LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN-CHINA

KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS:
STATE OF THE FIELD

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ABOUT THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is an independent, international, nonprofit organization founded in 1923. It fosters innovative research, nurtures new generations of social scientists, deepens how inquiry is practiced within and across disciplines, and mobilizes necessary knowledge on important public issues. For nearly 100 years the SSRC has coordinated the research, policy, and philanthropic communities in the pursuit of evidence-based policies to promote human well-being, emerging as both a pivotal force in the academy and a respected contributor to the public good. The SSRC is guided by the belief that justice, prosperity, and democracy all require better understanding of complex social, cultural, economic, and political processes. We work with practitioners, policymakers, and academic researchers in the social sciences, natural sciences, humanities, and related professions. We build interdisciplinary and international networks, working with partners around the world to link research to practice and policy, strengthen individual and institutional capacities for learning, and enhance public access to information.

ABOUT THE CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH PROJECT

The China and the Global South initiative aims to develop research capacity about China in the Global South and connect institutions and researchers producing knowledge on China in a global network. It builds capacity for knowledge generation and dissemination on China in the Global South by supporting research institutions, linking them to each other in an international network, and giving locally produced knowledge a greater voice in global academic and policy conversations.

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INTRODUCTION

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is an independent, international nonprofit organization. It fosters innovative research, nurtures new generations of social scientists, deepens how inquiry is practiced within and across disciplines, and mobilizes necessary knowledge on important public issues.

The SSRC is guided by the belief that justice, prosperity, and democracy all require better understanding of complex social, cultural, economic, and political processes. We work with practitioners, policymakers, and academic researchers in the social sciences, related professions, and the humanities and natural sciences. We build interdisciplinary and international networks, working with partners around the world to link research to practice and policy, strengthen individual and institutional capacities for learning, and enhance public access to information. We award fellowships and grants, convene workshops and conferences, conduct research and participate in research consortia, sponsor scholarly exchanges, and produce print and online publications.

The SSRC, through the development of the China-Africa Knowledge Project, the China-Africa Peace Fellowship, and more recently, the China and the Global South Project, is a leading node for a growing, yet fragmented interest in China’s engagement with the world. We thus bring a deep commitment and experience to building research capacity in the Global South, as well as expertise on China’s engagement in the Global South.

The China and the Global South project at the SSRC aims to strengthen capacity for knowledge generation and dissemination on China by catalyzing centers of excellence on China in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America; connecting them to each other; and giving locally produced knowledge greater voice in global academic and policy conversations. This project builds upon the SSRC’s earlier activities that situated emergent scholarship on China and Africa within broader scholarly and policy discourses about ongoing global transformations; and the Council’s 100-year history of building research capacity around the world, strengthening interdisciplinary and international networks, and linking research to practice and policy.

This study consists of two major components, a capacity assessment and a literature review. This dual purpose distinguishes the CGS project as more than a purely academic study: it profiles both the intellectual and institutional landscapes of a vibrant and diverse field of research. Each of the geographic studies in this project follows a similar structure. Drawing upon the expertise of different authors, in this project, the Global South has been divided into three broad geographic regions: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Separate teams studied each region, and the SSRC has published similar scoping studies for Asia and Africa. The specific approach of the China-LAC study to this project is examined in more detail below.

METHODOLOGY NOTES

Literature review

Our systematic review of the qualitative literature used database searches with a variety of keywords as well as the snowball method. Our searches were conducted primarily in Spanish, English, and Chinese. This reflects the status of English as, for better or worse, the language most privileged in global academic scholarship.
As we conducted the literature review, our focal questions included:

- Where is the knowledge being produced?
- What are the key topics that people are writing about?
- What are the gaps in the literature?
- How does the literature align with empirical reality?

The material that we draw on for our review primarily includes academic books and journal articles; academic conference topics and paper presentations; secondarily, it includes gray literature (reports from think tanks, research NGOs, and international and regional organizations). This review is not intended to assess the quality of the literature, but rather to provide an overview of the research themes that are dominating knowledge production and the existing gaps in knowledge.

Mapping

This report is the result of over 60 consultations with academics, researchers, and other experts both in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as outside of the region. These consultations took place virtually from November 2021 to May 2022. These consultations were held under the Chatham House Rule, and therefore are not for attribution in this report. Specifically, we also benefit from the pioneering work on China studies in the Global South done by the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Universidad del Pacífico in Peru (Sanborn et al. 2021).

This report includes an Annex which attempts to map the institutions and networks that are producing knowledge on China and China-LAC topics. Here, we use the term “network” broadly, encompassing the types of institutions that are not universities or research institutions. This includes a wide variety of knowledge networks and platforms.

The inventory of institutions and networks aims to provide a snapshot of the diversity of initiatives on China and China-LAC, but it is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it attempts to represent a snapshot of the current environment, which is constantly changing. Like the literature review, it is not intended to assess the quality of the initiatives, but rather to provide an overview of the entities that are producing knowledge or have capacities for knowledge generation and/or dissemination on China and China-LAC relations. In terms of criteria, we have sought to include those which meet one or more of the following benchmarks:

- Outputs: those that are producing research publications, blogs, articles, or other types of research materials.
- Teaching: those that offer courses at the undergraduate and/or postgraduate level.
- Convenings: those that are organizing conferences, seminars, and other events.
- Fostering connections: those that are facilitating connections between stakeholders or “knowledge-producers” (researchers, academics, students, civil society members, and the private sector).

We looked at their online presence to determine such activity. To assemble this information, we began with the aforementioned consultations. We also used online searches. We examined the research institutes, centers, and networks that we could find via keyword searches and by locating where scholars publishing on relevant topics were based. We traced events, conferences, and research outputs listed on major research center websites; we looked into major universities in the region to find China-LAC-related work.
The mapping does not include funding institutions or those institutions that provide financial support as their main output. Although challenges related to funding are mentioned in this report, an analysis of funding sources for institutions was outside the scope of this report. Funding is mentioned as part of the key takeaways from the consultations, as it was systematically brought up as one of the main challenges that scholars are facing in the region. The discussion of funding here does not aim to provide an analysis of funding sources.

We dedicate most of the inventory to mapping the landscape of institutions, platforms, networks, and other actors which are most active and significant in research production and otherwise shaping this area of work. We attempted to provide an extensive snapshot of the current institutional landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is both diverse and ever-changing. There are some institutions in the inventory whose accessible output do not quite match their stated missions. We include them as well to present a fuller picture of the institutional landscape.

Reflections

While fully exhaustive coverage of a growing and dynamic field is impossible, our work provides a solid overview of the major intellectual currents and institutional underpinnings at this moment. Nevertheless, there are limitations in our approach, and we hope that acknowledging them will help readers become more reflexive of the impressive growth of a vibrant field. Since the study began in 2021, major geopolitical shifts inside and outside the LAC continue to occur, which have implications not only for China-LAC relations, but also for knowledge production. Our report is unable to fully capture these recent developments.

This work and the consultations began during the Covid-19 pandemic. While we originally envisioned field visits, these were not possible due to travel restrictions. Such field visits would be a rich source of information once travel is further normalized. In fact, many scholars we consulted both within and outside of the LAC region mentioned a lack of travel as a major obstacle to cross-institutional collaboration and knowledge production.

RESEARCH THEMES / CLUSTERS

During the course of our research, we identified two themes under which much of the research has been and is being conducted in Latin America, and two themes that have gained attention. In the first category, we have identified (1) (geo)economics (which includes trade, investments, financing, aid, and infrastructure projects), and (2) (geo)politics and international relations. Work has been done on other two themes such as (3) social and environmental impacts (including labor); and (4) migration, identities, and culture. Nonetheless, gaps remain in certain topics that would benefit from additional research.

The scholarship dedicated to analyzing China-LAC relations has mainly concentrated on (geo) economics since economic objectives have been the most salient motivation of China’s engagement with the region. Initially, most of the literature was devoted to studying the evolution and general trends of trade relations and focused on identifying the opportunities and challenges of bilateral trade trajectories. As economic relations evolved and ties with China diversified to include the provision of investments, financing, and aid, but also the construction of infrastructure projects, scholars began to conduct research on these topics, as well as to debate the impacts of these dynamics for reprimarization, deindustrialization, and development. The literature about China-LAC economic relations has focused mainly on analyzing bilateral relations, reflecting the importance of bilateral and market channels through which China has approached countries in the region. However, most of the researchers that
were consulted for this study pointed out the need for more LAC-elaborated economic and financial databases, further in-depth case studies, as well as deeper research about China’s economic approach to certain countries or subregions, such as those of Central America and the Caribbean.

The research about China-LAC relations has also deeply debated the nature and implications of China’s (geo)political engagement with countries in the region. In the case of (geo)politics and international relations, the literature can be divided into studies that have focused on security concerns, which are mainly conducted by researchers based in institutions in Washington, but also by some experts based in LAC, and those analyses that identify both the positive and negative implications of China’s engagement in LAC. The latter comprises research conducted mainly by academics based in LAC, and considers that Chinese engagement with LAC is essentially motivated by economic and commercial interests rather than (geo)political ones. Also, though the second approach recognizes the multiple risks that China’s presence might imply, scholars that share these views emphasize the option that ties with China have offered countries in LAC to establish relations with a counterpart that differs from Western countries. More recent but still scarce studies have included debates about how China’s presence in the region relates to European interests. In addition to the above-mentioned two dominant approaches, the literature about (geo)politics and international relations also comprises studies that identify common positions between China and LAC in global affairs, and includes analyses that address cooperation in subregional, regional, and multilateral frameworks. According to most of the experts consulted for this study, more research in LAC is needed regarding China’s security engagement with countries in the region, but also studies that go beyond China or U.S.-influenced views.

Within the category of (geo)politics, the literature has recently begun to address China’s health diplomacy in LAC, though discussions are still incipient compared to debates about this topic in other regions in the Global South. Research about China’s health diplomacy in LAC has been conducted by scholars based in LAC but also elsewhere, and has mainly focused on identifying whether China’s provision of aid responds to its broader economic policy, aimed at pursuing political interests and goals. In addition, experts have conducted research about the extent to which China’s donations and provision of vaccines have improved China’s image in the region. Also, scholars have debated about the extent to which China has played a role that the U.S. and, to a lesser extent other powers, did not—that is, becoming a donor and provider of health supplies to countries in LAC during the pandemic, while Western countries were absent.

Research conducted on China-LAC (geo)political engagement has also recently started to analyze the various kinds of linkages established by a diversity of Chinese and LAC non-state actors. Though still nascent, these new approaches are gaining relevance, and include a wide range of agents and levels of relations that cannot be understood under one label. Most scholars that have started to study China-LAC relations based on these approaches point out the importance of broadening the analysis of Chinese presence in the region based on a multi-actor perspective that includes both state and non-state actors.

The social and environmental aspects of China-LAC engagement have been an emerging topic of study that evaluates the social and environmental implications of China-LAC economic activity, including trade, foreign investments, and infrastructure projects from China. While challenges still exist in measuring social and environmental effects, scholars have followed economic data and case study information to analyze these dynamics. The literature proposes both positive and negative effects of the economic relationship. On the positive side are an influx of revenues and project opportunities, as well as employment opportunities in LAC. On the negative side, the literature largely suggests that the nature of China’s economic engagement in LAC, which has been increasingly concentrated in primary sectors of the economy such as large-scale agriculture and extractives, heightens the social and environmental risks associated with them. Particular climate risks, including those related to
greenhouse gases, water resources, and deforestation, have been cited. Increasingly, the scholarship is considering grassroots and indigenous voices, as the areas affected by this activity often coincide with indigenous territories. Various case studies examine the social and environmental impacts related to mining, lithium, and transport and energy infrastructure projects (including hydroelectric projects). These case studies also describe instances where China-based companies have managed community relations both successfully and unsuccessfully, suggesting that prior consultation and analysis of the social and environmental consequences of potential ventures are essential to minimize the negative impact on communities. The impact of China-LAC economic activities on labor creation and quality is also discussed in the literature. Similar to other areas of China-LAC relations, the literature urges LAC governments to create policies that take advantage of business opportunities from China-based entities to further sustainable development and benefit communities.

Scholarship has also covered Chinese migration to Latin America, which started with labor recruitment in the mid-nineteenth century with “coolie” labors working on railroad construction and plantations and staying at the end of their contracts to establish small businesses along the railroads. New waves of Chinese migrants during the 20th century were largely constituted by those fleeing China due to the civil war and the Communist revolution, leading to a negative political connotation of “betrayal” regarding migration. Also, during the 20th century, the region saw wealthy entrepreneurs arrive from China to seek business abroad, making for a vast and diverse diaspora with complex identities. Scholars have found that multiple factors play out in building these identities, such as global actors and international relations, as well as values and perceptions around the meaning of “Chineseness” both in the region and in China. The literature has also described how livelihoods have been impacted by racist and xenophobic attitudes towards Chinese migrants, often shaped by Latin American countries’ policies towards China. Regarding livelihoods, extensive research has been conducted on the role and significance of Chinatowns through multiple case studies. Chinatowns have served both as a hub for Chinese migrants and following generations to integrate themselves while finding a space where their culture is celebrated rather than discriminated against, and as a means to adopt and protect social, economic, and cultural structures from China. Research has found that the life of Chinese migrants still revolves around ethnic capital.

(GEO)ECONOMICS

Overview of China-LAC (geo)economic relations

The increase of relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) dates back to the postwar period; however, due to the geopolitical context of the Cold War, most countries in the region established diplomatic ties with the PRC in the 1970s and 1980s. The only exception was Cuba, which established diplomatic relations in 1960. At the end of the nineties, economic relations between China and LAC were scarce. However, due to the displacement of global growth from the developed world to Asia and the emerging economies of the Global South (with China as the main driver), a phenomenon that began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 2000s, a significant rise in trade emerged between China and countries in LAC. Since 2000, with its accession to the WTO being a key driver, China began to intensify its trade presence in the region; as exchange grew, so too did research that analyzed its evolution, including its positive and negative implications. Diverse approaches have characterized these research agendas, which have been produced both inside the region and elsewhere.

The various debates that have addressed LAC countries’ relations with China have sought to
understand the extent to which China is pursuing strategic motivations through its economic presence in the region, and the multiple implications of these relationships. Since the use of economic instruments over territories—such as trade, investment, aid, and financing policies—to expand or restrict access to certain resources can be interpreted as a way to advance strategic objectives and obtain certain results in foreign policy, the denomination of this section as “(geo)economics” aims to open up the discussion about the extent to which China’s presence in LAC has been interpreted as motivated by the quest to control markets and financial, natural, and technological resources. The (geo)economic analyses aim to understand whether there are geostrategic intentions in the use of economic power in international relations; in other words, whether trade, investments, and financing are connected to underlying objectives for states such as national security and foreign policy. Though the strategic component of (geo)economics and geopolitics makes it difficult to separate them in doctrinal, practical, and discursive terms, the economic activities that characterize (geo)economics are different from the political and diplomatic ones that characterize geopolitics. Also, in geopolitics, states and international organizations are considered main actors, while in geoeconomics, apart from them, enterprises, both national and global ones, are also relevant.

As shown in the following paragraphs, most of the literature about the China-LAC relationship coincides with the affirmation that economic objectives have been the main motivations for China’s presence in the region and that economic ties have evolved mainly through bilateral and market channels. Also, most of the academic analyses remark that the initial reason for China’s economic engagement with LAC was commodity-oriented, with activities mainly conducted by Chinese companies and banks, and supported by the Chinese state. More recently, as scholars have pointed out, though the interest in raw materials remains relevant, infrastructure projects, electricity generation and distribution, energy transition, as well as telecommunications and digital technologies, among other sectors, have gained importance in China’s rapprochement to countries in the region.

According to the literature, this engagement has been developed through multiple vias: initially by trade, but later by Chinese companies outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), as well as by Chinese banks’ provision of aid and loans, as well as by the construction of infrastructure, which includes both OFDI and provision of loans to develop the projects. In recent years, some scholars have demonstrated that, apart from Chinese policy banks, commercial banks and regional funds created among China and countries in LAC have become important sources of financing as well. Most scholars have also pointed out that, for the region, China has become an important economic partner; however, they also remark that national experiences differ greatly. Most academics claim that the literature has been centralized on analyzing bilateral relations, reflecting the importance of bilateral and market channels through which China has engaged countries in the regions. Also, most experts have remarked on the need for more in-depth case studies, as well as for more economic databases elaborated in LAC, and further research that addresses economic relations between China and countries in the Caribbean and Central America. Since China-LAC engagement is mostly motivated by economic interests, scholars have also debated the extent to which these relations entail geopolitical motivations. These debates are addressed in a specific section below in this report.

According to the United Nations Comtrade Database, between 2000 and 2008, trade grew at an average annual rate of 31 percent, and reached an amount of $180 billion in 2010; these numbers evidenced that the dynamism that characterized trade exchanges remained constant even during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. By 2021, trade between China and LAC totaled $450 billion. These growing relations have been reflected in increasing institutional cooperation. The formalization of the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum (China-CELAC Forum) in 2014 as another multilateral mechanism China convened after the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) shows the importance of institutionalizing the relationship between China and LAC. Both
China-CELAC and FOCAC started in economic cooperation and gradually extended to other areas as needed. Despite challenges in setting agendas agreeable to multiple parties, some Chinese scholars consider both to be successful examples of China’s comprehensive diplomacy with developing countries and South-South cooperation (Zhang Hui 2017).

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is another pillar of the contemporary China-Latin America connections. Although writing in 2020 two Chinese scholars acknowledge the negative impact of, among other things, the right-leaning domestic politics in various Latin American countries, the unrest in Venezuela, and the U.S. opposition to China’s presence in the region, they remain confident of the BRI’s long-term appeal if China can continue to demonstrate its mutual benefits (Cao Ting 2020; Zhou Zhiwei 2020). In contrast, some scholars claim that there have been no major changes in trade exchanges between China and those countries in LAC that have become part of the BRI (Jenkins 2022; Serrano Moreno 2021). Some of the problems that have characterized China-LAC economic relationship in the past, such as the environmental and social impacts of Chinese investments and projects, are expected to persist posing challenges in the near future.

In addition to the overall design of China-Latin America economic connections, Chinese scholars are also paying particular attention to individual countries in the region and to bilateral ties. According to some authors, as Mexico accelerates the construction of various special economic zones, China has offered to share its own experience in this regard, which started to be developed mainly in the Chinese coast in the late 1970s (Zhou Mi and Kou Chunhe 2019). In South America, Uruguay has expressed strong interest in becoming part of the BRI, while it is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China, and Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama are also negotiating an FTA. Related bilateral negotiations are in the works (He Shuangrong and Wang Yuxin 2020). Studies acknowledge that bilateral cooperation needs to contend not just with domestic politics in a single Latin American country, but also with larger regional dynamics, particularly those related to ties with the United States.

Diversification of relations is another feature that characterizes China-LAC contemporary economic engagement. Though trade has become a crucial component of China-LAC’s economic relationship, the provision of investment and official financing and, to a lesser extent, aid, have evolved as relevant elements of these relations, together with the construction of infrastructure projects. As such, the multiple ways in which economic relations are being developed have acquired increasing importance for the scholarship that studies China’s ties with the region. Relatedly, China’s motivation to increase its presence in the region includes both positive and critical assessments. In this context, the academic research about China-LAC economic engagement has not only evolved in terms of quantity, but also in the variety of sub-themes that characterize the approaches. We have identified the most salient in the literature, which are addressed in the subsections presented below.

Bilateral trade

Before 2005, there were scarce studies that addressed the economic relations between China and LAC. The most salient studies were those conducted by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)—which has, since then, become a leading reference through the publication of numerous contributions about the strategic importance of China-LAC economic relations—and by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The ECLAC’s publications addressed the relationship between China and countries in Central America and Mexico, with a focus on the impacts of Chinese products in local and global markets in certain value chains that were central for these economies, such as electronics and textiles (ECLAC 2004; Dussel Peters 2005). Afterward, the IADB’s studies pointed out that the negative effects of trade relations with China would be minimal for countries in LAC (IADB 2005; Lora 2005). This view was in line with preliminary estimations made by a
study published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Blázquez-Lidoy, Rodríguez, and Santiso 2006). Later, a report by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars raised questions about the consequences of China’s presence on LAC’s economic development and set the tone for future analysis of these challenges (Arnson, Mohr, and Roett 2007). Afterward, various studies that presented diverging views showed a tendency that began to be distinctive in the academic analysis of China-LAC: that is, the tension between those that emphasized exclusively the benefits of China’s economic presence in the region, and those that claimed that China’s engagement involved negative implications for countries in LAC (Roett and Paz 2008). Different research works also addressed both the opportunities and challenges of China-LAC economic relations and started to raise questions about the multiple implications of trade imbalances (Lederman, Olarreaga, and Soloaga 2009; Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom 2010; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

By 2013, most countries in the region had China as their number one or number two trading partner. This was particularly true of countries in South America: since 2011, China has been the largest trading partner of the subregion (Albright, Ray, and Yudong Liu 2022). However, as various studies have demonstrated, this trade relationship has been built based on China’s scarcity of certain raw materials, and LAC’s abundance of natural resources. Moreover, for quite a few countries such as Mexico and Central America, the issue has not been one of the compositions of exports, but of lacking the natural resources that China demands while confronting the competition of Chinese manufactures. Thus, as the academic scholarship about China-LAC has remarked, China’s economic engagement is far from uniform across sub-regions and countries in LAC (Wise and Myers 2016; Hiratuka 2018a; Oviedo 2020).

According to most studies, these differences have been reflected in the geographical concentration of the bilateral trade, since the South American countries accounted for nearly 90 percent of LAC’s exports to China by 2008, with nearly no substantial changes since then (IADB 2010; Silva, Gomes, and Teixeira 2018). Concentration in the origin of sub-regions and countries that export to China has not been the only issue addressed by scholars, but also concentration in a handful of commodities being exported to the Asian country: 70 percent of the export basket is made of soybeans and other oilseeds, crude petroleum oil, iron ore and concentrates, copper ore and concentrates, fish meal, and wool (Gallagher 2016; Stallings 2020; Ray, Albright, and Wang 2021). On the import side of the equation, some authors have remarked that LAC’s imports of Chinese manufacturing goods have been growing faster than exports to China since the beginning of this century, leading to trade deficits with China in most cases (IADB 2010; Albright, Ray, and Yudong Liu 2022). Thus, academics have claimed that trade between China and LAC is mainly characterized by medium and high-technology products imported from China, in exchange for raw materials or natural resources with a low level of transformation. These patterns exhibit an inter-industry trade relationship, with scarce diversification on the export side (Cuhna 2011; Santiso and Avendano 2011; Roldán et al. 2016; Agramont and Bonifaz Moreno 2018; Hiratuka 2018a; Silva, Gomes, and Teixeira 2018).

Relatedly, some studies claim that the “China effect”—that is, China’s external trade composition, which generated demand pressures on commodity markets and supply pressures in industrial markets—has been reflected in the skewed distribution of benefits among countries in the region (Hiratuka 2018a; Jenkins 2019). Various research works discuss what in the first decade of the 2000s used to be the key difference in the patterns of trade in countries in South America and the other countries in the region. Specifically, a relatively well-balanced trade with China in the case of the former—since these countries’ share of exports associated with commodities is remarkably higher than in Mexico and Central America—and imbalanced exchanges in the case of the latter. Based on these disparities, several studies analyzed these relations by classifying countries in LAC as “winners” and “losers” in their trade relations with China (ECLAC 2004; IADB 2005; Lora 2005; Funakushi and Loser 2005; Phillips 2007; Gonzales 2008; Albrieu and Rozenwurcel 2015; Gallagher 2016), or by differentiating
between “complementary” or “competitive” trade effects of China in the region (Jenkins, Dussel Peters, and Mesquita Moreira 2008; Jenkins 2019). Nevertheless, even within subregions, as some authors remark, the effects of trade with China have not been equal in all countries—a few countries in South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru account for the majority of exports (Devlin and Kahn 2016; Wise and Myers 2016). Some studies have identified “winners” and “losers” within countries, referring to sectors or particular social groups that have either been benefited or affected by these patterns of trade with China (Jenkins 2019). However, once dynamics started to change in the context of the end of the “commodity boom” in 2012/13 due to China’s economic slowdown and the global fall in commodity prices, most South American countries registered deficits in their trade relations with China and started to be addressed by the scholarship as “losers” in their trade relations with China as well.

Due to the increase in LAC’s income between 2003 and 2013 in those countries that became key suppliers of commodities, the “China boom” or the “China lottery” in the region, as referred to by Gallagher (2016), has also been interpreted as a major contributor to one of LAC’s best growth periods since the state-led industrialization phase, enabling countries in the region to boost social programs to reduce the rise in inequality and poverty that had characterized them in previous years (Cypher and Wilson 2015; Gallagher 2016; Hiratuka 2018a). However, scholars have also claimed that governments in the region fell far short in capturing the incomes resulting from the “China boom” and investing them in upgrading their industry, innovation, and technology sectors (Adler and Magud 2013; ECLAC 2015). In this regard, authors have remarked that China is not to blame for the economic and social management of the region, but that it is the responsibility of LAC governments to establish and strengthen institutions that address China’s presence based on long-run development goals (Gallagher 2016; Wise 2020; Kaplan 2021).

Re-primarization, deindustrialization, and development

The fact that trade between China and LAC is predominantly inter-industry has promoted an important debate among scholars about the impacts of China in LAC, and the extent to which China contributes to the “re-commodification” or “re-primarization” of the region’s exports structure (Bértola and Ocampo 2013; Rosales and Kuwayama 2012; Bolinaga and Slipak 2015; Svampa and Slipak 2015; Fornés and Mendez 2018; Ahumada 2019; Bernal-Meza 2020; Li Xing 2020; Menezes and Bragatti 2020). In this regard, some scholars have claimed that China has contributed to LAC going back to its old “commodity trap” (Stallings 2016). In line with the debate about “re-primarization”, there are scholars that have debated about the extent to which China’s presence is contributing to recreating the “resource curse” in the region, producing a dependence on commodity exports at the expense of the industrial sector (Durán Lima and Pellandria 2013; 2017; Gallagher 2016). According to some authors, fears of a “resource curse” are not supported by data (Wise 2016). Relatedly, some scholars have discussed the extent to which the specialization and export concentration on commodities would lead to “Dutch disease,” since trade surpluses, caused by raw material exports, can drive up the exchange rate and, therefore, contribute to the long-term decline in non-commodity exports (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010; Santiso and Avendaño 2011). In this regard, some experts discard the possibility of “Dutch disease” since most countries in the region present trade deficits with China, despite commodities exports (Dussel Peters 2011). Also, emphasis has been made on the pattern of trade with China as being distinct from the region’s pattern of trade with the rest of the world, and China’s imports from other regions in the world (Gallagher 2016). Based on the analysis of trade data, scholars have claimed that while most of LAC’s exports that go to China are in the primary products sectors, the region’s export basket to the rest of the world is more balanced in terms of the commodities and manufacturing goods that are sold to other countries. As for China’s imports from other regions of the world, manufactured products are
remarkably more relevant than primary commodities.

Concerning how the literature has interpreted China’s demand and purchase of certain commodities, multiple debates have characterized the broader discussion of “re-primarization” based on the environmental and social impacts that these modes of production have had in the region. Below in this report, a whole subsection is dedicated to addressing these approaches.

The problem of deindustrialization has also been a topic of increasing debate, aimed at evaluating the extent to which the rise of China has accelerated industry decline in LAC. According to some scholars, China has affected the region's manufacturing sector and, more broadly, technological development and long-term growth due to a pattern of specialization in commerce that is mainly based on the exchange of Chinese manufactures for LAC's primary products (Mesquita Moreira 2007; Rosales and Kuwayama 2012; Dussel Peters, Hearn, and Shaiken 2013; Gallager, Irwin, and Koleski 2012; Guajardo, Molano, and Sica 2016; Hiratuka 2018a; Li 2020). The “China Boom” has also been associated with a reduction in the competitiveness of manufactured and other non-primary export sectors in the region. These facts have raised the concerns of some scholars that claim that countries in LAC have to get the right policies in place to respond to these challenges (Gallagher 2016; Fornés and Mendez 2018; Kaplan 2021). In this regard, Silva, Gomes, and Teixeira (2018) claim that there is not only a lack of public policies to diversify the portfolio of products that countries in the region export to China, but also an inability of LAC’s producers to participate differently in Chinese markets, such as by offering products with certain quantity of value-added.

