerced into studying abroad. (For example, Mulvey [2021a, 6] recounts a case of Eritrean students employed by their national government who were bluntly informed that they had received non-optional scholarships to study in China.) Magbondé (2021), considering Benin, finds that student migrants chose China for the quality of education but would prefer Western countries for the quality of institutions.

Many of the students who study in China tend to return to their home countries (Hodzi 2020, 574). Hodzi (2020, 574) finds that “an education in China does not necessarily result in upward mobility” for the students—possibly in part because courses of study undertaken in China do not necessarily increase employability in Africa. According to Hodzi, it is more salient that China is projecting its soft power through offering education and scholarships (Hodzi 2020, 578). But Mulvey (2021b) nuances the binary stay-or-return choice of African student migrants in China. He finds three distinct paths: some students are willing to return, while others prefer to set up businesses after graduation, and a third group aims to “use China as a stepping stone to destinations in the Global North” (Mulvey 2021b, 3). In any case, African students in China find themselves in a place where the diploma acquired in China is not always a stepping stone itself when they return, but moving up the social scale in China is also difficult.

Chinese scholars also see African students as an important resource for China’s international development. Huang (2019), for instance, stresses the role African students can play in China’s international development strategy, calling them a "central force" (zhongjian liliang 中坚力量) and "core cadres" (hexin gugan 核心骨干) in Sino-African scientific and industrial cooperation.

Another line of Chinese-language research considers Africans as domestic subjects. This scholarship generally perceives Africans as a distinctively alien group that requires specific policy accommodation or intervention. Researchers usually identify their subjects through the general label of “Africans” or as spatially clustered migrant communities, rather than diving into other vectors of identity such as nationality, profession, or immigration status. In addition to the National Social Science Fund of China, local governments have also funded such research. In particular, as a primary destination of African migrants, the provincial government of Guangdong shows great interest in supporting research from the perspective of local administration (Wang Bingyu and Lu 2021).

Such research can be further divided into two kinds. First, there is anthropological and sociological research that constructs the migrant community as a subject of administrative management. Wang Bingyu and Lu Yanxuan (2021), for example, study how African migrants interact with institutional, social, technological, and physical infrastructure in Guangzhou, and in their daily life. Based on their
ethnography, they advocate reforming the “immigration infrastructure,” which often fails to respond to the “quotidian” and “procedural” needs of African migrants (Wang Bingyu and Lu 2021; see also Li Yanzhi and Liu 2021). In the second mode, epidemiological research frames the migrants collectively as a public health subject. Remina Maimajitijiang et al. (2019) conclude that the Chinese healthcare system is insufficient to meet the needs of an expected increase of African migrants in Guangzhou (居穗非洲人) and call for additional investment and reform. In another examination of African migrants’ healthcare needs, Xu Junfang et al. (2019) from Tsinghua University make use of racialized language (e.g. 黑种人). Xu’s team characterizes their subjects as “uneven in their knowledge,” with “diverse sexual partners” and “widely practiced unprotected sex.” They recommend “enhanced” and “innovative” governmental intervention, “particularly significant” as a public health response. However, this conclusion is dubious on several grounds and uses a questionable methodology: for one, it never compares African migrants with other population groups.

Despite the significant influx of African migrants, many see China as a transitory stop rather than a terminus and thus lack a strong motivation to acquire language skills and cultural knowledge. This skepticism toward assimilation, compounded by a lack of institutional support for immigrants and a relatively conservative culture towards foreign migrants among many Chinese, is viewed as creating certain challenges for local administrators (Li Yanzhi and Liu 2021). During the COVID pandemic, violent clashes between migrants and native residents even triggered diplomatic protests.

One response from the central government is to attempt to incorporate some Africans into Chinese institutions by selectively construing them as an informal constituency. Young African professionals who have worked or studied in China are a main target. For example, Pu Shuihan (2020) reports that the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has hosted a series of programs under the banner of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meant to create venues of political and policy communication.

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

Originally, this section was titled “Environment and Health,” reflecting the dominance of concerns about the environmental effects of China’s involvement in extractive industries in Africa. Specifically, after a “new scramble” for African oil dominated media headlines and academic literature in the mid-2000s, attention expanded in the following decade to other topics; for example, some Western academics saw China “exploiting” African resources through mechanisms such as wildlife trafficking. China’s humanitarian aid and health assistance remained almost entirely unexamined in the academic literature until the Ebola crisis of 2014.

In the light of COVID-19, China’s impact on Africa’s health sector is growing as a primary area of research and continues to grow as the relationship adjusts given the impacts of the pandemic. Therefore, we highlight first the state of the literature on health, and then discuss arguments in the scholarship on environmental outcomes of Chinese involvement in Africa. The sub-themes that we cover, in order, are: how the Ebola crisis changed China-Africa health impact research; the beginnings of China-Africa COVID-19 engagement research, which we expect to continue to grow; the role of Traditional Chinese Medicine; environmental effects of extractive industries and hydropower; African agency in environmental outcomes; forestry and fishing; wildlife trafficking; and coal, renewable energy, and climate change.
How the Ebola crisis changed China-Africa health impact research

Before the Ebola crisis, Chinese healthcare assistance to Africa generally flew under the radar of Western scholars and government officials. China has officially provided healthcare assistance to Africa for decades. In 1963-1989, this included sending medical teams to over forty African countries, and “twinning” Chinese provinces with African national counterparts; these efforts incorporated the political and ideological mission of spreading Mao Zedong Thought (Xun Zhou 2017, 144-146). An analysis by Xiangcheng Wang and Tao Sun (2014), however, argued that this assistance was relatively disorganized and received less emphasis from top policymakers compared to the global health campaigns of the US and the UK. In more recent years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has operated a mobile hospital ship since 2010, with missions to Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Seychelles, but China did not attract much attention for its health work until its response to the Ebola crisis, when it sent three large military medical teams to Sierra Leone and the West African region (Duchâtel et al. 2016, 3).

Before the Ebola crisis, the Chinese government also did not place much emphasis on tracking and publicizing its own health engagement in Africa. Deborah Bräutigam (2016) has noted that the Chinese government likely undercounted its own contributions to the Ebola response, partly because it did not report the costs of the medical personnel sent or the cost required to transport, house, and equip them.

However, China’s engagement with development assistance for health in Africa was increasing rapidly even before the Ebola crisis. An analysis by Shajalal et al. (2017) found that Africa was a focal point of China’s global health development assistance from 2000 to 2013: “In terms of specific diseases, China is most concerned with building an African public health system through donations targeted towards general health (313 projects), combating Malaria (115 projects) and maternal, neonatal and child health (MNCH), (12 projects).” This analysis was based on the AidData database of development assistance (noted in the geo-economics section of this report), and the authors additionally found that “there is a statistically significant relationship between [health] aid to Africa and Chinese exports to Africa.”

The Ebola crisis brought more public and academic attention to China’s engagement in African health, and it was also perceived as a turning point within China. Researchers from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention wrote that the Chinese response to the Ebola epidemic was “a new chapter for public health security in China” (BiKe Zhang and Gao 2015, 114). The researchers note that this was one of the first times China had “participated in actions to cope with significant international public health emergencies” (BiKe Zhang and Gao 2015, 115). They suggest that Chinese medical teams gained experience in turning general hospitals into infectious disease hospitals during the SARS epidemic, which helped them do the same in West Africa (BiKe Zhang and Gao 2015, 115).

In the period between Ebola and COVID-19, academic research on China-Africa health engagement flourished. Papers covered topics including China’s engagement in shaping innovative national initiatives against infectious diseases (Tambo et al. 2016) and China’s more general investment in public health among countries signed on to its Belt and Road international development initiative (Tambo et al. 2019). A recent working paper by Allison Grande, Sara Fischer, and James Sayre on Chinese medical teams deployed to Ethiopia and Malawi found that “very few Chinese physicians ... were able to communicate in English beyond an elementary level” (Grande et al. 2020, 15), which hindered their ability to care for patients or transfer knowledge to African counterparts, but knowledge transfers did still occur sporadically.

As COVID-19 upended international perceptions of pandemic preparedness, researchers examined the differing dynamics of Ebola and COVID-19, with the latter requiring a “broader public
health response” (Ayebare et al. 2020). However, given Africa’s longstanding fight against Ebola, among
other infectious diseases, the mechanisms introduced during the Ebola crisis have also been leveraged
to assist in the response to COVID-19. The 2014 Ebola crisis highlighted the multiple gaps in Africa’s
pandemic response plans and surfaced certain changes necessary to save lives during large-scale
health crises; the Chinese aided in making some of these changes (Yanzhong Huang 2017, 1). Thus,
when COVID-19 hit Africa, its effects were somewhat mitigated by improved responses which had been
developed in reaction to Ebola. Although much of the literature discusses China’s direct response to
help aid Africa during COVID-19, as discussed below, such as sending medical supplies and equipment
(Verma 2020, 254), it must also be noted that Chinese efforts during the Ebola crisis contributed to
Africa’s more prepared response to COVID-19.

The beginnings of China-Africa COVID-19 engagement research

The first known case of COVID-19 in Africa was detected in Egypt in February 2020; the World Health
Organization declared COVID a pandemic in March. As COVID began to spread in Africa, China
responded by donating masks and other medical supplies and resources to Africa (Hangwei Li and
Musiitwa 2020), though most of China’s coronavirus-related donations globally originated in the
private sector rather than the Chinese government (RWR Advisory Group 2020). Interestingly, the
arrival of an eighteen-person Chinese medical team to Nigeria in early April provoked a public backlash
from medical associations in that country, as some Nigerians felt the aid was unnecessary and even
demeaning (Olander 2020a).

In the early stages of COVID-19, social anthropologist Melissa Leach wrote on the intersection
of China’s experience with COVID and West Africa’s experience with Ebola, suggesting that “in most
African settings, [Chinese-style] centralised state control [to respond to an epidemic] is less likely to be
effective, and more likely to generate mistrust” (Leach 2020). Additionally, Leach commented that given
Africa’s varied experience with Chinese engagement, including “China’s strong support for the West
African Ebola response and the new African Centre for Disease Control,” Africans will “surely not simply
stereotype COVID-19 (negatively) as a ‘Chinese disease’ or (positively) as a ‘Chinese response’.” However,
as the pandemic continued, reports emerged in April 2020 of a wave of COVID-19-related discrimination
against Africans in Guangzhou, China (as noted in the previous section on migration). This news led to
an anti-China backlash in multiple African countries, especially Nigeria (Olander 2020b). The lack of
a strong relationship and clear understanding between the ordinary people of China and Africa was
exposed during the pandemic, revealing the fractures between the two parties (Osondu-Oti 2020).
However, despite this backlash and resentment, many African governments continued accepting aid
from the Chinese in the form of medical supplies as the pandemic progressed (Bone and Cinotto 2020).

While phrases such “vaccine/mask/coronavirus diplomacy” are not uncommon in non-
Chinese-language sources which assess China’s aims in Africa during the pandemic (Kobierecka and
Kobierecki 2021, 939-940), a striking difference with the Chinese-language sources is that the latter
make no reference to these types of diplomacy, which appear too pragmatic to be compatible with
the ideal of a “community of a shared future.” Once again emphasizing the importance of long-term
development goals in Africa, Chinese scholars frame China’s COVID assistance to Africa not so much
as aid, but rather as part of public health governance that goes far beyond physical health (Zeng 2020;
Zhao Yating 2021).

What do the COVID pandemic and associated diplomatic negotiations mean for China and
Africa’s relationship moving forward? Much of the scholarship has covered economic and financial
burdens, one of the main sectors affected by the pandemic (e.g., Yunnan Chen 2021). Many scholars
are concerned with the broader landscape of the future of Sino-Africa relations: for example, Lingnan
University convened an international symposium on "Africa-China Relations in the Post COVID-19 Era," which aims to explore the changes that have materialized since the start of the pandemic. As Osoundo-Oti has argued (2020), people-to-people engagement, a significant feature of China-Africa relations (Amoah et al. 2020, 547), was notably disrupted between China and Africa; this symposium was geared toward reigniting it.

One clear thing, Xiamen University’s Emmanuel Umeonyirioha (2022) points out (among others, such as Makengo 2021), is that the COVID-19 pandemic may buffet but will not put a halt to the China-Africa relationship and that, thus far, Sino-Africa relations have proven to be resilient throughout its multiple waves. In fact, Cobus van Staden of the South African Institute for International Affairs considers that the pandemic actually forced many African governments to work more closely with China as they struggled to maintain adequate amounts of medical supplies for their populations (see Schwikowski, 2020). At the same time, scholars are discussing how China's reduced commitments in Africa announced at the eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in November 2021, can partly be attributed to the impacts of COVID-19. Despite the lackluster goals set by the Chinese at the Forum, Yun Sun (2021) writes, trade was “the only growth point of China's financial commitment to Africa” as “China eyes growing trade with Africa as its priority.”

Similarly to trends seen in other areas of the China-Africa relationship, scholars are beginning to discuss the pandemic’s impacts on the role of African agency in the relationship. Carmody (2021, 10) argues that the pandemic “would appear to be generally reducing the relative power of African political elites in relation with China.” This can in part be contributed to the overwhelming financial burdens brought on by the pandemic, as well as the need for medical aid. Moreover, as Patterson and Balogun (2021, 161) report, the pandemic has also highlighted the variable levels of agency between African countries, depending upon the various forms of governance, health systems, and infrastructures in place.

The role of Traditional Chinese Medicine

An area of growth in China–Africa health research is the application of Chinese traditional medicine (TCM). It is notable that artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs), the "most effective antimalarial medicines available today," had their origin in TCM. Artemisinin, called *qinghaosu* 青蒿素 in Chinese, is a naturally occurring chemical found in high concentrations in the Artemisia annua plant native to Sichuan (Tu 2011, 1218). This plant has been used in China for over 2000 years, and starting in the 1960s, medical research based in TCM led to a breakthrough in the development of artemisinin; the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted ACTs as its primary recommended antimalarial treatment in 2005 (Tu 2011, 1217-1219). Chinese researchers have continued to express substantial interest in applying TCM to other diseases afflicting Africa and the world at large (Tu 2011, 1219). For example, as the world was struggling to find a vaccine against COVID-19, researchers discussed the potential role that TCM could play in fighting the disease. There is interest in applying TCM to other parts of the world; the literature suggests that China plans on utilizing its BRI partners to further promote the spread of TCM in these countries (Cao et al. 2019).

Many Chinese-language journals are devoted to TCM, and these journals commonly publish articles on the spread of TCM worldwide—including, and often with a special focus on, Africa. The Chinese-language literature on TCM far outpaces the English-language literature; while there are only a handful of academic articles in English that discuss TCM in Africa, there appear to be dozens of such articles in Chinese (e.g. Dai et al. 2014; Yang Jihong and Song 2013; Ke and Chen 2018). In sum, although Oxford professor Elisabeth Hsu identified Chinese medicine in Africa as an "under-studied category"
of medical anthropology (Hsu 2012, 295), this may not be the case if the Chinese-language literature is taken into account.

Environmental outcomes of extractive industries, hydropower, and climate risks

In the English-language literature, the study of China’s impact on the environment in Africa primarily originated in oil geopolitics, as the 2000s saw a plethora of high-profile publications on a “new scramble” for African oil, in which China was seen as a major player (e.g. Zweig and Bi 2005; Frynas and Paulo 2007; Ghazvinian 2008). The environmental reputation of China’s overseas ventures took a significant hit in 2006 when the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) was found to be illegally prospecting for oil in a national park in Gabon. Sinopec halted its operations, its environmental impact assessment (EIA) was determined to be inferior (Wenran Jiang 2009, 604), and for a few years many scholars believed that “Chinese enterprises have little environmental consciousness” (Wenran Jiang 2009, 588).

Around the same time, Sinohydro (a Chinese state-owned hydropower company) likewise drew attention and criticism from media and NGOs when it contracted for two massive hydropower projects in Ghana and Sudan. Construction for the Bui Dam in Ghana started in 2008 and was completed in 2013; construction for the Merowe Dam in Sudan started in 2004 and was finished in 2009. Though none of these cases—Sinopec in Gabon or Sinohydro in Ghana and Sudan—turned out to be as environmentally destructive as some feared, they continue to be widely cited as salient cases of large, environmentally sensitive projects undertaken by Chinese companies in Africa.

Hydropower is a perennial feature of China’s international environmental reputation. China is known for its massive Three Gorges Dam project, which sparked extreme concern among Western NGOs during its construction (Bosshard 2008, 14) and has lingering environmental and social impacts today. China is now the largest financier and builder of hydropower projects in Africa, with both positive and negative environmental consequences. China’s role as a key financier of African hydroelectric infrastructure can also be seen in its funding of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, whose successful completion without explicit financial support from Western sources is notable. The reticence of traditional Western-based financiers to support the project has been attributed to opposition from downstream Egypt. Issues around sharing the Nile River’s water flow have become key concerns between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. Due to these tensions, Ethiopia was forced to fund the majority of the construction of the GERD through domestic sources and, significantly, China (Abtew and Dessu 2018, 161-169).

After an initially anxious appraisal in the mid-2000s of the environmental prospects of Chinese hydropower projects in Africa (Bosshard 2008), Western analysts have become more confident that Chinese companies are increasingly adhering to international norms (Hensengerth 2013, 297-298; Bosshard 2010). A 2015 policy analysis by researchers at Johns Hopkins University found that, contrary to media reports stating that the Chinese do not require environmental impact studies for projects in Africa, “such studies are in fact often required” (Hwang et al. 2015, 1).

Hydropower projects in particular continue to receive scrutiny, especially for their displacement of people and effects on farmland and food security (Yankson et al. 2018), but also for their impacts on energy security and natural habitats (Tan-Mullins et al. 2017). The usage of large-scale hydroelectric projects as a basis for power projection by China has also been evaluated more carefully in recent years. Large hydroelectric projects are used to bolster market expansion by China and as a basis for sustained engagements with other countries. This mobilization of dams as soft power has been considered effective at the macro level, but more limited on a micro level (Adovor-Tsikudo 2021, 337-339). There is also increased analysis of how these hydroelectric projects, especially on international waterways, such as the GERD on the Nile, also situate China as a key actor in sustainable cooperation between African
states, considering both the mitigation of conflict over resource access and meeting climate change challenges (Pemunta et al. 2020). China’s now long-established role as a key funder of hydroelectric power and dam construction in Africa has led to increased examinations of the nexus between China’s soft power in this field and its relationship to the issues of climate change, clean energy production, and water scarcity that Africa will face as climate change progresses (Pemunta et al. 2020).

In more recent years, extractive industries—oil, natural gas, and mining—have again been generally treated as a geo-economic topic, including a focus on labor conditions rather than environmental outcomes. One of the few analyses specifically focused on such environmental outcomes considered a Chinese oil venture: a Sinopec project in Chad. The researchers behind this analysis found little support for the “overriding view … that lower environmental and social standards constitute a competitive edge for Chinese companies exploiting African natural resources compared to their Western competitors” (van Vliet and Magrin 2012, 13). In fact, they found that Sinopec’s ongoing cooperation with Total, the French oil and gas company, and other integrative measures had likely helped to reinforce environmental regulation (van Vliet and Magrin 2012, 229). With regard to other extractive industries, Chinese mining activities in Africa, for their part, tend to receive more attention for low wages and poor working conditions than for their environmental impact (see, e.g., Sautman and Yan 2011; Wegenast et al. 2017).

African agency in environmental outcomes

Scholars have historically disagreed about to what extent China’s industry projects in Africa have improved their environmental performance, though there is more agreement in recent years that it has improved. Former US ambassador David Shinn described a consensus position emerging by 2016 that the media narrative is “more negative than the reality of the situation,” but that “there is plenty of room for legitimate criticism” (Shinn 2016, 25). Shinn went on to note that “in more recent years, the government of China has become more sensitive to criticism” and has improved its environmental record in Africa (Shinn 2016, 25). Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that Western companies in Africa today often demonstrate only marginally better environmental performance than Chinese companies, and that targeted criticism of Chinese companies is largely driven by political and strategic distrust of China rather than factual analysis (Mol 2011, 793).

Around the same time that this consensus was forming, the “African agency” argument also became more popular. As noted in the geo-economics section of this report, this view posits that Chinese business practices in Africa are less affected by Beijing’s policies than by actual conditions in Africa and the choices of African governments (see, e.g., Weng 2016). That is, compared to Western companies, which are largely held accountable by NGOs and civil society, Chinese companies in Africa receive the strongest regulatory pressures from African governments themselves (Scott 2012, 14). This argument thus implies that in African countries with weak rule of law, Chinese companies’ environmental behavior suffers, while in African countries with higher standards and enforcement, Chinese companies’ environmental performance is likewise higher. In line with this argument, many scholars have seen Chinese companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures as a direct response to local circumstances and civil society pressure (Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013). In recent years, as China’s significant presence in Africa has become more of an established fact, larger amounts of data have become available for statistical analysis. Such analyses suggest that China’s direct foreign investment tends to concentrate in, and even prefer, countries with stable political environments and robust legal systems, which are valued along with resource endowment (Xiaoliang Wang, Yu, and Yuan 2021).

Another popular argument among scholars is that decisions emanating from Beijing to upgrade and rebalance its own economic structure, leading to the increased export of polluting industries,
could also influence environmental outcomes in Africa. This argument became prominent as early as 2008 (Bosshard 2008, 5), and has continued to be regularly discussed as examples of such relocation have emerged. However, this view is not mutually exclusive with the African agency argument. Take, for example, the highly polluting industrial process of tanning. Chinese tanneries in Ethiopia and Somaliland have received environmental complaints, and the responses of the respective African governments involved have varied: Ethiopia temporarily shut the company in question down until it addressed the problems, while Somaliland was afraid of losing foreign investment and did nothing (Shinn 2016, 41).

Forestry and fishing

Policy reports from international monitoring and advocacy organizations have identified illegal logging as one of the most prominent environmental issues within the China–Africa relationship. Following a June 2016 United Nations Environment Programme and INTERPOL report on the rise in environmental crime worldwide (Nellemann et al. 2016), Greenpeace flagged illegal logging as the “number one environmental crime” globally, noting that illegal logging accounts for “about 60% of the total loss of resources caused by environmental crimes,” and identifying China as the main impediment to addressing the problem (Stroot 2016).

Despite such NGO and media reports flagging illegal logging as one of the most urgent negative impacts of China’s ventures in Africa, as well as the active efforts of some African countries to combat illegal logging (Weng et al. 2014, 5-6), there is only a small amount of academic literature on the subject. An economic analysis of China’s influence on illegal logging in Africa has shown not only a significant demand for illegal timber, but also a decrease in standards (Kaplinsky et al. 2010). That is, as the main market for African timber shifted over time from the European Union to China, the demand for high-quality, species-specific, and processed wood has slowed, while the demand for high quantities of unprocessed logs has skyrocketed.

Recent reports have also predicted the significant growth of Africa as a source of illicitly obtained luxury wood materials for the Chinese market. Illicit trade in sandalwood and rosewood for the Chinese market is present throughout the African continent, despite various laws and treaties outlawing the trade. The scale of this trade is expected to grow as China’s timber and forest product imports increase (Kioko 2022, 128-132). In regions such as West Africa, the illegal harvesting of keystone species of trees increases vulnerability to fires and desertification (Kioko 2022, 132).

In 2014, China announced a set of voluntary guidelines that apply to overseas logging, Guidelines for Overseas Sustainable Forest Products Trade and Investment by Chinese Enterprises. There is broad agreement among Western scholars that the compliance of overseas Chinese companies with these guidelines is low. While some analyses simply note low compliance while treating the guidelines as a step in the right direction (Hoare 2015), others argue that voluntary measures such as these are not enough (Yi 2019), or are entirely misguided and only exacerbate the problem (Vicky Lee 2014). Issues concerning bribery and lax forestry governance are noted as endemic to the whole forestry industry in Africa. Illegally obtained wood from Africa often enters China with documentation, also illicitly obtained, which renders it “legal” timber upon entry to the Chinese market (Kioko 2022, 134). Further evidence-based research is needed to examine the impact of these Chinese guidelines, as well as options for better Chinese policy. In recent years rough estimates for the illicit export of timber from Africa to China have been published, noting significant growth over the last ten years. Examples include Mozambique, where these timber exports to China have increased sevenfold. Such reports suggest that the guidelines have had limited impact.

Unlike logging, most Chinese fishing in Africa, where China sources around two-thirds of
its global catch, is generally carried out "in accordance with treaties"—i.e., not illegally—and occurs offshore (Vicky Lee 2014). However, some is still being done illegally, such as Chinese fishing of small mackerel, which has harmed the welfare of some African fisherman and communities that rely on this fish as their main source of food and income (Vicky Lee 2014). It has also been reported that some Chinese companies have ignored fishing quotas and violated fishing zone regulations, resulting in the "depletion of the marine resource base and the attendant ecological impacts" (Shinn 2016, 49). A New York Times investigative report brought attention to the prevalence of illegal Chinese fishing off of Africa’s western coast (Jacobs 2017). There is room for more academic analysis of what determines how Chinese boats fish around Africa, especially when they toe the line between international waters and sovereign waters where individual African states could push back.

Recent studies have noted an increase in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by Chinese companies off the coasts of West and East Africa. While China is not the only nation illegally fishing in African waters, 75% of all ships fishing off the west coast of Africa are registered to Chinese companies (Pedrozo 2022, 343). Recent reports from NGOs have found that a large proportion of documented IUU fishing off Africa’s coasts were conducted by ships registered to the China National Fisheries Corporation, a state-owned enterprise (e.g., Greenpeace 2015).

Wildlife trafficking

Though elephants, rhinos, zebras, lions, and gorillas are all commonly poached in Africa, elephants and rhinos are particularly highly valued for their ivory and horn, respectively. China is often implicated in the poaching of these two species. Poaching in Africa is a high-profile issue and the dynamics of Chinese involvement are complex, as are the reactions of different African countries. For example, analysts disagree about China’s role in the illegal rhino horn trade. Some argue that Vietnam is the primary driver of demand for rhino horn products and behind an upsurge in rhino poaching (Guilford 2013), while others have argued that China’s role is underestimated (Hongqiao Liu 2013). An investigation of precisely which actors drive this trade leads Alden and Harvey (2021) to argue for the deep involvement of Chinese transnational criminal organizations. It is generally well-established that China’s ban in the 1990s on the use of rhino horn in Chinese medicine was effective in reducing demand (Guildford 2013), though there is some indication that rhino horn in China has become prized not as medicine but as a status symbol, much like ivory (Hongqiao Liu 2013).

Debates about how to address elephant and rhino poaching in Africa are highly contentious (Twigg 2016). Not only do analysts disagree on the efficacy of policy tools like one-off legal sales, but different African governments also espouse different policies. For example, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana have repeatedly petitioned to legalize the ivory trade (Alden and Harvey 2016), while other countries have urged keeping it illegal. Similarly, South Africa has been embroiled in a legal battle over rhino farming (Christy 2016), following years of debate over whether legalization is the best way to control rhino poaching (Yushan Wu 2015, 3). China, for its part, responded to intense international criticism by cracking down on the ivory trade in 2015 (Yushan Wu 2015, 3), which led to a 50% drop in the price of raw ivory in China (Alden and Harvey 2016), and by eventually phasing out all legal ivory trade in the country in 2017. Analysts were initially unsure if China would be successful in stemming demand for ivory. They later found evidence that indicated, in China, “the legal trade in ivory,” at least, “is dying”—but that this may also coincide with increased profits in the illegal trade (Cruise 2017).

Around the same time that China took action to stem the ivory trade, donkey hides were dubbed the “new ivory” in some media outlets (e.g., Olander 2017). Specifically, the hides are “processed to create ejiao 阿膠[,] a traditional remedy used to treat everything from anaemia to dizziness” (Wararu 2019), and some advocacy groups warned that donkey populations in Ghana and Kenya could be
“devastated” if Chinese consumption did not slow down (Paquette and Suuk 2020).

Research into the social and cultural geography of the illicit animal-product trade between China and Africa has been spurred on by the high-profile nature of the ivory trade, and its subsequent banning by China. Lessons learned from the efforts to ban the illicit ivory trade are seen as helping to clarify methods of promoting conservationist ideologies across cultural boundaries (Yu Luo and Gao 2020, 116).

Coal, renewable energy, carbon emissions, and climate change

Since the declaration of a common goal of "sustainable development" for China and Africa at the 2009 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the advancement of clean energy, green lending, and climate change-related initiatives in the China-Africa space has garnered increased attention from analysts and academics (World Wildlife Fund 2012). Some Chinese scholars argue that China-Africa climate cooperation should be situated within the larger context of great power relations. In other words, China’s efforts to help Africa mitigate the worst impact of climate change cannot be separated from its engagement with the United States and European Union in the same field (Yu and Wang 2022).

While 60% of renewable energy infrastructure installed in sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2015 was in South Africa, that trend has been changing in recent years, as more African countries promise fast-growing demand for renewable energy (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2016, 10). A recent study has found positive environmental carbon emission effects from China’s large investment in clean energy in non-resource-rich countries (Tawiah et al. 2021).

Studies of carbon emission transfer between Africa and China, including through international trade, form part of a growing body of research, but more research and data is needed to fully understand the situation. A Chinese study noted that considering carbon emissions via global trade, improving carbon-emission efficiency by both China and Africa plays a positive role in global carbon-emission reductions (Ji et al. 2020). Emphasis on low-carbon and high-efficiency development of trade between Africa and China is paired with the development of an industrial base in both regions for higher-level manufacturing, seen as crucial for reducing carbon emissions.

Among renewable energies, and beside hydroelectricity, solar power has received the most attention in Africa (see, for example, Shen and Power 2017; Baker and Shen 2017; Fan et al. 2018). A group of mostly Chinese researchers in 2019 wrote that there is a “new opportunity for African countries to develop their solar power resource through mutually beneficial cooperation between Africa and China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative” (Lei et al. 2019). It must be noted, however, that even in papers stressing the necessity of solar power in Africa to combat global climate change, caveats are noted, such as:

weaknesses of small scale of renewable energy investment, shortness of foundation for the PV [photovoltaic] industrial chain, insufficient awareness of social and environmental benefits of solar PV; their external opportunities of increasing gap between energy supply and demand, raising global awareness of Climate Change, rapid decrease of PV price, as well as their external threats of dominant position of the fossil fuels, potential environmental impacts related to the solar PV development, and discontinuity of energy policies. (Lei et al. 2019)

Compared to the hydroelectric projects mentioned earlier, China’s involvement in such fields is much more novel.

However, China remains the top financier of coal power plants across the African continent, presenting a contradiction with Beijing’s official goals of building a "green” Belt and Road, and a
contradiction with global trends of moving away from coal to combat climate change (Sguazzin et al. 2020). Chinese scholars further underscore that aid between China and African nations is between developing countries, which therefore prioritizes agricultural production, (hydraulic) power supply, and joint climate research ahead of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Kang and Liu 2021). As Africa’s energy needs rise—and its demand for both coal and more renewable energy with it—analyzing the determinants of Chinese investment into Africa will continue to be an important area of study.

**MEDIA, THE INTERNET, AND TECHNOLOGY**

The topic of China-Africa engagement in media, the internet, and technology is a smaller but fast-growing area of research in the academic literature in English. Bob Wekesa, a leading scholar in Africa-China media studies, noted in 2013 that media, communications, and ideology were quickly becoming a distinct research theme in the literature on engagement between China and Africa (Wekesa 2013). In 2017, Wekesa wrote that what he called the “Africa–China media and communications field” was still “nascent but rapidly growing,” but had “yet to achieve theoretical and methodological rigour” (Wekesa 2017).

However, Chinese scholarship on this topic still lags behind, as Li Jiafang and Wang (2021) have noted. This is despite the fact that, according to Ran (2015), China’s media outreach to Africa dates back to 1956, when the New China News Agency set up a branch in Cairo soon after Egypt recognized the People’s Republic of China. Since that time, China’s media engagement with Africa has been steadily growing to include press, radio, and TV. A consistent motivation of such efforts is to amplify China’s voice on the international stage against Western media dominance and to empower African media as well. But Ran concedes that such a politically-motivated approach poses challenges for Chinese media in its attempts to become more well established.

At the same time as China’s media presence in Africa has expanded, hundreds of millions of Africans have gained access to the internet, many of them relying on Chinese smartphones and Chinese-built telecom networks, and some African governments have also invested in surveillance capabilities provided by Chinese firms. China’s growing footprint in the African information, communications, and technology (ICT) sector is now attracting increased interest.

In this section, we discuss three primary questions that scholars have focused on: What influence does Chinese media have in Africa? Is China promoting its model of internet governance in Africa? And finally, how is Chinese technology purchased and perceived by African governments and publics?

**What influence does Chinese media have in Africa?**

In the 1990s and 2000s, China gave assistance to a handful of African countries to build broadcasting stations, especially for radio, but these instances were scarce, not well documented, and generally overlooked. Douglas Farah and Andy Mosher, in one of the earlier research articles that examined Chinese media in Africa, wrote in 2010 that “it is reasonable to assume that much of the effort is aimed at keeping local public opinion on the side of the Chinese” (Farah and Mosher 2010, 5; see also Mihouibi 2019).

Especially in those early days, China’s engagement with media and communications in Africa was perhaps most accurately categorized as development aid, though in more recent years it has
become a more overt project of public diplomacy. In the early 2010s, China’s footprint in the African media space grew rapidly. As Wekesa (2017, 13) recounts:

In 2010, the People’s Daily established an online platform in Johannesburg, followed closely by CCTV’s establishment of a Nairobi hub in 2011, eventually going on air as CCTV Africa in January 2012. The year 2012 closed with the rolling off the press of China Daily Africa edition in Nairobi.

CCTV Africa has since become the largest non-African TV initiative in Africa, and multiple studies have been published comparing its coverage in Africa to that of the BBC or Al Jazeera (Shubo Li 2017).

In that sense, geopolitical competition with Western powers influences the Chinese media strategy (Mihoubi 2018, 2019). Other works have attempted to characterize the underlying mission and narrative of Chinese media in Africa, using terms like “positive reporting” and “constructive journalism” (Gagliardone 2013). These studies have not found massive differences in coverage between CCTV Africa and other international media (Gabore 2020), though Chinese channels, unsurprisingly, consistently frame China as an ally and friend to Africa. But recent studies on specific issues nuance the difference in reporting between CCTV Africa and other international media. For example, some scholars have found that China is represented more positively in Kenya and Zimbabwe than in the USA (Melnyk 2021).

But while Chinese media may put a marginally more positive spin on the news, particularly news about China, it does not seem to have built up significant influence in Africa, at least yet. Herman Wasserman and Dani Madrid-Morales used data from seven focus groups in Kenya and South Africa to show that “Chinese media have little impact on students’ information habits,” and “attitudes toward China are predominantly negative” (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales 2018, 20). Scholarly literature is moving toward considering African audiences and how they produce, receive, and represent China-Africa relations through media. Iginio Gagliardone (2019, 48), who coined the “positive reporting” characterization of Chinese journalism in Africa, comments:

There seems to be a commitment on the side of Chinese editors to develop a distinctive narrative, building on ideas of South-South cooperation, leveraging the image of Africa as a continent of opportunities, but Chinese channels abroad seem not to have found — yet? — a distinctive image and space that does appeal to African and global audiences.

Meanwhile, Wekesa notes that Chinese state media in Africa has been a focus in the literature, whereas little rigorous analysis has been published on Chinese-language diaspora media in Africa, or on African media portrayals of China (Wekesa 2017, 20). At the same time, “media” could be understood more broadly: it offers the possibility for cooperation between China and Africa beyond strict reporting. For instance, China offers training programs to journalists (Benabdallah 2017), and various cooperation projects center around Chinese film translation for African audiences (Jin 2020; Jedlowski 2021) or grassroots cinematic connections between China and Africa, as Bao (2020) notes for the Queer University Video Capacity Building Training Program.