According to some analysts, China’s increasing share in the global markets of industrial manufactures has operated as a “direct threat” to LAC’s products in the domestic markets, but also to certain LAC’s industrial exports to other countries in the region, and in the U.S. and world markets, with Mexico, Brazil, the Central American countries, and the Dominican Republic as the most affected by Chinese competition (Jenkins, Dussel Peters, and Mesquita Moreira 2008; Gallager and Porzecanski 2010; Bittencourt 2012; Hiratuka et al. 2012; Dussel Peters, Hearn, and Shaiken 2013; Ray and Gallagher 2013; Jenkins 2014; Ortíz Velásquez and Dussel Peters 2016; Bellucci Módolo and Hiratuka 2017). Relatedly, the effects of China’s commercial presence in LAC have been interpreted as particularly affecting trade integration processes; these perspectives point out that China, by becoming the largest trade partner, has displaced South America’s industrial suppliers, Argentina and Brazil, and has contributed to placing limits to trade integration processes as well as to productive transformation (Aguiar de Medeiros and Cintra 2015; Beckerman, Dulcich, and Moncaut 2014; Oviedo 2016; Bernal-Meza 2020). Moreover, Mattos and Carcanholo (2012) point out that China is placing South American industries under great pressure due to its presence in markets that are relevant to industrial development (Mattos and Carcanholo, 2012). As a result, growth in the Chinese economy has had negative effects on growth in South American countries (Silva, Gomes, and Teixeira 2018).

Meanwhile, some studies claim that it should not be assumed that all the growth of Chinese imports has displaced domestic production in LAC, but that the impact is much greater in certain industries, such as textiles, leather, and footwear. Furthermore, scholars have remarked that increased imports from China are not negative for all producers since there are low-cost Chinese inputs or capital goods that can help reduce production costs (Jenkins and de Freitas Barbosa 2012; Powell 2016; Jenkins 2019).

With regard to the study of the extent to which inter-industry trade with China has contributed to deindustrialization, some scholars have claimed that the specialization in exports of commodities and commodity-based manufactures represents a challenge for countries in LAC to diversify their productive structure and enter or move to higher-value-added activities (Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010). According to these experts, China is outcompeting LAC industrial products in third markets, contributing to accentuating the narrowing of LAC industrial production and the possibilities of
upgrading to higher technology and higher-value-added segments. In this regard, some studies point out that there is scarce knowledge about the specific impacts of China on backward and forward LAC’s industrial chains (Dussel Peters 2022a). However, most authors that have debated the extent to which China has promoted LAC’s deindustrialization argue that China is not only affecting LAC’s industrial production and exports but also negatively affecting the relative advantages of these countries in certain global commodity chains, by displacing them from exporters of commodity-based manufactures to mere suppliers of non-processed commodities (Bernal-Meza 2012; Sevares 2015; Li 2020). Thus, as some authors have remarked, trade with China contributes to an unbalanced development trajectory for countries in LAC, leaving little room for local producers to move up the value chain. Moreover, these scholars have asserted that the technology gap between China and LAC has widened in recent years due to the characteristics of trade (Fornés and Mendez 2018).

According to Hiratuka (2022), in the case of Brazil, the asymmetrical trade with China as a cause for deindustrialization is only part of the overall picture, since there are examples where China-Brazil economic relations have opened opportunities to promote Brazilian industrial and technological upgrading. Though the author acknowledges that trade with China has had implications for deindustrialization, he also claims that setbacks are mainly a consequence of domestic drivers. While most of the literature about Chinese companies’ presence in Brazil has focused on other sectors, particularly energy, Hiratuka (2022) highlights the importance of analyzing the role of the Chinese company BYD, and the potential that this kind of cooperation has for economic bilateral relations, but also to other countries in LAC to move toward more knowledge-intensive and sustainable economic activities.

In connection with the idea of China affecting export manufacturing in LAC, some authors have claimed that while China’s demand for LAC basic products continued to grow, it contributed to driving down employment in the manufacturing sectors (Ray and Gallagher 2013). Other studies point out the positive impacts of trade relations on commodity exports sectors. In this regard, Costa, Garred, and Pessoa (2016) claim that although imports of Chinese manufactures have affected Brazil industrial sectors, these effects have been more than compensated for by the increase and formalization of jobs in the agricultural and extractive sectors. Relatedly, a study conducted by Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) claims that there are “winner” sectors in terms of labor creation due to trade with China, such as agricultural activities, while “losers” are mainly those sectors where labor is affected by Chinese imports—this has been the case of textiles and leather industries, but also electronics and electric production. The debate about the extent to which China is affecting labor in LAC is fully addressed in a specific subsection below in this report.

Debates over the extent to which China’s engagement with LAC could be understood as a new “center-periphery” or “core-periphery” relationship, or a form of “neo-dependency,” have characterized some of the approaches in the scholarship during the second decade of the 2000s (Pieterse 2011; Laufer 2013, 2019; Puyana y Constantino 2015; Stallings 2020). Relatedly, some authors have remarked that China reinforces old patterns of insertion into the global economy by re-editing the dependency on primary production in the region, especially in South America, deteriorating the terms of trade and, thus, impeding countries in LAC to advance toward economic development (Turzi 2016; Bernal-Meza 2020). These perspectives argue that China functions as the “new” industrial core for peripheral countries in LAC, which has led to the third phase of dependency in the region (Pieterse 2011). In some cases, these dynamics have been defined as being part of the “Commodity Consensus”, which leads to models of development based on neo-extractivism (Svampa 2013; Slipak 2014; Svampa and Slipak 2015; Bolinaga and Slipak 2015). In other cases, these trends have been interpreted as a growing economic hegemony of China in the region (Oviedo 2012; Bernal-Meza 2016).
The above-mentioned discussions have regained importance recently, in the context of an increasing Chinese trade presence in commodities that are key for the energy transition. As Albright, Ray, and Yudong Liu (2022) point out, while the agricultural and extractive sectors that have characterized LAC’s exports to China during the past two decades continue to be relevant, new commodities such as lithium, aluminum, balsa wood, and a new generation of metals, such as molybdenum and niobium, are beginning to be required by China. These trends pose novel opportunities and challenges for the China-LAC trade relationship, especially in the context of the debate about the possibilities of increasing value-added exports from countries in the region, but also regarding the environmental and social impacts that the extraction of certain resources involves. There is a specific section below dedicated to address the debates about environmental and social impacts of extractive activities in LAC.

Experts have also claimed that Chinese finance and OFDI in the region, which have mainly been concentrated in commodity sectors, have reinforced LAC’s specialization in primary products. Recent studies have included Chinese finance and investments in the mentioned new commodities and debated the possible consequences of these trends for the China-LAC economic relationship. The following subsections address these and other discussions that have emerged concerning the region as a destination of Chinese finance, investments, and aid, but also regarding Chinese firms’ construction of infrastructure projects in countries in LAC.

Chinese investments

In 2001, China launched the “Going-Out” policy and encouraged Chinese enterprises to invest abroad. However, it was not until the aftermath of the global financial crisis that Chinese firms started to invest in LAC on a significant scale. Some scholars have remarked that the surge of China as an investor has transformed its engagement with countries in the region, from ties based on trade exchanges to relations where Chinese firms have a physical presence.

As in the case of Africa, the official Chinese data has been reported to be problematic because the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) data only registers the initial destination of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), omitting Chinese overseas investments via other countries (Roldán et. al 2016; Jenkins 2019). Also, official data about Chinese FDI in the region include investment in Caribbean tax havens, especially in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Since these are unlikely to be the final destinations of Chinese investment, including them in the analysis contributes to underestimating the real level of Chinese FDI in the region (Rosales y Kuwayama 2012; Jenkins 2019; Dussel Peters 2022b). Additionally, data based on media reports tend to overestimate Chinese FDI in LAC since most of them look at announced projects, rather than those realized.

To address these challenges, institutions based in LAC have refined data on Chinese OFDI in the region; one of the most relevant is the LAC Academic Network on China (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China), which since 2017 brings together statistics from several sources to elaborate on the Monitor of Chinese OFDI in LAC, and since 2020 elaborates on the Monitor of Chinese Infrastructure in LAC, to quantify China’s realized—not just announced—infrastructure projects in the region. A subsection below is dedicated to how experts have addressed Chinese investments and the provision of finance for infrastructure projects in LAC. Regarding investments, apart from the work of the Red ALC sobre China, institutions based outside LAC, such as AidData and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) / The Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT)—which covers China’s global investments and construction since 2005—also elaborate data on Chinese FDI in the region.

Apart from the data published by the above-mentioned institutions, the work of ECLAC has made important contributions regarding the evolution of Chinese investments in the region since the
beginning of this century (ECLAC 2011, 2021). In the last report published by the institution, some trends are worth considering. For example, though Chinese investments were scarce before 2010, they reached an amount of USD $3 billion in 2011, and have registered an average of USD $2 billion since 2017. In 2018, Chinese investments represented 1.6% of LAC’s total FDI, while they declined to 0.6% of LAC’s total FDI in 2019 (ECLAC 2021).

Most scholars that have analyzed Chinese OFDI in the region claim that the patterns of investment have been similar to those of trade, with most OFDI being located in energy, mining, and food sectors, and related infrastructure. These trends mainly characterized the period between 2000 and 2010 (Rosales and Kuwayama 2012; Dussel Peters and Armony 2015; Gallagher 2016; Ray and Gallagher 2017; Perez-Ludeña 2017). For example, as a major oil producer, Brazil has been an increasingly important supplier of China’s enormous demand in the twenty-first century and has received significant Chinese investment in its oil industry. As China continues to diversify its oil supply, this relationship is expected to grow further (Barbosa and Chen 2020). Beyond fossil fuels, China is also investing more in alternative and renewable energy in Latin America; the construction of hydroelectric, solar, and wind plants in countries in the region by Chinese firms have been notable since 2015 (ECLAC 2021). This can be a leverage for more green investment from China, and such actions might provide concrete benefits for ordinary people in Latin America, as analyzed in another subsection below (Xing Wei 2022).

Beyond the literature that analyzes China’s OFDI in specific sectors, authors have pointed out that, like LAC’s exports to China, Chinese OFDI has been concentrated in certain countries, mainly in Argentina and Brazil and, more recently, in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Additionally, some studies have remarked that Chinese OFDI is mostly dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), though Chinese private companies have started to invest more in recent years (Dussel Peters 2015; 2020; 2021; 2022b; ECLAC 2021; Klinger 2015). Relatedly, some scholars claim that, since SOEs are part of the state, they seek not only economic profits but also political and strategic interests, to guarantee social stability and regime preservation (Turzi 2016). Energy and food security goals, thus, have been addressed as key motivations for Chinese firms to invest in LAC; these conclusions are in line with trends that evidence the sectors where Chinese investments concentrated during the first decade of the 21st century. However, some studies have demonstrated that since 2010 Chinese firms started to diversify their investments into other sectors rather than those exclusively related to resource extraction, such as electricity, construction of transport infrastructure, mainly ports, and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing—especially in the basic chemical and agrochemical industries—the financial sector and information and communication technologies (Wise 2016; Dussel Peters 2021, 2022; ECLAC 2021).

As some studies have remarked, the ascent of China as a global power is different from those of other leading countries. Among the multiple characteristics that differentiate China’s ascent, there is a strong presence of SOEs in the Chinese economy, but also the process of internationalization of these companies has received important fiscal benefits and financial support from Chinese State-owned banks, particularly by the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM) (ECLAC 2011). Apart from being SOEs, most Chinese firms investing in countries in LAC are big conglomerates (ECLAC 2021). There is a subsection below that analyzes Chinese policy and commercial bank’s provision of finance to Chinese firms investing in LAC, but also to governments in the region.

Though Chinese agricultural investment in LAC has been reported to be very small in comparison to Chinese investment in the energy and mining sectors, China’s expansion into this sector has been attributed to a strategy of “two markets, two sources” to secure access to food. Thus, according to some experts, while China has improved domestic production capacity, it has invested in LAC seeking to control the whole production chain of certain agricultural commodities, like soy,
which cannot be completely supplied by domestic production (Myers and Guo Jie 2015; Guo Jie and Myers 2016; Taraborrelli and Gonzalez Jauregui 2018; Gonzalez Jauregui 2018). These authors argue that Chinese private and public firms are not only motivated by China’s food security objectives but also driven by profit-based motivations. Relatedly, other scholars have claimed that Chinese agricultural investments in LAC are part of a new China’s model of development, based on state capitalism (Turzi 2016). Regarding how Chinese agricultural investments have been viewed in the region, studies such as those conducted by Guo Jie and Myers (2016) and Oliveira (2018) consider that, although Chinese companies have invested and leased far less in lands in comparison to firms from other countries, Chinese deals have been perceived as an attempt to trespass LAC’s agricultural sovereignty, since they have been wrongly attributed to “land-grabbing” activities. Oliveira (2018) claims that there is evidence of only minor participation of Chinese investments in agribusiness in Brazil, particularly in farmland ownership, whereas FDI from the Global North, Japan, and Argentina are much more significant. According to the author, instead of considering Chinese firms as “land-grabbers,” a broader analysis of the transnational agribusiness’ system is needed, in order to avoid approaches that address the national origin of companies investing in agroindustrial production rather than the functioning of the whole agricultural global production chains (Oliveira 2018). Conversely, according to Puyana and Constantino (2015), Argentina and Colombia have launched public policies to promote the arrival of foreign investments in the agricultural sector, particularly they have encouraged foreign firms, including Chinese ones, to increase the production and exports of raw materials. In this regard, authors claim that China’s demand for raw materials and food explains why Chinese companies have made attempts to control lands in certain countries in LAC (Puyana and Constantino 2015; Constantino and Mora 2021).

Concerning the debate about the extent to which Chinese OFDI patterns are similar to those of trade, and how they affect the process of development in the region, some authors have claimed that, though official statements encourage the transfer of technology and know-how between the two sides, there is little evidence that Chinese firms are transferring technology to countries in the region on a significant scale through their investments (Jenkins 2019). In this line, some studies have remarked that the expansion of Chinese firms in sectors associated with raw materials in LAC has been prioritized to the detriment of the development of new technological capacities in the region, enlarging the gap between primary and industrial production (Rosales and Kuwayama 2012). Recent progress has been made in this regard since the Chinese enterprise Sinovac began the construction of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Chile in May 2022, while the Argentinean company Laboratorios Richmond signed an agreement with the Chinese firm CanSino to produce vaccines in Argentina in October 2022. In Brazil, the production of Sinovac was canceled in June 2022 after production had halted in October 2021. However, it remains to be seen how these engagements will play out in the future.

With regard to Chinese investments in the technological sector in LAC, a recent study published by ECLAC (2021) confirms that these type of OFDI is still scarce. However, the presence of Chinese technological firms has been increasing since 2015, particularly through investing in data centers, infrastructure for telecommunication networks, and smart city and safe city infrastructure. The debates on the extent to which this presence is related to security issues are addressed in a subsection below.

Regarding China’s presence in LAC’s extractive sector, some authors have remarked that, since the Chinese government does not desire to be accused of “neo-colonialism” practices nor promoting situations of dependency, Chinese firms prefer to invest through establishing joint ventures or by realizing mergers and acquisitions with companies in the region to gain local acceptance but also to acquire institutional learning (Fornés and Mendez 2018). Only when they are well established in the local markets, they proceed to make greenfield investments (Abdenur 2017). Relatedly, scholars have debated the motivations of Chinese investments; among the most relevant goals, academics have remarked that China’s provision of OFDI to countries in LAC has been characterized by two stages: first, from
around 2001 to 2007, aimed at securing the supply of natural resources for its economic development, mainly dominated by Chinese SOEs (Fornés and Mendez 2018); second, from 2007 onwards, based on small, medium, and large firms in the manufacturing sector’s goal of acquiring strategic assets for market-seeking purposes (Fornes and Butt-Philip 2011). During the second stage, authors have claimed that SOEs’ investments in natural resources continued (Fornés and Mendez 2018). In this line, these authors have also pointed out that investments based on Chinese firms’ market-seeking goals have had implications for LAC’s local producers (Fornés and Mendez 2018). The literature has also debated the concerns that have arisen regarding labor and environmental and social implications of Chinese OFDI in the region, particularly in the extractive industry; these debates are addressed in two subsections below.

Concerning the debate about the extent to which China has replaced traditional sources of investment in LAC, such as the U.S., Canada, and several European countries, whose companies have been present in the region for decades, most of the scholars have claimed that, though China’s presence has grown remarkably and has become an emerging investment partner, it is still not a leading investor, and falls behind the U.S., Spain, and the Netherlands (Chonn Ching 2021; Dussel Peters 2022b; Hogenboom et. al 2022). In two related empirical studies, researchers test the degree to which the U.S. economic interests in Latin America affect the promotion of the BRI and China-Latin America relationship. They find that U.S. actions such as direct investment and the Growth in the Americas Initiative could have more adverse impacts on China’s investment in the region, but not so much on bilateral trade. Particularly regarding foreign direct investment in Latin America, Chinese and American firms are responding to local conditions in similar ways. Both, for example, try to avoid countries with severe political instability (Gao Zhijun 2021). Another study demonstrates that while the U.S. competition has slowed China’s 5G networking in Latin America, it is unlikely to erase the appeal of Chinese technology in the region (Wang Huizhi and Fu 2022). These findings mean that in the foreseeable future, the Chinese government and firms need to be mindful of maintaining constructive relations with the U.S. interests on the ground to deepen economic ties with Latin America (Song Haiying and Wang 2021).

Research on the extent to which China’s economic presence in LAC has involved practices that lack institutional transparency and accountability is still limited. There are some instances in Central America and the Caribbean as China’s provision of investments and loans in the construction and infrastructure sectors has generally involved negotiations with local authorities without transparency, established norms, or legislative authorization. These situations have fueled narratives of corruption and malpractices among Chinese actors and their sub regional counterparts. There are also some cases of Chinese companies operating in the subregion with scarce expertise, which reinforces existing distrustful views of Chinese firms in general (Baud et. al 2022). This is not an issue to be blamed only on Chinese actors, but mainly on the weak democratic institutions that characterize some of the countries in the subregion.

Chinese financing and aid

Concerning China’s provision of finance to countries in LAC, Chinese lending began to be relevant in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as well; before that, it was minimal (Jenkins 2019). Since Chinese institutions do not provide data on official flows to countries or regions, institutions based outside LAC have developed databases that provide up-to-date information on Chinese policy and commercial banks’ loans in the region. This has been the case with the China-Latin America Finance Database, co-produced by the Inter-American Dialogue and the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, and the China-Latin America Commercial Loans Tracker, developed by the Inter-American Dialogue. Also, in the book Globalizing Patient Capital, Stephen Kaplan has contributed with the elaboration of
a dataset, the China Global Finance Index, which is the first of its kind to classify Chinese policy banks’
credits in LAC by their investment channel—that is, differentiating state-to-state from market-based
loans that China has provided to countries in the region, based on multiple sources (Kaplan 2021).

The China-Latin America Finance Database has informed that finance provided by the CDB
and the CHEXIM to LAC has been mainly concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
This lending has been significantly greater than that of either the World Bank, the Export and Import
Bank of the U.S., or the IADB.

According to some authors, the “dollar diplomacy”, which characterized the U.S. policy of
provision of finance to LAC at the end of the XIX Century and the beginning of the XX Century, has been
replaced by the “yuan diplomacy,” with China’s development banks providing loans to governments in
the region to help them support energy, mining, and infrastructure investment (Gallagher 2016). Apart
from emphasizing the large amounts of funds that China has provided to countries in the region, authors
have also argued that Chinese banks tend to lend to countries that have had difficulties accessing
global capital markets (Gallagher 2016; Girado 2018; Kaplan 2016, 2021). Moreover, some authors have
claimed that Chinese lending does not come with the policy conditionalities imposed by International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). However, they also point out that Chinese financing includes commercial
conditionalities; this means that Chinese companies will be involved in a significant amount of the
development of the projects, or that the projects will involve imports of inputs or machinery from China
(Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski 2012; Roldán et al. 2016; Kaplan 2021). Other authors have also claimed
that the provision of loans from Chinese banks includes political conditions, particularly the respect to
the “One China policy” (Stanley and Fernández Alonso 2018).

Concerning commercial conditionalities, some authors have debated the impacts of certain
infrastructure projects financed by Chinese banks, especially those that include “turnkey” modalities,
and consequently, allow Chinese firms to provide the technology but also highly-qualified human
resources, as well as control the maintenance and post-sale processes. According to them, these types
of projects pose important challenges for LAC’s economic development since they establish scarce links
with local economic and social apparatuses, particularly because of low or null technology transfer
and limited participation of Latin American high-skilled workers (Ortiz Velásquez and Dussel Peters
2016; Bernal-Meza 2020; Kaplan 2021). In some countries such as Mexico, Chinese firms have preferred
to subcontract Mexican companies and employ Mexican labor in the construction phase of certain
infrastructure projects, but technology transfer has been scarce (Dussel Peters 2018a). In the case of
Ecuador, though contracts with Chinese firms to develop Coca Codo Sinclair and Sopladora projects
stipulated compliance with labor regulations, promotion of technology and know-how transfer, and
inclusion of national companies, studies have demonstrated that most of these compromises were
not accomplished (Villavicencio 2013; Garzón and Castro 2018). According to DeHart (2018), the
construction of a stadium in Costa Rica presents similar characteristics: no transfer of technical
skills, and intervention of local labor only at the unskilled phases of construction. On the other hand,
some scholars have found that in most countries in South America, governments have restricted the
participation of foreign workers in certain projects and have not permitted Chinese companies to carry
large numbers of Chinese workers with them (Dolores, Manky, and Sousa 2022). Two subsections below
address, first, how the literature has analyzed Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC, and second, the
debates about the question of labor.

Some scholars have also addressed the differences between China’s innovative financial schemes,
that is: an important part of Chinese financing is in the form of commodity-back loans, a unique lending
instrument where countries in LAC ship commodities to China to partly repay the credits (Kaplan 2021).
In the debate over Chinese commodity-backed loans, some views interpret these loans as part of a move
by the Chinese government to secure the supply of commodities and help Chinese companies expand
abroad (Arnson and Davidow 2011). Scholars also emphasize the commercial interests of the banks; according to them, rather than a way by which China secures the supply of commodities, this kind of financing is a strategy used by the Chinese banks to reduce the riskiness of loans to countries with a low credit rating and increase profits (Downs 2011). Also, authors claim that, by lending to these countries, Chinese banks can obtain relatively high returns without having to deal with an excessive level of risk, because payment is made through the sale of oil to Chinese companies (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013).

According to some experts, China’s provision of finance to countries in LAC is a result of its goals as a developmental state; thus, Chinese loans aim to secure access to natural resources, but this does not imply great amounts of losses since finance is offered at market rates (Gallagher and Irwin 2016). These authors also discuss the differences among loans from Chinese banks and IFIs to countries in LAC and point out that Chinese finance is larger, involves higher interest rates, is mainly concentrated in energy, mining, infrastructure, and transportation sectors, and in certain countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador (Gallagher and Irwin 2016). Relatedly, these and other authors remark that Chinese financing in LAC is part of a broader objective: to support China’s national champions in acquiring market access and, thus, benefit China’s development (Kaplan 2021).

Since China has become an important creditor for countries in the region, the literature about China-LAC relations began to debate China’s contribution to the generation of “debt traps” in LAC. Some authors claim that, due to China’s lending does not imply political conditions, certain countries in the region prefer financing from China than from Western countries or multilateral organizations; however, these countries acquire debts that are difficult to afford, and are consequently caught into cycles of dependence, tied to China for strategically longer terms (Fornés and Mendez 2018). In this line, some scholars point out that, since Chinese loans are provided based on government-to-government agreements, and are therefore confidential, can entail clauses that constraint future room for financial maneuver (Hogenboom et al. 2022). Conversely, there are scholars that, based on China’s debt payments suspensions and restructuring processes with certain countries in LAC during 2020, 2021, and early 2022, have claimed that the hypothesis of China contributing to creating debt traps in LAC is not consistent with real facts and that it has incentives to pursue a strategy of “patient capital,” characterized by high-risk tolerance (Kaplan 2021; Myers and Ray 2022).

Apart from providing finance to countries in the region, China has also provided official aid, though in lesser amounts compared to loans. As in the case of Chinese FDI and the provision of loans, China’s aid information is difficult to trace since it is considered a matter of state secret (Stallings 2016). According to Gallagher (2016), China began to provide aid to LAC’s governments in 1996. As Stallings (2016) remarks, most of the research about Chinese foreign aid has focused on Africa since this region has received the largest amounts. Other authors point out that China’s provision of aid to LAC has been mainly a political tool. First, because the provision of aid has helped China advance its One-China Policy—providing aid to countries that recognized Taiwan and, thus, switched their alliance to China (Stallings 2016; Maggiorelli 2017, 2020; Malacalza 2019). Second, and since Chinese aid in LAC is mainly demand-driven, it is a way to gain friends and pursue China’s soft power strategy in the region (Stallings 2016). Concerning the debates about the extent to which China’s engagement with LAC has been part of a soft power strategy, a specific subsection below summarizes the most salient perspectives.

Some authors have claimed that China’s provision of aid to countries in LAC is part of a broader South-South cooperation logic, where China aims to promote development in the region (Vadell 2019). Others have remarked that China’s provision of aid has been affected by the need for China to assure natural resources (Creutzfeldt 2016; Sun Hongbo 2017), open markets for its products (Creutzfeldt 2016), as well as to obtain support from international organizations and improve China’s image.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, apart from increasing its investments, financing, and provision of aid, China has also signed swap agreements with central banks of countries in LAC;
this has been the case for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Suriname. According to some experts, the limited access to international capital markets has also encouraged LAC countries to sign swap agreements with China (Trinkunas 2016; Brenta and Larralde 2018, 2019; Laufer 2019). Argentina was the first country in LAC to sign this type of agreement with China in 2009 (Fernández Alonso 2018).

**Chinese infrastructure projects**

Certain projects in LAC, either as a result of bilateral agreements with China, or as a more recent consequence of countries’ incorporation into the BRI, generally tend to be overestimated. Announcements in the media contribute to generating unrealistic expectations about the size of projects, and the amount of money involved. As mentioned above, since 2020, the LAC Academic Network on China (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China) has made important contributions through the publication of the Monitor of Chinese Infrastructure in LAC, which quantifies China’s realized—not just announced—infrastucture projects in the region. It is worth noting that the Monitor differentiates infrastructure projects from OFDI, and considers projects independently of their funding. In this sense, infrastructure projects are understood as those that implicate a service between a client and a supplier, based on a contract that generally involves a bidding process, though there are cases in which the process is a result of a direct appointment; in contract to projects developed through investments, the ownership of infrastructure projects’ belongs to the entity or client that required the service and not to the companies involved in the construction (Armony, Dussel Peters, and Cui 2018; Dussel Peters 2021).

According to Armony, Dussel Peters, and Cui (2018), China’s infrastructure projects in LAC have been carried out since 2013 long before LAC was announced as part of the BRI. However, due to the increase in subscription of countries in the region to both the BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China’s infrastructure projects could be further promoted, though concrete results have yet to be seen—as of November 2022, out of 196 of the projects approved by the AIIB, only two have been confirmed to be allocated in LAC, particularly in Brazil and Ecuador (Dussel Peters 2022b; AIIB 2022). A recent study published by ECLAC (2021) evidenced that between 2005 and 2019, 86 infrastructure projects—which represented approximately USD $77 billion—were conducted by Chinese companies in LAC.

Relatedly, certain characteristics of Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC have been identified by the Monitor of the Chinese Infrastructure in LAC, and have contributed to amplify the literature about China-LAC economic relations. Among the main findings, the last report shows that, up to 2021, 192 projects have been carried out, while 57 of those have been carried out between 2020 and 2021; recipient countries have diversified in the period 2020-2021, until 2015 most of them concentrated in Brazil, but since then countries that had not been recipients began to have a more important role, such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, while Argentina increased its participation as a recipient (Dussel Peters 2022). The last edition of the Monitor evidences that diversification has also characterized sectors where China’s infrastructure projects are allocated: while energy such as gas, mining and oil have historically been key, alternative and renewable energy projects have gained relevance in 2020-2021; also, transportation has turned to be the most important sector where China’s projects are allocated (Dussel Peters 2022). Moreover, information provided by this study evidences that the Chinese public sector, particularly the central government public companies, are the main actors participating in Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC, though Chinese private initiatives have expanded since 2017 (Dussel Peters 2022).

As in other parts of the Global South, infrastructure building is an important entry for China’s economic outreach in Latin America. Based on the fact that most Latin American countries face an “infrastructure gap”, and that China enjoys rich experience in overseas construction, some scholars have
pointed out that these engagements can be interpreted as complementary. Various Chinese researchers point out that Chinese companies need to better understand the local public-private partnership (PPP) rules and develop more diverse and flexible financing for infrastructure projects (Cui Shoujun and Zhang 2017; Chen Taotao et al. 2017; Wang Jun 2017). Relatedly, some authors claim that LAC symbolizes a relevant learning opportunity for Chinese firms, since they generally seek lower standards of environmental, labor and safety, and compete already with other firms globally (Armony, Dussel Peters, and Cui 2018). Moreover, these authors claim that, through building infrastructure projects in the framework of the BRI, China’s public sector aims to leave its own footprint in LAC vis-à-vis other Western powers, especially the United States (Armony, Dussel Peters and Cui Shoujun 2018).