The question of Chinese influence in or through the African media is not clearly positive or negative. Scholars are moving beyond the macro narrative of “influence” to interrogate the receptivity to Chinese media in country-specific contexts (Jedlowski 2021), such as focusing on African portrayals of China. Diakon and Röschenthaler (2017), for example, studied China’s involvement in the Malian mediascape from the perspective of Malian journalists. They find that
Some Malian journalists report in a positive way about China and reproduce a rhetoric that repeats tropes about the historical and cultural greatness of Mali and China in contrast to “the West”, whereas others report much more critically about Chinese activities and their consequences for Malian moral values, trade and industrial production. (Diakon and Röschenhaler 2017, 97)

Similarly, Harrison, Yang, and Moyo weave together visual imagery and text analysis of Chinese presence in South Africa since the 1900s to find that “[s]imultaneously the Chinese in Africa are embraced and disavowed, loved and despised, desired and derided” (Harrison, Yang, and Moyo 2017, 26). Hence, the question of media influence is not straightforward.

Scholars are also innovating by focusing their analyses on social media platforms, beyond traditional media outlets (Calzati 2020; Matingwina 2020). Matingwina, for instance, finds in an analysis of YouTube videos “that the themes and the sentiments reflect the dominance of pessimistic and optimistic perspectives on the Africa–China relationship.” (Matingwina 2020, 23).

In Ghana, Oduro-Frimpong (2021, 223) considers cartoons in the media, reporting journalists express concerns around the “non-assertiveness on the part of African leaders in their geo-political interactions with China.” On the opposite side, researchers looked at the media production of FOCAC regarding China-Africa cooperation and found stereotypical representations of a primitive Africa unidirectionally benefiting from China (Batchelor 2022, 9). Batchelor mentions, however, that the visuals analyzed also portray a “modernizing, hard-working Africa” (Batchelor 2022, 12). This discrepancy in terms of media representations of Africa-China relations by Africans and Chinese clouds the study of Chinese media influence in Africa.

In the literature, the question of China’s media influence is moving toward diverse methods and considerations of African audiences’ representations of Africa-China relations. But this is complicated by the fact that in some countries China is a major stakeholder in large media companies (Pillay 2021). Pillay analyzes major media headlines in South Africa during COVID-19, finding only positive framings of China (Pillay 2021, 224-225). He connects this to the fact that China is a major stakeholder of one of South Africa’s biggest Media conglomerates: the Independent Media Group. The Star … is a [subsidiary] of this corporation. Another top heavyweight of South African Media, Naspers, receives the overwhelming majority of its revenue from its China operations. There are only four “big["] media corporations in South Africa. With two under the [yoke] of China. (Pillay 2021, 227).

Other scholars further pursue this question of influence. Guyo and Yu (2019) show that in Nairobi, ordinary citizens are being more exposed to Chinese news media, and “that audiences wanted more non-western news to consume alongside local and Western news in order to broaden their horizons or to compare and contrast different media outlets” (Guyo and Yu 2019, 63). The authors point out that in their study, respondents perceived the content of Chinese media to be biased, government propaganda, and untrustworthy (Guyo and Yu 2019, 64). To complicate the picture further, Umejei (2018a) approaches the question of Chinese media influence by focusing on the newsroom practices of African journalists working in Chinese media organizations based in Africa, specifically in Nairobi. The author finds that these Chinese media hold editorial conferences that “inform Beijing of the content produced by African journalists, to ensure it does not offend Chinese interests on the continent” (Umejei 2018a, 7). In this sense, African journalists have limited journalistic agency (Umejei 2018a, 8). Through these organizational practices, Umejei suggests, “there is an attempt to socialise African journalists working within Chinese media organisations based in Africa into a ‘positive reporting’ paradigm of journalism”
AFRICA-CHINA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS: STATE OF THE FIELD

(Umejei 2018a, 12; see also Umejei 2018b, 352; Mihoubi 2018, 11). However, Ojo (2020), in a study on China-Africa journalist grantees from Wits University, argues that there are structural challenges to reporting on China-Africa issues and that these should be accounted for “beyond the vague classification of the outputs into positive, negative and neutral reporting simply on content analyses of news stories” (Ojo 2020, 1189). From Ojo’s perspective, “constraints, which range from language barrier and scarcity of background information to limited access to [a] diverse pool of sources, influence the mode and the pattern of news coverage on China-African relations” (Ojo 2020, 1189).

Other researchers treat the question of influence through specific topics of media reports and on social media platforms. For instance, Yeboah-Banin et al. (2019) analyzed Ghanaian media coverage of Chinese aid. They found that media reports are dominated by stories with “positive frames, followed by those with negative frames […]” The data suggest a tendency for the sampled media to communicate posture (positively or negatively) in China–Ghana news rather than toeing the objective middle line” (Yeboah-Banin et al. 2019, 59). Other scholars advance that Chinese media’s journalistic approach in Africa takes more of a “constructive” than a positive approach (Yu and Zhang 2020). In a broader comparative exercise involving AllAfrica news, BBC, and CGTN, Yanqiu Zhang and Machila (2019) find similarly that CGTN had a more constructive tone to its reporting on Africa’s debt to China. Gabore (2020) argues that when it comes to media reports on COVID-19, Western media reports were more diverse in both framing and variety of tones, from positive to neutral to negative.) In a large study covering thirty African countries, Madrid-Morales (2021, 129) investigates “the extent to which African media relied on Chinese news sources to cover China and the COVID-19 outbreak during the first-half of 2020.” She finds that “the direct use of content published originally by Chinese sources (e.g. Xinhua, China Daily . .) is very marginal in both English and French-speaking Africa, particularly when compared with the reuse of content created by France’s Agence France Presse and, to a lesser extent, Reuters” (Madrid-Morales 2021, 141). Although Chinese media presence has expanded, investigations into coverage of COVID indicate that African media and African audiences resist consuming Chinese media. This fits with the recent finding that Chinese media expansion struggles in a contested audience marketplace (Yanling Zhu 2022).

A number of other researchers have sought to transcend the positive-negative coverage framework. Basu and Janiec (2021) have studied Kenyan news media representations of mega-infrastructure projects that China has financed in the country. These authors find that the media narrative “moves beyond the frame of negatives and positives to become one part of the larger regional ambitions espoused by Kenya’s political and economic elites” (Basu and Janiec 2021, 61). But Zheng (2022) finds, also in Kenya, that some Chinese actors’ non-intervention in the political space affects how issues are reported and represented. In South African media, Huan and Deng (2021) also find other frames beyond the positive-negative binary which are shaping coverage, such as the BRICS context, competition, and tension in China-Africa relations. In a media study of Sino-Zimbabwean relations, Mano (2021) finds frames of acceptance, resistance, and negotiation.

Scholars are also analyzing the China-Africa relationship by focusing on traditional media’s (BBC and CGTN) engagement on social network platforms (Yanqiu Zhang and Ong’ong’a 2021). Moreover, research is moving toward understanding the influence of Chinese media on diasporic Africans, namely African students in China, which could be understood as a counterpart to the influence of Chinese media on Africans in Africa. Xiang (2018, 131) finds that “the dominant codes of CCTV-Africa promoting the agenda of prioritising economic growth proved to be persuasive.” The CCTV media narrative around promoting Chinese soft power seemed to have found a positive reception amongst African students in China, although Xiang (2018, 132) admits that the group of students she interviewed “held different opinions regarding different issues.” Other researchers focus on the representations of Africans in Chinese media, specifically in Hong Kong (Chow-Quesada and Tesfaye 2020). These authors
find that Hong Kong media use a “representation of ‘blackness’ that relies on portraying Africans as the inferior Other” (Chow-Quesada and Tesfaye 2020, 391). On a broader scale, other researchers have found various online platforms in China (such as Weibo) that seek to raise “awareness of the seemingly harmful, dangerous Africans in China” (Tingting Liu and Deng 2020, 104; see also Liu et al. 2021).

Is China promoting its model of internet governance in Africa?

As Gagliardone writes in *China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet* (2019), policy analysts in the US and Europe have an almost instinctive suspicion that China—because it has invested so much effort in perfecting its own methods of censoring and controlling the Internet and information within its own borders—is probably teaching other countries to do the same.

Gagliardone sought to test this claim with fieldwork in four fast-developing African countries that have diverse governing structures and relationships with China, both politically and within their ICT sectors. From this work, he found “little trace” of evidence to support the narrative that China is promoting repressive internet governance in Africa:

The experiences of Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Rwanda pose a difficult test to those claiming China is promoting a more authoritarian model of the Internet in Africa and globally. Rather, they seem to reaffirm China’s pledge to support nationally rooted visions of the information society, whether it is the need expressed by the governments of Ghana and Kenya to strengthen infrastructure as well as the capacity of the state to deliver services in a competitive environment, or the ambition of the Ethiopian leadership to expand access under a regime of monopoly. (Gagliardone 2019, 82)

Gagliardone further emphasizes that African countries, not China, appear to be setting the agenda for managing their information spaces, supporting the application of the “African agency” lens to this aspect of China-Africa engagement. The ICT industry of Rwanda, a country which has adopted methods of information control and surveillance with perhaps the “closest similarities” with China, has the least investment from China out of the four countries Gagliardone studied.

There is a trend towards increased internet controls in some African countries, but Gagliardone suggests that these measures are publicly—and, it appears, also privately—justified more by a US-supported “securitization of development” frame than by citing the Chinese model.

Apart from very isolated cases [such as in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe], when repressive measures have been adopted or proposed in countries as diverse as Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, or Cameroon, it has not been China being held as an example for creating a supposedly more harmonious version of the information society. Across the continent, it has been the United States-backed anti-terrorism agenda, and the related securitization of development, which has offered much more easily exploitable arguments to justify and legitimize the repression of online communication and the persecution of Internet users. (Gagliardone 2019, 125)

Gagliardone (2019, 161) later asks a related question that may be difficult or impossible to answer without unprecedented access to Chinese government officials: “Is it possible that Chinese leaders, when they decided to venture into the ICT sector in Africa, realized how it was not necessary to openly articulate a discourse emphasizing control and security, because this discourse was already available and was actually being promoted by its adversaries?” This discourse of control and security, and questions of technological surveillance, are a topic of discussion, covered further in the following section. Given the
complexities in determining where the motivation for internet controls comes from, and the interesting
trends, as Gagliardone’s book describes, of hybridization and recombination of internet models that
many African countries have adopted, further research will be valuable.

How is Chinese technology purchased and perceived by African governments and publics?

In some respects, the presence of Chinese technology companies and the sale of their products in Africa
tell a story of trade and investment, localization, and technology transfer. As noted in the geo-economics
section of this report, the transfer of jobs, skills, and technology to Africa via Chinese enterprises is
a growing area of research interest. In a systematic analysis of information and communications
technology (ICT) aid flows from China to Africa, Rong Wang, Bar, and Hong (2020, 1515) find that
“Chinese ICT aid has unmistakably concentrated on three countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.”
They state that China’s ICT aid to Africa is not exchanged for natural resources; rather, China invests in
this “with goals ranging from cultivating diplomatic goodwill to promoting infrastructure development
to bolster market growth, from developing good relations with countries rich in natural resources to
selling telecoms equipment, from locking in market opportunity to instituting network power” (Rong
Wang, Bar, and Hong 2020, 1516).

The other side of the coin is African perceptions of Chinese technology and technology
companies, which is an evolving area of study. Gagliardone’s book summarizes in broad strokes what
we know about African perceptions of Chinese technology. His interviews with African entrepreneurs in
Kenya, Ghana, and Ethiopia found a widespread perception that large Chinese technology companies,
such as Huawei and ZTE, primarily use African countries as a “learning school” to train their employees
and gain global experience (Gagliardone 2019, 30-31). This is not dissimilar from how Chinese oil
companies have also been motivated to “go out” to Africa (Patey 2017).

Africans hold “largely positive attitudes towards megaprojects and negative ones towards cheap
consumer products,” Gagliardone writes, citing Afrobarometer surveys. Some Chinese companies, like
StarTimes, have entirely avoided calling themselves Chinese in their marketing to avoid the historical
association with cheap “made in China” goods (Gagliardone 2019, 34-35). Another Chinese company that
downplays its origins in China, Transsion, is the leading supplier of smartphones in Africa, reportedly
selling more than 130 million Tecno and Itel devices on the continent (Cascais 2019).

Most recently, Chinese companies supplying surveillance technology and expertise to African
countries have attracted media attention. For example, about a dozen African countries have purchased
AI technology from Huawei, many for “smart city” or “smart policing” functions, meaning sophisticated
surveillance and tracking technologies, often using facial recognition.

Other media reports have highlighted controversial aspects of Chinese engagement in African
technology. For example, the French newspaper Le Monde reported in 2018 that the African Union
building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which was built on China’s dime, had been bugged with microphones.
According to the report, a backdoor in the building’s computer system had allowed sensitive data to
be routed to Shanghai between midnight and two in the morning for five years, from January 2012 to
January 2017. Chinese officials vehemently denied the allegations of bugging, and African officials also
sought to smooth over the controversy (Niewenhuis 2018). Soon after, a Wall Street Journal investigation
indicated that Huawei technicians in Uganda and Zambia had helped governments surveil civil society
actors (Parkinson et al. 2019).

However, there are few academic studies on the political and social implications of these new
trends in surveillance. One exception is the scholarship of Seyram Avle (2022), who has focused on how
China’s low-cost hardware provision to African consumers serves to induct these consumers into a
surveillance-capitalist economy from which they had previously been excluded. Bulelani Jili (2020) has
also highlighted the agency of African governments in seeking out Chinese surveillance technology, as well as what he views as China's mask of neutrality in providing it. Additional work is needed in this area to put the spread of new advanced technologies into the broader theoretical frameworks of China-Africa engagement.

CAPACITY FOR KNOWLEDGE GENERATION ON AFRICA-CHINA

OVERVIEW

The second major section of this study is an inventory of the capacity for knowledge generation on China-Africa topics. This distribution is globally uneven, as becomes clear in the inventory itself. We have divided this into three sections: capacity in Africa, in China, and in the rest of the world, especially the Global North. Institutions were identified for this mapping study through internet searches; finding the institutional homes of relevant scholars, projects, publications, and conferences; and tracing institutional partnerships. We inventoried institutions including universities, think tanks, and NGOs, along with a number of more diffuse contributors to (and publishers of) research, especially online platforms and networks. Our list is also strongly informed by consultations with experts in this area, who identified important actors and networks as well as describing for us the shifts in capacity and behind-the-scenes factors that shape research production. More information about the criteria for inclusion appears in the inventory itself in the Annex.

CAPACITY IN AFRICA

Capacity for knowledge generation on China in Africa is changing but remains limited, fragmented, and largely disconnected from policymaking. Organizations tend to geographically cluster not so much by region or country as around cities, with a few major urban areas hosting the bulk of active organizations, notably: Johannesburg, Accra, and Dakar (several institutions exist in and Nairobi but it is unclear how active these actually are in producing research). A number of institutions which existed in the past are now defunct or no longer putting out research, while a few new ones are poised to become more active players. This includes those based at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, which are both well established and significant, but also several newly established, independent institutions, including the Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA) and the Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations (ASCIR).

Only one of our inventoried institutions is located in North Africa. Capacity in this sub-region is minimal, but interest is growing and regional networks are beginning to be built. Several North African institutions participate in Chinese government-initiated networks, but none of these as of yet possess active research programming. American University in Cairo has a study-abroad program in China, and Egyptian Chinese University (also in Cairo) also has a student exchange program. However, these programs are presumably inactive at the time of writing due to COVID-related restrictions on travel to China. Institutions which have such student-focused connections but are as yet not producing research are not included in our inventory.

Early interest in China-Africa connections led to the emergence of a critical mass of research on these issues over a decade ago. On its face, the number of institutions in Africa contributing to this knowledge production has grown significantly: our earlier report (Carayannis and Olin 2012) listed only
five institutions in Africa, and in this report we include twenty. At the same time, certain major players have left the space. For example, South Africa is perhaps the main hub on the continent of research institutions with a China-Africa programmatic focus, but it has seen the prominent Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University close its doors. Some intended expansions have not panned out: the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which a decade ago had hoped to grow its China programming with Chinese funding, has not done so as the funding did not materialize. And in other instances, institutions which have in theory joined the Africa-China research space have done so in name only, without producing substantive research outputs—at least as of yet.

There are several reasons for this somewhat flattened institutional landscape. In some cases, the political and institutional climate has not been friendly to this type of knowledge generation. In one case, a research NGO (China House) fell victim to strict NGO registration laws and ceased to operate. In another, a university center’s research independence and critical perspectives on China’s engagement in the region (the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University) came under increasing political pressure, leading the Centre’s leadership to eventually step down. Often, programs on China are one-person shops, driven by one individual who, if they relocate or step down, is not replaced, sounding the program’s death knell. Some of our consultations suggested that while individual faculty in universities on the continent continue to work on China-Africa topics, little research funding is available, leaving few avenues for academic advancement. In response, faculty and researchers tend to branch out into other specializations within their academic disciplines or produce other donor-driven research.

Expert consultations also suggested that as a general trend across the continent, there is a serious lack of roadmaps or pipelines for career development. Chinese or Asian studies programs are sparse at the undergraduate level; aspiring researchers who wish to specialize in this topic are left to cobble together their own career paths, often through routes that involve training in Europe or North America. The lack of postdoctoral opportunities also dissuades these scholars from returning to Africa—as can the problem of diploma equivalence, where diplomas obtained from one country are not recognized (or are not recognized at the same level) by another. As a result, African researchers working in this space may not be based on the continent. Furthermore, governments, experts commented to us, do not make full use of these scholars: they fail to take advantage of trained African researchers or, indeed, of the many Africans who have studied abroad in China at the undergraduate or graduate level by employing them or consulting them for policymaking. There are numerous Africans with graduate degrees from Chinese universities, but upon their return to Africa, they often find it difficult to get jobs in African institutions. Those who manage to find employment are often swamped by heavy teaching loads; others go into business, where they can have higher incomes and more stability. Significant amounts of research are never published when PhDs go on to careers in other fields, which leaves their unpublished dissertation work inaccessible to the broader research community. In this way, the higher education crisis in Africa has undercut individual researchers’ careers and, more broadly, the continent’s capacity for research production, failing to make use of the pool of educated researchers.