Apart from studies that address the general characteristics of China’s infrastructure project in LAC, important contributions have been made to identify similarities and differences among countries, based on case studies. A study conducted by Monica DeHart (2018) highlights the unique characteristics of China’s infrastructure projects in Costa Rica, while offers an overview of the debates that these projects have generated based on national identities and China perceived as a threat. This study not only provides results based on secondary sources, but also is a product of extensive ethnographic research.

Research conducted by Garzón and Castro (2018) examines two of China’s infrastructure projects in Ecuador in the hydropower sector—Coca Codo Sinclair and Sopladora—and points out the difficulty in determining the extent to which Ecuador has benefited from China’s projects in terms of environmental, social, and economic areas. Argentina’s need for infrastructure and the role that China’s projects have played in the country has also been a case of study; projects such as Belgrano Cargas railroads, Kirchner and Cepernic dams, gas ducts, water works, and renewable energy parks have been addressed by scholars (Uriburu Quintana 2017; Malena 2018; Stanley 2018; Laufer 2019; Gonzalez Jauregui 2021). The cases of Belo Monte energy transmission lines, and the proposed biocceanic railroad project in Brazil have been addressed by Hiratuka (2018b), who points out that China’s infrastructure projects in Brazil have been modest; however, the author identifies great potential due to Chinese companies’ interest in the country, and remarks on the importance of the Brazilian side in promoting more of these initiatives.

(GEO)POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Overview of China-LAC political relations

As elsewhere, China’s economic presence in the region has been analyzed based on strategic political and economic motivations of the Chinese state to gain global influence and guarantee access to natural resources. Also, academics have pointed out the interest of Chinese private and public firms to open new markets in LAC, as part of broader instrumental commercial reasons, thereby consolidating themselves as global economic players. The growing economic presence of China in LAC has, thus, generated major intellectual debates about the consequences of deepening relations with the Asian country.

The debate about the nature and implications of China’s (geo)political engagement with countries in LAC includes a wide range of views. In the case of U.S.-driven analysis, reports by Washington-based institutions have mainly focused on security concerns, and the potential consequences and risks that China’s presence might pose for the region in the near future. There are also experts inside LAC that view China’s growing economic presence as part of a broader geopolitical strategy to counter U.S. hegemony in what has historically been its “backyard.”

Other studies, mainly conducted by academics based in LAC, but also elsewhere, have pointed out the positive and negative implications of China’s engagement with countries in LAC. Most of these analyses consider that Chinese engagement with LAC is mainly motivated by economic and commercial
interests rather than political ones. Also, though recognizing the risks that China’s presence might imply in terms of creating new scenarios of dependency, they have remarked on the option that linkages with China have offered for countries in LAC; that is: establishing relations with a counterpart that differs from their historical relations with Western countries, opening the door for more policy space for governments in the region. Recent —and still scarce —studies have also included debates about how China’s presence in the region relates to European interests. In addition, some scholars have claimed that China’s ties with LAC entail broader interests rather than merely countering other powers’ relevance in the region; these engagements involve common positions in global affairs, based on cooperation in multilateral frameworks, to promote multipolarity. The following subsections address these and other discussions, including China’s security ties with countries in the region and their implications, China’s soft power initiatives, and health diplomacy, as well as China-LAC relations based on the interactions of different actors, at various levels.

**China’s “underlying” motivations**

According to some authors, competition with the U.S. has been a key motivation in China’s expanding its economic presence in LAC (Ellis 2009, 2022a), a strategy that might already be having some impact. For instance, some researchers based in Brazil make note of the Trump administration’s reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine but question its effect regarding China-Latin American relations because of the high level of bilateral economic relations (Pires, do Nascimento, and Yu 2020).

With regard to China pursuing economic interests in LAC, but from another perspective, some experts have pointed out that China’s foreign policy main mandate is to increase Chinese political influence and guarantee access to natural resources; thus, cooperation for development, based on “South-South” relations, “win-win,” and mutual benefits, is rhetorical rather than realistic (Oviedo 2012; Svampa 2013; Bolinaga and Slipak 2015; Fornillo 2016; Bernal-Meza 2020). Others simply point out that China’s motivations have been mainly to secure access to resources to sustain economic growth (Jenkins 2019; Wise 2020). Conversely, there are those that claim that China pursues hegemonic aspirations, and that, consequently, LAC is at the crossroads of geopolitical competition among China and the U.S. (Shambaugh 2013). According to some authors, countries in LAC’s decision whether to adhere to BRI or not is correlated to their economic interdependence on China, but also to how politically close they are to the U.S. (Serrano Moreno 2021).

From the perspective of some scholars, China’s growing presence in the U.S.’s “backyard” is motivated by geopolitical interests, aimed at countering the U.S. global influence and power, especially in East Asia (Lei Yu 2015; Lanxin Xiang 2016). The latter views are particularly dominant among experts who claim that China’s growing engagement with countries in the region could be understood as a strategic threat to U.S. interests in LAC. Conversely, others argue that since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has progressively diminished its attention to Latin America, allowing China to expand its diplomatic and economic ties with the region, based on the strategic importance of LAC for China’s development (Roett and Paz 2008; Hearn and León-Manríquez 2011; Erikson 2011; Gallagher 2016; Urdínez et al. 2016).

In this sense, some experts have claimed that China’s engagement with the region has been less strategic than it has been suggested; in fact, it has been a consequence of seeking to fill in gaps rather than compete directly with the U.S. (Jenne 2021; Urdínez 2021). Relatedly, according to Hogenboom et. al (2022), the long history of colonialism and imperialism in LAC explains why governments in the region have struggled to minimize external power’s influence and situations of dependence; the authors also point out that this historical background explains the willingness of governments in LAC to receive China as a new partner, at a time when both the U.S. and Europe were withdrawing from the region. More generally, these authors claim that those countries that oppose the Western liberal order
have opened the door for both political and economic relations with China (Hogenboom et al. 2022). According to Ferchen (2022), though China’s presence in the region is mainly economic driven, both policymakers and businessmen in countries in LAC will continue to seek alternative partners rather than the U.S., since the latter’s engagement with the region in recent years has been inconstant.

There are those that, conversely, claim that the U.S. interference in LAC has not only remained active but also been reinforced as a way to sustain the U.S. leadership and counter China’s presence in the region. In this regard, some authors point out that, for example, the election of a U.S. candidate for the IADB's leadership went in tandem with the U.S.’s geopolitical intention of limiting China’s closeness to countries in the region (Merino and Barrenegoa 2022).

Chinese scholarship also acknowledges the entrenched U.S. interest in Latin America but calls for China’s deeper engagement with the region beyond purely pragmatic issues. Building the “community of common destiny” with Latin America is seen as a bulwark against U.S. interference with China-Latin America connections (Huang Leping advance online publication). According to some Latin American scholars, the “community of common destiny” is profoundly related to the BRI, which is interpreted as a new paradigm of international cooperation (Schulz and Staiano 2022). Other authors claim that the BRI is China’s main geostrategic tool and is a key element of Chinese global geopolitics (Ríos 2019; Malena 2020).

Some experts point out that there is no “Beijing Consensus,” and China has not proposed measures to be implemented in LAC such as those that encompassed the “Washington Consensus.” These views claim that the idea of China enforcing the adoption of certain economic policies has been driven by western approaches aimed at explaining China’s economic rise since China’s policy is based on non-intervention (Ramo 2004).

From another perspective, there are those that, laying the foundations for the analysis of contemporary relations between China and LAC, claim that China sought both ideological and pragmatic considerations when encouraging economic ties with countries in the region during the 20th Century, but also at the beginning of the 21st Century. According to these views, on the one hand, there are historical ideological convergences that had pushed China to encourage trade ties with countries such as Chile under Allende, Cuba under Castro, and Venezuela under Chávez, while, on the other hand, the general rule has been a pragmatic interest, based on China’s developmental needs (Domínguez et al. 2006). Relatedly, some studies analyzed the extent to which China influenced processes of autocratization in LAC and concluded that China’s relations with autocratic countries such as Cuba and Venezuela do not differ from those established with democratic countries such as Chile and Costa Rica (Brand, McEwen-Fial, and Muno 2015). Concerning this argument, but from a different perspective and with regard to more recent trends, some authors remark that though China’s engagement with the region is not primarily motivated by political interests, the provision of loans, first, and of medical supplies and military equipment during the pandemic, second, can be understood as a way to support authoritarian leaders, and their modus operandi, in LAC (Hogenboom et al. 2022).

Other points of view claim that China has moved to a “core-periphery” relationship with countries in Latin America over the last two decades, and LAC has been addressed as being “functional” to China’s economic and political development. According to these perspectives, countries in the region have adopted the Chinese political agenda, which means not questioning certain controversial issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights, among others (Oviedo 2012; Bernal-Meza 2020). Others claim that China’s need to secure allies in the context of rising tensions with the U.S. and the Global North gives the region a revived political appeal, which explains why China is promoting partnerships with LAC governments and securing their support, including the “One China policy” (Gil-Barragan, Aguilera-Castillo, and Suárez Galeano 2020).

The emphasis on China pursuing geostrategic motivations in LAC has also characterized
some analyses when addressing the issue of Taiwan or the "Taiwan factor." Some scholars point out that countries in the region, mainly those of Central America and the Caribbean, have functioned as territories of dispute for diplomatic recognition, and that Beijing has deployed a strategy to obtain Taipei’s remaining allies in the region (Erikson 2011). After the PRC’s founding in 1949, the Republic of China government in Taiwan maintained diplomatic relations with most Latin American countries until the 1970s. However, there have been notable changes recently, with Costa Rica switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 2007, Panama in 2017, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic in 2018, and Nicaragua in 2021.

Relatedly, some authors claim that, in contrast to countries in South America—where the principle of "One China" has not been a key concern—in the case of the Caribbean and Central American countries, apart from China's engagement being driven by diverse economic interests, the "One China policy" has been core in China's intensification of relations with these countries and shows a clear geopolitical effort (Baud et. al 2022). Moreover, some authors remark that since the Caribbean and Central American countries concentrate half of the countries worldwide that continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, this subregion has become a key element in the diplomatic rivalry between China and Taiwan (Bernal-Meza 2016; Baud et. al 2022). According to Baud et. al (2022), the success of China in acquiring diplomatic recognition of certain countries in the subregion can also be understood as a symbolic distance from the U.S. or Europe. This means, according to the authors, that countries that have shifted allegiance have a more independent posture toward the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, Europe.

In contrast, there are those that, based on the idea of complementarity between Chinese and countries in LAC’s economies, view China as a strategic partner, not only due to the economic resources—such as investment and finance—that China provides to the region, but also because it offers an alternative to the U.S. hegemony and, thus, more room to maneuver (Borón 2012; Bonilla and Milet 2015). In this line, some authors claim that LAC has a historical opportunity to develop a strategic relationship with China based on cooperation and mutual benefits, one that could break previous patterns of engagement characterized by dependency, such as those established with the Global North (Bruckman 2010; Bonilla and Millet 2015; Chávez 2015; Niu Haibin 2018, 2020). Relatedly, some point out the complementarity rationale of the relationship and the benefits of replicating the Chinese model of development in LAC (Cypher and Wilson 2015).

Other approaches claim that, though China’s presence in the region offers both opportunities and challenges, expanding relations with China gives certain LAC’s governments more “policy space” to pursue alternative economic policies free from Western pressures (Ratliff 2009; Hogenboom 2009, 2014; Kaplan 2016, 2021; Hogenboom et. al 2022). In this line, China’s increasing engagement in the region has also been interpreted as not merely encompassing socio-economic aspects, but also as a new actor that has broken the duopoly of the U.S. and Europe’s presence in LAC (Fornés and Mendez 2018; Dussel Peters 2020). Though some scholars consider that it is a good sign for countries in LAC to diversify relations and not rely exclusively on a single developed country like the U.S., they also point out that ties with China have not contributed to avoiding reprimarization (Fornés and Mendez 2018). Moreover, these academics claim that trade relations with China are not enough to create dependence in the region on China, but it is the axes of trade, investment, and provision of finance that strengthens situations of dependency on China.

Based on the recognition that countries in LAC have a historical and socio-economic relationship with the U.S., but that China's presence in the region extends to multiple socio-economic areas, some experts analyze these dynamics as being part of a "new triangular relationship" (Stallings 2008, 2020; Arnson and Davidow, 2011; Chávez 2015; Rosales 2017; 2020; Dussel Peters 2022a). Due to the increasing tensions between China and the United States, these authors remark that countries in the
region are in the middle of these two powers’ global competition. In this framework, some experts claim that China’s presence has strategic implications and poses a threat to U.S. interests and domination (Farnsworth 2011; Ellis 2022), and thus requires a geopolitical response from the latter (Picone 2016; Trinkunas 2016; Dollar 2017), and others believe that China avoids actions in the region that could upset U.S. authorities (Paz 2012; Bonilla and Milet 2015). The U.S. continues to be a relevant partner of countries in LAC, but China has become a critical ally of some countries in LAC (Actis and Creus 2020; Battaleme 2017). It is thus difficult for countries in the region not to be trapped in a new Cold War competition or zero-sum logic between the two powers (Fortín, Heine, and Ominami 2021; Rosales 2020; Telias 2021).

Perspectives that view China as a challenge to the U.S. hegemony contrast with those that interpret China’s growing presence in LAC as driven by strategic economic and commercial interests, minimizing geopolitical considerations based on competition with the U.S. According to these views, China’s state most relevant motivations in LAC are to ensure access to resources, based on food and energy security purposes to support China’s development, and do not primarily seek to confront the U.S. sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere (Camus et al. 2013; Hogenboom 2014; Wise and Myers 2016). In this regard, certain scholars point out that China’s search for global economic primacy has posed LAC as a relevant part of the Chinese international economic strategy (Cesarin 2018). Relatedly, some authors claim that Chinese firms pursue commercial objectives in LAC that cannot be completely separated from the strategic economic interests of the Chinese state, since most of China’s OFDI in LAC has been by SOEs (Dussel Peters 2015). However, these and other scholars remark that, although these types of firms enjoy the support of the government, they operate with considerable autonomy (Lin Yue 2013).

Also, some scholars point out that although Chinese OFDI is mainly motivated by resource-seeking interests, there has been an increase in market-seeking investment in manufacturing and services (Rosales and Kuwayama 2012; Dussel Peters 2021, 2022a). In addition, some studies claim that Chinese firms’ transactions in LAC involve multiple actors and motivations, and their investments are not at the behest of the Chinese government (Fornés and Butt Philip 2011).

There are authors who analyze the China-U.S. rivalry in LAC based on a variety of aspects. According to Ferchen (2022), competition among these two powers in LAC covers technology infrastructure, green energy resources, and electricity transmission. The author claims that the increasing tech competition, including the race to access minerals that are critical for energy transition, not only involves competition at the government level but also in the private sector.

Some Chinese scholars that wrote in the first decade of the 2000s remarked that China was aware of the historical relationship between LAC and the U.S. and had been reluctant to be seen as a challenger of the U.S. hegemony in the region (Jiang Shixue 2006, 2011). More recently, certain Chinese experts claim that China-LAC relations share common strategic interests based on high economic-commercial complementarities, with China being a key driver of LAC’s economic growth (Song Xiaoping 2015). There are also non-Chinese approaches that argue that China’s economic relations with LAC are not primarily politically motivated, but are a result rather than a cause of China’s growing economic engagement (Trinkunas 2016). Thus, for some authors, pragmatism, based on economic relations, is the general rule in China’s engagement with the region (Armony 2011). Furthermore, some point out that there is no evidence of direct ideological or political influence from China in the region; according to these authors, there is no evidence that China has had the intention to influence the domestic political dynamics of countries in the region, nor to distance themselves from the U.S. (Chávez 2015). These views also claim that China lacks a military projection toward LAC and characterize China’s presence in the region as “passive diplomacy” since there is no evidence of political-military interests, but mere economic intentions based on access to strategic natural resources (Chávez 2015).

Though the debates that discuss the extent to which China’s presence in LAC entails geopolitical
interests mainly focus on whether this presence seeks to counter the U.S. historical engagement, there are views—still limited—that have begun to analyze Europe’s role in the region vis-a-vis China-U.S.-LAC relationship. In this regard, Hogenboom et al. (2022) claim that, except for Germany or Spain, the European countries have not elaborated a strategy towards the region and China’s presence in it. Some authors point out that, in the framework of the China-U.S. global rivalry and their specific competition in LAC, Europe has a relevant role to play in the region based on both material interests and value-oriented objectives (Ferchen 2022; Hogenboom et al. 2022). In this line, Agramont (2022) argues that European countries have reduced importance to their relations with LAC, not only by diminishing cooperation funds but also technical and other types of bilateral cooperation, while China has taken advantage of the spaces left by Europe. In this sense, the author claims that Europe should turn away from its North-South approach to countries in LAC and differentiate its relations from the Chinese engagements through re-involving with the region based on value-oriented objectives (Agramont 2022).

Bilateral and regional engagement

Concerning China’s relations with LAC in regional and sub-regional schemes, most of the academic scholarship dedicated to China-LAC relations points out that China has designed a broad framework/strategy for its engagement with the region (Creutzfeldt 2016). According to some authors, initially, China’s diplomatic outreach to LAC was part of a broader effort of reconnecting to the international system; as a result, during the 1990s, China became an observer of the Group of Rio and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), while during the first decade of the 2000s, it became an observer at the ECLAC, the Latin American Parliament, and the Organization of American States (OAS), and a member of the IADB (Hogenboom et al. 2022). In addition, China began to engage in sub-regional schemes: it established a dialogue mechanism with the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and cooperation mechanisms with the Andean Community of Nations, the Pacific Alliance, and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), among others.

However, as various scholars claim, China’s main guidelines to engage countries in LAC both bilaterally and regionally can be encountered in its first Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, published in 2008, and the second Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, launched in 2016. The literature points out that, based on the Policy Papers’ general guidelines, China’s wide-range diplomatic outreach to LAC covers high-level visits, the establishment of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica—and different statuses of negotiations to sign FTAs with Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Panama—strategic associations with several countries in the region, as well as promoting the creation of the China-Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States (China-CELAC) Forum. Concerning bilateral ties, some authors point out that the most important deals between China and countries in the region have occurred at the bilateral level (Hogenboom et al. 2022). This interpretation comes in line with the fact that economic ties, which, to date, have been the most important aspect of engagement between China and LAC, have evolved mainly through bilateral channels.

The China-CELAC Forum specifically, has been interpreted by scholars as the main platform to promote cooperation among China and countries in LAC (Serbin 2022; Hogenboom et al. 2022). Some authors remark that when creating the Forum, China sought to replicate forums that were alike in other regions, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa (Ferchen 2022). China has so far elaborated three cooperation plans with LAC in the framework of the China-CELAC Forum; as the literature has addressed, these plans cover multiple areas. Meanwhile, as several authors have claimed, countries in LAC have not yet designed a cohesive China-related policy, either individually or as a region; on the contrary, their responses have been fragmented, with no mirror documents to China’s
Regarding cooperation in regional and multilateral forums and institutions, some scholars remark that China views LAC as a partner in global affairs, since they share cultural and political values, and have convergent positions in both regional and multilateral organizations (Song Xiaoping 2015). In contrast, some experts are skeptical about China and LAC sharing a common vision of both being part of the developing world; they claim that China and countries in LAC’s interests in global politics are different and should not be interpreted as similar (Bernal-Meza 2020). Other authors argue that economic priorities and the need to diversify resource suppliers explain why China promoted the creation of the China-CELAC Forum, but also why it increased its participation in multilateral organizations where countries in LAC are members, such as by becoming a member of the IADB and, afterward, through establishing a dialogue mechanism with the MERCOSUR, or cooperation mechanisms with the Andean Community of Nations and the Pacific Alliance (Creutzfeldt 2016; Serbin 2022). In this regard, authors claim that China, through engaging in bilateral and regional institutional arrangements, promotes its preferred forms of governance to conduct relations with LAC (Wise 2018; Legler, Turzi, and Tzili-Apango 2018, 2020). Relatedly, some academics remark that China’s cooperation with LAC in the framework of new platforms such as the BRI responds to its willingness of encouraging the so-called “globalization with Chinese characteristics” in the region (Dussel Peters 2022a).

Concerning the debate about China’s presence in LAC and the impacts on the construction of regional governance, some authors discuss whether China contributes to strengthening integration in the region or whether its engagement with countries in LAC is promoting regional fragmentation (Legler, Turzi, and Tzili-Apango 2018, 2020; Gonzalez Jauregui and Tussie 2022). Some authors argue that while the regional hegemonic decline of the U.S. has created a new geopolitical framework and opened the door for China to expand relations with LAC, China’s presence has not necessarily promoted the construction of autonomous regional governance vis-a-vis the U.S.; they claim that China pursues pragmatic interests, based on comparative advantages and complementarity, rather than ideological or political objectives; thus, the encouragement of regional governance is not a purpose when establishing or reinforcing ties with countries in LAC (Christensen 2018; Legler, Turzi, and Tzili-Apango 2018; 2020).

Beyond a singular Chinese state

The scholarly understanding of “China” in China-LAC is becoming more nuanced beyond a singular Chinese state. A growing body of literature is differentiating not only politicians and diplomats’ actions from the firms’ operations, but also different levels of interactions from the national to the subnational. China has been developing an increasingly multi-layered relationship with countries in the region (Creutzfeldt 2016). When analyzing the Chinese presence in LAC, it is important to adopt a multi-actor perspective, including both state and non-state actors (Hogenboom et. al 2022). China’s subnational engagement is part of a multi-tiered approach to LAC and responds to multiple purposes. It creates more space for Chinese firms in the region’s varied investment environments and secure contracts in strategic sectors. It also promotes policy interests at different governmental and societal levels and influences views of China and Chinese political interests in the region (Myers 2020).

The inter-local framework is useful in understanding the relationship between regions (provinces) and cities. The engagement between the Biobío and Coquimbo regions in Chile and Hubei, Jiangsu, Sichuan, and Henan provinces in China facilitates academic and entrepreneurial ties (Araya Heredia 2019; Myers 2020). The city-to-city relations between China and Chile facilitated the donation of medical supplies from Chinese to Chilean cities and confirmed the promotion of China’s decentralized health diplomacy in LAC (Urdinez 2021; Myers 2021). The establishment of “twinning” or “sister
relations among certain Argentinean and Chinese provinces and cities promoted Chinese investments and loans to develop projects in the alternative and renewable energy sectors, as well as in urban safety (Gonzalez Jauregui 2021; Juste 2022). In the case of Brazil, local-level engagement contributed to the development of renewable energy projects in the Northeast region (Nascimento et. al 2021). Also in Brazil, the potential co-production of infrastructure projects such as the Bi-Oceanic Railroad project have been characterized by converging and conflicting views among Brazilian and Chinese de-center nation-state actors (Oliveira and Myers 2020).

The Chinese language scholarship also pays attention to the relations between the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and leftist parties in the region. In commemorating the CCP centennial, communist parties of varying prominence in several Latin American countries express their admiration of the CCP success in governing China, promoting the BRI in the region, and containing the COVID-19 outbreak (Lou, 2021). Even in countries where the communist party is not in power, such as Brazil, they value the historical ties to the CCP and consider the CCP success in China an illuminating though not necessarily repeatable example of the localization of Marxist doctrines (Doria and He 2021).

Security ties and their implications

The interplay of economic, and political factors that have promoted China’s presence in LAC have also been analyzed considering the implications for interactions with the U.S. and the extent to which geopolitical considerations have also motivated China’s engagement with countries in the region in the security aspect. Though economic ties remain central in the studies about China-LAC relationship, some scholars have begun to debate about the increase of security ties; however, the treatment of this topic is limited compared to the assessment of economic issues. Among the first studies to apply these perspectives are those developed by Ellis (2009). Though Ellis has claimed that China’s engagement with LAC in the security arena is far less important than in the economic one, and that China’s establishment and enlargement of relations with countries in the region should not be interpreted based on strategic motivations, the author also remarks that the existence of this kind of cooperation among China and LAC is an empirical fact (Ellis 2022). Relatedly, Brands and Berg (2021) point out that military collaboration is a growing aspect in China-LAC relationship, and that arms sales, military training, and technical military support have opened the door for China to build strategic ties with the armed forces of countries in the U.S. “backyard.”

According to the view of some of the few experts that so far have analyzed this theme, cooperation in security with LAC is part of China’s broader global strategy, that is: secure its own development, and consolidate its position as a global power (Jenne 2021; Agramont 2022). Based on these goals, this type of relationship with LAC is aimed at guaranteeing the security and stability of markets. Among the multiple ways in which China has promoted cooperation in security with LAC, the sale of relative low-sophistication military equipment is worth considering; according to some scholars, these trends began at the end of the 20th Century, but accelerated at the early 2000s, since left-wing countries in the region—particularly, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela—started to acquire Chinese equipment. These authors also claim that Chinese sales of military equipment remains low compared to those of the U.S., the European countries, and Russia (Roett and Paz 2016; Hogenboom et. al 2022). Authors also claim that China’s arms sales to LAC more than tripled since 2008, but are still not as important as the U.S. sales to countries in the region, while China’s arms sales to Africa are far more significant compared to those sold to countries in LAC (Wise 2020).

With regard to China’s military engagement with countries in the region, Ellis (2016) claims that this type of relationship has intensified the strategic mistrust and tension between China and the U.S. Relatedly, cooperation in the field of aerospace with countries in the region has recently generated
a debate among scholars based on China providing dual-use technologies and the implications that this might have in terms of access to sensitive data (Jenne 2021). Still, according to the author, countries in the region have room to cooperate with both China and the U.S. in the area of security and must be careful not to become dependent on one another (Jenne 2021). In contrast, Brands and Berg (2021) point out that the People's Liberation Army has rapidly advanced in constructing dual-use infrastructure, as well as in acquiring access to already existing dual-use infrastructure, such as deep-water ports in several countries and a space station in Argentina, that could increase its future military presence in LAC.

Regarding the specific debate about the extent to which countries in Central America and the Caribbean have become a scenario of the dispute between China and the U.S. in the security arena, some authors have pointed out that security issues are far from a priority, based on the fact that China’s military provisioning is still limited in the subregion (Baud et al. 2022). In this line, some authors claim that since China has focused on strengthening economic relations with these countries, it will not become a scenario of security contingency between China and the U.S. (Bernal 2017). Conversely, Ellis (2022) claims that China's influence has the potential to increase—and, therefore, diminish the possibilities for closer relations with the U.S. and Europe—since countries in this subregion have strengthened their security ties with China, particularly in certain sensitive areas such as acquiring technologies or equipment from Huawei. The author also remarks that the recent switch of relations from Taiwan to China has contributed to expanding China’s influence.

In South America, according to Jenne (2021), military interactions with China have not pursued ideological motivations, but have been a consequence of strong commercial ties. As the author points out, this explains why Chinese defense diplomacy is more extensive in countries such as Brazil and Chile. While these activities have raised concerns among some U.S. scholars such as Lazarus and Berg (2022), other academics remark that these activities are still limited, and frequently accompanied by academic exchanges and other activities aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation (Hogenboom et al. 2022).

China’s role as a provider of surveillance infrastructure and satellite technologies for public security stands out, in contrast to military equipment, both in sales and donations (Jenne 2021). In this regard, the author claims that, contrary to the U.S. or Europe, policymakers in the subregion have still not shown concern about the management and control of security data (Jenne 2021). Regarding China’s increasing presence in LAC as a provider of digital investments, some scholars argue that Chinese technology companies have become important players in the region and that their growing role has been more problematic for actors outside the region than within LAC itself (Hogenboom et al. 2022). In this line, these authors have differentiated among concerns related to Huawei providing 5G infrastructure to LAC—which, according to them, is mainly causing preoccupation to the U.S., and not inside LAC—and concerns associated with surveillance technologies, particularly Huawei’s safe-city systems—which, from these authors’ views, have encountered opposition from LAC’s civil society and NGOs, who have accused the system of monitoring activities that, in some cases, have involved repression (Hogenboom et al. 2022). Relatedly, these authors point out that though Chinese technology amplifies access to digital services, in certain cases, the provision of less expensive technology by Chinese firms has outweighed others’ costs; according to the authors, some countries in the region, such as those more vulnerable to hurricanes in the Caribbean, have accepted their exposure to surveillance or dependency on technology provided by Chinese firms in order to access to lower prices and accessible equipment (Hogenboom et al. 2022).