Efforts originally aimed at strengthening such institutional research capacity in Africa, such as the University of Leiden-based “Africa-Asia, a New Axis of Knowledge” platform, and the Association for Asian Studies in Africa (A-ASIA), have not succeeded in building the infrastructures for doing so. This has been due in part to funding limitations, but some responsibility may also belong to the approach, which has been criticized for not being African-driven and for following an overly conventional “area studies” model focused more on providing Asia scholars with opportunities to study Asia in all of its forms in Africa.

Yet others have suggested that perhaps the “newness” of China in Africa has waned and that China has now become just another external actor operating across the continent, with research interest in this engagement following suit. Funding for China-Africa studies in the early years of the millennium
came largely from Western philanthropy and governments, driven partly by Western alarm at China’s growing political and economic engagement with the continent in the early 2000’s.

It is important to note that the landscape of research here is not limited to universities. From consultations with experts, we have learned that some African scholars establish their own institutions, decline associations with established universities, or otherwise seek to engage in work on China-Africa outside of well-established formal structures such as universities. The reasons for this may vary; some suggestions from our consultations include wariness of political cooptation or pressure by national governments, pursuit of relief from heavy teaching burdens, and earning potential.

Another important point which emerged from our consultations is the limitations placed on African scholars in terms of their resources for conducting fieldwork and communicating with Chinese scholars and communities. This, of course, varies from place to place. However, limited funding for scholars is a condition which is largely true across the continent (with South Africa perhaps the least subject to this condition), and it places unavoidable constraints on scholars’ ability to do field research. Funding considerations may even constrain academic freedom: with China viewed as a source, actual or potential, of funding for universities, scholars at these institutions have limited space to adopt critical stances toward China. Financial challenges due to inadequate institutional support can also be problematic in terms of researchers’ access to publications and ability to attend conferences and network internationally, a well-known problem for scholars based in the Global South, who also struggle with travel and visa regulations. This may further contribute to another challenge pointed out to us in expert consultations: the lack of comparative research between Africa and other regions, even as the forms of engagements with China that are found in Africa are not unique to Africa itself but are rather shared with other regions of the world.

Other challenges for African researchers include transforming research into publication: there is, according to our expert consultations, a need for training in this particular area. One expert, stating that there is little training in writing for publication in African PhD programs, suggested that this leads to African scholars falling prey to predatory journals rather than publishing in better-regarded, peer-reviewed venues. A lack of knowledge of the publication terrain appears to be a roadblock for many African scholars. Certain institutions are attempting to develop the research-to-publication pipeline: ASCIR, for example, operates workshops aimed at helping junior scholars publish both academic and general-audience articles. Some of ASCIR’s efforts, as at certain other institutions as well, pair junior with senior scholars for mentoring purposes. This points at another unmet need which experts described to us: the lack of a continent-wide network for African researchers working on this topic, which would provide venues through which to encounter colleagues and discover new work.

The majority of African research organizations working on China are located in anglophone regions. This includes significant clusters in South Africa (especially Johannesburg) and Nairobi, with further institutions located in or near Accra, Ghana; Zimbabwe; Botswana; and Tanzania. In francophone West Africa, two institutions can be found in Dakar, Senegal (CORA and CODESRIA); both operate bilingually. In francophone Cameroon, a cluster of researchers can be found in Yaoundé. For these scholars, particularly considering the politics of language in Cameroon (and in francophone Africa more broadly), there are barriers to participation in global research on China-Africa especially given the relative dominance of English as a global language for research publication and networking. Francophone researchers may end up siloed as a result, which likely informs CORA and CODESRIA’s bilingual approach. Experts we consulted considered that there is less capacity in francophone Africa for this research than in anglophone Africa. They suggested that this is a result of empirical conditions: Chinese government and business have more capacity to work in English than French (or indeed Portuguese), and so interventions and investments have prioritized anglophone Africa. Research interest follows.
The Chinese language also poses a challenge for a number of African scholars. In our consultations, several experts noted that even among African researchers focusing on studies involving China, a significant number do not possess Chinese language skills. This could threaten to keep African studies of China in a self-referential cycle, in which only a small pool of publications in certain languages are repeatedly cited and research cannot cross-fertilize across national or linguistic borders; it also means that in some contexts, fieldwork involving direct contact with Chinese communities in Africa is not extensive. According to one junior Chinese scholar, this is exacerbated by a growing wariness in Chinese business communities regarding engagement with researchers, including Chinese researchers, for fear of being criticized for their business practices.

While Confucius Institutes are included as a category in our inventory of partnerships (see the China section of the annex), due to their focus on culture and language training rather than research, we do not include individual CIs. Although people at African institutions who have worked with CIs may use their networks to advance research and connections on a personal level, we did not find that CIs themselves are sufficiently engaged in research activities to merit individual inclusion on this list—ultimately, they do not qualify as “research capacity.” We learned from expert consultations with African scholars that Confucius Institutes can in fact undercut research capacity in African institutions. Where there is interest in China issues, a Confucius Institute—which comes with funding from the Chinese government, an advantage in many chronically underfunded African universities—may be established instead. This siphons off energy and interest from other parts of the CI’s associated university, but the CI itself does not generally produce research. government and private security firms in providing consular protection (Zhang Dandan and Sun 2019).

CAPACITY IN CHINA

Capacity in China for studying its relations with Africa is fairly well developed, and this is reflected in the number of institutions included in our list: twenty-two (plus three networks), up from nine in our 2012 inventory. Building on foundations established during the Cold War era, African studies in China have grown along with China’s early policy focus on Africa. An additional recent expansion of capacity for work about Africa in China-based networks and institutions over the last thirty years is impressive, but further analysis reveals some key challenges. These stem from the pressures of a centralized and top-down system of directives in the higher education space; a lack of foresight and consideration of the sustainable longevity of research initiatives; a lack of transparency concerning actual capacity built via capacity-building initiatives; and COVID-19 compounding issues concerning fieldwork, international cooperation, and original research. However, the recent attention African studies in China have been receiving, along with the area of study’s rather nascent nature compared to its Euro-Atlantic counterparts, affords institutions and academics in China a certain flexibility in facing challenges and advancing this research.

It is important to note the top-down, centralized nature of higher education in China. All institutions adhere to and operate following directives and policy guidelines from their relevant ministries, not to mention the institutions that are directly tied to, or housed under, the central government. Such institutions can be exemplified by the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), created by Xi Jinping to centralize Africa studies in China under a think tank. Even institutions not founded by the government, such as Peking University or Fudan University, operate under the directives of the central government. This situation helps to explain why capacity in China is so heavily tied to government priorities and how the trajectory of African studies in China, from its foci to its very nature as an area of study, aligns with China’s foreign policy goals.
In China, studies of Africa (as compared to other regions of the Global South) are more developed, benefitting from the earlier attention China focused on the continent during the Hu Jintao era. Unlike certain other regions covered in the CGS studies on China-Asia and China-LAC, the current boom in African studies in China predates Xi Jinping’s BRI goals. Capacity in China directly reflects government needs. Recent reforms in the classification of African studies as its own field by the Ministry of Education—unlike previously, when African studies was considered part of political science—exemplify this. This move was codified and implemented in all institutes of higher education to address gaps in previous organizational structures that balkanized area studies and prevented a holistic training of academics in the study of Africa. The centralized nature of the field also explains the tendency to set up Africa-China institution-to-institution pairings as part of larger networks and frameworks. Such frameworks have gone through many iterations and have had mixed results concerning the production of original research and building capacity.

Tying into the centralized reality of China’s capacity for the study of Africa, institutions in China are heavily clustered in Beijing. This can be explained by the increased priority of Africa for the government and, therefore, increased centralization through the creation of think tanks and programs close to the political capital. It should also be noted that another significant cluster of “first-tier” institutions contributing to capacity for the study of Africa can be found in the Yangtze River Delta region, including Zhejiang University, Fudan, Jiaotong, and others. This distribution of important, impactful institutions reflects that, on one hand, Beijing is the seat of political power, while on the other, the Yangtze River Delta region is economically and culturally significant. Still, these institutions, despite being some of the best in China and their output not being negligible, punch below their weight in terms of producing original research on Africa.

One interesting, novel development is the rapid proliferation of Africa-centered initiatives at second- and third-tier provincial institutions in China outside of the two clusters listed above. Such initiatives tend to fall into two camps: those focused on pairing Chinese universities with universities in Africa in order to provide technical training in the STEM fields or specific industries, and those stemming from high level MOUs with African partner institutions. This second category more often than not contributes little original research: it often includes only the establishment of student exchanges and joint conferences and at times does not even advance past the signing of the MOU.

It is very important to note that while centralized government policy has encouraged significant capacity growth over the past few years at first-tier universities and institutions, the same pressures of centralized top-down directives have led to many initiatives that in theory support capacity-building, but in practice are designed to fulfill certain criteria and quotas, such as the numbers of foreign students and international partnerships. Such institutions produce less original research and make negligible contributions to China’s actual research capacity. The COVID-19 pandemic has also called into question the viability of partnerships between African and Chinese institutions, as travel between Africa and China is very limited and these collaborations are heavily dependent on the movement of people, from students to faculty and university leaders. Finally, language barriers appear to affect Chinese scholars’ ability to work across Africa: as a global research language more commonly learned by Chinese citizens, English is more accessible than French, leading to a bias toward research in and on Africa’s anglophone regions, as well as a reliance on secondary sources in English.

CAPACITY OUTSIDE CHINA AND AFRICA

Research capacity outside China and Africa is concentrated in the United States and a few countries across Europe, especially the United Kingdom and northern Europe. We note not every university or
institution which has produced research on this relationship, but rather those with significant research centers, clusters of scholars, and/or major roles in this space, as identified especially through our literature reviews and consultations with experts. Many of the institutions which appeared in our earlier report (Carayannis and Olin 2012) reappear here, and others are new; up from thirteen organizations, this report includes twenty-one.

The US has a significant capacity for research production on Africa-China. Leading scholars such as Deborah Bräutigam, Yoon Jung Park, and Jamie Monson are American-based, as are several important institutions and networks focused on this topic. Numerous institutions are located on the East Coast of the US; the greater Washington DC–Baltimore area, taken together, serves as a central location, which is not surprising given the foreign policy focus of many institutions and scholars in this area. Organizations can also be found in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and elsewhere. A similarly high capacity can be found in London and elsewhere in the UK, including Bristol and Oxford. In the Netherlands, Leiden University is a hub of research efforts, and other inventoried institutions can be found in Milan and Turin, Italy; Stockholm, Sweden; and Brussels, Belgium.

One important point to note is that many of the African organizations listed here have significant connections with the US and Europe. Researchers may move back and forth between institutions in each region, and/or hold multiple appointments. Many of the directors and leaders of African organizations have advanced degrees from American or European universities. A large proportion of the research we cite in this literature review comes out of non-African, non-Chinese institutions. This poses ethical challenges for research on and for researchers interested in this topic, as we noted at the beginning of this report, and reflects the legacies of colonialism as perpetuated through the politics of funding, mobility, research, and citation. The China-Africa relationship remains one in which Global North, English-speaking scholars’ work is privileged by receiving more resources, attention, and practical support, especially in terms of funding and fieldwork. This creates a cycle in which US and European organizations maintain the highest capacity for research on the topic and drive scholarly conversations.
Figure 1. Map of organizations involved in research on China-Africa engagements, courtesy of Laura Laderman. Institutions without a geographic home are not included.
ANNEX: ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCING AND PROMOTING CHINA-AFRICA KNOWLEDGE

OVERVIEW OF THE ANNEX

Many universities, colleges, research centers, non-profit organizations, and other institutions around the world play roles in producing and promoting knowledge about the China-Africa relationship. As a resource for China-Africa researchers, we have compiled this annex with information on the most significant entities in this research space. We inventory institutions, organizations, and associations based in Africa, China, and the rest of the world.

Many more universities, think tanks, and other organizations produce research on China-Africa engagement than those we include here, but those listed are among the most prominent. While “prominent” is admittedly a malleable category, we have assembled this list based on various considerations. Does the organization have an active program of research on China-Africa relations? Are productive scholars engaged in this research based at the institution, and does it house graduate students studying these topics? Does the institution receive funding oriented toward this sort of work? Does its mission statement focus on Africa-China, or does its work cover Africa-China even if it lacks explicit statements to this effect? Has it hosted conferences, workshops, or other forms of programming that highlight these issues? Our list was also informed by numerous consultations undertaken with major China-Africa scholars, who flagged for us the organizations that were most active in this space as well as noting those which theoretically covered it but in practice were inactive.

We have divided the list into three geographic regions: Africa; China; and Outside Africa and China. We chose geography as the most suitable way to delineate these institutions, as nationality (“Chinese”) or even-harder-to-define terms like “Western” have varying applicability. Increasingly, institutions producing and promoting China-Africa knowledge are interdisciplinary and work with other institutions across borders. Some are explicitly co-national and led by governments, like the Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development; others are diffuse and internet-based, such as the Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) Research Network. Still, for almost all of the organizations, institutions, or networks on this list, it is possible to identify a primary geographic location with which they are affiliated: the CA/AC network, for example, is connected to Michigan State University in East Lansing, MI, USA, and the Sino-German Center is housed in Beijing. Such associations determine where we place organizations in this inventory.

For most institutions, largely limited by what information is publicly available and whether the institution had a working website, we have quoted the most relevant information about their mission statement and/or organization structure, partner organizations, and, in selected cases, notable publications, activities, and staff members. (If quoted material does not have an accompanying footnote with a source, it comes from the organization’s own website.) When an institution’s primary mission is not focused on China-Africa, we further describe which of their departments or programs has produced research on the Africa-China relationship. In many cases we have also noted funding sources, including foundations, governments, or other organizations. Leaders of particular organizations are often listed, but may change over time.

In order to understand knowledge production on China-Africa, we must go beyond listing the brick-and-mortar institutions which include this topic in their missions. While a large number of these do of course appear in this list, we have also located a significant number of institutions which appear to be conducting research but are in fact doing so only in theory. This is particularly true for institutions
which form part of international partnerships, e.g. through China’s Think Tank 10+10 network. The establishment of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) between paired institutions appears to have a use for scholars but may not indicate an active research agenda. (For example, it emerged in our consultations with experts that certain Chinese scholars may find the signing of such MoUs particularly useful in justifying international trips, which helps them to navigate a domestic atmosphere of increasing skepticism about Chinese researchers’ engagements with their foreign colleagues.) On the other hand, some of the more productive research comes out of online platforms and associations with a more diffuse presence, although generally speaking these still have specific institutional affiliations.

Aside from institutions, networks, and associations, there are other sources of information on Africa-China topics. While we include several internet-based publishing platforms in our list, such as the China-Global South Project (see the Africa section), it is also worth noting the proliferation of blogs belonging to individual scholars, commentators, and diplomats, as well as those undertaken as collaborative group projects. For example, “From Africa to China” was maintained by four African women—Wadeisor Rukato, Thuthukile Mbanjwa, Nothando Khumalo, and Sihle Isipho Nontshokweni—as they pursued higher education degrees in Beijing. Former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso David H. Shinn maintains a personal blog with updates on China-Africa research and news, accompanied by commentary; the Lingnan University-based scholar Roberto Castillo publishes “Africans in China,” which bills itself as a source for “everything about African presence in China in 500 posts.” However, the blog space changes quickly, with new ones appearing and older ones going defunct without warning. For example, the blog “UTurn Asia,” run by researchers Heidi Østbø Haugen and Manon Diederich, who documented the stories of Gambian migrants in China, is no longer operating and indeed even its archives have been removed from the internet. As a result of factors like these, we have not listed blogs as specific entries in our inventory. However, blogs and other forms of unofficial or personal online publishing can still be rich sources of research-based information and commentary for scholars.

AFRICA

We catalogue here research centers, institutions, and organizations in Africa that play roles in producing knowledge on China-Africa engagement, including:

1. African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)
2. Africa Policy Institute: China Africa Center (API-CAC)
3. Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations (ASCIR)
4. Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA)
5. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)
6. Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs
7. Institute for Security Studies
8. Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology: Sino-Africa Joint Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences (SAJOREC-CAS)
9. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
10. Sino-Africa Centre of Excellence (SACE)
11. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
12. Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC)
15. University of Ghana: Centre for Asian Studies (CAS)
16. University of Johannesburg: Centre for Africa-China Studies (CACS)
17. University of Nairobi
18. University of the Witwatersrand: Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP)
19. University of the Witwatersrand: African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS)
20. University of Yaoundé II: The International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC)

Eight of these have been established since 2012: the China Africa Center at the Africa Policy Institute, established in 2013; the Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations, established in 2019; the Collective for the Renewal of Africa, established in 2020; Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology’s Sino-Africa Joint Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, established in 2013; the SinoAfrica Centre of Excellence, established in 2013; the University of Dar es Salaam’s Centre for Chinese Studies, established in 2018; the University of Ghana’s Centre for Asian Studies, established in 2015; and the University of the Witwatersrand’s Africa-China Reporting Project, established in 2013.

Two now-inactive institutions are worth mentioning here. One is Stellenbosch University’s Centre for Chinese Studies, in South Africa. Formerly active in the Africa-China space, producing policy-relevant analysis and putting out commentaries and briefings, the CCS announced in 2017 that it was ceasing operations. The director, Ross Anthony, indicated that the CCS would refocus on teaching programs and seek alternative funding sources; however, it has been inactive since. The other defunct institution is China House, an NGO which since 2014 had been based in Nairobi. During its period of operation, it aimed “to integrate [BRI] into global sustainable development” and engage “Chinese global citizens” in research and development projects. In the last several years, after being unable to renew its NGO registration in Kenya, China House relocated to Shanghai. However, since then and in light of the COVID pandemic, it has been inactive.