Conversely, to some authors Chinese telecommunications companies’ presence in LAC could be problematic, especially Huawei’s. According to Brands and Berg (2021), this presence can be interpreted as a way to influence countries in the region, since, according to them, these companies respond to the interests of the Chinese state. In this regard, others claim that China’s partnerships with
countries in the region will be relevant in the context of increasing tensions between China and the U.S; according to them, countries in LAC will have to choose between one or the other when implementing 5G technologies (Stuenkel 2021).

According to Agramont (2022), Chinese firms have also become relevant providers of specific military technologies such as space satellites in LAC; the Great Wall Corporation has produced eight units for Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In some cases, the provision of satellites was accompanied by the construction of monitoring bases—space ground control—in Venezuela and Bolivia, and the training of local personnel. In the case of Argentina, China built a space monitoring base (Agramont 2022).

With regard to China’s engagement with countries in the region in certain aspects such as violence or organized crime, Ellis (2013, 2016) claims that it has generated consequences for governments in the region since these are areas in which they were not yet enough prepared to face, such as criminal activities—including contraband of goods, human trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering, among others. In this regard, Jenne (2021) points out that there is no empirical evidence confirming the increase of human trafficking, contraband, or money laundering in the region due to the presence of Chinese criminal organizations. Despite this, Jenne (2021) highlights that there is empirical proof of drug trafficking through trade between China and LAC.

**Soft power initiatives**

In addition to traditional political and economic engagement, China is also actively trying to foster its positive image in the region. Some researchers point out that Chinese soft power has sought to counter negative perceptions such as those that assert that China pursues neo-colonialist goals in the region, or that view China as a “threat” (Zheng Bingwen 2012). China’s economic activity in the region is not separate from the projection of soft power (Roldán et al. 2015). In certain cases, such as Venezuela, China is willing to lose economically in order to gain strategic alliances for non-economic reasons (Kurlantzick 2007).

Specifically, China aims to counter increasing concerns about its instigation of the reprimarization of national economies, environmental degradation, “debt-traps,” and infringement of local legislations and labor rights. The specific soft power strategy includes cultural and educational cooperation such as the Confucius Institute, people-to-people diplomacy, and the expansion of Chinese media (Aoun, Kellner, and Wintgens 2021; Serbin 2022). Regarding the Confucius Institute, some researchers believe that the presence of an essentially propaganda outlet in universities in the region could endanger academic freedom and intellectual integrity (Hogenboom et al. 2022).

According to Jenne (2021), China’s defense diplomacy in LAC not only involves functional needs, but it is also a way to disseminate soft power through, for example, high level military meetings and visits, and, to a lesser extent, joint military exercises, military visits to LAC ports, military training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and military medical assistance. Soft power as the main motivations underlying these activities has also been claimed by Pu Xiaoyu and Myers (2022), who remark that military engagement is part of a broader Chinese public diplomacy effort.

The Chinese language scholarship also examines various kinds of engagement beyond the corridors of power. During the Cold War, it was prominent non-state actors, such as José Venturelli and Pablo Neruda, that paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Chile in 1970, the first in South America (Figueroa and Yan, 2017). One study notes that while perceptions of China in Latin America are more positive than those in the developed world, they are markedly more negative than those in Africa. The author argues that while cultural differences and Western media dominance are partly responsible, China needs more nuanced understandings of the region and more
flexible approaches in international communications beyond stiff official news (Guo Cunhai 2016). At present, China’s public diplomacy in Latin America—the effort to directly engage constituents beyond the ruling governments—has made concrete progress. The evidence is seen in the increase in China’s Spanish language media, the number of Latin American students learning Chinese and studying in China, and other bilateral cultural exchange events (Song and Han, 2017). Beyond documenting the general success, studies on a particular bilateral relationship such as China-Brazil also acknowledges specific shortcomings such as the limited understanding of local society, and overemphasis on China’s traditional culture (Zuo 2020). This line of inquiry tends to lump together a diverse range of engagements under one label and needs to strengthen the explanatory power of key concepts such as public or cultural diplomacy.

Health diplomacy

Some authors argue that the dissemination of a favorable image of China in the region has been reinforced through the provision of medical supplies and vaccines to countries in LAC during the pandemic (Merino and Barrenengoa 2022). Relatedly, but from a more radical point of view, Brands and Berg (2021) claim that China is expanding its soft power mechanisms in the region to mitigate its influence; according to them, “vaccine diplomacy” has been the latest via that China has employed to broaden its soft power in LAC.

The foreign aid program that China launched during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, labeled as “mask diplomacy” and “vaccine diplomacy,” has been a topic of recent but still incipient debate among authors in LAC and elsewhere, based on whether China’s provision of aid is an extension of its economic policy, aimed at pursuing political interests. Also, scholars debate about the extent to which China has played a role that the U.S. did not, that is, becoming a donor and provider of health supplies to countries in the region during the pandemic.

One of the first studies to address China’s health diplomacy in LAC at the onset of the pandemic was developed by Sanborn (2020). According to the author, once the pandemic erupted, China responded rapidly, and started providing donations of medical supplies to countries in the region, while the U.S. interrupted supply chains (Sanborn 2020). This study also remarks that donations were aligned with diverse foreign policy objectives: in the case of Venezuela, donations have occurred as a result of China’s support to its geopolitical allies in the region; in the case of Brazil, subnational governments drew Chinese assistance, showing how local-level engagement has included the area of health; while in the cases of Chile and Peru, both have long-standing relations with China, and a multiplicity of actors in the private sector contributed to accelerate China’s assistance (Sanborn 2020).

A study conducted by Myers (2021) characterizes China’s health diplomacy as semi-coordinated, since it has involved a wide range of actors and has included a multiplicity of objectives. The author identifies two phases in China’s health diplomacy in LAC: first, from February 2020 to September 2020, when China mostly donated and sold medical supplies to countries in the region, as well as provided assistance through advisory services; and second, after September 2020, when China concentrated on distributing vaccines to countries in LAC. In this regard, Myers (2021) claims that China’s aid to LAC during the pandemic sought to strengthen bilateral relations; this included, on the one hand, the promotion of a benevolent image as donor and responsible actor—these messages were mainly propagated by Chinese embassies and ambassadors—and on the other hand, the encouragement of China’s commercial and political interests, including the political isolation of Taiwan.

Based on the elaboration of their own up-to-now unique database, which identified donors, and recipients, Telias and Urdinez (2021) developed an updated and relevant research work on the topic. Among their findings, these authors have remarked that China’s donations of medical supplies to LAC’s
phenomenon were marginal and that the number of donations was not as huge as the press suggested, with Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile as the main recipients (Telias and Urdinez 2021). Also, in line with the study of Myers (2021), these authors provided relevant information by identifying that, apart from the Chinese government being the main donor of medical supplies to LAC, the Chinese diaspora and certain Chinese companies, foundations, and even provincial and municipal governments have also provided important amounts of donations (Telias and Urdinez 2021). This study, along with the ones conducted by Sanborn (2020) and Myers (2021), is important in terms of preliminary but increasing lines conducted by scholars that work on China-LAC relations, and aim to evidence the proliferation of ties at the subnational level; this new cluster of research is addressed below, in a specific subsection.

Regarding the so-called “vaccine diplomacy,” according to Urdinez (2021), three Chinese laboratories—Sinopharm, Sinovac, and CanSinoBIO—have signed contracts with governments in LAC, though there is no access to the amounts that these contracts involve; these laboratories have played an important role as suppliers of vaccines to countries in the region. In relation to the motivations that China has pursued when donating vaccines to certain countries in the region—only the Dominican Republic and Venezuela have been recipients of vaccines donations—Urdinez (2021) claims that the Chinese government’s donations of Sinopharm vaccines to the Dominican Republic—which represent 90 percent of the vaccines that have been applied in the country—is a salient case of vaccines being used as a source of diplomacy. Since the Dominican Republic established diplomatic relations with PRC in 2018, according to Urdinez (2021), this case shows the difference between those countries in the subregion that still recognize Taiwan, and therefore are not recipients of considerable donations from China, and those that have established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Also, with regard to the extent to which China’s donations of medical supplies and donations and sales of vaccines to countries in LAC have improved Chinese image in the region, Myers (2021) and Urdinez (2021) remark that notwithstanding China’s “mask diplomacy” and “vaccines diplomacy,” the pandemic has affected China’s reputation in the region, and did little to gain support in LAC.

According to other authors, China’s provision of vaccines to LAC during the pandemic is part of China’s geopolitical strategy in the region and has been an additional way of moving forward to deepen relations with countries in LAC (Merino no and Barrenengo 2022). Relatedly, some authors claim that China’s health diplomacy has been developed based on two dimensions: first, through cultural, discursive, and symbolic aspects, centered on the deployment of China’s soft power and the configuration of a new geopolitical scenario grounded in the area of health; and second, through donations and sales of vaccines (Vadell 2022). According to Vadell (2022), Chinese health diplomacy has also been promoted through both bilateral and multilateral channels; in the case of the former, the author remarks on the bilateral donations and sales of medical supplies, while in the latter, the author claims that the China-CELAC Forum has been the only institution to promote cooperation among parties in the area of health.

A study conducted by The Atlantic Council analyses and compares China’s and the U.S.’ vaccine diplomacy in Central America, and certain countries in LAC. According to one of the authors, health diplomacy has contributed to the expansion of China’s presence in Central America, such as in the case of Nicaragua, shortly after the country switched its recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, China donated an important quantity of vaccines (Brizuela de Ávila et. al 2022). The study concludes that China and the U.S. COVID-19 health diplomacy in LAC are part of a triangular relationship, where governments in LAC do not consider China as a substitute of the U.S., or vice versa, but as an alternative actor where to seek support (Brizuela de Ávila et. al 2022).

Relatedly, some authors understand China’s health diplomacy in LAC as part of its geopolitical approach to the region. In this regard, in line with Myers (2021), Malacalza and Fagaburu (2022) claim that China’s direct and indirect donations of vaccines to countries in Central America and the Caribbean have been core instruments of pressure to switch recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Also, the authors...
point out that countries in LAC have been a territory of geopolitical dispute that has included the area of health; according to them, while China focused on providing donations and exporting vaccines to the region, the U.S. combined bilateral donations with contributions to the multilateral mechanism known as COVAX (Malacalza and Fagaburu 2022). In addition, the authors claim that China’s health diplomacy has been combined with economic diplomacy in certain countries in LAC: China donated and sold vaccines to Chile and Uruguay, former members of the BRI, but also to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which also became local allies for the production of Chinese vaccines in the region (Malacalza and Fagaburu 2022). Conversely, according to Myers (2021) and Malacalza and Fagaburu (2022), in countries that recognize Taiwan, such as Paraguay and Honduras, direct and indirect donations have sought to increase political pressure and encircle Taiwan.

SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND LABOR IMPACTS

Social and environmental impacts:

Though (geo)economics and, to a lesser extent (geo)politics, have been crucial themes in the research work about China-LAC relations, the social and environmental dimension of China-LAC relations has increasingly become a source of research over the last decade. This includes debates about the negative environmental consequences of trade with China being specialized in certain export-oriented sectors in LAC, such as large-scale commercial agriculture, mining, and hydrocarbons extraction. This also includes debates about the extent to which Chinese companies that invest in LAC countries in those and other sectors, such as infrastructure, have addressed these consequences. The research about social and environmental impacts has also gained more widespread attention amidst social protests and public tensions related to the performance of Chinese companies. Researchers not only debate on the extent to which LAC governments respond to the institutional and political challenges that these dynamics generate, including the quest for transparency, but also on the lack of dialogue spaces and consultation with local communities.

Apart from the scholarly research on environmental and social impacts of Chinese companies’ presence in LAC that scholars in the region and elsewhere have conducted, civil society, including NGOs, have contributed to knowledge production on this topic. For example, the China-Latin America Sustainable Investment Initiative (IISCAL), which recently became the Latinoamérica Sustentable (LAS), has made important contributions to these topics, particularly because of the collaboration schemes established with civil society organizations such as Confederación de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE), Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (COICA), Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), and the Fundación para el Desarrollo de Políticas Sustentables y Sustentarse (FUNDEPS), among others. Since LAS is actually the only NGO in LAC completely dedicated to doing research on Chinese investments with a focus on the environment and community rights, some of its contributions have been included in the discussions that follow.

While certain activities such as Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC may have a positive impact on communities in terms of employment, bolstering revenue, and creating local business opportunities, and may come with corporate social responsibility-related programs, other impacts are less positive (Ray et al 2017; Jenkins 2019). According to Garzón (2018a), the affluence of Chinese investments financed by Chinese banks’ loans has generated, in some cases, serious conflicts and losses for governments in LAC, Chinese enterprises, and local communities. This is mostly explained by the nature of China-LAC trade; Ray et al (2017) echoes that, as a relatively new player in international investment and financing, as discussed further in the section on governance and sustainable
development, China’s social and environmental regulations have not yet reached the same level as those of long-standing global lending institutions.

As large-scale agriculture and extraction has increased and manufacturing decreased in proportion to total LAC exports to China, Núñez Salas (2022) and Ray et. al (2017) also suggest that LAC-China exports have had a particular environmental impact. With regards to greenhouse gas emissions and water use, Ray et. al (2017) suggest that exports between LAC and China are the source of more greenhouse gas emissions and water usage than other exports (p. 7). Given that competition for water resources has often been a source of conflict, this has significant social, as well as environmental, consequences (Ray et. al 2017). In the case of Colombia, for example, according to Rudas and Cabrera (2017), carbon mining in the regions of Cesar and La Guajira have not only contributed to reducing agricultural activities, but also affected superficial and underground water sources and general access to water, in addition to causing air pollution. The authors remark how trade concentration with China has promoted these impacts, since China is the main recipient of Colombian carbon exports. In addition, the building of roads and other infrastructure to access extraction areas and transport goods have contributed to accelerate deforestation (Núñez Salas 2022; Ray et. al 2017; Gallagher 2016). For instance, according to Núñez Salas (2022), the development of cattle and pig farming, mainly motivated by Chinese demand, is also contributing to increased emission of greenhouse gases while the expansion of soy harvests is causing deforestation.

In a similar vein, a study conducted by Escobar et. al (2020) analyzes how trade concentration has had environmental impacts in Brazil, since massive soy exports to China have strengthened deforestation and the emission of CO2 in northern regions of the country, particularly in the states of Mato Grosso, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul. Research works conducted by Fearnside and Figueiredo (2017) and Studart and Myers (2021) claim that not only do soy exports to China contribute to deforestation and local communities’ displacement in the Amazonia (particularly in Mato Grosso), but so does livestock production. The environmental impacts of Argentina’s engagement with China in the large-scale agricultural sector has also been a topic of study, particularly the effects of intensive soy production for pollution, land degradation, and deforestation (Teubal 2006; Reboratti 2010; Donaubauer et. al 2017; Gras and Hernández 2021).

Nonetheless, the need for the LAC region to develop its own policies and leverage its resources is clear across much of the literature on this topic. Scholars seem to generally agree that Chinese firms should not be held uniquely responsible for the social and environmental impact of trade relations with LAC (Mora 2018; Wagner 2019; Ray et. al. 2017). Some studies conducted in Latin America claim that Chinese investments have accentuated environmental degradation and social conflicts (Lowe 2017; Ballón et. al 2017), while others point out that impacts depend more on which sectors the investments are concentrated in than on the origin of investments, and that Chinese companies’ negative effects do not differ much from other enterprises in the region (Ray et al. 2017; Irwin and Gallagher 2013). Other experts’ reports have demonstrated that there are cases where certain Chinese firms have behaved better than their competitors (Kühne 2018; Ray et al. 2017).

Some scholars also seem to agree that China-based firms do not behave in ways that are particularly “worse” or “better” than their counterparts based in other countries, and that such generalizations do not account for the differences between entities and firms that are intrinsically and behaviorally different. Moreover, researchers have claimed that there is not a unique “Chinese” way of doing business, and that performance varies also in the case of the same Chinese companies operating in different countries in LAC (Gonzalez-Vicente 2012; Irwin and Gallagher 2013; Sanborn and Chonn Ching 2017). In various cases, neither Chinese investors nor diplomats have performed the required due diligence to evaluate the overall social impacts of certain projects, and Latin American authorities have
generally not provided information about the potential conflicts that certain activities would involve (Sanborn and Chonn Ching 2017).

Still, the impact of Chinese firms’ behavior is particularly important given the extent of China’s demand compared to other countries, making it urgent that Latin American countries adopt robust plans and frameworks that do not rely exclusively on voluntary initiatives from the private sector (Nuñez Salas 2022). The weakness of legal frameworks has been linked, for instance, to socio-environmental conflicts concerning beef production in Brazil and copper extraction in Peru (Nuñez Salas 2022).

Climate change has also been pointed out as a challenge arising from Chinese firms’ activities in LAC, the global consequences of which extend far beyond the region. While Chinese investments in renewable energy in Latin American countries appear to be contributing to mitigation commitments, overall, climate change has not been addressed as part of legal frameworks that regulate their activities (Nuñez Salas 2022).

According to Hogenboom et. al (2022), though several Chinese projects in the commodities sectors have been contested, the weakness of local institutions along with the interests of the national states to promote the rapid allocation of foreign investments contribute to oversight of environmental and social impacts, as well as to disregarding risks. The PRC could also contribute by adopting better sourcing standards. For example, Chinese banks could incorporate international standards, such as those stipulated by the International Labour Organization Convention 169, as a compulsory prerequisite to evaluate and concede credits to Chinese companies (Garzón 2018a; Merino 2021, 2022).

Another consequence described in the literature of Chinese firms’ investment in LAC extraction (e.g., mining, coal, oil) is the displacement of communities to make way for such extraction projects. Highly biodiverse or valuable land, both in terms of ecology and heritage, is often at stake. Gallagher (2016) notes that the geography and demographics of the LAC region are such that natural resources tend to be located in areas where local communities, often indigenous, live. This has been a source of conflict in various cases. Scholars are paying increasing attention to such grassroots and indigenous voices in understanding the wide-ranging impact of China’s presence in the region (Amar et al. 2022). Prior consultation and good faith negotiations between investors, governments, and local communities are particularly important when the affected area has a high level of biodiversity or is indigenous territory; there are lessons to be learned from cases where this type of situation has been handled well, and others where it has not (Ray et al. 2017).

Various experts have addressed the case of Chinese companies’ early presence in Ecuador’s mining sector. Some authors claim that local communities and national environmental and human rights organizations have often resisted the types of contracts that governmental actors and political élites have negotiated with Chinese counterparts, but since policymakers have prioritized extractive activities and neglected social and environmental safeguards for local communities, these dynamics have negatively impacted the human and political rights of local populations in certain localities, such as Mirador (Gonzalez-Vicente 2013, 2017; Quiliconi and Rodríguez Vasco 2021). According to Hogenboom et. al (2022), the Chinese company involved in the project initially neglected the protests and even repressed them, but afterward negotiated with the local inhabitants and made some social concessions. In other cases, according to Quiliconi and Rodríguez Vasco (2021), stronger local organizing led to the suspension of mining activities in localities such as San Carlos Panantza. As a result, Chinese companies’ presence in the mining sector and their interactions with the Ecuadorian State have not only damaged consultation processes and promoted the provision of environmental licenses under controversial circumstances, but also contributed to the dislocation of communities (Quiliconi and Rodríguez Vasco 2021).

Apart from the impacts in Ecuador’s mining sector, China’s infrastructure projects in the hydropower sector have posed major challenges both in environmental and social terms for Ecuador,
challenges that have been addressed by researchers and NGOs (Finer and Terry 2010; Villavicencio 2013; Garzón 2014; Terán Samanamud 2014). According to Garzón and Castro (2018), based on a study conducted on the Chinese projects Coca Codo Sinclair and Sopladora, most Chinese stakeholders involved in these projects were distant from Ecuadorian civil society, and access to information about projects was extremely difficult, resulting in conflicts in territories and with local communities. Moreover, these authors claim that the environmental studies that were conducted to evaluate the impact of the plants were unreliable (Garzón and Castro 2018).

The environmental and social impacts of the Chinese presence in the Peruvian mining sector has also been a topic of study. According to Sanborn and Torres (2009) and Sanborn and Chonn (2017), the Rio Blanco project was highly resisted by the local agricultural communities. According to Rudas and Cabrera (2017), perceptions about Chinese oil firms' compliance with environmental and social issues in Colombia are especially unfavorable since these companies have not complied with commitments regarding transparency and integration of local communities and have generated conflicts with civil society. Also in Colombia, local communities have criticized the environmental impact assessments carried out by Chinese firms to develop oil projects in the Colombian Amazonia (COICA 2018).

The impact of lithium extraction has also been a topic of debate. A study conducted by Marchegiani, Höglund Hellgren, and Gómez (2019), and another by Marchegiani, Morgera, and Parks (2020), analyze the social and environmental effects of Chinese investments in the lithium sector in Argentina, particularly, in the Caucharí-Olaroz projects operated by Minera Exar in Jujuy province. According to the authors, the provincial government has been non-compliant in the supervision of the dialogue between the companies and local communities, as with previous consultation processes, while the concerns of local communities regarding environmental degradation have not been fully taken into account. Some experts claim that the Chinese presence in the Chilean lithium sector has also been a subject of disputes with local communities due to water use (Jerez, Garces, and Torres 2021). Also, some scholars point out that civil society groups have already raised concerns about the potential environmental impacts of the project led by a Chinese company and the state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB) in Bolivia, since the Environmental Impact Assessment has not yet been published (Jemio 2020). Based on the experiences of countries in LAC regarding mining activities, Ray, Wang, and Albright (2021) claim that it is key for all parties involved, that is: countries in the “Lithium Triangle” together with China, to learn and apply those lessons to the lithium sector, which means assuming greater transparency and guaranteeing deeper participation of civil society and the affected communities in the processes.

The expansion and diversity of Chinese companies’ presence in the infrastructure sector in LAC have also intensified the debates about the social and environmental implications of large-scale projects in certain environmentally sensitive areas, such as those located in the Amazon basin and the Cerrado, in Brazil, which are inhabited by different Indigenous communities and small-scale farmers. According to Abdenur, Santoro, and Folly (2021), the case of the Ferrogrão project, which is still under negotiation, reflects the multiple impacts that these types of projects involve, including environmental and socioeconomic effects, such as the displacement of local communities. These authors remark that, due to controversial experiences of Chinese infrastructure investments in other countries in the region such as Bolivia and Ecuador, Chinese companies have become increasingly subject to scrutiny by several actors in Brazil, including civil society, indigenous communities, and other native groups, as well as by political parties (Abdenur, Santoro, and Folly 2021).

The environmental and social impacts of Chinese investment in hydroelectric plants in the Brazilian Amazonia have also been a topic of study. According to some experts, these types of projects have not only displaced local communities, but also affected biodiversity and contributed to global warming (Fearnside 2016, 2020; COICA 2018). NGOs, local communities, and experts have used the
Hidrovía Amazónica in Peru as a case of study, claiming the insufficient evaluation of environmental and social impacts. According to Merino (2021, 2022) the environmental impact assessment conducted for this project did not comply with the terms agreed during the previous consultation process, and did not address the environmental and social concerns raised by indigenous communities. According to information provided by Navas (2019), the hydropower project Patauca III in Honduras was also problematic due to its controversial prior consultation process and the scarce attention to Indigenous communities’ demands. As Chinese investments in infrastructure, and in other sectors, are set to continue expanding, most experts that have addressed the environmental and social implications of the China-LAC relationship have pointed out the importance of both Chinese and LAC actors’ engagement in ensuring compliance with local, national, and international socio-environmental rules in future projects.

A study conducted by the Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) in Argentina argues that several Chinese infrastructure and energy projects have involved claims regarding social and environmental issues. The report includes cases such as the Cauchari solar plant in Jujuy province, two large-scale hydroelectric plants in Patagonia, and an oil basin in Jujuy. In all these cases, there have been social conflicts due to the displacement of local communities, and noncompliance with environmental information and previous consultation processes (FARN 2020). In 2021, FARN published a new study that further extended the analysis of social and environmental impacts of Chinese presence in Argentina; this report includes an agreement between Argentina and China for potential investments in the pork sector—which have been rejected by local communities, the civil society and several NGOs (FARN 2021). In this line, Gras and Hernández (2021) point out that the memorandum involving potential Chinese investment in the Argentinean pork industry can be interpreted as a strategy of China to outsource environmental and health effects of this type of production. The authors also remark that although opposition from most small-scale producers and environmental movements impeded the agreement from entering into force, local governments, such as in Chaco province, have taken steps to plan the installation of three pork farms.

Some research shows positive results regarding Chinese firms’ presence in some countries in LAC. According to Merino (2021), the cases of the mines of Jungie and Toromocho in Bolivia have been successful in terms of how the Chinese enterprise Chinalco became involved with local communities. Also, a study elaborated by Kühne (2018) highlights the social responsibility developed by the Chinese company, SAPET, a local subsidiary of CNPC, in Peru. A similar case was reported in Honduras, where the Chinese enterprise Sinohydro halted plans to develop a hydropower project because of local resistance. At the same time, as Chinese firms face more scrutiny in Latin America, Chinese scholarship is also paying more attention to how corporate social responsibility (CSR) is shaping local receptions. Overall, Chinese firms have come a long way in engaging the local communities since their first investment in mining in Latin America in the early 1990s. At present, there are quite a few initiatives in environmental protection, youth support, and indigenous rights. But they need to do a better job in engaging opinion leaders such as NGOs and think tanks in order to communicate with diverse constituents (Chen Yuanting 2020). As China’s most recognized telecommunications giant, Huawei has accumulated successful experience in Mexico in this regard despite the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government (Gong Yunjie 2020b).

There is academic consensus about the way Chinese firms have developed their projects in different countries in LAC, which varies depending on the sectors where those investments are allocated, but also based on how national and local governments and social movements address Chinese companies’ presence. However, that consensus is problematic considering the social fragmentation in regions with Indigenous communities (Garzón 2018a). Sometimes these variables push Chinese companies to comply with environmental and social standards, but that is not always the case.
Human rights impacts

The impact of Chinese firms on the human rights’ situation in LAC is still an incipient and largely unexplored theme of research. In 2018, in the framework of the United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a report elaborated by the Colectivo sobre Finanzas e Inversiones Chinas, Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente (CICDHA) addressed 18 projects conducted by Chinese firms in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, and reported violations of human rights (CICDHA 2018). According to some experts, the violation of human and environmental rights are not a result of isolated cases, but of general performance by Chinese firms (Wolff 2015).

A more recent report prepared by more than 60 Latin American civil society organizations as part of the monitoring of the PRC’s commitments in the UPR analyzed 26 projects in which China participates—both directly through Chinese firms’ activities or indirectly through financing—in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. While the report covered different sectors, most of the projects were related to the mining and hydroelectric sectors. Among the human rights pointed out as affected are the right to live in a healthy environment, the right to health, individual and collective labor rights, the rights to participate and free, prior, and informed consultation, the rights to land, territory, and adequate housing, and even fundamental civil and political rights, such as the right to life, freedom, and free assembly; the infringement of these rights has led to social conflicts (CICDHA 2022).

Comparing the activities against the PRC’s commitments with regard to controlling and auditing the actions of its businesses and financing outside its territory, the report found that there is “a pattern of noncompliance of the Chinese State with international standards in the areas of human rights and environment” (CICDHA 2022). Moreover, the report highlights noncompliance with the recommendations that the UPR made to China as a result of the 2019 report.

Some studies point out that Chinese companies have been involved in human rights issues in oil extraction and mining projects in Bolivia. In this case, based on communiqués reporting abuses and violations regarding labor conditions—overtime and restrictions to lactation breaks—the authors provide an analysis of the Chinese firms that have been accused of violating local workers’ rights (Saravia López and Rua Quiroga 2017). A study that addresses the Coca Codo Sinclair hydropower project in Ecuador highlights that the construction of the dam was reported to cause deaths of workers, and violations of workers’ rights, as well as labor claims; due to these episodes, the authors claim that is it one of the most controversial projects in the history of the country (Garzón and Castro 2017).

A study conducted by Merino (2021), claims that the Chinese company involved in the project Hidrovía Amazónica in Peru did not comply with the Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors, launched in 2012, nor with other guidelines related to environmental protection of Chinese investments abroad. According to the author, the rights of Indigenous communities were not fully respected, since the environmental impact assessment did not address their concerns (Merino 2021).

Environmental governance and sustainable development

Other areas of the literature on this topic describe the regulatory mechanisms that come into play on social and environmental impacts, both in LAC and in China. In LAC, some of the literature provides examples of advances and setbacks at the national level.12 Ecuador, for example, established a national development plan that acknowledges the need to diversify the economy away from oil, citing also the social and environmental impacts of extraction (Ray et. al 2017). Its Citizens Participation Law of 2010
requires prior consent from communities for oil and mining projects, and other regulations make provisions for environmental assessments and re-investment in public projects (Ray et. al 2017).