**African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)**

Nairobi, Kenya
Established in 1988

- “Established in 1988, the African Economic Research Consortium is a capacity building institution to inform economic policies in sub-Saharan Africa. AERC has three primary components: research, training and policy outreach. The organization integrates economic policy research, postgraduate training and policy outreach within a network of researchers, universities and policymakers in Africa and worldwide.”

- The AERC completed a program on China-Africa Studies in 2011 and has conducted ad-hoc research on China-Africa since that time. The program in 2011 had the following goals: “to provide a basis for achieving a fuller understanding of the country and sector specific impacts of the relationships, the opportunities and challenges for the development prospects of the African countries, as well as an articulation of the appropriate overall and sector-specific policy measures that individual African countries may wish to take to advance their interests in the light of the impacts experienced and the opportunities and challenges faced.”

- AERC is partnered with Yunnan Nationalities University through the Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan.

**Africa Policy Institute: China Africa Center (API-CAC)**

Nairobi, Kenya
Established in 2013

- “The China Africa Center at the Africa Policy Institute (API-CAC) is designed to undertake
policy-relevant research and evidence-based analysis; promote policy dialogue and collaboration; and train a cadre of future African leaders who fully understand the strategic, security, economic and governance dimensions of China-Africa relations from a distinctly African lens. The Center was set up in 2013, initially as Observatory on China Africa Relations (OSCAR), to promote quality scientific research and champion an Africa-centered perspective on Sino-Africa relations to contribute to a genuine understanding, mutual respect and tolerance across civilizations.

- The Center offers fellowships to “junior, mid and senior career professionals focusing on China – Africa Relation[s],” and occasionally publishes research notes and working papers.

**Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations (ASCIR)**

Accra, Ghana

Established in 2021

- “The Afro-Sino Centre of International Relations (ASCIR) based in Ghana was set up in 2019, as an African-based research centre with a focus on conducting extensive research on Africa-China relations, China’s dominant presence in Africa. It was launched in April 2021, marking its arrival on the China-Africa scene with experts, scholars and researchers from around the world.”
- "ASCIR will undertake research mainly in three focal areas; Environment, Education and Economy (Infrastructure/Trade/Investment) with Security and Migration being cross-cutting areas. The Center’s focus will be to assess Afro-Sino relations primarily in these areas and will prioritize these areas in all our research except in situations where specific decisions have been made to do otherwise.” One of its research projects is an AU/FOCAC Assessment Report which considers the Beijing Action Plan and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It also has an interest in examining the spaces or gaps where other development partners, in addition to China, can work with Africa.
- Pamela Adwoah Carslake is the Executive Director and Arhin Acheampong is the Deputy Director.
- ASCIR aims to develop the community of African researchers in this research space and facilitate the development of younger scholars through a mentoring program it operates with support from the CA/AC Network. One of its goals is to shape the public conversation about China in Ghana/Africa through social media, webinars, and accessible online publications, as well as promoting African voices in a sphere of research that it views as often dominated by Western ones.

**Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA)**

Dakar, Senegal

Established in 2020

- CORA is a “Pan-African intellectual collective of over 100, social and natural scientists, historians, writers, medical doctors and artists from across Africa and the diaspora.” The collective is “dedicated to promoting African knowledge,” and believes that “African knowledge systems can act as a safeguard against imported development models that may not reflect the realities and the needs of African societies.” CORA emphasizes Africa’s linguistic diversity, with a manifesto written in English, French and Portuguese.
• Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou is the leader of CORA’s Africa-China Initiative, which at the time of writing is soon to launch. She announced on Twitter that the collective’s Initiative will have three pillars: “the creation of a database composed of up-to-date experts and scholars investigating Africa-China relations with a particular focus on francophone Africa and Africa-based scholars”; “coordination of a team of experts to produce a report that outlines an Africa-centered vision of Africa-China relations”, involving “commissioning up to 10 empirically grounded working papers”; and “organisation of webinars and building partnerships and collaborations with key relevant African regional bodies and policy institutions.”

**Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)**
Dakar, Senegal
Established in 1973
• CODESRIA is an “independent pan-African research organisation primarily focusing on social sciences research in Africa.” Its first objective is to “[p]romote and facilitate research and knowledge production in Africa using a holistic, multi-disciplinary approach.” CODESRIA is also “committed to combating the fragmentation of knowledge production, and the African community of scholars along various disciplinary and linguistic/geographical lines.”
• The organization’s South-South Program aims to revive cooperation and collaboration among scholars of the global South working in the broad field of the social sciences, and provides research fellowships, international workshops, and summer institutes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The program offers thirty fellowships per year.
• CODESRIA worked with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2010 and 2011 to help establish the Joint Africa-China Research Cooperation and Academic Exchange Program. It is also partnered with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as part of the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan.

**Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs**
Cairo, Egypt
Established in 1964
• The Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs is an NGO. Its partners include Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, China Centre for Contemporary World Studies, and China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
• In 2021 ECFA held a webinar on sixty-five years of Egypt-China relations. In 2017, its annual conference was held on the theme of “Egyptian-African relations ... towards new horizons.”

**Institute for Security Studies**
Pretoria, South Africa
Established in 1991
• ISS is a nonprofit organization with a main office in Pretoria and other offices in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Senegal.
• Its work “covers transnational crimes, migration, maritime security and development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, crime prevention and criminal justice, and the analysis of conflict and governance.” It aims to provide “analysis, practical training and technical assistance to governments and civil society” regarding “Africa’s human security challenges.”
**Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology: Sino-Africa Joint Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences (SAJOREC-CAS)**

Juja, Kiambu County, Kenya  
Established in 2013

- "Sino-Africa Joint Research Center (SAJOREC) is a talent cultivation and scientific research institute aided by the Chinese government on the basis of the exchange of official letters between Chinese and Kenyan Governments." It is based on the main campus of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), and involves housing, labs, research equipment, a botanical garden, and a training and conference center. Daily management is performed by JKUAT with SAJOREC-CAS providing advice and technical support. "The implementing agencies of SAJOREC on [the] China and Kenya sides are Wuhan Botanical Garden, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, respectively."

- "SAJOREC serves as the platform and bridge of scientific cooperation between the Chinese and the African scientists in a wide range of fields. It is a hub of Sino-Africa collaboration on biodiversity-related research, it also focuses on areas such as wildlife protection, prevention and treatment of desertification, climate change monitoring, and modern agriculture demonstration."

- "SAJOREC [has] put forward more than 45 joint research programs focusing on biodiversity investigation, pathogenic microorganism detection, geographic science and remote sensing, high-yield and high-quality crop cultivation demonstration, and land and water resources management. SAJOREC scientists have led more than 50 ... joint field survey[s]. The center has already supported the publishing of 6 academic monographs [and] 162 peer-reviewed journal articles." It has also provided 149 scholarships for African students to complete graduate studies, and trained more than 160 African scientists and senior technicians from thirteen African countries in fifteen training courses and seminars.

**Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)**

Accra, Ghana  
Established in 1998

- "The Ghana Ministry of Defence (MoD) established the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in 1998 and commissioned it in 2004. The purpose was to build upon and share Ghana’s five decades of internationally acclaimed experience and competence in peace operations with other states in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region and the rest of Africa. This was in recognition of the need for training military, police and civilian men and women to meet the changing demands of multidimensional peace operations. The Centre is one of the three (3) Peacekeeping Training Centres of Excellence mandated by the ECOWAS to offer training in peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Africa."

- Though KAIPTC does not have a program specifically for China-Africa cooperation, we have included it in this list because of its prominence as an institution and China’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa.

**Sino-Africa Centre of Excellence (SACE)**

Nairobi, Kenya  
Established in 2013

- SACE was created as a foundation in 2013 with the following mission: "The Sino-Africa Centre
of Excellence (SACE) Foundation is a China-Africa focused initiative that aims to promote the exchange of knowledge, ideas and experiences between China and Africa. Our objective is to increase cooperation between China and Africa by adding value in the areas of business development, trade and investments and entrepreneurship. We are a premium platform that promotes discourse in industry, academia and government exchanges.

- In 2014, SACE published a Business Perception Index, which surveyed Chinese Companies’ Perception of Doing Business in Kenya.
- Since 2018, SACE has been described as a “non-profit research centre” of Botho Emerging Markets Group, a holding company owned by Isaac Kwaku Fokuo Jr., who also founded SACE.

**South African Institute of International Affairs (SAILA)**
Johannesburg, South Africa
Established in 1934

- SAILA, an “independent public policy think tank” which is located on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand, describes its China-Africa relations research theme as follows: “We have been tracking Africa’s ties with China over a sustained period, and our work continues to unpack the implications of a relationship with China that is becoming ever broader and deeper over time. Our research seeks to tease out the implications, benefits and drawbacks of these burgeoning ties in an ever-changing world.”
- Since 2005, SAILA has been led by Chief Executive Elizabeth Sidiropoulos.
- Cobus van Staden is the Senior China-Africa Researcher at SAILA. He is also on faculty at the Department of Media Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand and co-founder of the China Global South Project.
- SAILA receives funding from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).
- SAILA is partnered with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan.

**Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC)**
Harare, Zimbabwe
Established in 1985

- SARDC is an “independent regional knowledge resource centre” which aims to “strengthen regional policy perspectives and track implementation on a range of issues in southern Africa.” Its focus is on “economic, political, cultural and social developments in southern Africa.”
- SARDC’s research arm is formed of several topic-focused institutes; one is the Institute for China-Africa Studies, formed in 2007. This institute intends to “strengthen academic and strategic linkages including joint research and exchanges” as well as to “strengthen private sector collaborations and opportunities, and address challenges to this sector through practical support.” It has published papers, reports, and policy analysis, participated in conferences, and engaged in other research activities.

**University of Botswana: Chinese Studies Programme**
Gaborone, Botswana
Established in 2013

- The Chinese Studies Programme provides Chinese language training to Botswanan students, who can study abroad with partner universities in China.
- The Senior Lecturer in the program is Sarah Zumbika-van Hoeymissen, whose research and
graduate student supervision topics include Africa-China relations.
• The university began offering a BA in Chinese Studies in 2011 and founded the Department of Chinese Studies in 2013. An Africa-China Research Group for multidisciplinary UB scholars and partners was also established in 2013 (Youngman 2014).

*University of Dar es Salaam: Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS)*
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Established in 2018
• The CCS is hosted at the College of Social Sciences, University of Dar es Salaam, with a mission to “deepen knowledge on socio-economic development processes in Africa and China as a basis for a mutually beneficial relationship.”
• CCS hosts regular public lectures, and in November 2018, it held a conference on Belt and Road Initiative and Industrialization Cooperation between China and Tanzania. Other conferences have included China-Africa topics such as Chinese investment and industrialization in Africa generally and Tanzania specifically.
• Humphrey P.B. Moshi is the Director of CCS.

*University of Ghana: Centre for Asian Studies (CAS)*
Legon, Ghana
Established in 2015
• CAS was established by the University of Ghana in October 2015 and began operations in August 2016.
• The goal of CAS is “to be a world class platform for innovative research, training and exchange programmes and activities in Asian studies relevant for mutually beneficial relations between Africa and Asia.”
• The Director of CAS, Lloyd George Adu Amoah, earned a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Wuhan University in China.
• On October 21-23, 2020, CAS held a conference on the theme “60 Years of Ghana-China Relations: A Critical Appraisal.” Dr. Adu Amoah’s book of the same name was published in 2022.

*University of Johannesburg: Centre for Africa-China Studies (CACS)*
Johannesburg, South Africa
Established in 2018
• The Centre for Africa-China Studies is a research institute within the University of Johannesburg. “Its purpose is to study the entire range of Africa-China relations, including diplomatic relations, economic relations, people-to-people relations, and relations between China, African institutions and African countries in international forums. It maintains an international network of scholars and experts in five countries, four of them BRICS countries, namely South Africa, Brazil, Russia, China, Ethiopia and Kenya.”
• CACS operates in parallel with the University’s Confucius Institute. Prof. David Monyae is the co-director of CACS and the CI.
• It hosts conferences, meetings, summits, and other convenings, including webinars, as well as publishing reports and policy briefs. It also offers a graduate-level course on the political economy of Africa-China relations and hosts postdoctoral fellows.
• This is a joint initiative with Nanjing Tech University.
University of Nairobi

Nairobi, Kenya

Established in 1970

- The University of Nairobi has put on conferences on the topic of Africa-China relations. In 2019, the conference covered "From Sino-Africa to Afro-China Engagements in the 21st Century: Emerging Interdisciplinary Issues and Research Gaps." It was hosted by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration.
- In 2021, this department signed an agreement with the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, which "will see the department and the embassy jointly host academic seminars in areas of common interest."

University of the Witwatersrand: Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP)

Johannesburg, South Africa

Established in 2013

- "The Wits Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP) ... aims to improve the quality of reporting on Africa-China issues. Despite the expanding links between the two regions, reporting has often been inadequate or polarised, either portraying China as an exploiting predator or a benign development partner. The Project aims to encourage balanced and considered reporting as Africa-China relations are further entrenched in the editorial narrative of both regions."
- "The Project offers reporting grants, workshops and other opportunities to African and Chinese journalists and encourages collaborations to investigate complex dynamics and uncover untold stories, with an emphasis on on-the-ground impact and perspectives to illustrate how the lives of the people of Africa are changing amid the comprehensive phenomenon of Africa-China interactions."
- The ACRP is hosted within the Journalism Department of the University of Witwatersrand and funded by the Ford Foundation.
- Though the ACRP does important work to advance the study of Chinese media in Africa and other topics in China’s influence in Africa, its primary purpose is not academic, but journalistic and informational. However, the ACRP regularly hosts panel events that discuss academic research, bringing in experts internationally.
- Bongiwe Tutu is the Project Coordinator.

University of the Witwatersrand: African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS)

Johannesburg, South Africa

Established in 2018

- ACSUS, housed at the University of the Witwatersrand, "addresses the gap in distinct research and engagement exclusively dedicated to the study of the US in sub-Saharan Africa. It thus became, and remains, the first Centre of its kind on the African continent to turn a nuanced, analytical, and rigorous African gaze on the US."
- It is headed by the media studies scholar Bob Wekesa, who obtained a PhD in China.
- While the center is focused on Africa-United States engagements, it has begun a research focus on China in Africa, which examines "how the competition between China and the US has played out in Africa and the ramifications for Africa's interests." This dovetails with another one of its program areas, digital diplomacy, which considers digital competition between the US and China in Africa.
- ACSUS hosts regular webinars and publishes research and blog posts.
University of Yaoundé II: The International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC)

Yaoundé, Cameroon
Established in 1971

- IRIC is housed at the University of Yaoundé II. In the Think Tank 10+10 Program; it is affiliated with China Foreign Affairs University.
- It does not appear to have a program dedicated to studying Africa-China. However, it does house scholars and graduate students whose research focuses on this topic.

CHINA

Here, we include two sections. The first lists schemes initiated by the Chinese government to connect Chinese and African institutions of higher education. These are:

1. 20+20 Higher Education Collaboration scheme
2. Confucius Institutes
3. Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan

Academic collaboration that directly connects Chinese and African institutions is fast increasing. According to a bibliometric analysis by Wilson Eduan and Jiang Yuanqun (2019), the amount of China-Africa research collaboration rose from “merely hundreds of documents in 2006 ... to more than 2000 by 2016.” Eduan and Jiang (2019: 988) also find that South Africa and Egypt are the leading African academic collaborators with China, and that “China-Africa collaboration is characterised by less involvement from Francophone countries compared to the Anglophone countries.”

Jean Gonondo (2017) provides a further review of official China-Africa higher education initiatives, and surveys African students in China, finding a widespread interest in knowledge sharing. While much of the increased China-Africa research collaboration and exchange has followed organic trends in geo-economics and migration (as detailed in the main section of this report), the Chinese state has also played an active role in promoting these linkages, and found a receptive African audience.

A number of the institutions which participate in these collaborations appear in the following section, which enumerates specific institutions and organizations (see below). However, some of those noted as collaborators in these schemes do not appear on that list. This is because being included in a partnership scheme does not ensure that a given institution has active China-Africa research programming. Institutions whose involvement in Africa-China research exists only in this way, on paper, have not been included in our catalogue of active organizations. We also do not include Confucius Institutes, for reasons elaborated in our section on capacity for knowledge generation in Africa.

Next, we have catalogued information on twenty-two research centers and institutions in China which are involved in producing knowledge on China-Africa engagement. These are:

1. China Society of African Studies
2. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS)
3. Chinese Society of African Historical Studies
4. China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU): Center of African Studies
5. China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR): Africa Research Center
6. China Institute of International Studies (CIIS): Department for Developing Countries Studies
7. Communication University of China: Africa Communication Research Center
9. Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC)
10. International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC)
11. Jinan University: Center of African Studies
12. Nanjing University: Research Center of African Studies
13. Peking University: Center for African Studies
15. Shanghai Normal University: Center for African Studies
16. Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development
17. University of Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (HKIHSS)
18. Xiangtang University Law School: African Law and Society Research Center
19. Yunnan University: Center of African Studies
20. Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University (ZAFU): Center for China-Africa Agriculture and Forestry Research (CAFOR)
22. Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU): Institute of African Studies (IASZNU)

Four of these have been established since the beginning of 2012: Communication University of China: African Communication Research Center, founded in 2012; Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, whose Center for West Asian and African Studies started studying China-Africa relations in 2012; Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development, launched in 2017; and Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University: Center for China-Africa Agriculture and Forestry Research, founded in 2013.

In 2012, we noted a collaboration between Saferworld and the School of International Relations and Political Science at Tongji University to create a “Library of International Conventional Arms Control.” While not exclusive to Africa, much of the literature in the library dealt with Chinese arms transfers to the continent. However, in the time since, the library has been taken offline and information on it is no longer publicly available.80

The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy since 2010 had a program on China and the Developing World. Based in Beijing at Tsinghua University, it operated with support from the Carnegie Endowment as well as a range of other foundations and donations. It aimed to “bring together leading policy experts and practitioners from China and around the world to engage in collaborative dialogue and research [and work] to identify constructive solutions to common global challenges”; it regularly produced work on China-Africa issues. By 2022, this center had closed. The Carnegie Endowment still has a Carnegie China center, with a research focus that may cover Africa-China issues, but this is not one of its explicit aims. It also puts out the “China in the World” podcast, which covers “China’s foreign policy, evolving global role, and relations with the world.”

Partnership schemes initiated by the Chinese government

20 + 20 Higher Education Collaboration scheme
Established in 2009

• King (2014, 166) writes that unlike the situation with Confucius Institutes, where the funding is transferred to African universities, the funding for the 20 + 20 scheme “is provided by China’s Ministry of Education and remains with the Chinese partner,” but that nonetheless, “many—perhaps most—Chinese staff see the relationship as potentially symmetrical, even if most of the funding comes from the Chinese side.”

**Institution pairings in the 20+20 Higher Education Collaboration Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African institution</th>
<th>Chinese institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking University (Beijing)</td>
<td>Cairo University (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast University (Nanjing)</td>
<td>University of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin University</td>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan University (Changsha)</td>
<td>Stellenbosch University (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Soochow (Suzhou)</td>
<td>University of Lagos (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiangtan University</td>
<td>Makerere University (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangzhou University</td>
<td>University of Khartoum (Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polytechnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donghua University (Shanghai)</td>
<td>Moi University (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China University of Geosciences (Wuhan)</td>
<td>University of Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Agricultural University (Beijing)</td>
<td>Institut Supérieur Agronomique et Vétérinaire de Faranah – Institut supérieur agronomique et vétérinaire Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (ISAV) (Guinea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing Agricultural University</td>
<td>Egerton University (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine</td>
<td>University of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East China Normal University (Shanghai)</td>
<td>University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Normal University (Changchun)</td>
<td>University of Pretoria (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Normal University</td>
<td>University of Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang Normal University (Jinhua)</td>
<td>University of Yaoundé I (Cameroon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin University of Technology and Education</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education Training Institute (Ethiopia) [formerly Ethio–China Polytechnic College]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics/Finance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of International Business and Economics (Beijing)</td>
<td>Université de Carthage (Tunisia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing Language and Culture University</td>
<td>Suez Canal University (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing International Studies University</td>
<td>Université Mohammed V (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Confucius Institutes**  
Established in 2004

- The most visible official Chinese presence in African universities is often these Chinese state-funded language and cultural centers attached to foreign universities. They have attracted controversy and a number have been closed down in the US (Myre 2019) and some European countries (Myklebust 2020), but their numbers continue to grow in Africa. As of 2018, there were forty-eight Confucius Institutes in Africa, and an additional thirty smaller partnership programs called Confucius Classrooms, according to the Development Reimagined consultancy. However, these programs, while fast-growing, are still vastly outnumbered by French and American cultural promotion programs in Africa (Development Reimagined 2018). Research by Muhammad Akhtaruzzaman, Nathan Berg, and Donald Lien (2017) investigated whether China’s establishment of new Confucius Institutes in Africa was motivated by resource seeking, and found that they “reflect Chinese soft power not explained by natural resource seeking and not easily compressed to a single dimension.”

- Confucius Institutes are not each listed in this inventory due to the fact that their missions focus on language and culture, rather than research. While in our expert consultations we learned that individual scholars sometimes use CIs as a networking platform to support research efforts, as a whole, CIs do not contribute to active research and publication on China-Africa relations.

**Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan**  
Launched in 2013

- The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched this plan to create a platform for dialogue and exchange between Chinese and African think tanks. At launch, just sixteen think tanks were part of the initiative, with eight from Africa and eight from China. Six of these institutions appear to have no programs or departments devoted to studying China-Africa relations, though they may have individual affiliated researchers that have published on China-Africa topics. Like the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (see entry on Zhejiang Normal University in the China section), the 10 + 10 plan appears designed to enhance elite connections across China-Africa lines.

**Institution pairings in the Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African institution</th>
<th>Chinese institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td>China Institute of International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs*</td>
<td>Zhejiang Normal University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Economic Research Consortium</td>
<td>Yunnan Nationalities University*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Peace and Security Studies at the University of Addis Ababa*</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party School*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellenbosch University: Centre for Chinese Studies**</td>
<td>Shanghai Institutes for International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Université Mohammed V in Morocco*</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Relations Institute of Cameroon*</td>
<td>China Foreign Affairs University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This institution does not appear to have a dedicated program to studying China-Africa relations.  
**This Centre is no longer active.
Institutions and organizations

**China Society of African Studies**
Nanjing, Jiangsu
Established in 1979

- "The China Society of African Studies is a collection of over 550 academics and non-academics who study Africa from China." It receives funding from Nanjing University.
- It has hosted more than ten seminars to promote China-Africa research and collaboration. It also organized the 2013 Symposium of the 3rd African Research Forum & Sino-Africa Investment Cooperation (CAARDSAC) conference, which Nanjing University hosted, and helped to run the 2014 version of the conference.

**Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS)**
Beijing
Established in 1998

- The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is a leading academic research organization in the fields of philosophy and social sciences as well as a national center for comprehensive studies in China. The organization is made up of thirty-one research institutes and more than fifty research centers studying all aspects of the social sciences. It is affiliated with the State Council of the Chinese government.
- The Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) is the research center within CASS responsible for China-Africa research. IWAAS contains four divisions, one of which is the Division of African Studies. The Institute is directly funded through the State Council of the Chinese government.
- Xu Weizhong 徐伟忠 is Deputy Director of the Institute of West Asian and African Studies and Deputy Secretary General of the China-Africa Studies Society.
- CASS is partnered with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) as part of the Think Tank 10 + 10 Partnership Plan.

**Chinese Society of African Historical Studies**
Beijing
Established in 1980

- The Chinese Society of African Historical Studies was established in 1980 at Peking University’s School of International Studies. Today, the Society has more than 300 members, who all vote to elect the Society’s leadership council, most recently in November 2012.
- Li Anshan 李安山 is Chair of the Society. Bi Jiankang 毕健康 is one of several vice-presidents and also General Secretary. Shu Yunguo 舒运国, the former director of Shanghai Normal University’s Center of African Studies, is another vice-president.
- The Society’s aims are to coordinate and strengthen domestic and international academic exchange, promote deep engagement with African studies, and push for the development of China-Africa relations. It also connects academic institutions engaged with African history throughout China and brings together researchers and practitioners to study African history. The Society organizes discussion forums and public lectures, and shares compiled writings, translations, reports, and informational materials by Society members.
- The Society has compiled and published influential monographs including *Feizhou shi lunwen ji* 非洲史论文集 *Collection of Papers on African History* (San lian shu dian 三联书店 *Joint
Publishing, 1982), as well as a three-collection volume on the 古代 ancient, 近代 modern, and 现代 contemporary history of Africa called 非洲通史 A History of Africa (East Normal University Press, 1996). In addition to other publications, the Society was also responsible for translating UNESCO’s landmark General History of Africa into Chinese (as 非洲通史, Beijing Normal University Press, 1984).

- Throughout its history, the Society has held over twenty nationwide academic meetings, with topics including socialism in Africa, African people’s liberation movements, African social structure, African political transformation and development, African modernization and economic development, and globalization and Africa-China relations. Notable events include, in August 2016, an annual discussion forum in Shanghai, China, which was focused on “Africa’s development, in theory and reality: The prospects and challenges of a new period in the development of China-Africa cooperation.” In October 2015, the Annual Academic Discussion Forum was held in Xinxiang, Henan, on “China and Africa: Developing complementarity and blending in strategy.”

**China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU): Center of African Studies**

Beijing

Established in 2009

- CFAU carries out research and teaching activity on African politics, economics, and culture, as well as China-Africa relations. This includes: forming discussion forums, conferences, public lectures, and discussion meetings on academic trends and information; translating and editing, compiling, and publishing the Center’s research results, resources, and papers; collecting and exchanging related specialized resources and information worldwide; and offering consultation services to relevant government offices (diplomatic and foreign affairs departments) and institutions in society.

- A translation of the official mission statement of the Center is as follows: “Using Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the ‘Three Represents’ and the Scientific Outlook on Development as guides, and abiding by the national constitution and laws and statutes and the related rules system of the University: to actively develop China’s academic research and dialogue on the politics, economics, and culture of African countries, and to promote CFAU and African learning and research institutions, in service of the government’s scientific decision-making.”

- CFAU is funded by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- It is paired with the International Relations Institute of Cameroon through the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan.

**China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR): Africa Research Center**

Beijing

Established in 1980

- CICIR is a comprehensive research institution for international studies established by the State Council and linked to the Ministry of State Security. CICIR consists of eleven institutes, two research divisions under direct supervision of CICIR leaders, eight research centers, and several administrative departments, e.g. the President’s Office. CICIR has a staff of 380,
including researchers, administrative and logistic personnel, among whom 150 are research professors or associate research professors.

- An introduction to the Africa Research Center at CICIR is as follows, translated from Chinese: “The Africa Research Center is principally engaged in policy research and comprehensive research and is an important research institution for issues within Africa countries. This Center is located under the African Political Security Research Center, the African Economic Development Research Center, and the French-language African Research Center. Major research areas include: African political, economic, security, social, and other subjects; China-Africa relations and Africa's relations with major nations; the African Union and African sub-regional organizations; individual country studies on Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa, the DRC, and more. Africa has undertaken many government and private company research projects, and researchers at home and abroad have published a large amount of important academic journals [sic] articles. The Center is a part of the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan, and has long held close relations with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) in Zimbabwe, Emory University in the United States, and other African, European, and dozens of think tanks in the United States.”

China Institute of International Studies (CIIS): Department for Developing Countries Studies
Beijing
Established in 1956
- The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is directly administered by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and conducts research on a wide range of foreign policy issues. Research at the Institute is focused primarily on medium and long-term policy issues of strategic importance, particularly those concerning international politics and world economy. It also includes comments and policy recommendations on the world’s major events and hot-spot issues. CIIS has engaged in significant work on multilateral institutions such as the EU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and also houses the Institute of International Strategic Studies, which specializes in multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations.
- While lacking a specifically Africa-focused program, CIIS has a Department for Developing Countries Studies, which hosts some Africa experts and publishes some reports on China-Africa relations. The Department receives direct government funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- It is paired through the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan with the University of the Witwatersrand's South African Institute of International Affairs.

Communication University of China: Africa Communication Research Center
Beijing
Established in 2012
- The Center is part of the University’s “Faculty of Journalism and Communication” department, which itself was established in 2010. The Center researches the development of media in Africa, the broadcast of information from China to Africa, China-Africa diplomatic and cultural exchange mediums and strategies, and China-Africa comparative media.
- The Center shares funding with other centers in the Faculty of Journalism and Communication.
- In June 2015, it hosted the International Round Table Conference on China-Africa Communications.
- Zhang Yanqiu 张艳秋 is the Director, and Bob Wekesa is the founding research coordinator.
Development Research Center (DRC) of the PRC State Council: Asia-Africa Development Research Institute (AADRI)

Beijing
Established in 1994

- The Development Research Center of the State Council is a policy research and consulting institution directly under the State Council. Its main functions are to undertake research on strategic and long-term issues concerning China’s economic and social development. The DRC provides policy recommendations for the government’s Central Committee and the State Council.

- The Asia-Africa Development Research Institute (AADRI), a division within the DRC, conducts the Center’s China-Africa research.

- It is partnered with Stellenbosch University, although this university’s Centre for Chinese Studies is now defunct.

Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC)

Beijing
Established in 2000

- FOCAC is an official forum which brings together the Chinese and African states, with the exception of Eswatini. Major convenings are held every three years, alternately in China and in Africa; past locations include Beijing, Johannesburg, Dakar, Addis Ababa, and Sharm el-Sheikh.

- “The Ministerial Conference is held every three years; the Senior Officials Follow-up Meeting and the Senior Officials Preparatory Meeting for the Ministerial Conference are held respectively in the year and a few days before the Ministerial Conference is held; and the consultations between the African Diplomatic Corps in China and the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee are held at least twice a year. The Ministerial Conference and the Senior Officials Meeting are held alternately in China and an African country, with China and the African host being co-chairs presiding over the meetings and taking lead in implementing the outcomes of the meetings. The Ministerial Conference is attended by foreign ministers and ministers in charge of international economic cooperation, and the Senior Officials Meeting by director-general level officials of the competent departments of China and African countries.”

- The objectives of FOCAC are “equal consultation, enhancing understanding, expanding consensus, strengthening friendship and promoting cooperation.”


International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC)

Beijing
Established in 2005

- The IPRCC was established by the government of China, the UN Development Program (UNDP), and other international organizations in 2005. The Center aims to advance poverty reduction research and policy, disseminate good practices, and strengthen international exchanges and collaboration on poverty reduction.
• In 2010, IPRCC signed a memorandum of understanding with UNDP for strengthened south-south cooperation, establishing a dedicated “China-Africa Window” within the framework of the IPRCC.
• IPRCC is funded by the Chinese government (various ministries), UNDP, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UK Department for International Development (DFID).

**Jinan University: Center of African Studies**
Jinan, Shandong
Established in 2010

• The Center was established within the university in 2010. Its research foci include African politics, regional African cooperation, Africa's relations with world powers, ethnic Chinese abroad, and economic cooperation between Africa and non-African countries (including China).
• The Center aims to promote collaboration between Jinan University and African institutions of higher education; it has a relationship with Rhodes University in South Africa, among others.

**Nanjing University: Research Center of African Studies**
Nanjing, Jiangsu
Established in 1964

• The Center was established to strengthen the relationship between Africa and China. From 1964 to 1993, its research focused on analyzing the geographic issues of Africa. Its series of papers, books, and reports were the earliest academic or popular archives of Africa in China, which helped many Chinese become more familiar with Africa. Since 1993, the Center’s research fields have broadened; they currently relate mostly to geographic topics and comparative studies of Sino-Africa economics, as well as to traditional culture and history.
• Zhang Zhenke 张振克 is the Director.
• The Center partners with the China Society of African Studies.

**Peking University: Center for African Studies (PKUCAS)**
Beijing
Established in 1998

• PKUCAS is an interdisciplinary institution for comprehensive African research. It comprises teachers and research fellows from different departments and institutes at the university, who specialize in African politics, economy, culture, history, sociology, languages and literature. Its mandate is to organize and promote African studies at Peking University and to improve linkages with other institutions.
• From July 2010, the Center started distributing a weekly newsletter with information on Africa-related news and updates on Center activities, called the “PKU African Tele-Info” (北大非洲电讯). In 2012, the Center began to publish the *Annual Review of African Studies in China* 中国非洲研究评论 (2012), edited by Li Anshan.
• Li Anshan 李安山 retired as Director of the Center in 2016; he was succeeded by Liu Haifang 刘海方. The Center has approximately twenty staff members, ten invited guest researchers, and several dozen students and associates worldwide.
• The Center partners with the Université Mohammed V in Morocco through the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan.
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS): Center for West Asian and African Studies
Shanghai
Established in 2012
- The Center conducts research primarily on Middle East politics and international relations, energy security and geopolitics, Islamic culture in international politics, China-Middle East relations, African politics, and China-African relations.
- Since 2012, SIIS has jointly published the China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies with the US-based World Century Publishing Corporation. SIIS also publishes its own journal, Global Review, with the Shanghai Association of International Relations. Global Review is a bilingual journal specializing in international relations that is published bimonthly in Chinese and quarterly in English.
- Zhang Chun 张春 is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for West Asian and African Studies.
- The Center partnered with the now-defunct Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS), Stellenbosch University, as part of the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan.

Shanghai Normal University: Center for African Studies
Shanghai
Established in 1998
- In 2011, the Center was approved by the Ministry of Education to be an "Area and Country Studies Base" (区域和国别研究基地), meaning that it receives yearly funding from the Ministry of Education to carry out research on the African region.
- The Center has graduated over twenty students, who have gone on to work at universities, research organizations, publishing houses, and businesses. A few of the Center's students have been selected by the China Scholarship Council (国家留学基金) to study abroad at African universities, especially at the University of Zambia.
- The Center is funded by the China Scholarship Council (国家留学基金), the National Social Sciences Fund (国家社会科学基金), the Research Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Committee (上海市教育委员会科研创新项目), and the Ministry of Education, which gives it yearly funding as an Area and Country Study Base.
- The Center partners with the Ministry of Education and the Shanghai Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science.

Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development
Beijing
Established in 2017
- The Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development in Beijing was established as a joint initiative of the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The Center is run by the Trade Development Bureau and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, which report to MOFCOM and BMZ as “political partners who are jointly steering the work.”
- “The establishment of the CSD introduces a new chapter of the development partnership between China and Germany. At the same time it is a concrete effort for vitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda. As strategic partners, both countries are combining their international efforts towards building an inclusive, sustainable and resilient future together with developing countries. Acknowledging that public support will not be sufficient to tackle
global challenges, partnerships with the Chinese and German business sector are sought to promote sustainable development in third countries. For that the CSD explores new and innovative ways of international cooperation. More concretely, it is the CSD’s role to:

- support the Sino-German Dialogue on Development Cooperation from a methodological and technical point of view
- identify, assess, prepare, accompany and monitor triangular cooperation projects between Germany, China, and third countries, particularly in Africa and Asia
- actively seek partnerships with German and Chinese enterprises to utilise the potential of business activities to promote sustainable development in third countries.”

- Its website indicates projects in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia. It also hosts forums and trainings.