The literature touches on the state mechanisms that guide outward investment in China. These include the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission, and banking institutions such as the CDB, the CHEXIM, and the regulatory commission of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), some of which have set forth guidelines related to environmental protection with varying levels of adherence (Ray et. al 2017; Dussel Peters and Armony 2017; Gallagher 2016). There is, however, no single entity responsible for ODFI (Dussel Peters and Armony 2017). Only the Supreme People’s Court of China issued an opinion on how the judicial system could support the development of projects under the BRI and called on Chinese courts to strengthen environmental public interest litigation and damage litigation outside China (Merino 2021). Further, a lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether firms are complying with such guidelines (Gallagher 2016). As such, some scholars suggest establishing grievance and independent review mechanisms as accountability tools (Ray et. al 2017; Gallagher 2016).

In order to have a clearer picture of Chinese environmental and social voluntary guidelines, Latinoamérica Sustentable has elaborated a compilation, which is available online and aims to identify the most important guides, particularly those related to the sectors in which the presence of Chinese investors and companies in Latin America and the Caribbean is more common. This compilation includes guidelines of the above mentioned Chinese institutions that apply to Chinese companies and investments, to Chinese commercial and policy banks and Chinese companies that act as investors in projects financed by those banks, and to projects in several sectors. Also, IISCAL—currently Latinoamérica Sustentable—elaborated a handbook of Chinese guidelines to ensure that social organizations have access to them and are informed about their main contents (Garzón 2018b). According to Garzón (2018b), most of the guidelines are general and non-binding; however, many highlight the importance of ex-ante and ex-post environmental and social impact assessments, and the relevance of due diligence assessments elaborated by independent evaluators, while others indicate the obligation to respect the rights of workers, to make information available to the public and to open space for civil society participation.

Recent studies have also addressed the extent to which changes in environmental and social regulations in LAC have influenced the cancellation of certain projects, and have promoted learning processes in China-LAC deals. In this regard, Dourado (2022) analyzes the case of the Chinese-leaded bioceanic railroad project, aimed at connecting the costs of Brazil and Peru, and points out the various causes why the project has not advanced, while Abdenur, Santoro, and Folly (2021) highlight that this case served as a learning process for Chinese firms in Brazil, and promoted the realization of other infrastructure projects.

Relatedly, Ray et. al (2022) conducted a study about environmental and social regulations in the Amazon Basin (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru), and point out that during and after the “China boom,” regulations rose and fell according to the variation of prices of export commodities, strengthening protections when export prices rose and relaxing regulations to attract investments when export prices reversed course. The authors also remark that Chinese investment did not change significantly due to regulatory relaxation—not even after the introduction of the BRI—and conclude that countries in LAC that host Chinese investments have policy space to establish and enforce regulations to protect their natural resources and to meet their national needs (Ray et. al, 2022).

In general, experts tend to agree on the necessity of a shared responsibility among China and Latin American governments regarding the establishment and compliance with environmental and
social regulations; that is to say, a more active role for all parties involved (Garzón 2018a; Merino 2021; Ray et al. 2017).

Sustainable development is also a prominent topic across the literature on social impacts. On China’s side, its developmental goals have become key in its economic approach to LAC; the Chinese companies’ presence in LAC in the mining industry is, jointly with China’s engagement in the energy sector, one of the first areas where it has allocated investment and financing (Ray et al. 2017; Ray et al., 2022). The analysis of these dynamics has, thus, increasingly become a topic of interest when considering social and environmental impacts of China’s relationship with countries in the region.

On the LAC side, various sources indicate that the impact of China-LAC economic activity on sustainable development depends on local and national governments. When it comes to social and environmental challenges, many scholars point inward, stressing that the onus is on governments in the region to find structural solutions to mitigate social and environmental problems, including those arising from economic relations with China-based actors. Gallagher (2016) suggests that as a result of the “China boom,” many LAC countries took advantage of the skyrocketing profits from exports by initiating programs to combat poverty and inequality but did not take such advantage to build and innovate industries, and such experiences are not universal. Others point to specific case studies where areas with sustained extraction from Chinese companies have not experienced an improvement in human development indicators, despite their large contribution to the national economy and their profits from such activity. Some disputes also arise from the extent to which local communities benefit from Chinese investment, suspected corruption, or unmet expectations (Jenkins 2019).

According to studies that have analyzed hydropower projects in Ecuador, particularly the Coca Codo Sinclair and Sopladora dams, official information has informed compensations to local communities with investments allocated to improve social services and infrastructure (Garzón and Castro 2018). According to Sanborn and Chonn Ching (2017), the creation of the Programa Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo (Solidarity Mining Program for the People) in Peru, which functioned between 2006 and 2011, involved the voluntary reinvestment of 3.75% of the companies’ profits into social and infrastructure programs that would benefit the populations affected by mining. The Chinese firm Shougang not only made contributions to this program, but also to other localities that surrounded its operations. The authors point out that the Chinese company Chinalco has made similar re-investments in other localities in Peru. According to them, although these processes have been controversial, these investments have no precedents in the history of Peru (Sanborn and Chonn Ching 2014, 2017). Similar re-investments have also been required in the Argentinean province of Jujuy, particularly in the case of the solar plant Cauchari and projects that involve lithium extraction (Lucci and Garzón 2019; Gonzalez Jauregui 2021).

There are also examples of sustainable development cooperation. One such example is the Joint Action Plan between the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and China (CELAC-China) for 2022-2024, in which several priority areas are related to sustainable development, including public health, the eradication of poverty, infrastructure cooperation, support to higher education institutions and think tanks, and local community exchanges (as described in the earlier section on this), and others.

Impacts of China-LAC economic activities on labor

Literature on the specific labor dimension of China-LAC relations is limited. There is a significant body of research on labor in Latin America itself (such as on the history of labor policy, labor movements, and studies surrounding industries and productivity) and on LAC’s economic relationship with China in general (as detailed in the previous section). However, few studies have taken a deep dive into the labor impact of China-LAC economic activity. As such, those that do may rely on existing, general labor trends
or trade and FDI data to understand how these have changed over time in parallel to China’s growing influence in LAC and their effects on employment. Though Chinese studies have addressed Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in LAC (Cui y Zhang 2017; Huang, 2016; Lu 2016; Xie 2016; Yue 2017; Zhang et al. 2017), the impacts of these activities on labor have not yet been incorporated into most Chinese scholarship analysis.

Nonetheless, more recent works have begun to explore the labor impacts in the context of the most prominent economic activities: trade, and in particular, exports from Latin American countries; foreign direct investment from China; and the activity of Chinese firms and projects, including construction of infrastructure projects, in LAC (Dussel Peters and Armony 2017, 2018; Jenkins 2019). The baseline for understanding labor impacts in almost all labor-related studies is China’s increasing role in global trade, particularly its role as an exporter of manufactured goods and an importer of mining and agricultural goods, which raises concerns for negative and positive labor impacts, respectively (Artuc, Lederman, and Rojas 2015).

One facet of the literature on labor impacts attempts to quantify the number of jobs created (or lost) as a result of economic activity between LAC countries and China. For example, see the Monitor of Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) and the Monitor of Chinese Infrastructure in LAC from the LAC Academic Network on China (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China), which are updated annually and include not only the number of OFDI and infrastructure projects transactions and their amounts but also the net employment generation numbers and their sectoral distribution. For example, by reviewing existing databases and information related to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (which they note are constantly being updated), Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) estimate that around 1.8 million jobs were generated between 1995 and 2016 across three types China-LAC economic activities: trade (which according to their estimations accounts for the majority, or 65% of jobs created), Chinese foreign direct investment (accounting for 15 percent of jobs created), and Chinese infrastructure projects (accounting for 20 percent of jobs created). Jenkins (2019) finds these estimates too high, in particular regarding overseas FDI and infrastructure projects.

Despite information on jobs created by Chinese economic activity in LAC becoming increasingly available, most studies agree that this accounts for only a small percentage of the overall employment market activity, and further, that trade is only one of the contributors to employment oscillations. Jenkins (2019) concludes that the overall impact of China on employment, and that of trade specifically, is relatively small. In order to deepen previous studies on the topic, Dussel Peters and Armony (2018) conducted an analysis based on different data sources and concluded that 2,053 million jobs were created in LAC between 2000 and 2014 due to net trade with China, as well as investments and infrastructure projects. However, most of that employment was unskilled, since the generation of employment is concentrated in activities related to exports, reducing the quality of employment in LAC. Regarding labor impacts of Chinese OFDI in LAC, the study claims that although agriculture and extractive activities continue to be the most relevant recipients of investments and creators of jobs, diversification of investments to sectors such as manufacturing and services and the consequent creation of jobs has begun to modify previous figures (Dussel Peters and Armony 2018). More details on these topics are addressed in the following subsection.

Many scholars discuss an “offsetting” effect where employment numbers in certain industries are more affected by Chinese activity than others, positive trends in some industries thereby offsetting negative trends in others. Artuc, Lederman, and Rojas (2015), for example, found that “the rise of China has had positive effects on agriculture and mining in Argentina and Brazil, which offset negative impacts
Effects of Chinese competition and “(re-)primarization” of labor

Much of the literature on the impact of China’s economic relationship with LAC on labor explores the impact of rising competition from Chinese firms. Jenkins (2019) explains some of the concerns surrounding how this competition might be expected to have a negative effect on labor in LAC, including Chinese imports replacing the need for export-related jobs in LAC (causing factory closures and affecting low-skill workers disproportionately) and—depending on how LAC firms respond to Chinese competitors—increasing the use of informal employment (285-7). This competition between firms in China and LAC occurs also in markets such as the United States and countries in Europe (Bittencourt et. al 2012; Schatan and Piloyan 2017). Similarly, some of the literature in this area discusses the labor impact of Chinese activity in terms of the “reprimarization” of the LAC economy; as commodity exports become more prevalent, the region falls behind on the manufacturing global value chain (Hearn and León-Manríquez 2011; Barzola and Baroni 2017), which impacts labor and wages too (Salém Vasconcellos and Chilcote 2022).

As detailed in the (geo)economics section, studies on the economic relationship between China and LAC often characterize some countries as “winners” and others as “losers” in their relationships with China. Countries in the Southern Cone and Brazil have been noted for the magnitude of their economic activity with China, and other countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru have been identified by some as positioning themselves positively in the face of competition from China (Wise 2020).23 Although they may not be explicitly labeled “winners” and “losers,” the data on labor market impacts seems to show the same set of countries at opposite ends of the spectrum; Brazil at one (positive) and Mexico at the other (negative) (Artuc, Lederman, and Rojas 2015; Dussel Peters and Armony 2017).24 Some studies have focused on the impacts of trade with China on labor in specific industries such as textiles, where Chinese imports have contributed to generating less participation of employment in all stages of textiles production in Mexico (Dussel Peters and Gallagher 2013; Schatan and Piloyan 2017). Also of note are the subsets of countries that have gained the most employment from certain types of activities. For example, with regard to Chinese infrastructure projects, some data shows that the majority of the employment generated has been concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela (Dussel Peters and Armony 2018 using data from Red ALC-China 2018). Additionally, researchers have conducted case studies about trade with China, Chinese investments, and infrastructure projects to address the impacts of these activities on labor, for example, in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Mexico (Dussel Peters 2018b; Fairlie, Queija, and Herrera 2018; Velásquez Pinto 2018; Hiratuka 2018c).

Thus, the data and literature on employment created or lost as a result of China-LAC economic activity shows positive or negative impacts for some countries and industries in particular. On the other hand, some scholars argue that other factors that are endogenous to Latin America contribute to fluctuations and labor dynamics and thus China should not be held solely responsible for all labor, social, and environmental issues.25 Several authors have pointed out the deficiencies of the LAC region in positioning itself to take advantage of the global market.26
Various case studies have been conducted to gain an understanding of labor relations between Chinese companies operating in LAC and their workers. Some of these describe tensions arising from lack of previous consultation of local communities and workers for large-scale infrastructure projects (Jenkins 2019), and others the perceived lack of transparency in negotiations between LAC governments and incoming Chinese firms (Hearn and León-Manríquez 2011).

Also, NGOs have elaborated case studies to analyze labor conflicts in projects conducted by Chinese enterprises in countries in LAC. Some studies conducted by NGOs emphasize the precariousness of labor relations in Chinese firms’ activities. In the case of a recent report launched by the Center for Public Policies and Human Rights (Perú EQUIDAD), the Chinese firm, Shougang, has been identified as the main company to register labor conflicts in the mining sector in Peru, followed by Chinalco, though to a much lesser extent (Dolores, Manky, and Sousa 2022). According to the report, there have been conflicts regarding collective bargaining and unionization; however, the study also concludes that Chinese enterprises do not behave differently from other countries’ firms, and that there are variations among Chinese companies whether they are State-Owned, or belong to provincial governments (Dolores, Manky, and Sousa 2022). Notwithstanding, the authors claim that the Peruvian state reactivates negotiations of its FTA with China and calls for the Chinese state to include social and environmental stipulations in the agreement (Dolores, Manky, and Sousa 2022).

Another subset of this literature begins to describe the proportion of Chinese to Latin American workers in various country and company settings, and potential tensions arising from this. Information is mostly available through case studies, and it has not been holistically or systematically reviewed (Dussel Peters and Armony 2017). According to Dolores, Manky, and Sousa (2022), conversely to the African case, the nationality of companies is not presented as a mobilizing or politicizing element; the authors claim that, in comparison to Africa, some investments in LAC have been a result of Chinese banks’ loans, and therefore have provided firms with more space to negotiate with the recipient countries. Also, labor conditions vary based on the sector where investments are allocated (Dolores, Manky, and Sousa 2022). As in the case of quantifying employment creation and loss, there are few generalizations that can be made across the region.

Other studies have also emphasized the difficulties that Chinese companies have encountered in understanding local labor environments in LAC, which in some cases has generated tensions. Differences in culture and expectations have also been reported as a challenge for labor relations (CAITEC, RCSASAC, and UNDP China 2017; Ellis 2014). According to some authors, cultural differences have an impact in the way that norms, regulations, laws, and habits are interpreted; that is why Chinese enterprises have faced difficulties adapting to local and national dynamics in countries where they set operations (Schatan and Piloyan 2017; Dussel Peters and Armony 2018).

Compared to the extensive body of literature on broadly-defined economic and political topics, the amount of research on the largely one-way migration of ethnic Chinese to Latin America, the varied meanings of such transnational life trajectories, and the making of mutual understandings between China and Latin America, appears far less. Yet it is in these related topics where one finds the most nuanced ethnographic insights on the ground, particularly how different actors make sense of the complex and sometimes conflicting social forces at play. Rather than a separate set of research topics on their own, they provide an indispensable dimension of how the macroeconomic and political factors
actually play out in individual lives. Our understanding of macro China-Latin America issues in the previous sections will not be complete without this body of work.

Complex migration patterns

When studying China-Latin American relations many authors have found it important to understand the long legacy and influence of Chinese populations in Latin America from the perspective of migration. Studying the waves of Chinese migrants helps better understand how those migrants have integrated themselves into Latin America and created communities. Their vast diasporic network has transformed the social and geographic landscape of the region alongside other migrant populations. *Amerasia Journal*, a leading publication in Asian American studies, ran a special issue on Asians in the Americas as early as 1989, and once again in 2002. The two issues interrogate respectively the theoretical application of diaspora and transculturation in understanding the Asian (including Chinese) migration (Leong 2002; Hirabayashi 2002). They confirm the critical importance of transnational perspectives in understanding the longstanding population movement between China and the Americas and its layered meanings.

Chinese migration to Latin America dates back to various kinds of labor recruitment in the mid-nineteenth century for railroad construction and plantation work. Their arrival filled the critical gap in labor needs after the gradual abolition of slavery (DeHart 2021). At the end of railroad construction, some Chinese established small businesses along the railroads in the service sector, such as grocery stores and restaurants, which also attracted more Chinese workers (Mazza 2016). As Chinese business started to emerge, more and more locals started to see them as an economic and social threat (Palma and Montt 2019). Still, it was unthinkable at the time that China would constitute an exporter of capital, not people, a century later (Hu-DeHart and López 2008).

While economic reasons continued to motivate the migration of ethnic Chinese to the region in the twentieth century, such as wealthy entrepreneurs from Taiwan in the 1970s and ordinary Chinese in the post-reform period, political instability was also an important push factor. This was particularly the case in the 1940s, as China was suffering from Japanese invasion and civil war, and remains true at present among Chinese dissidents (Mazza 2016; DeHart 2021). Such national politics often had transnational reverberations as Chinese immigrants in Mexico leveraged their connections to the fraught Chinese politics in the mid-twentieth century to strengthen their claim of belonging in Mexico (Gonzalez 2017). In the 20th century, there were Chinese migrants in almost every country in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Cuba, Peru, and Mexico hosting the largest populations (Hu-DeHart and López 2008). Until the 1990s, Argentina and Venezuela were also popular destinations among Chinese migrants because of their political and economic stability. Due to recent political instability, there has been a noticeable trend of migrants to Chile. This highlights the prevalence of "serial migration," where multiple migrations in the Americas defy singular national residence or belonging in one state (Siu 2005; Chan 2018).

Livelihoods and identities

The complex history of Chinese migration to Latin America offers ample opportunities for contemporary social scientific research to flesh out grounded perspectives on the complex immigration patterns and subjectivities. There is a higher concentration of the ethnographic approach in this body of work, which showcases how the migrants negotiate and mediate the layered and sometimes competing processes of globalization and national belonging in order to make a living.

Chinese migration to Latin America has generated distinct cultural relations, social networks,
and perceptions towards Chinese migrants. Not fitting into Western norms or reference frameworks, the Chinese were arguably the first migrant group stigmatized as “alien” (Young 2014). Latin American countries’ policies towards China are intricately tied to the livelihood of Chinese in the region, often shaping what has been described as “racist and xenophobic anti-Chinese anxiety” and frequently linked to economic advantages perceived as legitimate or illegitimate (Chan 2018). But China’s recent rise means that harnessing the trust of the local Chinese community is essential as they serve as a critical conduit between China and different Latin American countries such as Cuba and Mexico (Hearn 2016).

Since the early days of Chinese immigration, Chinatowns have long been the epicenter of the livelihood of Chinese migrants across Latin America. In case studies of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Peru, the literature finds that this unique space helps migrants gradually integrate to the host society but in the meantime allows them to maintain cultural traditions, food, and customs (Eng Menendez 2021). Costa Rica is an outlier because of the very recent origin of its Chinatown in the capital San Jose dating back only to 2012. Despite support from a former mayor, as well as the Chinese government, which is eager to deepen its outreach in the country and Central America in general, the expected urban renewal following the project ultimately failed due to several factors, including ambivalence among ethnic Chinese towards soaring property values, opposition from non-Chinese residents who cherish the space as significant in the country’s political democratization, and construction delays (DeHart 2015). This is part of a more general phenomenon of revitalization of Chinatowns due to the strengthening of China’s economic and diplomatic presence across the world (Hu-DeHart and López 2008).

Chinese language scholarship on Chinese communities in Latin America focuses on how their livelihood in the host society still maintains intimate ethnic ties. An almost year-long ethnographic study of Chinese communities in different parts of Mexico finds that their life still largely revolves around ethnic capital, which has three dimensions: human, economic, and social. Whether in the dependence sectors with ethnic clientele or development sectors with wider clientele, Chinese rely on familial or broader ethnic ties in organizing their life from business ventures to social networks (Xu, 2018). Other studies on Chinese communities in Peru and Chile confirm the importance of such ethnic ties. Historically, the restaurant business provided most Chinese immigrants to Peru employment opportunities. Although Chifa was already firmly integrated into Peruvian cuisine by the early twentieth century, persistent suspicion of the Chinese Other outside the body politic, often inflamed by the intermarriage between Chinese men and local women, was also part and parcel of the nation-building process (Lai and Qu, 2020). A similar love-hate complex is still present in how Chile accepts Chinese immigrants. On the one hand they provide essential services in restaurants and trading through familial and ethnic support. But on the other hand, their concentration in these sectors offer an easy scapegoat for economic downturn and job loss (Zhu, 2019).

Similar to the previously reviewed research on economy and geopolitics, the United States also features prominently in the study of Chinese immigrants in Latin America. The disproportionate U.S. influence in the region means that Latin American nationalists often consider Chinese immigrants double outsiders because of their business and educational connections to the United States. On the other hand, such influence also allows the emergence of popular fusion Chino-Latino restaurants such as Cuban Chinese and Peruvian Chinese in New York, which further reinforces the transnational theme. Food has in this sense been studied as a visible expression of a Chinese-Latin American community that is otherwise invisible (Siu, 2008). Individuals see themselves as both Latinos who can speak Spanish and cook Latin American cuisine but also speak Cantonese and cook Chinese cuisine. The restaurants serve as a tangible cultural fusion.

Particularly in the English language literature, researchers caution against the singular understanding of China as just the People’s Republic (PRC). Even after the PRC’s founding in 1949, the
Republic of China government in Taiwan maintained diplomatic relations with the vast majority of Latin American countries until the 1970s. As of right now, the Taiwan government still enjoys diplomatic recognition by several states in the region. Monica DeHart’s recent monograph drives home the point that at least in Central America, the invocation of China continues to refer to the competition between the PRC and Taiwan in winning the hearts and minds of local residents (DeHart 2021). It is worth noting that among her three research sites, Costa Rica switched the diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 2007, Nicaragua in 2021, and Guatemala still recognizes Taiwan. Another high-profile recent switch was in Panama in 2017. How the PRC’s diplomatic inroads continue to affect how China is received in the region needs more research.

Pragmatic uses of culture

When it comes to the broadly-defined cultural connections between China and Latin America, Chinese scholars have mostly considered their pragmatic values to further economic and political ties (Cheng and Yang 2017). As China navigates its comprehensive going out strategy, TV and film industries, sports, and literature are promising levers in supporting its outreach to Latin America, a region with world-famous cultural and athletic icons. Both sides also share their dissatisfaction with the U.S. hegemony in international cultural communications. To realize the full potential of these levers, scholars believe both sides need to be more sensitive to cultural differences and further institutionalize channels of exchange. For China in particular, cultural outreach to Latin America should feature less official actors in order to minimize misunderstandings and achieve the desired reception (He 2015; Zhang, Liu, and Lan 2021; Lou 2017). A team of researchers empirically tested a mathematical model of trade and cultural dimension data and confirmed that cultural distance inhibits China-Latin America trade particularly for middle-income countries. They also found positive associations between particular cultural dimensions and trade, such as masculinity and uncertainty avoidance (Guan et al. 2022).

Making of mutual understandings

In the past few years, there have been more concrete studies of how exactly Latin America constructs its knowledge of China. Several articles by both Chinese and Latin Americans scholars touch upon the development of Chinese studies in Latin America in general and particular countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. They are pleased with the growing interest in China in Latin America as represented in more research institutions and more diverse research output. But they all call for sustainable support for interdisciplinary networking and language training in order to build Chinese studies with distinctive Latin American characteristics (Villagran and Zhang 2019; Gaiotto and Jia 2019; Guo Cunhai 2020).

Other studies demonstrate the importance of understanding Latin American knowledge of China beyond academic research. A micro study focuses on a series of articles on President Xi Jinping’s Latin America in 2016 in the largest Chilean newspaper El Mercurio. It shows how a historically right-leaning publication blends discourses from influential Western media such as BBC and China in crafting its reporting. Readers’ comments reflect not so much their concerns over China’s impact in Latin America as disagreements and anxieties over where Chile is headed (Wan Dai 2018). Such attention to the interactive process of knowledge production from the reporter to reader is not yet the norm in Chinese scholarship. It is more typical to see studies that compile various Spanish translation of the Chinese leaders’ remarks, or different views of China by Latin American think tanks during the pandemic. While they provide essential information on what kind of China-related knowledge is available in Latin America, the readers are left wondering how exactly such knowledge is constructed and possibly contested (Gong Yunjie 2020a, 2021).
Some researchers have zeroed in on how different economic relations with China affect perceptions of the country in Latin America. In Brazil, losers from Chinese trade see ties with China as posing risks, while those that benefited from exports to China do not (Campello and Urdínez 2020). Self-interest thus has a relevant role in the formation of attitudes and public opinion about China as a trade partner. A recent work of Duarte et al. (2022), which includes a survey of opinion leaders to understand how China’s influence in the region is being perceived, concludes that China has significant influence in LAC, particularly in economy and technology, in comparison to culture or health. Moreover, China’s influence is characterized in relatively negative terms, while Chinese media influence does not seem to significantly influence public opinion. Since such research addresses how the Chinese government, state-owned media, and leading corporations are increasingly engaged in messaging in LAC, more studies are needed to analyze variations in sources, and in contents across different platforms, and how they influence Latin American public opinion perspectives about China.

Understanding Latin American studies in China in the East Asian context also provides unique insights into knowledge formation. A 2016 review article of the development of Chinese studies of Latin America in conjunction with its Japanese and South Korean counterparts finds that while Latin American studies in China started as historical research in the 1960s, contemporary China-Latin American relations have become the major focus right now. Compared to Japan and Korea, Chinese institutions need to do a better job in combining language and area studies training and diversifying the disciplinary methods in the field (Guo Jie 2016). In a more recent article, the same author calls on East Asian scholars of Latin American to be more proactive in international collaboration. Their participation in a field long dominated by paradigms coming from the United States is a productive way to globalize and decentralize Latin American studies (Guo Jie 2022).

CAPACITY FOR KNOWLEDGE GENERATION ON CHINA-LAC

CAPACITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

We conducted consultations with specialists in the region that are researching or teaching topics related to China and Latin America and the Caribbean. While across the region there are vastly different experiences, drivers of research, and capacities for knowledge production, the consultations revealed several key challenges and opportunities for growing this work. On a general level, the following section outlines first the capacity of knowledge production on China-LAC across the region. It presents the strengths we identified in the Latin America and the Caribbean regions, followed by the challenges related to scholarship, research, regional collaboration, and cross-regional collaborations between Latin American and Chinese institutions. The mapping of relevant institutions and networks (details in Annex A and B) confirms uneven capacity in the region. To make the information collected consistent, we look at the number of current initiatives such as dedicated programs, teaching and research lines, and specialized staff. The capacity assessment here reflects a preliminary effort in understanding the national variation, rather than the capacity of specific institutions within a certain country. In both the capacity and mapping sections, we break down the LAC region into four subregions: South America, North America (Mexico), Central America, and the Caribbean, followed by entities that cross national boundaries.
South America

In general terms, the bulk of knowledge production in the region is concentrated in South America, with the notable exception of Mexico. We found Argentina, Brazil, and Chile enjoy the most expertise in China-LAC knowledge production. This does not mean, however, that the networks and institutions in these countries are exempt from challenges related to funding and resources, networking, research collaboration, and other obstacles as described below.

In these countries, for the most part, the work is occurring in universities. The degree of institutional specialization in China-Latin America linkages varies in each case; some universities have created research and teaching centers dedicated to studying China, while in others, professors and researchers carry out their work under the umbrella of an area studies center (e.g., Asia studies) or a disciplinary area such as international relations, political science, or economics. The universities in these countries, for the most part, also tend to have agreements with some Chinese universities for student exchange programs.

In the case of Brazil, universities are among the highest ranked in the region. Its market for higher education is one of the largest in Latin America. Many universities in Brazil have established work on China-Brazil topics from various angles, including research, teaching, and convenings. The State University of Campinas (Universidade Estadual de Campinas, UNICAMP), for instance, has been producing knowledge on China-Brazil relations through its Centers for Economic Development and Economic International Relations Studies; a Brazil-China Studies Group (Grupo de Estudos Brasil-China, GEBC), which was one of the first initiatives to begin promoting research and teaching on China and Brazil, and hosts academic events through the Research Seminar on Contemporary China; and most recently, the first-ever research center established in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Similarly, the system of federal and state universities have a diverse range of China activities, some of the most long-standing of which include a laboratory of Chinese Political Economy Studies (Laboratório de Estudos em Economia Política da China) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, UFRJ); a Center for Chinese Studies at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, UFMG); a research and studies group on the Asia Pacific region (Grupo de Estudos e Pesquisa em Ásia Pacífico) at the State University of Paraíba (Universidade Estadual de Paraíba, UEPB), among many others. In addition, many China studies initiatives and centers have been established recently (2019-2021) at Brazilian universities.

Nonetheless, Brazil’s recent economic instability and budget cuts for universities and research are a threat to knowledge production, which is not specific to China work (Quintant-Junior et. al 2020). The declining value of the Brazilian currency also affects scientific research. While cuts started in 2015, these were exacerbated in 2019, when the Brazilian government announced plans to cut funding for public universities by 30%, and there were indications that the Ministry of Education was planning to cut funding entirely for some social sciences departments in particular (Dos Santos Paula 2019). In 2021, President Jair Bolsonaro signed a bill that reduces the budget for the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation by 90%, which, consequently, has increased fears of “brain drain” among Brazilian researchers (McKie 2021). In this context, researchers and universities in Brazil are looking at funding options from outside the country, including foundations and civil society organizations in the United States. China is also providing some funding which may, according to some consultations, impact the outcomes of research. Nevertheless, the change of government in Brazil may bring a new approach to research and thus to research funding.