**University of Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (HKIHSS)**

Hong Kong

Established in 2001

- HKIHSS has a mission to promote multi-disciplinary work in the humanities and social sciences by supporting platforms for a critical community of scholars to share experiences across the globe.
- It organizes lecture series, summer workshops, research clusters, conferences, and academic publications, along with outreach programs and commissioned projects aimed at policy and business professionals.
- From 2010-2012, HKIHSS partnered with Yale University to conduct research on Chinese-African diasporas, investigating how Chinese citizens are operating on the African continent and how Africans are operating in China. This contributed to a research cluster on China-Africa engagements, with members at HKIHSS and globally. This cluster’s latest activity appears to have been in 2017.

**Xiangtan University Law School: African Law and Society Research Center**

Xiangtan, Hunan

Established in 1978

- The Center has its origins in a 1978 CCP Central Committee directive to establish a research work unit on African issues. Thus, it became the first academic institution in China studying African issues established after the Cultural Revolution. Since then, it has expanded and focused on three themes on Africa: theory and practice of African law, changes in African law and social development, and African human rights and diplomacy. The Center has a special research focus on national and regional commerce law and international investment law in Africa.
- The Center is funded by the Chinese Department of Commerce and the Chinese Ministry of Education.
- Hong Yonghong 洪永红 is the Director of the Center.
- The Center launched a journal in Spring 2015 called *Xiangtan University African Law Review*. The first issue was published in November 2015.
- The Center partners with Renmin University of China Law School, the China Law Society, China Legal Exchange Center, Department of Commerce, and Ministry of Education.
- In 2006, the Center agreed to a contract from the Department of Commerce and the Ministry of Education for organizing a training class in African law and socioeconomic development. As a result of this contract, along with Renmin University of China Law School, the Center
conducted a “China-Africa Legal Education and Legal Culture Forum” in 2006. It also participated in and helped organize a seminar titled “Zhongguo – dongnan fei jingji ji touzi falü yantaohui” [China – South and East Africa Trade and Investment Law] as part of the 2012 ministerial FOCAC.

**Yunnan University: Center of African Studies**
Kunming, Yunnan
Established in 2007

- The Center is part of Yunnan University’s School of International Studies and was preceded by a Center for Asian and African Studies which had existed since 1998. The most active research unit within the School is the one focused on Myanmar studies.
- The Center’s research focuses on the history of sub-Saharan Africa and China-Africa cooperation in agriculture and science & technology. It has published a number of research papers and books and conducted about ten research projects at the state level.
- It acts as an advisory body to both government and enterprise in order to promote mutual understanding and friendship between China and Africa.

**Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University (ZAFU): Center for China-Africa Agriculture and Forestry Research (CAFOR)**
Hangzhou, Zhejiang
Established in 2012

- CAFOR is a joint collaborative initiative between the International Bamboo and Rattan Organization (INBAR) and ZAFU.
- The center is planned to act as an interface and communication platform for researchers and related stakeholders, such as the private sectors, in China and Africa to promote exchange, research and technology transfer in the fields of forestry and agriculture. CAFOR states that it will have a particularly strong emphasis on both bamboo and tea resource research and development for environmental protection and poverty alleviation.
- It frames its work on science and technology within South-South cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development, and also states that it aims to support capacity-building in African higher education institutions.

**Zhejiang Normal University: China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF)**
Jinhua, Zhejiang
Established in 2011

- China has also promoted academic linkages with Africa through this forum, which has been held yearly since 2011, with locations alternating between China and Africa, similar to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). CATTF has been described in Chinese state media as “an initiative launched by Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU) in 2011 to create a platform for dialogue and exchanges between Chinese and African thinkers.”
- It was originally held by IASZNU (see below), but for the past several years responsibility has been rotated between IWAAS (see the CASS entry) and IASZNU; CAS at Peking University has also been invited to hold it twice.
- Yun Sun (2015) wrote the most widely cited analytical piece on the CATTF, in which she argues that the forum is intended by the Chinese government to be a primary tool for enhancing the country’s soft power in Africa by reaching out to academics and intellectuals. Sun writes, “the forum receives its financial support from China, including through the China Development
Bank, one of the most active Chinese financial institutions operating in Africa. Financing also comes from the FOCAC Secretariat.

Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU): Institute of African Studies (IASZNU)
Jinhua, Zhejiang
Established in 2007

- IASZNU consists of four research centers: the Center for African Political and International Relations Studies, the Center for African Economic Studies, the Center for African Educational Studies, and the Center for African Historical and Cultural Studies. In addition to graduate programs, including exchange programs with African universities, IAS researchers focus on development challenges facing Africa, and the implications of Sino-African relations for both partners.
- It was “the first comprehensive institute established specially for African studies.” It has cooperative relationships with at least ten African universities.
- The Institute publishes its own academic journal on Africa called African Studies.
- It is partnered through the Think Tank 10+10 Partnership Plan with the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

OUTSIDE AFRICA AND CHINA

Here, we include two sections. The first lists schemes initiated by the Chinese government to connect Chinese and African institutions of higher education. These are:

1. Africa-China Independent Working Group of Scholars
2. Afro-Asian Networks
3. American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
4. Black China Caucus (BCC)
5. China-Global South Project
7. ChinaMed Project
9. International Crisis Group (ICG)
11. Leiden University: International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS)
12. Michigan State University: Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network (CA/AC)
13. Oxford University China-Africa Network (OUCAN)
14. Saferworld
16. Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
17. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
19. United States Institutes of Peace (USIP)
20. Yale University
Eight of these have been established since the beginning of 2012: Afro-Asian Networks launched in 2016; AidData in 2013; Black China Caucus in 2020; China-Harvard-Africa Network in 2016; Saferworld in 2012; SAIS-CARI in 2014; SOAS’s China Institute in 2013; and the University of Florida’s China-Africa Working Group in 2015.

**Africa-China Independent Working Group of Scholars**
Online only
Established in 2020
- This working group brings together senior scholars, diplomats, practitioners, thought leaders, and policymakers to discuss Africa-China relations from the vantage point of African agency. It aims to shape and influence the policy agenda on the African side in terms of how African stakeholders can engage their Chinese counterparts in ways that bring Africa’s added value to that relationship. In its membership, it emphasizes participants from Africa as well as from the African diaspora, and also includes members from the Chinese side.
- The group was established in the early period of COVID as an online convening, with regular meetings, approximately every two weeks. Initially, its aim was to influence the upcoming FOCAC meeting in November 2021 as well as the African Union summit in January 2022, but it has now expanded with the intention of becoming a more permanent group with an institutional home.
- The overarching theme of the group’s work is “Reshaping African Strategic Engagement with China.” It subdivides this theme into multiple strategic areas, such as African agency, debt sustainability, financing arrangements, infrastructure, military and security engagements, great power competition, and others. Currently, the group is working on producing a document with chapters on each of its strategic areas.
- It does not yet have an online presence or a home institution, but is in the process of locating two institutions (in the US and Africa) which will become permanent homes. It is currently self-financed by members and by grants; the major portion of its support comes from Morgenthau Stirling and the Habari Journal is also involved.
- The leadership of the group is fluid, but one person with significant responsibility is Paul Nantulya, who is affiliated with the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the US Department of Defense.

**Afro-Asian Networks**
Bristol, UK and Leiden, Netherlands
Established in 2016
- Afro-Asian Networks is a research collaboration between the University of Bristol in the UK and the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. It receives support from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) and the International Institute of Social History (Netherlands). Its topical focus on African-Asian connections, and methodologically, participants are largely historians working on global and transnational history.
- It has hosted workshops and collaborative research projects on these topics. Its website contains a visualization of data about Afro-Asian conferences in the 1950s and 1960s. Its online publication, *Afro-Asian Visions*, aims to publish “new and ongoing research on the history of decolonisation and transnational connections across Asia and Africa, as well as Latin America and the Middle East.”
**American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)**
Philadelphia, PA, USA
Established in 1917
- The AFSC is an American-based international NGO committed to addressing the root causes of poverty, injustice and war. AFSC’s North East Asia Quaker International Affairs Representative works throughout the Asia Region and in collaboration with other local offices and the Quaker United Nations Office to facilitate dialogue, research, and exchanges between China and the United States and between China and developing countries.
- Six of China’s leading researchers participated in a recent study tour in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supported by AFSC’s Asia and Africa programs and the Quaker United Nations Office in New York. Their interest in broadening their studies on the United Nations and Africa to explore civil societies meshes with AFSC’s decades-old support for similar work both in China and Africa.
- Jason Tower is the North East Asia Quaker International Affairs Representative.

**Black China Caucus (BCC)**
Washington, DC, USA
Established in 2020
- The Black China Caucus group was founded by “Black professionals passionate about rectifying underrepresentation in the China space.”
- “BCC strives to enhance the presence and participation of all self-identifying Black professionals specializing in any aspect that furthers the holistic understanding of China. The mission of BCC is accomplished by the creation of targeted resources aimed at enhancing the professional development and advancement of Black practitioners in the China space. BCC aims to promote an accessible and inclusive community of Black China specialists who are empowered to contribute their perspectives, add complexity of thought, and use their position to destigmatize discourse on race within China related disciplines and industries.”
- It is a registered nonprofit run on grants and donations, featuring mentorship programs, working groups, educational resources, workshops, lectures, and other events.

**China Global South Project**
Online only (registered nonprofit in the United States)
Established in 2010
- “The China-Global South Project, formerly known as the China Africa Project, is a nonprofit independent multimedia organization dedicated to exploring every aspect of China’s engagement with Africa.”
- It is a nonprofit registered in the United States but co-founded by Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden, the former of whom is a journalist and the latter of whom is based at the University of the Witwatersrand; both are also involved in other projects on this list. Its funding comes from subscribers and members (90%) supplemented by small grants from foundations.
- The project is focused on public communication: it “produces a mix of editorial content that combines original material with carefully curated third-party information.” This includes a weekly podcast as well as videos and text publications, which appear in English, French, and Arabic, although not Chinese.
China-Harvard-Africa Network (CHAN)\textsuperscript{101}
Cambridge, MA, USA
Established in 2016

- This tripartite initiative was announced in June 2016 “to conduct collaborative training, research, and capacity building programs to advance global health.” Its goals include: to “serve as a platform for innovation in research and education, bringing together leading institutions of public health and governmental entities. The Network strives to create, disseminate, and translate knowledge as well as nurture the next generation of experts and leaders of global public health in China and Africa. Through training, research, and engagement, the Network will increase our knowledge of large-scale global health interventions and establish best practices for the benefit of all.”
- CHAN held its first convening workshop in Boston, USA, April 28 to April 30, 2016, at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. It has also run a summer fellowship program, most recently in 2018.
- CHAN is partnered with the Ministry of Health of China, the China Global Health Network, and the Africa Research, Implementation Science and Education (ARISE) Network.

ChinaMed Project\textsuperscript{102}
Torino, Italy
Established in 2011

- "The ChinaMed Project is a research platform promoted by the Torino World Affairs Institute, part of the TOChina Hub developed by the University of Torino. The ChinaMed Project offers a fresh analytical response to the shifting geo-economic and security landscape in the wider Mediterranean region. In particular, the primary research aim of the ChinaMed research team ... is to analyse the deepening interconnections between China and countries in this region, reflecting on their potential impact on regional and global dynamics.”
- ChinaMed engages in academic and policy initiatives which include the ChinaMed Business Program, publications, academic events, and data collection and analysis. It publishes a monthly newsletter called The ChinaMed Observer which collates analyses of articles in Chinese and Mediterranean-region media.
- The ChinaMed Report 2019: China’s New Role in the Wider Mediterranean Region included contributions from researchers on China’s relations with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco.
- The ChinaMed research team is led by Prof. Enrico Fardella (Peking University) and coordinated by Dr. Andrea Ghiselli (Fudan University and TOChina Hub).
- Its funders include the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the International Affairs Program of the Compagnia di Sanpaolo. It is partnered with Tel Aviv University’s Department of East Asian Studies and Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, along with the China Global South Project (see above) and the Asian Studies Unit at the Research Department of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies.

College of William & Mary: AidData: Tracking Chinese Development Finance\textsuperscript{103}
Williamsburg, VA, USA
Established in 2013

- Based at the College of William & Mary in Virginia, AidData aims to “equip policymakers and practitioners with better evidence to improve how sustainable development investments are targeted, monitored, and evaluated.”
• It is a “collaborative online platform that seeks to make information about Chinese
development finance flows to Africa more accessible and usable. By sharing, synthesizing,
and standardizing diverse sources of development finance information from journalists,
scholars, government officials, business professionals, and local community stakeholders,
this open data platform is designed to facilitate better analysis and understanding of Chinese
development finance activities in Africa.” Its website features various datasets for researchers
to use and its publications include briefs, working papers, and books.
• AidData receives funding from Humanity United, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).
• AidData partners with the University of Cape Town and the Center for Global Development.

Institute of Development Studies (IDS)⁹⁴
London, UK
Established in 1966
• IDS is a “leading global institution for development research, teaching and learning, and
impact and communications.” It was founded based at the University of Sussex and maintains
close connections with the University but is a financially independent self-governing
institution. Its funding comes from grants, including from the UK Department of International
Development, UK Research and Innovation, the European Union, UN agencies, foundations,
and other sources.
• Dating back to at least 2007, many of its research programs have addressed issues of
engagement between China and Africa, including projects on: Strengthening the Capacity
of the International Poverty Reduction Center in China for South-South Cooperation,
Understanding Chinese Investment and its Impacts in East Africa, China and International
Development Cooperation, and a special issue of the IDS Bulletin on China and Brazil in
African Agriculture. Its research on engagement between China and Africa extends back to
at least 2007, when it published a working paper on “The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan
Africa.” IDS published an evidence report in January 2017 on “China–UK–Africa Trilateral
Cooperation on Trade and Investment: Prospects and Challenges for Partnership for Africa’s
Development.” Much more research from IDS relating to China and Africa can be found on
its website.

International Crisis Group (ICG)⁹⁵
Brussels, Belgium
Established in 1995
• International Crisis Group is a non-governmental organization that conducts field research
and produces reports with recommendations for policymakers, aimed towards the resolution
of deadly conflict. Headquartered in Brussels, the organization has program offices
throughout the world conducting research, as well as advocacy offices in Brussels, New York,
and Washington.
• Although the organization does not have any formal China-Africa research team or structures,
there is a liaison office in Beijing which has helped produced several reports on China’s
involvement in UN peacekeeping, including in Africa, such as a July 2017 report on Chinese
foreign policy in South Sudan.
Johns Hopkins University: School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS): China Africa Research Initiative (CARI)\textsuperscript{106}

Washington, DC, USA
Established in 2014

- CARI is involved in "promoting research, conducting evidence-based analysis, fostering collaboration, and training future leaders to better understand the economic and political dimensions of China-Africa relations and their implications for human security and global development."
- The Initiative was "set up to promote evidence-based understanding of the relations between China and African countries through high quality data collection, field research, conferences, and collaboration." It makes available datasets on loans, Chinese debt relief, and other China-Africa topics. It publishes policy briefs, working papers, briefing papers, economic bulletins, and books. It runs conferences, webinars, and other events, and offers a research fellowship program.
- SAIS-CARI receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Economic and Social Research Council. In the past, it has received funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Department for International Development (DFID), and Private Enterprise Development in Low-Income Countries (PEDL).
- Deborah Bräutigam is the Director of the Initiative.
- It publishes the blog "China in Africa: The Real Story," featuring posts by Bräutigam. Begun in 2010, the blog has been less active in recent years and at the time of writing had not been updated in 2022.

Leiden University: International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS)\textsuperscript{108}

Leiden, Netherlands
Established in 1993

- IIAS was originally established by the Dutch government as an inter-university institute but is now based at Leiden University.
- "IIAS is a global humanities and social sciences research institute and knowledge exchange platform that supports programmes which engage Asian and other international partners. IIAS aims to contribute to a better and more integrated understanding of present-day Asian realities as well as to rethink 'Asian Studies' in a changing global context. IIAS works to encourage dialogue and link expertise, involving scholars and other experts from all around the world in its activities. IIAS thus acts as a global mediator, bringing together academic and non-academic institutes in Asia and other parts of the world, including cultural, societal and policy organisations."
- Its research clusters are on Asian heritages, Asian cities, and global Asia.
- IIAS has produced conferences on Africa-Asia relations and puts out a regular newsletter which it states reaches a readership of 50,000. It also hosts a platform called "Africa-Asia: A New Axis of Knowledge," dedicated to supporting scholars working on these topics, especially those who are based in the regions, and has convened two conferences within this project.

Michigan State University: Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) Research Network\textsuperscript{109}

East Lansing, MI, USA
Established in 2007

- Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) is a global and interdisciplinary (and said to be the largest) academic network in the China-Africa space. Originally conceived as an email
listserv via Google Groups, the CA/AC network now counts over 1,000 members.

- The Network was formerly hosted by the Social Science Research Council; currently, Michigan State University’s African Studies Center hosts its website and administers its grant from the Ford Foundation, while the Network itself is independent. The Network “aims to promote debate, cutting-edge research and ideas about China-Africa issues by supporting and encouraging the work and communication of a large and rapidly growing network of international scholars, students, media professionals and practitioners who are engaged in this growing field.”

- CA/AC hosts a website, a listserv, and a WeChat group; we organize panels at international conferences, host our own CA/AC conference every second year, and organize other China-Africa events around the globe; we facilitate the publication of members’ research in the media, online and open access platforms, and academic journals and books; and we work closely with other China-Africa and Africa-Asia institutions and networks and the media.”

- The Executive Director is Yoon Jung Park (Georgetown University) and the Chair at the time of writing is Jamie Monson (Michigan State University). It also has an international Executive Board.

**Oxford University China-Africa Network (OUCAN)**

Oxford, UK
Established in 2008

- Hosted by the Department of Politics at Oxford University, this network "seeks to build links between academics and practitioners in the field of China-Africa relations.”