In Argentina, work on China is being done mostly at university levels, along with some networks and think tanks activities. The National University of La Plata (Universidad Nacional de La Plata, UNLP) has had a Center for Chinese Studies since 1996, which researches several themes related to China
and conducts exchange activities of students and teachers. In 2016, the Center created a postgraduate program in Chinese Studies (*Especialización en Estudios Chinos*). The University of Buenos Aires has had a Group of East Asian Studies (*Grupo de Estudios del Este Asiático, GEEA*) since 2001 that has been conducting research and teaching activities on issues related to Asia, with some activities focused on China. The Faculty of Social Sciences also has a Center for Argentina-China Studies (*Centro de Estudios de Argentina-China, CEACH*), with experts that conduct research and teach on topics related to Chinese history, culture, contemporary China studies, and comparative studies of China and Argentina, among other issues. The University of Salvador (*Universidad del Salvador, USAL*) has a long-standing School of Oriental Studies that was the first to provide courses on Chinese history, literature, philosophy, and religions for many years. Currently, the School provides a graduate program in Oriental Studies.

Several other universities in Argentina conduct research and offer courses on China through dedicated China-related studies centers, Asian studies centers more broadly, or through their economics, international relations, or business faculties. Some examples include the Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina (*Universidad Católica Argentina, UCA*), the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (*Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO Argentina*), the National University of San Martín (*Universidad Nacional de San Martín, UNSAM*), National University of Lanus (*Universidad Nacional de Lanus, UNLa*), the National University of Rosario (*Universidad Nacional de Rosario, UNR*), the National University of Córdoba (*Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, UNC*), and the National University Tres de Febrero (*Universidad Nacional Tres de Febrero, UNTREF*), among others.

Interviews with scholars, however, revealed that the institutional web of universities and other organizations working on China-LAC work is fragmented in Argentina, and that there is not necessarily an institutional nucleus or network at the center of these initiatives. The dispersed nature of these initiatives at various universities can sometimes lead to the duplication of efforts, and can hinder collaboration among institutions, instead fostering competition.

In terms of research funding, public funding agencies in Argentina are specifically prioritizing China-LAC work. The National Agency for the Promotion of Science and Technology (*Agencia Nacional de Promoción de la Investigación, el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación*) in the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation manages three funds, one of them being the Fund for Science and Technology Research (*Fondo Para la Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica, FONCYT*). FONCYT funds research projects related to science and technology, one of the beneficiaries being the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET). FONCYT and CONICET are good sources of research opportunities for scholars in the country. Although FONCYT does not have an explicit prioritization for China-LAC issues, there are opportunities to apply for project funding. CONICET, on the other hand, has several initiatives relevant to China and Asia. For example, CONICET has a joint international research center with Shanghai University that studies culture and religion, labor relations, and economic and international relations, among other topics. The Council also recently created a joint center with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) which focuses on scientific research. It also recently developed two programs, one on strengthening social science research and cooperation with China/Asia, and the other being a bi-national Sino-Argentine Center for the Study of Policies and Innovation and Technology (Centro Bi-Nacional Chino-Argentino de Estudio de Políticas para la Innovación y la Tecnología) together with the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development. However, in Argentina, research and teaching positions at universities with institutional backing for China-LAC work are difficult to obtain, and professors’ salaries are considered low.

In Chile, the work is mainly being conducted at universities and specifically at the two leading universities in the country: the University of Chile (*Universidad de Chile*) and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, PUC*). This concentration also reflects in part a larger phenomenon of centralization of knowledge production—aside from the subject—in the capital.
At the University of Chile, the work on China is being conducted at the Institute of International Studies (Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, IEI) through its Program for China Studies (Programa de Estudios de China). Established in 2019, the Program conducts research and academic activities, and offers a diploma on Contemporary Chinese Studies, with a master’s degree on Asia/China studies expected to be launched in 2023. At the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the work is mainly being conducted at the Center for Asian Studies (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos), which was established in 2011 as an extension of the Asian Studies Program established in 1996. Although the Center is hosted by the Faculty of History, Geography, and Political Science, it aims to promote interdisciplinary collaboration with regard to both research and teaching, and brings together academics and researchers from different fields. The PUC’s Center for International Studies (Centro de Estudios Internacionales, CEIUC), hosted by the Faculty of Law, also conducts some work on China.

Work on China-LAC is also being conducted in a few other universities in Santiago and other parts of the country, such as the Andrés Bello National University (Universidad Andrés Bello, UNAB) through its Center for Latinamerican Studies on China (Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China, CELC), the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, PUCV) through its Asia Pacific Program (Programa Asia Pacífico), and the University of La Frontera (Universidad de La Frontera, UFRO), where research is being conducted as part of UFRO’s Research Center on International Challenges (Centro de Investigación sobre Desafíos Internacionales, CIDI).

Although some of these universities, in particular the University of Chile and the PUC, provide solid institutional frameworks for research and teaching, interviews with scholars revealed that research agendas are set and promoted by individuals rather than their home institutions and that funding remains a big challenge. The main source of funding for research projects is Chile’s National Agency for Research and Development (Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo, ANID), specifically through the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico, FONDECYT). China is not, however, a specific priority for FONDECYT, and there are currently only a few research projects on China that benefit from this grant.

There are also concerted efforts in studying China-LAC in other South American countries, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, although with slightly less volume and specialization. In Peru particularly, the bulk of knowledge production is coming from the University of Pacific (Universidad del Pacífico) through its Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia Pacífico, CECHAP). Although the Center, previously named Center of Peru-China Studies, was renamed in 2017, it has retained China as its main focus. Since 2021, the CECHAP has begun to deepen and diversify the agenda of research, inviting colleagues from the UP’s various academic departments to start new lines of research and teaching in line with their specialties. The CECHAP has conducted several research projects about China-Peru and China-Latin America relations, and frequently hosts events that analyze China’s presence in LAC. In Colombia, several institutions are working on Asia Pacific-LAC studies.

Countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela appear to have more individuals spearheading the work on China-LAC, as opposed to having dedicated institutional trajectories and support. The capacity is particularly scarce in the northeast of South America, including Guyana, Suriname, and French Guinea.

**North America**

The only country in North America included in this study as part of Latin America and the Caribbean is Mexico. It is a leading country on China-LAC research across the region, with a substantive number of institutions. The National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de...
Mexico, UNAM) is a major hub for China work in Latin America and the Caribbean. UNAM began to establish connections with the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ILAS-CASS) in 1998. Since then, diverse institutes and departments at UNAM have developed specific lines of research regarding China studies. The Faculty of Economics is home for the China-Mexico Studies Center (Centro de Estudios China-México, CECHIMEX), which was established in 2006. Since then, CECHIMEX has done research, teaching, and produced working papers and publications largely on the economic aspects of China-LAC and China-Mexico relations. It has made great efforts in improving the knowledge of Chinese socioeconomics, emphasizing long-term relations with Mexico and Latin America, with a tripartite vision of the academic, public, and private sectors. CECHIMEX was also one of the co-founders of the Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China (Red Académica de America Latina y el Caribe sobre China, Red ALC-China), one of the most prominent knowledge networks in the region, as noted below regarding regional networks.

The Colegio de México (COLMEX) also has a Center for Asia and Africa Studies (Centro de Estudios de Asia y África, CEAA) that conducts research and offers a graduate program with China as an area of expertise, as well as courses of extension such as "Understanding China." Established in 1964, the CEAA was a pioneer of Asian and African studies and helped found the Asian and African Studies Association (ALADAA), a network that brings together academics interested in Asian and African studies from the premodern period to the present (see more in regional networks).

Several other universities in Mexico conduct research and offer courses on China through dedicated China-related studies centers, Asian studies centers more broadly, or through their economics, international relations, or business faculties. Some examples include the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, ITAM), the Autonomous University of Nuevo León (Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, UANL), and the University of Colima (Universidad de Colima).

Central America

With the exception of Costa Rica, Central America is characterized by a scarcity of capacity on China-LAC. In Costa Rica, a major institution is the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO), which is a regional, intergovernmental academic organization headquartered in Costa Rica with campuses in several countries in Latin America. China has recently been admitted as an Observer State of FLACSO, an accession that allows the promotion of academic, diplomatic, and cultural cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean. As an initiative promoted by FLACSO's General Secretariat based in San Jose, the Chair on Contemporary China (Cátedra China Contemporánea) was established in 2021, in cooperation with the Chinese Embassy in Costa Rica and the ILAS-CASS. The Chair’s activities include training courses, research, and academic exchanges, with focus on four main lines of research: diplomacy and foreign policy, environment and climate change, technology and development, and economy and trade. So far, the Chair has organized two conference series, and a series of virtual regional courses about contemporary China. The Chair
also has a repository that includes publications such as books and papers, as well as videos and a blog. As noted below regarding regional networks, Costa Rica is also home of the Latino (and Hispanic) Americanist Academic Network on Sinological Studies (Red Académica Latino -e Hispano- Americanista sobre Estudios Sinológicos, Red Sinolatina).

The Caribbean

The Caribbean is the subregion with the most important capacity challenges regarding China-LAC work, partly because of its isolation from the rest of Latin America. There is a scarcity of institutions conducting work on China-LAC, with some individuals working in countries such as Barbados, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

Regional networks

As noted above, in addition to initiatives at the country level, there are regional networks that are fulfilling important convening roles on China-LAC relations. Among these, there is the Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China (Red Académica de America Latina y el Caribe sobre China, Red ALC-China)—an initiative of CECHIMEX and the Universities of Latin America and the Caribbean (UDUAL) that brings together experts from different sectors to socialize and exchange the information that is produced in Latin America and the Caribbean about China. Red ALC-China’s research lines cover economy and commerce, political and international relations, natural resources and environmental issues, and history, culture, and language learning. Red ALC-China adopts a multidisciplinary approach, combining the perspectives of experts from diverse backgrounds (academic, social, business, policy) to organize conferences, seminars, and other activities on China-LAC issues. Every year, Red ALC-China organizes an international seminar that convenes experts dedicated to China-LAC, and covers multiple research topics.

Another important network in the region is the China and Latin America Network (Red China y América Latina, REDCAEM), which brings together more than 140 researchers on China-LAC relations from across Latin America, and also in Australia, China, Europe, and the United States. It is an independent, plural, open, and multidisciplinary platform, aimed at promoting the exchange of knowledge between different actors. Its main lines of research are: politics and international relations; history and cultural relations; geopolitics and geostrategy; environment and development; gender; and economy, trade and investments. REDCAEM organizes every year the China and Latin America International Conference (Conferencia Internacional China y América Latina), elaborates different types of publications that include books and reports, and organizes seminars and webinars.

Other networks on China-LAC in the region include the Latin American Association of Asian and African Studies (ALADAA) and the recently created Latin (and Hispanic) Americanist Academic Network on Sinological Studies (Red Sinolatina), which aims to become a network with regional and global scope.

Strengths and challenges

Based on the capacity assessment and the consultations, the following section focuses on the strengths as well as the challenges for scholarship, research, regional collaboration, and connections between LAC and Chinese institutions and scholars. While many positive steps have been taken, and efforts to grow China-LAC work continue, we focus on the challenges so as to present opportunities for further China-LAC knowledge production.
One of the region’s main strengths is the fact that, despite challenging conditions in terms of financial and institutional support, there is an increasing number of researchers and academics working on this topic across the region. Some scholars in the region have described this as a “labor of love,” where researchers’ own passion for studying China and its links with Latin American countries drives their work in spite of the instability—financial, institutional, and otherwise—associated with it. As mentioned in the section on research themes, there is an expanding body of work on (geo)economics, and (geo)politics and international relations. There is also work being done on diasporas and migration, which has been conducted for a few decades, facilitated by the history of migration from China. Although it is still growing, there is also work being done on topics such as multi-layered or multi-actor relationships, cultural links, and health diplomacy, among others.

Another strength for knowledge production in the region is the emergence of a new, younger generation of researchers and professionals who have a personal knowledge of China’s language, culture, and many of whom have studied in China. This new generation provides much optimism for growing scholarship, however, as discussed below, this generation of researchers is not without its own challenges. In listing these challenges and others, we aim to provide recommendations for better formation, integration, and retention of younger generations of scholars into knowledge networks, both traditional and re-imagined ones.

One of the most common challenges for researchers, and universities in general, is a pervasive lack of funding and resources. There is especially a lack of funding that is endogenous to the region, meaning that most of the funding for research projects comes from outside. This affects not only China-LAC research specifically, but also the research agenda in general. There are many factors that contribute to this, including, recently, the COVID-19 pandemic affecting national economies and diverting attention and resources from governments. We did not find an explicit prioritization (or de-prioritization) for China-LAC research topics, either with respect to university research funds or national research funds, which, in addition to nongovernmental organizations outside the region, seem to be where the majority of scholars go to propose projects. The scarcity of funding and resources affects not only the possibility of new research, but in some cases and to varying degrees, it can also create an environment of competition among scholars for what limited funds are available.

Another challenge is that in a sizable number of institutions, individuals are advancing the work without dedicated institutional support. While this does not appear to compromise the quality of research (in fact, we found that dedicated institutional backing for China-LAC work is not a precondition for quality knowledge production), it does represent an added layer of difficulty. This is especially true regarding the sustainability of China work in some institutions, where it is reasonable to assume that the future of China-LAC work—including the relationships that these scholars have created personally across the region and internationally with other institutions and scholars involved in China-LAC issues—would become uncertain if those individual scholars driving the work were to leave their current university.

Both the scarcity of funding (which is ubiquitous) and the lack of institutional foundation for China-specific work (which is significant, but not ubiquitous) present challenges for young or new generations of scholars. Established scholars across the region shared that many students are not pursuing terminal degrees in China-LAC topics, even if they were interested in China in their undergraduate or graduate studies, due to a lack of institutional backing or viable career opportunities in this area. The students who do earn doctoral degrees on issues related to China often migrate to the private sector (where knowledge of the Chinese language is an asset), and those who stay in academia often seek more desirable opportunities in the US or Europe. This “brain drain” creates a significant challenge for growing and sustaining research and teaching in Latin American countries.

Relatedly, we found that new or young scholars on China-LAC find it difficult to carve out
space for themselves in the hierarchical academic culture of the region. This is seen as a missed opportunity, since many of the “second” or “third generation” scholars on China-LAC speak Chinese, have personal experiences in China, or have lived in China. This, of course, is not unique to Latin America, but it is still a barrier to new knowledge production. Limited funding in general adds to this challenge. Not only are there limited opportunities for employment for emerging scholars, but even when becoming a lecturer at a university, for example, young or new scholars have found it difficult to gain access to working on research projects, which often seem to be dominated by more senior scholars. We also identified a possible gender component, which is a challenge across academia in general and is reflected in China-LAC studies.

Challenges related to growing and sustaining scholarship on China-LAC, of course, affect research indirectly. There are, however, additional challenges specific to research production, methodology, and access to information and data that scholars in the region have highlighted. One such challenge is that the research agenda on China and Latin America is primarily oriented towards a general international relations lens. There is a perception that the research tackles several trending topics (mostly economic and trade-oriented), while not as many new ideas outside that schema have emerged. There is a need for more interdisciplinary approaches, including anthropology and sociology, although some literature exists in these fields. In addition, some researchers in the region shared that the research agenda in Latin America is reactive rather than proactive, meaning that research is less forward-thinking, and instead is more descriptive or responds mostly to past or current trends and events. This may be due to the nascent nature of China-LAC work in the region, but nonetheless represents a challenge and opportunity for improving the research in this field. This is especially important as many scholars in the region feel that China is a topic that requires a sustained engagement, given the history and rapidly changing dynamics surrounding China-LAC. Relatedly, the “revolving door” of diplomats in and out of academic activity that tends to occur in some countries of the region (whether or not they are trained in academic research) may bring in certain political perspectives or a lack of scientific methodology in their findings.

Related to the relatively recent popularity of China as a topic of research in Latin America is a lack of in-depth knowledge or specialization on and of China itself; its history, culture, economic model, political system, and other elements that are central to understanding China as a whole. In addition, the fact that China’s economic and political systems and development do not align perfectly with what are known as “Western” theories of international relations, researchers or mainstream writers who do not have an in-depth knowledge of China may approach China-LAC linkages with flawed reference frameworks. This is in addition to the significant language barriers that many scholars who do not have personal experience in China face, which tend to be senior scholars or those who approach China as a topic that is tangential to their main area of research, rather than as their main area of expertise (e.g., international relations, economics, Latin American studies, and others).

Many research topics coming from the region involve a heavy focus on bilateral relations between China and specific countries in the region, and that there is a need for more focus on other levels, including the transnational and sub-regional (local) levels. The lack of regional- and local-focused research is a gap not only for knowledge production, but also for policy making. In some countries, scholars shared that the uptake of research findings in policy making decisions is low in general. Furthermore, and perhaps due again to the newness of China-LAC relations and research, there is a need for cross-regional comparative perspectives, as China’s engagement with LAC does not occur in a vacuum and there are experiences and lessons to be learned from other regions in the Global South, such as parts of Africa and Asia. The decentralized nature of much of the current research—which tends to focus on country-to-country relations or specific projects and investments—limits the possibility for a more holistic analysis of regional trends and the trajectory of China-LAC relations. This lack of a
“zoomed-out” perspective may lend itself to more national or local narratives that can be seen as biased.

Regarding access to primary and secondary sources, we found two significant challenges: insufficient funding to get through paywalls, and language barriers to processing Chinese-language sources. A significant number of scholars, especially younger or newer scholars, shared challenges they have experienced regarding the prohibitive cost of purchasing access to journal articles and books. Scholars who do not speak Chinese face additional barriers related to processing Chinese language sources, including primary sources. Spanish translations of such documents are sometimes derived from English translations, meaning the original texts are processed twice or more. This risks presenting diluted or non-contextualized information, which, in line with the necessity of understanding Chinese culture and politics as a whole, is essential to understanding Chinese texts. Language barriers exist not only for Chinese, but also for English. Some scholars in the region shared with us that they feel a need to publish articles in English in order for them to have a wider readership. This is not always possible and may leave some publications at a disadvantage.

In addition to these challenges related to scholarly articles, we also found a lack of quantitative and qualitative data, not only in general, but especially data that is collected and produced in the LAC region. This leaves many to rely on data that is produced in the United States or to gather and process raw data themselves. There is, however, a significant amount of data that has been collected regarding financial topics, including development finance, investments, and loans. There is a lesser amount of qualitative data that is available on China-LAC, including, for example, an aggregated library of primary source documents (e.g., official political statements, historical documents, and other relevant sources).

The Latin America and the Caribbean region needs to reflect collectively on and craft a common strategy towards its engagement with China. In this vein, we asked scholars across the region about their experiences related to connecting and collaborating with colleagues in other countries and more broadly as a region, especially through regional networks and platforms. Their responses highlighted several key facilitators and barriers to regional knowledge production that are outlined in this section.

Despite the existence of various valuable China-LAC academic networks, cross-regional connections are still nascent. There are multiple networks in the region that are doing important convening and publication work, but there is still a need for more systematic academic networking on China-LAC. Often, relationships between scholars are on individual, rather than institutional, bases. We also found that in many cases, scholars in Latin America and the Caribbean look to US-based institutions to identify linkages and connect scholars to one another. For example, the Latin American Studies Association’s (LASAs) Asia Section, and particularly the 2022 LASA Asia Continental Congress, emerged as a key convener of Latin American, Caribbean, and international scholars. The International Studies Association (ISA)’s Latin America and the Caribbean regional division also has the potential to become a hub for interlocution among Latin American and Chinese scholars.

We also identified sub-regional silos. Central America, South America, and the Caribbean seem to operate in their own individual networks and less-so across sub-regions. The exceptions are countries with considerable capacity in China-LAC knowledge production, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, where scholars are more likely to have contact with each other. The disconnect between subregions is particularly the case for the Caribbean, where—perhaps due to geographic, linguistic, cultural, or other differences, as some experts suggested—connections with the rest of Latin America are less frequent.

In addition, while existing networks can effectively carry out activities such as bringing together academics for conferences and publishing articles and working papers, in general, there is still a lack of capacity for producing original research in these networks. In this sense, of course, part of the challenge may be tied to the lack of resources and funding, and to the fact that there are relatively
few experts in the region that are specialized in China as compared to other disciplines or topics. We also found that networks are sometimes perceived as "groups of friends" whose gathering in a particular setting is based more on individual relationships than on a clear academic methodology or selection criteria. There is also a perception that regional networks are composed of like-minded experts, and that they do not often include a diverse range of participants and perspectives.

Because a central part of China-LAC knowledge production is networking and exchanging between Chinese and Latin American and Caribbean scholars, we asked experts about their experiences bridging the gap. Their responses varied on this, with a noticeable divide between scholars who have had personal experiences learning or teaching in China versus those who have not. As expected, it is more difficult for scholars without experience in China, or without knowledge of the Chinese language, to create and maintain relationships with scholars based in China.

Although many scholars may touch on LAC issues within their specializations, the community of Latin Americanists in China is relatively small to begin with. In addition, there are language barriers on both sides, both for Chinese and for Spanish or Portuguese. In addition, COVID-19-related travel restrictions have had a detrimental impact on all collaborations, including travel exchanges and field research.

Beyond these practical challenges, connections between institutions in LAC and China need strengthening in other aspects, too. Often, a university in LAC may have connections to institutions in China through various different faculties (law, architecture, or through their Confucius institute), but not a centralized framework of collaboration. And these connections usually occur at the will of Chinese institutions or scholars. Top tier Chinese universities are usually interested in partnering with top tier (i.e., top-ranked) counterparts, both in LAC and in terms of US institutions with Latin America programs. In addition, the hierarchical nature of academic culture, both in Latin America and in China, can sometimes inhibit partnerships, especially at lower levels of the academic hierarchy.

A major aspect of networking capacity is the use of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and other kinds of formal cooperation agreements or statements between universities. These types of agreements elicited mixed reviews from scholars. In some cases, MoUs are a formality that is seen as being only on paper, rather than as a vehicle for increased concrete cooperation. In other cases, especially where scholars do not have personal or individual ties to Chinese academics and institutions, they are seen as a valuable prerequisite to opening up a relationship. Where these agreements have had the most success appears to be with regards to student and professor exchanges, and less so when it comes to generating research.

**CAPACITY IN CHINA**

Systematic Latin American studies in China started shortly after the Cuban Revolution turbocharged the field to the forefront of anti-imperial and anticolonial politics (Guo Jie 2016; Guo Cunhai 2019; Wang Xiaode 2021). Besides a handful of history departments at universities such as Nankai before the onset of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Institute of Latin American studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was founded in 1961. It has since remained the dominant institution in the field, despite the recent expansion of Latin American studies in Chinese universities. This sets Latin American studies apart from Asian and African studies in China, where the roles of universities are much more robust. The *Journal of Latin American Studies*, the flagship publication by ILAS, long represents the national standard of the field and features many recent special coverages on China-Latin American relations. In 2022, Southwest University of Science and Technology’s Center for Latin America and the Caribbean Studies, a fast-growing young program, just launched a new journal China and Latin America. How this new journal is going to shape the field in China remains to be seen.
The ensuing ups and downs of the field in China are often tied to general national policies of international engagement. Before the twenty-first century, China’s engagement with the region was not a major scholarly concern in Chinese language scholarship. In fact, Latin America was often treated as a cautionary tale of political instability and economic stagnation. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, China’s rapid economic development, accession to the World Trade Organization, and launching of the “Going Out” policy deepened its ties with countries in Latin America beyond simply purchasing primary resources. The introduction of the BRI in 2013 has further increased the importance of LAC to China and spurred dramatic recent development of Latin American studies. Far beyond the original focus on anticolonial history, Chinese researchers today spill a lot of ink on China-Latin America connections and particularly the economic ties. The policy-driven studies on China-Latin America could soon dominate Latin American studies in China (Guo et al. 2020).

But compared to the research on China-Asia and China-Africa in China, China-Latin America remains a smaller field, which may in part be linked to the sheer physical distance between them. This is despite the mitigating efforts from the two sides. Chinese universities have often invited Latin American scholars to participate in conferences or teach in Chinese institutions. Though to a lesser extent due to limited resources, Latin American institutions have also tried to engage Chinese scholars in conference and teaching programs. The pandemic has significantly affected personal interactions, despite virtual events. Going forward, new efforts will be needed to sustain long-term collaborations.

Recent estimates put the number of Latin American research centers in China at almost 60. The vast majority of these are university-based units, and most of them are located in major metropolitan centers along China’s east coast with broad international economic connections to the rest of the world, with Southwest University of Science and Technology as a major exception (Myers, Barrios, and Guo 2018; Guo Cunhai 2019). Although the sheer number itself is impressive, a lot of these centers, similar to many other area studies centers in Chinese universities, only have a “virtual” presence. With one or two principal researchers but few other full-time staff or budget, very few of them maintain dedicated and up-to-date websites. It is thus challenging if not impossible for external observers without personal connections to gauge their activities. This applies to both top-tier universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, and second-tier ones, such as Qingdao University and Zhejiang International Studies University. In July 2022, the provincial government of Shandong inaugurated a new China-Caribbean Development Center to carry out the Chinese proposal of Global Development Initiative. But outside observers are skeptical of its long-term substantive impact (Griffith 2022). The Chinese government has recently promoted area studies to the level 1 interdisciplinary field in academic degree regulations, which gives the field the state mandate to recruit students and faculty rather than rely on those from other fields. How this is going to affect Latin American studies in China remains to be seen. The number of Chinese institutions in our mapping is smaller than 60 because they all have somewhat substantive online presence at least. As it is impossible to list all relevant institutions, our inventory is more of a baseline than definitive listing.

Thanks to the policy support of area studies in China, there is a steady pipeline of younger researchers (under 40) joining the field according to a recent survey. But the language and disciplinary training of the workforce overall still needs a lot of improvement. Almost half of all the researchers rely on English as their research language, unable to read sources either in Spanish or Portuguese. This could also limit the direct exchange with scholars based in Latin America. Also, almost half of the researchers do not have doctoral degrees, which probably explains the relatively low output of in-depth scholarly research, particularly those that require longer field work, in relation to brief policy commentaries on macro politics and economy (Guo Cunhai 2019).
CAPACITY IN THE GLOBAL NORTH

Research on China-LAC in other parts of the Global South, such as Africa and Asia, appears miniscule. The capacity outside of the LAC region and China is concentrated in the United States. Universities such as Boston University, Brown University, George Washington University, American University, Florida International University, Johns Hopkins, University of Southern California, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Puget Sound, and the University of William & Mary have conducted work on China and Latin America and the Caribbean. Scholarly organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and the International Studies Association also pay attention to relevant topics. LASA, for example, recently established a section on Asian Studies, which aims at promoting research, teaching, outreach activities, and academic collaboration on the relations between LAC and countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including China. Due to long-standing geopolitical connections, several American think tanks are also interested in China-LAC, including the Inter-American Dialogue, the Wilson Center, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Atlantic Council, and Global Americans. Universities in Australia and Europe (Spain, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany) have also conducted some work, although not to the same extent as the research being done in the United States.
MAPPING

This map is based on the list of networks and institutions in Annexes A and B and excludes entities not identifiably linked to a city/country.
ANNEX A - MAPPING INVENTORY: NETWORKS

LATIN AMERICA

South America

Argentina

*Sino-Argentine Observatory / Observatorio Sino-Argentino*
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
(http://observatoriosinoargentino.com.ar)
- The Observatory is an organization that brings together professionals from different disciplines. It is made up of young Argentine researchers, academics, and politicians who are dedicated to studying the link between Argentina and China, and provides diagnosis and proposals.
- Aimed at studying the political, economic, and social reality of China, the team develops various activities that include research, elaboration of newsletters and reports on Argentina-China relations (with a focus on trade links and business opportunities), and the organization of talks and training seminars.

*Latin American Center for Political and Economic Studies of China / Centro Latinoamericano de Estudios Políticos y Económicos de China (CLEPEC)*
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
(https://www.facebook.com/clepec)
- The CLEPEC was established in 2013 as an initiative of a group of young Latin American politicians who had visited China through an invitation by the Chinese Communist Party to receive training on historical, social, political, and economic aspects of China.
- The CLEPEC’s team publishes analysis and organizes conferences, seminars, and training courses about political and economic aspects of China and its relationship with Latin America. The team also participates in provincial commercial in-person and virtual fairs in China, giving assessment to entrepreneurs and policymakers.
- Though its website does not work, recent information can be found on Facebook; however, the last publications date to July 2021.