- OUCAN is a student-driven, multi-dimensional organisation that that seeks to forge cross-disciplinary and trans-regional links between researchers, practitioners, and officials around the emerging phenomenon of Chinese engagement with Africa. It brings together scholars, graduate students, and experts from the field to push forward research pertaining to critical political, cultural, and socio-economic trends, both from a macro and a micro perspective. The focus is not just on governments and state-owned enterprises, but also on cultural bodies, NGOs, small and medium-sized businesses, minorities, and ordinary people. OUCAN aims to help provide an empirical basis for a better understanding of the nature and future of these interactions.

- OUCAN hosts regular events, including conferences. Its 2017 annual conference was titled "Opportunism or Altruism? Global Health in China-Africa Relations," and was held at the China Centre of Oxford University; the 2018 version was called "Between Physical and Ideological Mobility: The Role of Transport Infrastructure in Sino-African Relations.”

**Saferworld**

London, UK
Established in 2012

- Saferworld is an NGO that works with governments, international organizations, and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices for the prevention and reduction of violent conflict, and the promotion of cooperative approaches to security. Saferworld is working with Chinese academics to encourage debate on how China can play a more active role in international efforts to counter arms proliferation.

- Saferworld held a series of lectures and seminars at Tongji University, as well as in other universities across China, to introduce graduate students to the current discourse on conventional arms transfer controls, conflict prevention, and international security. It also
worked with School of International Relations and Political Science at Tongji University in Shanghai to set up a resource center on conventional arms, though that resource is now offline.


- Saferworld receives funding from a wide range of sources, including individual donors but also governments, multi- and bilateral donors, trusts, and foundations.

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS): China Institute (SCI)

London, UK

Established in 2013

- SCI is "one of the world-leading centres for China expertise located in the heart of London. With more than 54 academics working on different aspects of China at SOAS, it is home to the largest community of Chinese Studies scholars in Europe. The Institute promotes interdisciplinary, critically informed research and teaching on China. It channels the unrivalled breadth and depth of expertise and insights across a wide spectrum of disciplines on China to the wider worlds of government, business, media, education, the arts, NGOs and beyond. It works with colleagues at SOAS with expertise beyond China to promote collaborative research on China and its relations with the rest of the world, particularly in the rest of Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

- One of SCI’s seven research themes is “China in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.” This theme is described as follows: "SOAS is the world’s leading institution for the study of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. This theme leverages the School’s regional expertise to better understand the global context of China, outside of the typical US-China relationship. It will consider China as a nation that explores and expands, through trade, soft power, and potentially through military power, including both contemporary and historical perspectives.”

- The Institute partners with Yenching Academy of Peking University, the Young China Watchers, Beijing Normal University, and Zhejiang University.

Social Science Research Council (SSRC)

New York, NY, USA

Established in 1923

- SSRC is a non-profit organization devoted to the advancement of social science research and scholarship. The SSRC consists of a number of research programs, fellowship programs, and cross-disciplinary initiatives designed to lead innovation in the social sciences, build interdisciplinary and international networks, mobilize knowledge on important public issues, and educate and train the next generation of social science researchers. The SSRC pursues its mission by awarding fellowships and grants, convening workshops and conferences, participating in research consortia, sponsoring scholarly exchanges, organizing summer training institutes, and producing print and online publications.

- The SSRC maintains a liaison presence in Beijing through its China Environment and Health Initiative. A number of SSRC programs in New York have also increased their research and
activity on China-Africa relations in recent months. One of these programs is the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF); beyond its involvement in preparing this mapping study, CPPF has a particular focus on the security aspects of the China-Africa relationship, as well as China’s growing engagement in international peace operations and the UN system. Another program touching on connections between China and Africa is the Inter-Asia Program. This program acts as a convening body stretching from the Middle East to East Asia, investigating possible areas in which networks of academics and researchers can be built and strengthened.

- In 2016, the SSRC established the China-Africa Peace and Security Research Fellowship. Launched in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council’s African Peacebuilding Network (APN) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), this fellowship is designed to integrate junior Chinese scholars into important networks of peace and security scholars and experts in Africa, and establish links between their home institutions and African counterparts. Conversely, African institutions and individual scholars will have the opportunity to expand their networks among Chinese research communities. The fellowship program aims to strengthen the evidentiary basis for Chinese scholarship on the UN and in peace and security studies, foster greater South-South dialogue, promote knowledge exchange between African and Chinese scholars, and integrate African and Chinese perspectives into key policy debates within the UN and African Union.
- The SSRC received funding for research on China-Africa engagement from the Henry Luce and Ford Foundations.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)\textsuperscript{115}

Stockholm, Sweden
Established in 1966

- SIPRI created a China and Global Security Program, since renamed to China and Asian Security, to advance contemporary China studies with a particular emphasis on China’s role and impact in global, non-traditional, and transnational security. It conducts research and analysis, produces policy-relevant publications, and aims to help policymakers, scholars, businesses, and the general public more fully understand the foreign and security policy implications of China’s role.
- Although SIPRI does not have a program specifically focused on China-Africa, many elements of its research bear on this relationship. Databases including arms transfers, development cooperation, and multilateral peacekeeping information are relevant. In 2014, SIPRI published a book called Security Activities of External Actors in Africa, which included a chapter on China by Chin-Hao Huang and Olawale Ismail. In November 2021, it hosted a roundtable on “Chinese ODA in Africa and Implications for the International Aid Architecture.”

University of Florida: China-Africa Working Group\textsuperscript{116}

Gainesville, FL, USA
Established in 2015

- “The China-Africa Working Group is an interdisciplinary research group focusing on the relationship and growing importance of China in Africa. The rationale for the group’s formation is to explore aspects of the China-Africa dynamic, and how African countries are being affected by China. The Working Group invites scholars and students to present their research at workshops and lectures, and in small group discussions to garner additional insights that may lead to the publications of their research. Thus far, the group’s focus has been on the socioeconomic, cultural, political, and media aspects of the China-Africa relationship.”
- The Working Group is housed in the University’s Center for African Studies.
- It has held workshops on topics including “China-Africa Relations: Political and Economic Engagement and Media Strategies” and “China-Africa Relations: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives on African Migrants in China.” The group has also focused on studying the Belt and Road Initiative and curated a museum exhibition at the University of Florida’s Grinter Gallery on this topic.

United States Institutes of Peace (USIP)\textsuperscript{137}
Washington, DC, USA
Established in 1984
- USIP “is a national, nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical and essential for U.S. and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil societies to build local capacities to manage conflict peacefully. The Institute pursues its mission by linking research, policy, training, analysis and direct action to support those who are working to build a more peaceful, inclusive world.”
- USIP has an Africa Center and a program focused on China. A collaborative project between these two programs has focused on efforts to mitigate and prevent conflict in the Red Sea area. USIP has also engaged in grant-making for research on China-Africa, including supporting the work of early-career African scholars on topics such as China’s impact on peace, security, and development in Africa.

Yale University
New Haven, CT, USA
Established in 1701
- Yale University has participated in a number of notable initiatives to further the study of engagement between China and Africa.
- From 2010-2012, several scholars from Yale University partnered with the University of Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (HKIHSS) to implement a project to investigate the “trading and social activities of Chinese entrepreneurs in the African continent and also the mushrooming African trading communities in China.”\textsuperscript{139} The project received funding from the Council on East Asian Studies at Yale University through the Sun Hung Kai-Kwok’s Family Foundation. (See the entry on HKIHSS in the China section of this inventory.)
- In 2013, Yale University partnered with the Social Science Research Council to help launch its China-Africa Knowledge Project. A conference at Yale was held titled “Making Sense of the China-Africa Relationship: Theoretical Approaches and the Politics of Knowledge.” A series of twenty-one think pieces on China-Africa relations were presented by scholars at this conference.\textsuperscript{120}
NOTES

1 In the work of the China and the Global South Project, we use “Global South” to signify the regions of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia collectively. We find the term useful in considering global power relations broadly, but we are aware that it is both contested and imperfect, flattening national and regional specificities and eliding differences between parts of each region.

2 Author names appear here and the references as they appear in the publication referenced; we have chosen to do this in order to avoid imposing our own editorial choices on authors and how they render their names. For example, for scholars writing in Chinese, author names appear family name first; for scholars writing in English, we follow the name order of the publication. This means that for references where Chinese scholars are writing in English, family name often comes last; but in some instances, even when publishing in English, Chinese scholars maintain Chinese name order. In the in-text citations throughout this report, where there are multiple works by scholars with the same family name, we have included each author’s complete name (or, for multi-authored works, the first author’s complete name) to avoid confusion.

3 We include a limited number of works in French and were unable to survey the lusophone literature.

4 http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade

5 https://chinaafricaloandata.bu.edu/

6 http://www.sais-cari.org/publications

7 https://www.aiidata.org/publications

8 https://www.aiidata.org/china-official-finance


12 We also follow this approach.


Some of this analysis is drawn from Carayannis and Weiss (2021).

There is more scholarly focus on China’s engagement with the UN than with the AU. In the early 2010s, Chinese scholars called for deepening relations with the AU in order to continue the long mutual friendship dating back to anticolonial struggles during the Cold War, and to streamline China’s relations with individual African countries (Luo Jianbo 2013; Li Zhibiao 2010). The African Union is part of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); the discussion of China-Africa agricultural cooperation following the AU’s Agenda 2063 is still carried out through FOCAC, for example (Han and Yu 2017). Despite the AU’s involvement in FOCAC and scholarly calls for increased engagement with the AU, China-Africa relations seem to have proceeded mostly on a bilateral basis. At this point, Chinese scholarship on China’s relations with the African Union is ad hoc rather than systematic. However, the AU recognizes FOCAC resolutions as official documents which guide its relationship with China, and based on FOCAC is looking to shape its engagements with the rest of the world (we thank Pamela Adwoah Carslake for commenting on this).


We thank Guillaume Moumouni for this insight.

As noted in the discussion of the Libya crisis, this has changed since the quotation here was published in 2009. In 2011, China evacuated tens of thousands of Chinese nationals working in Libya’s oilfields. This action to protect China’s citizens abroad was described by Zerba (2014) as “a new diplomatic imperative” which required merging diplomatic and military capabilities.

The NGO Saferworld, included in this report’s inventory, has a dedicated project focused on flows of arms with reference to the Africa-China-Europe nexus. See https://www.a-c-e-project.eu/.


To survey the Chinese-language literature on this topic, we performed a combination of keyword searches in three databases, CNKI, National Social Sciences Database, and Wanfang, in February 2022. After eight years of growth, the number of journal articles peaked in 2019 and has been in significant decline thereafter. It is uncertain whether the drop in publications reflects the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic alone.

This is the low end of Skeldon’s “cautious” assessment of 270,000 to 510,000.
In a book talk hosted by the International Peace Institute in New York in October of that year, French stated that the number was "closer to two million": see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0jX0N0FrkY.

This figure is taken from a report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2016).

Here, Bodomo is characterizing the findings of Bork-Hüffer et al. (2014).

“Memories of Kung Fu masters (a la Bruce Lee), fahfee men, and kind and generous shopkeepers appear to play a mediating role in shaping perceptions about Chinese in South Africa ... The role of memory and social history in mitigating contemporary contexts of potential conflict are undeniable” (Park 2013, 145).

An important caveat in terms of the scholarship on lusophone Africa is that we were unable to search literature in Portuguese.

Even in media, Chinese in Egypt do not receive much attention. One fascinating exception to this is Hessler (2015).

French discussed Chinese migrant communities in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Liberia, Mali, Ghana, Namibia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

Li’s most-cited work on Chinese in Africa is from 2000, but since then he has published an updated history or survey every couple of years.

This may be a manifestation of a certain amount of interest in China on African history generally. In 2011 the Chinese scholar Liu Lan tried to account for all academic studies written on African history between 2005 and 2010, counting eight monographs and 116 papers. The author noted that although some Chinese academics have moved on to topics other than African history and the overall frequency of publication has decreased somewhat, the quality of research has steadily improved (Liu Lan 2011).

One book which takes on these topics from the angle of business and economics, considering how Chinese migrants are building manufacturing investments in Africa, is Irene Sun’s The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa (2017).

At the same time, the literature continues to take stock of the global shape of Chinese migration; see Miles (2020) and Guo (2021).

This theory, Liang (2014, 3) explains, “argues that factors other than migration networks slowly become less important, while the migration networks in places of origin can be self-evolving and cumulative.” One way that social scientists have observed a cumulative effect of migration is that when “social networks matured during the migration process, migration costs gradually declined, and a downward shift in the social class of migrants gradually appeared due to the cumulative effects of migration.”

We thank Pamela Adwoah Carslake for this insight.
Chinese knowledge of and perceptions about the use of condoms, for example, are not significantly different from those of surveyed Africans (Choi et al. 2020).

See, for example, the press release of the African Union Directorate of Information and Communication (2020).


Sinopec later received formal permission from Gabon’s government for the project and commissioned a very high-quality EIA (Jiang 2009, 605). For the hydropower projects, see Hensengerth (2013, 296-97) and Bosshard (2010).

For more on extractive industries, see Patey (2014).


Kioko (2022) offers a detailed breakdown.


Other researchers, such as Jin (2020), are also looking at Chinese films and TV programs for the African market in Tanzania.

In international relations, Carrozza and Benabdallah (2022) find that Chinese scholars both include and silence Africa in their work.

See Castillo (2020a, 2021) for an analysis of racial constructions, technology, and politics in China-Africa relations.

This was a particular challenge for mapping institutions in China. For three of the institutions catalogued, information had to be pulled primarily from news articles about the institution, rather than a website created by the institution itself. For at least six institutions, information was quoted primarily from Chinese-language sources. In our earlier mapping study (Carayannis and Olin 2012), we missed many of these institutions because we did not search in Chinese. Website links included here are correct as of the time of writing but may change or become defunct over time.

https://fromafricatochina.com/

http://davidshinn.blogspot.com/

https://africansinchina.net/
Another report potentially of interest to readers is "Studying China in the Global South: Draft Report from the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies" (Sanborn et al. 2021), which lists and analyzes several centers studying China in South Africa.

57 https://aercafrica.org/
59 https://china-africa.africapi.org/
60 https://ascir.org/
61 https://corafrika.org/
62 https://twitter.com/folasoule/status/1479042868245413888
63 https://codesria.org/
65 https://ecfa-egypt.org/
66 https://issafrica.org/
67 http://www.sinafrica.cas.cn/English/About/Introduction/
68 https://www.kaiptc.org/
69 http://www.sacefoundation.org/welcome/
70 https://saia.org.za/
71 https://www.sardc.net/en/
72 https://www.ub.bw/discover/faculties/humanities/chinese-studies
73 https://www.udsm.ac.tz/web/index.php/centres/chinese
74 https://www.ug.edu.gh/cas/
75 https://www.cacs.org.za/
76 https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/
77 https://africachinareporting.com/
78 https://africa-usforum.africa/

In our 2012 Mapping Study, we noted that as of November 2009, there were only 21 Confucius Institutes on the African continent, and four Confucius Classrooms (Carayannis and Olin 2012, 43).


[http://www.africastudy.cn/](http://www.africastudy.cn/)

[http://www.cicir.ac.cn/chinese/Organ_528.html](http://www.cicir.ac.cn/chinese/Organ_528.html): 非洲研究所主要从事政策研究和综合研究，是国内非洲问题重要研究机构。下设非洲政治安全研究中心、非洲经济发展研究中心和法语非洲研究中心。主要研究领域：非洲政治、经济、安全、社会等领域研究；中非关系及大国对非关系研究；非盟及非洲次区域组织研究；国别研究包括尼日利亚、安哥拉、埃塞俄比亚、南非、刚果（金）等。非洲所承担多项政府、企业相关研究课题，研究人员在国内外一些重要学术刊物上发表过大量文章。非洲所系“中非智库10+10合作伙伴计划”成员单位，与南非安全问题研究所、南非“非洲问题研究所”、尼日利亚国际事务研究所、津巴布韦南部非洲研究与文献中心、美国埃默里大学等非洲、欧美地区数十家智库长期保持密切交流关系。
95  [http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/t1295250.htm](http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/t1295250.htm)
96  [http://ias.zjnu.edu.cn/iasen/main.htm](http://ias.zjnu.edu.cn/iasen/main.htm)
97  [https://afroasiannetworks.com/](https://afroasiannetworks.com/)
98  [https://www.afsc.org/](https://www.afsc.org/)
99  [https://www.blackchinacaucus.org/](https://www.blackchinacaucus.org/)
100  [https://chinaglobalsouth.com/](https://chinaglobalsouth.com/)
102  [https://www.chinamed.it/](https://www.chinamed.it/)
103  [https://www.aiddata.org/](https://www.aiddata.org/)
104  [https://www.ids.ac.uk/](https://www.ids.ac.uk/)
105  [https://www.crisisgroup.org/](https://www.crisisgroup.org/)
106  [https://www.sais-cari.org/](https://www.sais-cari.org/)
108  [https://www.iias.asia/](https://www.iias.asia/)
109  [https://africa.isp.msu.edu/chinese-africaafricans-china-research-network/](https://africa.isp.msu.edu/chinese-africaafricans-china-research-network/)
110  [https://oucan.web.ox.ac.uk/home](https://oucan.web.ox.ac.uk/home)
111  [https://saferworld.org.uk/](https://saferworld.org.uk/)
112  [https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/](https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/)
113  [https://www.ssrc.org/](https://www.ssrc.org/)
115  [https://www.sipri.org/](https://www.sipri.org/)
116  [https://africa.ufl.edu/research-training/working-groups/china-africa-working-group/](https://africa.ufl.edu/research-training/working-groups/china-africa-working-group/)
117  [https://www.usip.org/](https://www.usip.org/)
118  [https://www.yale.edu/](https://www.yale.edu/)

120  http://china-africa.ssrc.org/making-sense-of-the-china-africa-relationship-think-pieces/
REFERENCES


Tu, Youyou. 2011. "The Discovery of Artemisinin (Qinghaosu) and Gifts from Chinese Medicine." *Nature Medicine* 17: 1217-1220. [https://doi.org/10.1038/nm.2471](https://doi.org/10.1038/nm.2471)


THIS STUDY WAS FUNDED BY THE FORD FOUNDATION.