*Argentina-China Former Fellows Association / Asociación de Ex-becarios Argentina-China (ADEBAC)*
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
(https://adebac.org)
- Aims to boost cultural and educational cooperation between Argentina and China.
- It brings together Argentinian former fellows in different universities and programs in China and promotes events and extension activities.
- The program "Study in China" (Estudiar en China) aims to promote China as an academic and research location.
**DangDai**
Based in Mendoza, Argentina
(https://dangdai.com.ar)
- DangDai was established in 2010 as a communication platform that includes different thematic areas, mainly aimed at disseminating information on Argentina-China relations. Its publications include a printed magazine, a website that provides daily information, a newsletter, and other sources.
- DangDai emerged as an independent project that brought together journalists, designers, photographers, and artists from Buenos Aires. In 2017, it became associated with the University of Congreso, based in Mendoza, which in Buenos Aires manages the House of Chinese Culture.40

**Reporte Asia**
Based Argentina
(https://reporteasia.com)
- Reporte Asia was founded by a team of Argentine specialists in Asia, with academic and work experience in that area of the world, and with experience in business development and comprehensive communication strategies in LAC.
- Reporte Asia is a specialized content hub with both information and analysis elaborated by professionals, from a Latin American perspective, in Spanish. The focus is mainly on economic and business activities of Asia in LAC, with a section dedicated to China.

**Bolivia**

**Center of Studies for Labor and Agrarian Development / Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA)**
Based in La Paz, Bolivia
(https://cedla.org)
- CEDLA, a private non-profit civil association founded in 1985, and its Energy Platform (Plataforma Energética), have developed a research area about China, mainly focused on the analysis of labor rights and worker struggles due to Chinese companies’ presence in Bolivia and Latin America.41

**Brazil**

**Plataforma CIPÓ**
Based in Brazil, with offices in London, Berlin, and Maldives
(https://plataformacipo.org)
- A research institute that focuses on climate, governance, and peacebuilding in Latin America and the Caribbean and, more broadly, in the Global South.
- Among its areas of expertise, the Fenxi: Latin America and China Observatory analyzes Chinese infrastructure projects and trade and investment patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of providing policy recommendations and raising capacity-building.42
- The Observatory focuses on climate, and socio-environmental impacts of Chinese infrastructure, trade and investments in LAC, and their intersections with geopolitics. Its publications include press articles and journal papers. Also, the Observatory organizes and participates in events to disseminate its research.
**Brazilian Network for China Studies / Rede Brasileira de Estudos da China (RBChina)**
Based in Brazil

- Founded in 2017, the Brazilian Network for China Studies (Rede Brasileira de Estudos da China, RBChina) is a multidisciplinary academic network that promotes the exchange of information between researchers that produce knowledge, conduct research, and provide teaching about China, as well as those that have had experiences in China. Currently, RBChina is made up of more than 300 professors, researchers, students, and professionals.
- RBChina periodically organizes events and encourages the dissemination of information about research and other activities that are being conducted by its members.

**Brazil-China Business Council / Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China (CEBC)**
Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil ([https://www.cebc.org.br](https://www.cebc.org.br))

- Founded in 2004, the Brazil-China Business Council is a non-profit bilateral institution integrated by two independent sections, one in Brazil and the other in China—coordinated and supervised by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM)—and dedicated to promoting dialogue between companies from both countries.
- The CEBC focuses its activities on conducting research and disseminating information about Sino-Brazilian economic relations, with the objective of improving the trade and investment environment between the countries. Thus, the CEBC organizes talks, webinars and an annual conference, and publishes research studies that address topics of trade and investments, identifying sectors, geographical localization, among others.

**Radar China**
Based in Brazil ([http://radarchina.co](http://radarchina.co))

- A media platform founded in 2011, Radar China aims to provide information about Sino-Brazilian relations, focusing on the Chinese reality and on the analysis of relevant themes that have an impact on bilateral ties such as economics, education, politics, society, and technology, among others. Chinese Xinhua News Agency and XinhuaNet are content partners.
- Radar China organizes virtual events, conducts interviews with experts, and produces content through podcasts and a YouTube channel.  

**Shūmiàn**
Based in Brazil ([https://shumian.com.br](https://shumian.com.br))

- A platform founded in 2018 made up of young researchers and professionals interested in China that compile and produce content about China, including articles, podcasts, and projects such as a guide of literature, a mapping of academic production on China by Afro American Brazilian, and a book club. The platform team aims to contribute to a better understanding of China, and demystify the content, meaning, and implications of its rise.
**Chile**

*Crossing the Pacific / Cruzando el Pacífico*
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile
([https://cruzandoelpacifico.org](https://cruzandoelpacifico.org))
- *Cruzando el Pacífico* is a non-profit institution aimed at promoting academic, educational, and cultural exchange between China and Latin America through disseminating knowledge and understanding by connecting institutions from the public, private, academic, and civil society sectors.
- It offers teaching about China through digital platforms, with various online programs and e-learning courses that address various topics related to China, from language and culture to business, economics, and foreign policy.

*Network of Chilean professionals linked to China / Red de profesionales chilenos vinculados con China (Red Chile China)*
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile
([https://www.redchilechina.org/index.html](https://www.redchilechina.org/index.html))
- Sponsored by *Cruzando el Pacífico*, the Red ChileChina is a network aimed at connecting Chilean professionals who have had study experiences with China, or live in China, promoting collaboration and exchange in the academic, cultural, educational, economic areas.
- The Red ChileChina organizes meetings with professionals from public and private institutions and civil society, and offers the courses developed by *Cruzando el Pacífico*.

*Chilean-Pacific Foundation / Fundación Chilena del Pacífico*
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile ([https://funpacifico.cl](https://funpacifico.cl))
- The Chilean Pacific Foundation was created to promote economic, cultural, and social insertion of Chile in Asia Pacific, as well as the knowledge in the country about the political, economic, social, and cultural systems of that region, through analysis of their markets, support for bilateral relations, development and participation in cultural projects, based in collaboration with government institutions, the private sector, universities and study centers.
  - The Foundation is active in organizing conferences as well as publishing reports and bulletins that address Chile-Asia Pacific, and Chile-China relations.

**Colombia**

*Colombian Network of International Relations / Red Colombiana de Relaciones Internacionales (RedIntercol)*
Based in Colombia ([https://redintercol.net](https://redintercol.net))
- RedIntercol is a Colombian network that was created in 2009. It brings together professors and researchers from different universities that host International Relations’ programs. It organizes conferences and events in cooperation with research members and universities to analyze in the International Relations’ field, including China studies.
- Due to the scarcity of experts about China, it is not a network where the expansion of China studies is being promoted.
Peru

Peruvian Network for Asia-Pacific Studies / Red Peruana para Estudios de Asia-Pacífico (REDAP)
Based in Peru
(https://www.facebook.com/RedapAP/)
- The REDAP was founded in 1997, aimed at contributing to a better insertion of Peru in the Asia-Pacific region through the interaction between the academic, business and government sectors. It is made up of 16 academic institutions. The activities of the Network are coordinated by its members, based in a rotating system. The REDAP organizes conferences and events to analyze Asia-Pacific-Peru, and China-Peru relations.

North America

Mexico

Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China / Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China (Red ALC-China)
Based in Mexico, D.F., with regional scope
(https://www.redalc-china.org/v21/es-es/)
- Based on the efforts of the Union of Universities of Latin America and the Caribbean (UDUAL) and the Center for China-Mexico Studies (CECHIMEX) of the Faculty of Economics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) to disseminate research on China, the Red ALC-China was established in 2013 as a network aimed at contributing to socialize and exchange the information that is produced in Latin America and the Caribbean about China.
- The Red ALC-China is based on a multidisciplinary perspective, bringing together experts from sectors such as the academic, social, business, government, as well as consultants and other analysts.
- The network organizes conferences, seminars, and courses on China studies, based on a variety of topics that include economics, trade, and investments; international relations and political relations; natural resources and environment; history, culture and the learning of mandarin.
- Its virtual library includes articles, books, reports elaborated by the researchers of the network, and a database of statistics on Chinese investments in the region based on a multiplicity of sources.

Central America

Costa Rica

Latin (and Hispanic) Americanist Academic Network on Sinological Studies / Red Académica Latino (e Hispano) Americanista sobre Estudios Sinológicos (Red Sinolatina)
Based in San José de Costa Rica, Costa Rica
(http://www.redsinolatina.ucr.ac.cr/es)
- The Latino (and Hispanic) Americanist Academic Network on Sinological Studies (Red Académica Latino -e Hispano- Americanista sobre Estudios Sinológicos, Red Sinolatina) was created in 2020, aimed at strengthening the study of China in Costa Rica, and in the region more broadly. Though the Red Sinolatina is based at the Universidad of Costa Rica, its goal is
to become a network with regional and global scope.

- The network was created based on the trajectory and importance of China studies in other latitudes, recognizing an urgent need in the Spanish-speaking world to promote similar dialogues and academic exchanges in a common language.
- The Red Sinolatina organizes in-person congresses (the "International Congress on Chinese Philosophical Studies," Congreso Internacional de Estudios Filosóficos Chinos, CIECH) and virtual conferences and events in collaboration with other institutions. It also conducts research in the framework of specific projects, publishes a selection of works presented at the CIECH, as well as papers and books.

Regional

**CLEC Foundation / Fundación CLEC**
Based in Santiago de Chile, with regional scope
(https://fundacionclec.org)
- The CLEC Foundation is the regional office for the Confucius Institutes in Latin America. It was established by Hanban in 2014, aimed at disseminating Chinese culture and Mandarin language. As the regional office for the Confucius Institutes in Latin America, it coordinates the 44 institutes in the region, which are enumerated in the Foundation's on-line directory.
- The CLEC Foundation organizes training activities for teachers that teach Chinese language, culture, or customs, as well as publishes and distributes educational materials among the Confucius Institutes of Latin America. It also offers a course on Chinese traditional medicine.

**China and Latin America Network / Red China y América Latina (REDCAEM)**
(http://chinayamericalatina.com)
- Established in 2014, the REDCAEM is an international network of more than 140 researchers dedicated to the study of Latin America and China relations from across Latin America, but also in Australia, China, Europe, and the United States. It is an independent, plural, open and multidisciplinary platform, aimed at promoting the exchange of knowledge between different actors. Its main lines of research are politics and international relations; history and cultural relations; geopolitics and geostrategy; environment and development; gender; and economy, trade, and investments.
- The China and Latin America International Conference (Conferencia Internacional China y América Latina) is one of its main activities; it is an in-person conference that takes place once a year. REDCAEM also elaborates publications that include books, reports, working papers and op-eds, as well as organizes seminars, symposiums, and webinars.

**Tusanaje 秘从中来**
(http://www.tusanaje.org)
- Tusunaje is a platform created by the Tusun community, a transnational, multidisciplinary, and intercultural community made up of Chinese descendants in Peru, Latin America, and Spain. Apart from disseminating Chinese descendants’ experiences and cultural work, Tusunaje brings together researchers whose work is dedicated to analyzing China’s diaspora and migrations and China’s relationship with Latin America and the Hispanoamerican world. The platform’s main objective is to distribute the Tusun’s history, culture, and identity in Peru, Latin America, and the rest of the world.
- Tusunaje has a digital library, IdenTusanes, which includes creative and intellectual production related to the Tusun’s culture, society, history, arts, literature, politics, and
economic development, as well as the documentary records of its social, cultural, and foundational life. Additionally, it includes creative and academic works produced by Chinese communities in Latin America and Spain.

- Among its many activities, Tusanaje organizes on-line conferences, conducts interviews, and has a podcast, Sinodiálogo.\(^{45}\)

**China**

*China-LAC Think-Tanks Forum 中拉智库交流论坛*

Based in Beijing Municipality

- First meeting in Beijing in 2010, and most recent one in 2017 in Chile, not a lot of substantive information on the official website.\(^{46}\)

*CECLA 中拉教科文中心*

Based in Beijing Municipality\(^3\)

- Appears to be the latest iteration of Comunidad de Estudios Chinos y Latinoamericanos (中拉青年学术共同体, founded in 2015) to promote scholarly exchanges between China and Latin American young scholars.
- Private company promoting broadly defined China-Latin America research, focusing on collaboration between think tanks, scientific collaboration, educational exchange, Chinese communities in Latin America, and sustainable development.
- Promoting research on not just broad political economy but also ethnographic field work on Latin American society and culture.\(^{47}\)

*Fudan-Latin American University Consortium (FLAUC) 复旦-拉美大学联盟*

Based in Shanghai Municipality

- Established in 2017, based at Fudan Development Institute (FDDI). Preliminary efforts to develop jointly-administered initiatives with universities in LAC include the creation of a joint-research center with the Tecnológico de Monterrey in 2015, and exchange programs with other universities in LAC. FLAUC was created to extend collaboration between Fudan University and universities in LAC, with 12 founding members that comprised universities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Currently, FLAUC is integrated by 15 members.
- Aimed at improving mutual understanding, FLAUC focuses on academic collaborations —mainly academic exchanges and knowledge sharing—instead of cultural exchanges. Knowledge sharing is mainly concentrated in the Annual Meeting, an event hosted by members based on a rotating chair system.
- FLAUC’s funding sources come from a seed funding, and supports FLAUC’s two programs: a 1-3 months fellow program for doctoral students that go to Fudan with their advisor, who is a visiting scholar (this program has been suspended due to the pandemic and is expected to be reopened in 2023), and a 1-year cross-disciplinary research group program between scholars based at Fudan and 3-5 LAC universities that are part of FLAUC.
GLOBAL NORTH

United States

America’s Quarterly (AQ): China & Latin America
Based in New York City, NY
(https://www.americasquarterly.org/tag/china/)
- Being a publication of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas (AS/COA), America’s Quarterly was launched in 2007 and is dedicated to politics, business, and culture in the Americas.
- Among its series, AQ’S China & Latin America examines the evolving China-LAC relations, including the publication of articles, but also the realization of podcasts and events—hosted by AS/COA—that address different aspects of the relationship.

Europe

Observatory of Chinese Politics / Observatorio de la Política China (OPCh)
Based in Galicia, Spain
(https://politica-china.org)
- The Observatory of Chinese Politics (Observatorio de la Política China, OPCh) is a study and analysis group with shared management between the Galician Institute of International Analysis and Documentation (Igadi) and Casa Asia.
- Aimed at providing analysis about China based on a research agenda that includes topics such as the legal reforms and the rule of law, unification, general political development, security and defense, society, human rights, and foreign policy, among others. There is particular emphasis on China-LAC relations and their multiple dimensions. Thus, although based in Spain, the OPCh has an Iberoamerican scope.
- The OPCh disseminates its research through op-eds, papers, and reports. It also edits the journal Análisis y Pensamiento Iberoamericano sobre China (Jiexi Zhongguo).
- The OPCh also organizes the International Electronic Symposium on Chinese Politics, a virtual platform of debate and socio-political reflection aimed at debating on the situation of China in various matters.
- The OPCh has created the Iberoamerican Sinology Network (Red Iberoamericana de Sinología, RIBSI), a network that brings together experts from the Iberian Peninsula and LAC countries. RIBSI organizes joint activities, and publications in order to disseminate its researchers’ work. The OPCh is also planning to create an Iberoamerican network of sinologist women.

Iberchina (IBC)
(https://www.iberchina.org)
- Created in 2005 by the Iberglobal Group, the first private website in Spanish on internationalization consulting issues, Iberchina is an information platform. The founder of Iberglobal-Iberchina is Enrique Fanjul, who was Commercial Counselor of the Spanish embassy in China, Iberchina.
- Iberchina not only disseminates information about China that includes various topics such as economics, trade, politics, foreign policy, and society, among others, but also specific information on China-LAC relations. It also offers online courses about business in China, and a newsletter.
**Diálogo Chino**
Based in London
(https://dialogochino.net/en)
- Diálogo Chino is an independent journalism platform dedicated to better understanding the China-Latin America relationship and its sustainable development challenges. Headquartered in London but with an extensive global network, Diálogo Chino has teams in Beijing, Mexico City, Bogotá, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires.
- Diálogo Chino’s main thematic areas are agriculture, climate and energy, extractive industries, infrastructure, and trade and investment, covering all countries in LAC, but also including global trends that have an impact in China-LAC relations.

**Nüvoices**
(https://nuvoices.com)
- Founded in 2018, NüVoices is an international editorial collective gathering veteran and emerging writers, journalists, translators, and artists working on the subject of China (broadly defined). Supported by Patreon donors, it is an independent not-for-profit organization that brings together women, non-binary people and BIPOC, and is open to people from all genders.
- The NüVoices Podcast is live twice monthly, while the NüStories is an online magazine that publishes narrative essays, event reviews, articles, multimedia projects and other content.
- Although it is not dedicated to China-LAC exclusively, there are Latin American experts generating content.

**ANNEX B - MAPPING INVENTORY: INSTITUTIONS**

**LATIN AMERICA**

**Argentina**

Argentine Council for International Relations / Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI)
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
(https://www.cari.org.ar)
- Being the largest think tank in the field of International Relations in Argentina, CARI was founded in 1978, aimed at analyzing global matters and its impacts in the country.
- The Oriental Affairs Committee, formerly known as Oriental Asia Committee, was founded in 1989. Among its six Working Groups, the Committee includes the China Work Group, mainly dedicated to conduct research about China’s domestic and foreign policy, and relations with LAC and Argentina.
- The China Working Group frequently publishes reports and policy briefs, as well as organizes seminars and public lectures with government officials and civil society experts.
- CARI is mainly financed by its members’ contributions.
Center for State and Society Studies / Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES)
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina (https://www.cedes.org)
• Founded in 1975, CEDES is a think tank, financed with the contributions of its researchers, the contribution of the Ministry of Science, and Technology, and CEDES’ Management, Monitoring and Evaluation Program. It develops research activities in social sciences, training of human resources, and provides technical assistance.
• CEDES brings together researchers from different disciplines and institutions.
• Among its areas of research, which include economy, public policies, and environment, CEDES’ researchers have conducted projects that focus on China, considering one or more of those lines of research.

Argentine Network of Professionals on Foreign Policy / Red Argentina de Profesionales para la Política Exterior (REDAPPE)
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina (https://redappe.org.ar/en/home/)
• Founded in 2019, this think tank aims to promote analysis and debate about foreign policy in Argentina and Latin America.
• Among its Work Commissions, the China and Asian Affairs Commission aims to promote deeper knowledge about China and Asia.

University of Buenos Aires (UBA): various units
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
• The Faculty of Social Sciences is home for the Study Group for Asia and Latin America (Grupo de Estudios sobre Asia y América Latina, GESAAL) aimed at developing Asian studies based on a Latin American multidisciplinary perspective. The GESAAL edits a semestral journal, Revista Asia/América Latina.55
• The Group of East Asian Studies (Grupo de Estudios del Este Asiático, GEEA) was created in 2001 and is based at the Faculty of Social Sciences’ Gino Germani Research Institute. The GEEA is made up of graduates and students of the UBA dedicated to research and teaching activities on issues related to East Asia. Its members have taught about Asia, in general, and China, in particular, in different elective courses.56
• The Center for Argentina-China Studies (Centro de Estudios Argentina-China, CEACH) is also based at the UBAs Faculty of Social Sciences. It aims to contribute to the development of Chinese studies in Argentina through teaching, research, extension activities, and exchanges of students and researchers.57 Some of the members of CEACH are also members of GEEA.
• The Faculty of Economic Sciences is home for a Confucius Institute, the first to be established in Argentina, in 2009.58

Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations: Especialización sobre China en la Era Global
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
• Though the UCA does not still have a research center about China, its activities related to China studies are mainly concentrated in the provision of training programs, which began to be promoted in 2018, led by Dr. Jorge Malena.
• The "Executive Program on Contemporary China" ("Programa Ejecutivo sobre China Contemporánea") is a 3-months training program aimed at providing knowledge about Chinese art, culture, economy, domestic and foreign policy, and society.59
The “Postgraduate in China in the Global Era” ("Especialización sobre China en la Era Global") was launched in 2022. It is a 1-year postgraduate training program that aims to provide theoretical, methodological, and analytical tools to understand China’s global role, based on a multidisciplinary approach. It is the first postgraduate program created by a private university in Argentina, and the first postgraduate career that focuses on China studies in the City of Buenos Aires.

**University of Salvador (USAL), School of Oriental Studies**  
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina

- The USAL’s School of Oriental Studies was founded in 1967. Though it does not have a research center or institute that focuses on the study of China, it has been a pioneer in South America since it became the first one to provide an undergraduate program in Oriental Studies, including Chinese history, literature, philosophy, and religion. Efforts to encourage research about China have been made recently, though there are still few researchers and students conducting research.
- Currently, the School also provides a graduate program in Oriental Studies, and a virtual 4-months postgraduate program on Contemporary Chinese Studies.

**National University of La Plata (UNLP), Institute of International Relations: Centro de Estudios Chinos**  
Based in La Plata, Buenos Aires province, Argentina

- The Center for Chinese Studies (Centro de Estudios Chinos, CEChino) was established in 1996. It brings together researchers and students that focus their work on China studies.
- The Center’s objectives include the analysis, study, and research of China encompassing multiple themes. The Center activities include publications, and the development of research projects in cooperation with universities and research centers in China, as well as exchanges of teachers and students.
- The CEChino’s Postgraduate Program in Chinese Studies (Especialización en Estudios Chinos), was created in 2016 and aims to provide postgraduate training about China, covering a multiplicity of areas.
- The Center is also home for the UNLP’s Confucius Institute, which has a subsidiary institute in the city of Rosario, and Confucius schools in Santiago del Estero, Jujuy, Salta, and Tucumán.

**National University of Lanús (UNLa), Department of Planification and Public Policy: Centro de Estudios de Investigación Sino-Latinoamericano**  
Based in Remedios de Escalada, Lanús, Buenos Aires province, Argentina

- The UNLa’s Department of Planification and Public Policy initiated a Sino-Argentine Cooperation and Linkage Program (Programa de Cooperación y Vinculación Sino Argentino, ProSA) in 2015. In the framework of this program, the Department established a postgraduate training program, also in 2015, the Postgraduate Diploma in Contemporary China Studies (Especialización en Estudios en China Contemporánea), which aims to contribute to an integral understanding of China. This postgraduate program was the first to be created by a public university in Argentina, before the one initiated by the National University of La Plata in 2016.
- Among the efforts made at the Postgraduate program to diversify the activities, initiatives include publications of books and papers; participation in conferences and seminars; dissemination of information in the media; and research projects. In this line, the research project FONCyT/UNLa “The Future of Sino-Latin American Relations in the Light of the Chinese Emergency. Political, Socio-Cultural and Economic Aspects” is an initiative of
research directed by Gustavo Girado and integrates professors, researchers, and students.

- The Center for Sino-Latino American Research Studies (Centro de Estudios de Investigación Sino-Latinoamericano) was created in July 2022 and will operate within the Department of Planning and Public Policies. This Center is a joint initiative of the UNLa and the Southwest University of Science and Technology of the Sichuan province in China.

**National University Tres de Febrero (UNTREF): Centro de Estudios sobre Asia del Pacífico e India**
Based in Saenz Peña, Buenos Aires province, Argentina

- The Center for Asia Pacific and India Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre Asia del Pacífico e India, CEAPI) was created as a specific hub of research about the Asia Pacific and India, to complement the knowledge generation about these areas of studies that are promoted in the framework of two training programs: the Postgraduate in Economics and Business with Asia Pacific and India, and the Master in Economics and Business with Asia Pacific and India. A specific line of research based on the intersection of historical, sociological, and anthropological approaches.

- The CEAPI conducts research about China in the broader framework of Asia Pacific and India studies.

**National University of San Martín (UNSAM): various units**
Based in San Martín, Buenos Aires province, Argentina

- The Center for the Study of the Slavic and Chinese Worlds (CEMECH) belongs to the School of Humanities. It is an interdisciplinary center for teaching and research. Regarding China studies, the CEMECH focuses on historical, social, economic, political, and cultural aspects. On China-LAC, there is a specific line of research based on the intersection of historical, sociological, and anthropological approaches.

- The Program on China Global Studies belongs to the IDAES School. It was created in 2021. Aimed at continuing a long trajectory of research about the global impacts of the transformations in Chinese society regarding migration, companies, and institutions of Chinese origin in Argentina, the Program brings together researchers from different disciplines. Apart from providing teaching about China, the Program seeks to continue publishing its research in books, papers, and other sources, and to continue organizing academic events.

- The Research Center for Transformation (Centro de Investigaciones para la Transformación, CENIT) was created in 2010 as a non-profit foundation that, since 2018, has become associated with UNSAM's School of Economics and Business. CENIT is an interdisciplinary center for research, and training on aspects of the productive and technological processes, public policies and the modalities of international insertion of Argentina and Latin America, aimed at promoting processes of economic, environmental, and social sustainability, supported by knowledge and innovation. Among its lines of research, the analysis of China's presence in Argentina and the region, and its impacts for development and sustainability has particular relevance.

**Austral University, School of Politics, Government, and International Relations: Centro de Estudios Legales, Políticos y Económicos de Asia**
Based in Pilar, Buenos Aires province, Argentina
• The Center for Legal, Political and Economic Studies of Asia (Centro de Estudios Legales, Políticos y Económicos de Asia, CELPEA) was created in 2015. It aims to study the legal, political, and economic dynamics of Asia, with special emphasis on East Asia and the Pacific, and the impacts for the international insertion of Argentina and Latin America in general.
• The CELPEA develops its activities at three levels: research, consulting, and training. It organizes events and seminars about Asia in general, and China in particular. Regarding China, the CELPEA also offers the training program "Doing Business in China.”

_Catholic University of Córdoba (UCC), Institute of Administration Sciences: Centro La Franja y La Ruta_
Based in Córdoba, Córdoba province, Argentina

• The Center for Belt and Road Studies (Centro La Franja y La Ruta) was created in 2020. It aims to promote research and teaching about China and its cooperation with Latin American countries. It is the first academic center that focuses on the study of China in Córdoba province.
• "The New Silk Road: Business and Strategic Projects with China” is a four-weeks’ training program that offers in-person and virtual modality classes. It aims to provide training about the Belt and Road Initiative.

_National University of Rosario (UNR), Faculty of Political Science and International Relations_
Based in Rosario, Santa Fe province, Argentina

• The UNR’s Faculty of Political Science and International Relations beginnings date back to 1919, being a pioneer in Latin America in studies related to Political Science and Diplomacy. Its academic training is composed of undergraduate and postgraduate careers, including master’s and doctorate programs that address China as an area of study. The Faculty is also home to a Research Institute, composed of several centers and groups of study. Regular conferences and seminars include the analysis of China’s rise and the implications for Latin America and Argentina.
• The International Economy and Policy Research Center (Centro de Investigaciones en Política y Economía Internacional, CIPEI) is home for the Group of Study about China-Argentina (Grupo de Estudio sobre China-Argentina, GEChina), a study group dedicated to the analysis and research about relations between China and Argentina, and about China in the global context. It is made up of students and graduates that aim to understand China’s global role in multiple dimensions. The GEChina edits a monthly brief summary of recent news about China.

_University of Congreso (UC): various units_
Based in Mendoza, Mendoza province, with campuses in other provinces in Argentina

• Based at the Center for Strategic Studies, the Chair in China and Latin America Interdisciplinary Studies (Cátedra de Estudios Interdisciplinarios sobre China y Latinoamérica, CEICHAL) was inaugurated in 2017. Since then, the Chair has organized the Chinese Culture Week in Mendoza, aimed at disseminating the Chinese culture in Mendoza through conferences and talks led by experts, entrepreneurs, and policymakers that work on issues related to China.
• The House of Chinese Culture (Casa de la Cultura China) was inaugurated in 2015, as the first of its type in Argentina, and is based at the UC’s campus in Buenos Aires. It exhibits iconic objects of Chinese culture, organizes talks about diverse topics related to China, and has a library.
• In 2017, the UC became a partner of the above-mentioned magazine, _DangDai_.

**National University of Córdoba (UNC): various units**
Based in Córdoba, Córdoba province, Argentina

- The Center for Research and Studies on Culture and Society (*Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios sobre Cultura y Sociedad, CIECS*) was created in 2007 as the UNC’s unit of the above-mentioned National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET). Among its research institutes, the Department of Asia-Pacific International Studies, and the Department of Contemporary History bring together researchers that work about China. The CIECS also edits a semestral journal, *Astrolabio, Nueva Época*.
- The Center for Advanced Studies (*Centro de Estudios Avanzados, CEA*), based at the Faculty of Social Sciences, offers postgraduate programs in International Studies, which include talks about diverse topics related to China. Researchers based at the CEA also conduct research about China.
- In 2020, the Faculty of Economic Sciences launched the on-line Diploma “A Bridge to China: Business Culture” (*Diplomatura Un puente hacia China: Cultura de negocios*), aimed at providing training about China’s economic, financial, administrative, cultural, and social aspects, and oriented to make business with Chinese counterparts.
- The UNC is also home to a Confucius Institute.

**National University of Chaco Austral (UNCAUS), School of Business: Diplomatura en Estudios de Asia**
Based in Saez Peña, Chaco province, Argentina

- The Asia Studies Diploma (*Diplomatura en Estudios de Asia*) is a 3-months virtual training program, aimed at disseminating and expanding the knowledge about Asia and its relations with Latin America, including training on China’s history, society, economy, and policy.

**Catholic University of Salta (UCASAL), Business School: Diplomatura en Integración Socioeconómica Asia Pacífico**
Based in Salta, Salta province, Argentina

- The UCASAL’s Business School launched a virtual training program on Asia Pacific in 2021, the Diploma on Asia Pacific Socioeconomic Integration (*Diplomatura en Integración Socioeconómica Asia Pacífico*).

**Bolivia**

- Institutional capacity regarding research and studies on China in Bolivia is scarce. Efforts have concentrated mainly in two research institutions based in La Paz, Bolivia, along with the work developed at the UMSA, which is addressed below.
- The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bolivia (FES Bolivia) has published research work about China in Bolivia and has organized events to debate China’s presence in the country.
- Established in 2006, the Institute for Advanced Studies in Development Foundation (*Fundación Instituto de Estudios Avanzados en Desarrollo, INESAD*) is a think tank that produces research and provides training aimed at proposing effective solutions to overcoming critical obstacles to sustainable socio economic development. INESAD’s lines of research include environmental economics, well-being economics, financial economics, and macroeconomics. Among its research work, INESAD develops analyses that include China’s presence in Bolivia.
and Latin America.

**University of San Andrés (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, UMSA): various units**

Based in La Paz, Bolivia

- The Postgraduate in Development Sciences (CIDES-UMSA) is the first multidisciplinary postgraduate academic unit in Bolivia that offers postgraduate training (Diplomas, Masters, and Doctorate) articulated around development. It is also the institution of the highest level in teaching, research, and interaction in its field within the Bolivian university system. Though it does not have a research center or institute focused on China, efforts have been made to include debate about China’s role in Bolivia, such as through the publication of a volume dedicated to China’s presence in Latin America and Bolivia in its journal *Umbrales*.84

- The Institute of Sociological Research “Mauricio Lefebvre” (*Instituto de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, IDIS) is based in the Department of Sociology. As the CIDES, the IDIS does not have a research center that focuses on China, but during 2020 was home for the research project that addressed China’s role in the regional popular economy. The results were published in the IDIS’s journal *Temas Sociales*.85

**Brazil**

**BRICS Policy Center / Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas BRICS (BPC)**

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

([https://bricspolicvcenter.org](https://bricspolicycenter.org))

- The BCP is a think tank affiliated to the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). It is dedicated to the study and analysis of global transformations and their implications for Brazil and the Global South.

- Regarding research about China, the BCP has created the China Panel, a platform aimed at gathering, organizing, and systematizing data about Chinese investment in Brazil, and economic flows between China and South America.86

**Brazilian Center for International Relations / Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI)**

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

([https://www.cebri.org/br](https://www.cebri.org/br))

- The CEBRI is a leading international relations think tank in Brazil, and the second most relevant in South America and Central America. Among its thematic programs, the Asia Program (*Núcleo Asia*) focuses on research on Brazil’s relations with China and the role of Asia in the global context, considering topics such as multilateralism, trade, environment, geopolitics, technology, and innovation.87

- The Asia Program’s includes the China Analysis Group, as well as planning and organizing courses, publications, and discussions with Brazilian and international speakers.

- The CEBRI runs, in partnership with the Institute for Brazil-China Studies (IBRACH), a think tank founded by Anna Jaguaribe, and the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University, the China Executive Training Program. The training program seeks to provide a better understanding of China’s role in geopolitics.

**Getulio Vargas Foundation / Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)**

Based in Brazil
• Leading the ranking as the best Latin American think tank, the FGV’s work on China comprises both research and teaching, and is mainly conducted in departments and programs in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, though there are several institutes and centers which address China’s presence in Brazil.

• FGV Rio de Janeiro’s School of Law is home for the Brazil-China Study Center (Núcleo de Estudos Brasil-China, NEBC), which was created in 2017. Based on comparative research and study, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of Chinese business, legal, political, and sociological cultures, and their impact on relations with China. The FGV Direito Rio was the first school of law in Brazil to focus on comparative studies on China.

• The Belt and Road & Brazil is a research initiative based at the NEBC, aimed at doing research and studies about the Belt and Road, Brazil, and Latin America.

• In São Paulo, the School of International Relations’ undergraduate program includes courses about China.

**Observa China**
Based in Brazil

• Founded in 2020, Observa China is a fully digital think tank that brings together professionals and experts in the field of China studies, and also students interested in debating and understanding China in overarching aspects that include politics, economics, society, and culture, among others. Many of its founders studied and worked in China.

• Every Saturday, it hosts a series of events in Portuguese, Observa Convida, while it also frequently hosts events in English, Observa Invites. The think tank also publishes interviews with experts, and opinion articles, while it has a study group that conducts research on China’s impact on a global scale.

**Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP): various units**
Based in Campinas, Brazil

• According to the QS World University Ranking for year 2022, UNICAMP is one of the three best universities in Latin America. At UNICAMP, work about China-LAC, and China-Brazil relations is mainly conducted at the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences’ Department of Sociology, the Institute of Economy’s Center for Economic Development Studies, and the Center for Economic International Relations Studies.

• Pioneer efforts to address China in UNICAMP were initiated at the beginning of the 21st century, by philosophy and sociology researchers aimed at demonstrating that sociology could set the basis for intercultural understanding, not only by providing joint-teaching but also conducting research with Chinese professors about China’s history, philosophy, and sociology. Afterwards, China studies approach at UNICAMP became interdisciplinary and extended to other areas of knowledge.

• The Brazil-China Studies Group (Grupo de Estudos Brasil-China, GEBC) was created in 2011, and it is directly related to UNICAMP’s Center for Advanced Studies (Centro de Estudos Avançados, CEAv). Being one of the first initiatives to begin promoting research and teaching activities about China in Brazil, the GEBC brings together experts from various departments at UNICAMP that do research and teaching on China from a multidisciplinary approach.

• As an initiative of the GEBC, the Research Seminar on Contemporary China (Seminário Pesquisar a China Contemporânea) is an academic event that has been hosted since 2017,
aimed at strengthening the Brazil-China research network and broadening the academic
debate on China.\textsuperscript{91} The seminar’s main goal is to connect professors, researchers, and
students by creating a space where graduate students present their research and exchange
information. Though the seminar is mainly composed of graduate students and researchers
working on China-Brazil, it is also open for researchers working on China-LAC.
- Some researchers based at the GEBC, jointly with researchers at the Universidade Tecnológica
Federal do Paraná (UTFPR) have also created a network, “Perspectives South,” which has not
been formalized but has made efforts to bring together researchers working on Contemporary
China, China-Brazil, and China-LAC topics.\textsuperscript{92}
- In 2019, UNICAMP was the first South American university to establish a research center
in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the CASS-UNICAMP
Center of China Studies.\textsuperscript{93} The GEBC has remained as an independent entity that promotes
research and training.
- UNICAMP is also home for a Confucius Institute.

\textit{Universidade de São Paulo (USP): various units}
Based in Sao Paulo, Brazil
- The Center for Research in International Relations (\textit{Núcleo de Pesquisa em Relações
Internacionais}, NUPRI-USP), based at the USP’s Institute of International Relations, was
created in 1989, being a pioneer in the research and teaching about international relations
at the USP. The NUPRI-USP’s Group of Studies on Asia (\textit{Estudos sobre Ásia}) conducts research
on contemporary and historical aspects of Asian countries, including China; it also meets
regularly to debate about projects and publications, as well as organizes seminars and
workshops.
- The USP’s Department of History is home for the Asian Studies Laboratory (\textit{Laboratório de
Estudos da Ásia}, LEA-USP), which brings together professors, researchers, and students who
focus their studies on Asia and integrate specific Work Groups. Apart from research, the LEA-
USP also organizes academic events.\textsuperscript{96}
- The Inova USP Innovation Center, the think tank Belt and Road Research Institute for
International Cooperation and Development (BRRI), and the University of Shenzhen signed,
in January 2022, an academic cooperation agreement for the creation of the China-Brazil
Research Center for Innovation and Competitiveness.

\textit{Pontifical University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), Program on International Relations: Centro de Estudos
sobre a China}
Based in Sao Paulo, Brazil
- The PUC-SP’s Program on International Relations is home to the Group of Studies about Asia-
Pacific (GEAP/PUC-SP), which was created in 2003.\textsuperscript{97} After GEAP’s restructuring process, the
Center for Studies about China (\textit{Centro de Estudos sobre a China}) was launched in 2006, aimed
at promoting a better understanding of China through developing research and teaching.\textsuperscript{98}

\textit{Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ): various units}
Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- The \textit{Laboratório de Estudos em Economia Política da China} (LabChina) was created in
2017 and is based at the UFRJ’s Institute of Economy and at the Postgraduate Program on
International Political Economy.\textsuperscript{99} It brings together researchers from the areas of economy,
social sciences, international relations, and history, and promotes both research and graduate
and postgraduate teaching about the socioeconomic development of China, and its impacts in Brazil and the interstate system.

- The Institute of International Relations and Defense (IRID) is home for the Laboratorio de Estudos Asiáticos (LEA-UFRJ), which was created in 2010 as the first center dedicated to Asian studies in Rio de Janeiro. The LEA-UFRJ not only teaches at the IRID’s graduate courses, but also conducts research and organizes extension activities about the Asian countries.\textsuperscript{100}

- In 2009, the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering (Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa de Engenharia, Coppe-UFRJ), jointly with Tsinghua University, created the China–Brazil Center for Climate Change and Innovative Technologies for Energy (Centro China–Brasil de Mudança Climática e Tecnologias Inovadoras para Energia). Since its opening, the Center has been based at Tsinghua University, in Beijing, and has offices at Coppe-UFRJ.

End of notes.

**Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ): Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences, Postgraduate Program on International Relations: Núcleo de Estudos sobre China**

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

- The Postgraduate Program on International Relations (Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, PPGRI) was created in 2009 and is home to a research group on China, the Center for Studies about China (Núcleo de Estudos sobre China), which brings together researchers, and master’s and doctoral students at the PPGRI.\textsuperscript{101}

- Apart from promoting research, the PPGRI offers specific training about China at the master’s and doctorate with courses such as “China and the Political Economy of Modern Market Socialism” (A China e a Economia Política do "Moderno Socialismo de Mercado”), among others.\textsuperscript{102}

**Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG): Centro de Estudos da Ásia Oriental**

Based in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil

- The Center for Chinese Studies was created in 2013 and was replaced by the Center for Oriental Asia Studies (Centro de Estudos da Ásia Oriental, CEAO) in 2015.\textsuperscript{103} It is an interdisciplinary research center focused on the study of China, South Korea and Japan. Apart from research, the CEAO organizes events and seminars.

- UFMG is also home to a Confucius Institute.

**Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Department of International Relations: Middle Powers Research Group**

Based in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil

- The Middle Powers Research Group was created in 2011. It conducts research about the global context considering the ascent of the BRICS’ countries. The group’s research projects have mainly been financed by the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).\textsuperscript{104}

- Regarding teaching, the PUC Minas’ Department of IR not only has master’s and doctorate programs in International Relations, but also created a two-year online Postgraduate Program on Contemporary China, which will have its first edition in 2022.\textsuperscript{105}

- Apart from the financing of the CNPq, the department of IR receives financing from the PUC and the state of Minas Gerais to support undergraduate scholarships aimed at encouraging students to learn about China.
Based in Recife, Brazil

- The Asian Studies Coordination (Coordenadoria de Estudos da Ásia, CEÁSIA) was created in 2021. It links teaching, research, and extension activities aimed at contributing to deepen the knowledge about Asia.
- It brings together approximately two hundred members and associated researchers. Regarding China studies, the CEÁSIA focuses on research about Sino-Brazilian and Sino-Latinamerican relations, among others.

**Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Faculty of Economic Sciences: Núcleo de Estudos no BRICS**

Based in Porto Alegre, Brazil

- The UFRGS Faculty of Economic Sciences’ Department of Economy and International Relations is home for the BRICS Studies Center (Núcleo de Estudos no BRICS, NEBRICS), a research center comprised by researchers and students who mainly focus on development, trade, finance, economic policy, geopolitics, and foreign policy of BRICS countries.
- UFRGS is also home to a Confucius Institute.

Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF): various units

Based in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

- Based at the Institute of Human Sciences and Philosophy, the Center of Asian Studies (Centro de Estudos Asiáticos, CEA-UFF), is an interdisciplinary research center that brings together graduate and postgraduate researchers. Its work comprises research and teaching about socio-historical processes in the Asian countries, including the realization of events, seminars, short courses, and publications.
- Based at the Law School, the Research Center on Comparative Law and Brazil-China Relations (Núcleo de Pesquisa de Direito Comparado e Relações Brasil-China) was created in 2021. It is a research group that brings together graduate students from the Law School, and promotes research as well as organizes academic events about China.
- UFF is also home to a Confucius classroom.

**Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL): Laboratório de Pesquisa sobre Culturas Orientais**

Based in Londrina, Paraná, Brazil

- The Research Laboratory on Oriental Cultures (Laboratório de Pesquisa sobre Culturas Orientais, LAPECO) was established in 2016. It brings together undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate students along with experts interested in conducting research about oriental cultures. Among other activities, LAPECO organizes seminars and courses on Chinese culture, history, political system, and so on.

**Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC): various units**

Based in Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brazil

- The Institute for Studies on China (Instituto de Estudos sobre a China, ICHIN) was created in 2019 by an interdisciplinary group of researchers and students. Its activities include research, and extension activities based on an interdisciplinary approach.
- The Southern Brazilian and the Southern Cone Center of China Studies (Centro Sul brasileiro e do Cone Sul de Estudos da China, CEC) was launched in 2011. According to its website, which is outdated, it aims to create a knowledge network to produce studies and research on China, and to organize a network of specialists interested in China and in the Brazil-China
and Mercosur-China relations.

*Universidade Estadual de Paraíba (UEPB), Department of International Relations: Grupo de Estudos e Pesquisa em Ásia Pacífico*

Based in Campina Grande, Paraíba, Brazil

- The Research and Studies Group on Asia Pacific (Grupo de Estudos e Pesquisa em Ásia Pacífico, GEPAP) was established in 2012. The GEPAP focuses its research on cultural, economic, political, and security topics in Asia Pacific countries and their relations with emergent countries and the rest of the world.

*Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC), Bachelor in International Relations*

Based in Santo André, São Paulo, Brazil

- The World in Transformation Study Group (Grupo de Estudos Mundo em Transformação, GEMUT) was created in 2015, aimed at conducting research and promoting debate about transformations in the international political economy in the 21st century, including China’s new role and its impact in Brazil.

- The Observatory of Foreign Policy and International Insertion of Brazil (Observatório da Política Externa e Inserção Internacional do Brasil, OPEB) was created in 2019 by a group of professors and students linked to the Bachelor in International Relations at UFABC, with the aim of organizing workshops, events, and publications that analyze the new directions of Brazilian foreign policy and the new wave of international insertion. Among its thematic groups, OPEB has a Brazil-China Group.

*Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), Bachelor in International Relations: Grupo de Estudos em Ásia-Pacífico*

Based in Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

- The Bachelor in International Relations is home for the Asia-Pacific Study Group (Grupo de Estudos em Ásia-Pacífico, GEPAP), which was created in 2020. The GEPAP was established as a hub of research and extension activities aimed at understanding the roots, characteristics, and unfolding of China’s rise to developing countries, especially in Asia-Pacific, seeking to comprehend the lessons for the South American and Brazilian reality. For that purpose, it organizes conferences and seminars about Asia Pacific and China in particular.

*Universidade de Brasília (UnB): various units*

Based in Brasília, Brazil

- Created by the Rectory in 1986, the Center for Advanced Multidisciplinary Studies (Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares, CEAM) is home for the Nucleus of Asian Studies (Núcleo de Estudos Asiáticos, NEASIA), a study group established in 1987 that conducts research and teaching on cultural and social aspects of Asia and the Pacific. Based on a multidisciplinary approach, the NEASIA offers extension and undergraduate courses, and publishes the results of its research. The NEASIA has a research group registered at the CNPq, the Asian Studies Research Group (Grupo de Pesquisa Estudos Asiáticos). Initially, the group was focused on studies on language and literature but has expanded research to study Asia as a whole.

- The Institute of International Relations is home for the Center for Global Studies, which has established the China Studies Group (Grupo de Estudos sobre China, GECHINA-ASIALAC UnB) in 2021, aimed at promoting debate and reflections, as well as the dissemination of scientific knowledge about China in diverse aspects: historical, political, economic, social,
and cultural, among others.\textsuperscript{119}
\begin{itemize}
\item UnB is also home to a Confucius Institute.
\end{itemize}

\section*{Chile}

\textbf{Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC): various units}
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile
\begin{itemize}
\item The PUC’s Faculty of History, Geography and Political Science is home for the Center for Asian Studies (\textit{Centro de Estudios Asiáticos}, CEAUC), which was created in 2011, as an extension of the Asian Studies Program, launched in 1996.\textsuperscript{120} The Center brings together researchers from various PUC’s institutes who focus their work on Asia studies, including China. It disseminates its members’ research through publications, such as the Working Papers in Asian Studies, specialized seminars, outreach programs, training, continuing education, and through formal postgraduate teaching. In addition, the CEAUC opens calls for postdoctoral positions focused on Asian studies.
\item The PUC Faculty of History, Geography and Political Science's Institute of History does not have a research center focusing on China, but promotes specific lines of research that have generated an important trajectory of projects and publications in the field of China studies, mainly financed by the Chilean National Agency for Research and Development (ANID) and ANID'S National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development, (Fondecyt). Part of the team that works about China is part of the CEAUC. The Institute edits the journal \textit{Historia}.
\item Similarly, the PUC Faculty of History, Geography and Political Science's Institute of Political Science does not have a research center focusing on China, but there are researchers working on topics about China, also members of the CEAUC; research projects are also mainly financed by ANID. In 2022, the Institute of Political Science launched the Diploma on Challenges and Governance in International Security (\textit{Diplomado en Desafíos y Gobernanza en Seguridad Internacional}), including the analysis of the implications of China’s presence in Latin America.\textsuperscript{121} Also, this institute edits the journal \textit{Revista de Ciencia Política}.
\item The PUC Faculty of Law’s Center for International Studies (CEIUC) is also active in research, teaching and organizing events and seminars about China, though not having a specific center. The postgraduate course “China: Business, Technology, Law and International Relations” (\textit{China: Negocios, tecnología, derecho y relaciones internacionales}) has had two editions so far.\textsuperscript{122}
\item The PUC is also home to a Confucius Institute.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{University of Chile (UChile), Institute of International Studies}
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile
\begin{itemize}
\item Founded in 1966, the Institute of International Studies (\textit{Instituto de Estudios Internacionales}, IEI) has been a relevant promoter of the study of international relations, mainly based on conducting research, providing graduate and postgraduate teaching, and disseminating research results. Asia and China studies are part of these efforts.
\item The IEI’s Program on China Studies, a research center focused on China studies, develops research and teaching based on three main lines: contemporary China, international trade and cooperation with China, and Sino-Latin American Relations.\textsuperscript{123} More recently, the expansion of the Program's capacity includes a contest for a postdoc position.
\item As part of its postgraduate teaching, the IEI develops the Diploma on Chinese Studies,\textsuperscript{124} and the online Diploma Introduction to China.\textsuperscript{125} Also, teaching about China is included in the
The IEI has presented a preliminary project to create a master's degree on Asia/China studies as well, which is currently under evaluation and is expected to be launched in 2023.

- The IEI edits two journals, Revista de Estudios Internacionales and Latin American Trade Policy, which have included several publications about China-Latin America.

**Andrés Bello National University (UNAB), Faculty of Education and Social Sciences: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China**

Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile

- The Center for Latinamerican Studies on China (Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China, CELC) organizes seminars and conferences to address China’s presence in Latin America regarding social, economic, cultural, and political aspects. The CELC also publishes reports on current events in China in the region, including a bimonthly bulletin with analysis and opinion pieces about China’s presence in the region, the "China en la prensa latinoamericana" bulletin, and an annual report, the "China/Innovación".

**Diego Portales University (UDP), Faculty of Economics and Business: Centro Asia Pacífico**

Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile

- The UDP’s Asia Pacific Center (Centro Asia Pacífico) was relaunched in 2009, aimed at promoting the generation of networks and applied knowledge in the field of business between Asia and Latin America. It has organized a series of executive training programs that include practical and theoretical classes on how to make business in China. However, there is no new information on its activities since 2019.

**Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso (PUCV): Programa Asia Pacífico**

Based in Valparaíso, Chile

- The Asia Pacific Program (Programa Asia Pacífico) was established aimed at creating an academic forum that studies and explores the economic, political, social, and cultural aspects of the Asia Pacific region, and carrying out academic activities and research projects that contribute to a better understanding between Chile, Asia, and the Pacific.

- The Program has organized conferences cycles, seminars, and webinars, as well as published its research in books and other sources.

**University of La Frontera (UFRO), Faculty of Legal and Business Sciences, Research Center on International Challenges**

Based in Temuco, Chile

- Founded in 2015, the Research Center on International Challenges (Centro de Investigación sobre Desafíos Internacionales, CIDI) is an interdisciplinary humanities and social sciences research center aimed at working on diverse lines of research that address international challenges, including China. The CIDI brings together researchers from diverse UFRO’s faculties and from universities outside Chile.

- The CIDI has developed specific research projects about China, mainly financed by the Chilean National Agency for Research and Development (ANID). The CIDI organizes events and seminars aimed at debating China’s role in Chile. The Faculty of Legal and Business Sciences’ Law School offers specific teaching about China in the elective course “Relations between Chile and China.”

- UFRO is also home to a Confucius Institute.
**Colombia**

*Colombian Association of Political Science / Asociación Colombiana de Ciencia Política (ACCPol)*  
Based in Colombia  
([http://accpol.org/accpol/](http://accpol.org/accpol/))

- ACCPol is a national scientific organization of a private nature. In contrast to RedIntercol, ACCPol’s members are institutions and academic organizations, some of which offer teaching about China in the framework of International Relations’ programs.
- ACCPol organizes the Political Science National Conference, as well as meetings of Political Science faculties and programs.

*Andrés Bello Foundation –– China Latin American Research Center / Fundación Andrés Bello – Centro de Investigación Chino Latinoamericano*  
Based in Colombia  
([https://fundacionandresbello.org](https://fundacionandresbello.org))

- The Andrés Bello Foundation – China Latin American Research Center was created in 2020. It is both a think tank and a journalistic platform dedicated to analyzing the relationship between China and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Its permanent staff is made up of five people, while there are temporary consultants working for certain research projects.
- The Center disseminates its work through different sections: journalistic reports on the lesser-known aspects of China’s involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean; academic articles, essays, and papers, and databases developed by Latin American experts; and latest news. Also, the Center created the Silk & Coffee podcast, a space for conversations with journalists, professors, and experts that work on China-LAC relations.

*Externado University of Colombia (UEC), Faculty of Finance, Government and International Relations: Centro de Investigaciones y Proyectos Especiales*  
Based in Bogotá, Colombia

- The Research and Special Project Center (*Centro de Investigaciones y Proyectos Especiales*, CIPE) was established in 1993. Among its research groups, the Observatory on the Analysis of International Systems (*Observatorio de Análisis de los Sistemas Internacionales*, OASIS) has developed a specific research line, Regional Studies, that analyzes processes and dynamics in different regions and countries, including China, but it does function as an institute dedicated to China studies.  
- The OASIS’ researchers give undergraduate and postgraduate courses about China at the Master’s in International Affairs and the Doctorate in Policy Studies programs, as well as at the virtual Diploma in Economics and Geopolitics of Asia (*Diplomado en Economía y Geopolítica de Asia*) and the program Asia Chain: *Profundización en China*. According to information based on consultations, efforts have started to be made to transform the Diploma program into a master’s program.
- The OASIS research group edits a semestral journal, OASIS.

*National University of Colombia: various units*  
Based in Bogotá, Colombia
• The Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, IEPRI) was created in 1986, and develops research and undergraduate and postgraduate teaching activities in the framework of its master’s and doctorate programs, including general courses about Asia and China. The IEPRI is home to the International Relations Research Group, an interdisciplinary research group that brings together researchers that also give teaching about general international relations topics at the IEPRI’s programs. The IEPRI edits the semestral journal, Revista Análisis Político.

• The Faculty of Human Sciences is home for the Asia-Latin America Network Research Group (Grupo de Investigación Red Asia-América Latina), which brings together professors from different faculties aimed at promoting Asian studies. The group carries out work about Asia and China in Colombia and Latin America. It has developed research projects, publications, and organized events and extension courses.

University of the Andes (Uniandes), Faculty of Social Sciences, International Studies Research Group
Based in Bogotá, Colombia

• The International Studies Research Group is home for the Global Studies Seedbed (Semillero en Estudios Globales), an interdisciplinary community of students focused on the study of global issues, including research about China’s presence in Latin America, but in a broad sense.

• The Uniandes edits the trimestral journal "Colombia Internacional."

• Uniandes is also home to a Confucius Institute.

Universidad del Rosario (URosario), Faculty of International, Political and Urban Studies: Grupo de Estudios Políticos e Internacionales
Based in Bogotá, Colombia

• The Faculty of International, Political and Urban Studies is home for the Political and International Studies Group (Grupo de Estudios Políticos e Internacionales, GEPI). GEPI was created in 2002, mainly focused on an interdisciplinary approach of political science, government, international relations, and urban affairs topics. Though the URosario and the GEPI do not have specific programs or research lines about China, the organization of events and research and teaching activities include China as an area of study.

University of Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano (UTADEO): various units
Based in Bogotá, Colombia

• Based at the undergraduate Program on International Relations, the Asia-Pacific Virtual Observatory (Observatorio Virtual Asia-Pacífico, OVAP) was established in 2005 as a center for information and research about cultural, economic, and political aspects of Asia Pacific-LAC relations, and Asia-Pacific and Colombia relations, including specific research about China’s presence in LAC. Though the OVAP was active in publishing articles, documents, essays, papers, and other digital content, as well as organizing academic and business events, its activities have diminished in recent times.

• The UTADEO offers an undergraduate program on International Relations, which includes teaching about Asian studies, and a virtual Diploma in Asia-Pacific, which provides training in culture, business, economy, foreign trade, mobility of people, and communications.

• The UTADEO is also home to a Confucius Institute.

Pontificial University Javeriana of Colombia: Centro de Estudios sobre la Cuenca del Pacifico
Cali campus, Colombia
• The Center for Studies on the Pacific Basin (Centro de Estudios sobre la Cuenca del Pacífico, CECP) aims to promote interdisciplinary research about the Pacific Basin countries. Its activities include publication of bulletins, reports, articles, and books.
• The CECP organizes the Asia-Pacific Alliance Chair, a forum organized jointly with universities in Mexico and Peru, aimed at bringing together experts from various disciplines.

**ICESI University: various units**
Based in Cali, Colombia

• The Pacific Alliance Studies Program (Programa de Estudios de la Alianza del Pacífico, PEAP) was established in 2015, aimed at studying the social, economic, political, and other aspects of the geographical area that frames the Pacific Alliance from a multi and trans-disciplinary perspective. Being the first institutionalized center dedicated to the study of the Alliance and issues related to the Latin American Pacific, the PEAP functions as a think tank since its work is made up of research, consulting, and teaching. Among its activities, the PEAP’s team publishes its research in books, bulletins, papers, and working papers. It also organizes forums and seminars, as well as offers teaching through a postgraduate course about Asian politics and international relations. Additionally, it organizes exchange, tailor-made programs known as Study Tours.
• Based at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, the Politics and International Relations Laboratory (PoInt) belongs to the Political Science Program. It brings together students, professors, and researchers from the undergraduate and postgraduate programs on Political Science and International Relations. Its blog publishes and documents the experiences of the Study Tours, as well as provides book reviews and short investigations carried out by the students.

**University EAFIT: Center for Asia Pacific Studies**
Based in Medellín, Colombia

• Founded in 2006, the Center for Asia Pacific Studies (Centro de Estudios Asia Pacífico) focuses on research, teaching, and consulting about Asia Pacific and relations with Colombia and Latin America; it offers undergraduate and postgraduate programs, and extension courses, as well as organizes events such as the "Semana Asia."
• The Center edits the journal "Mundo Asia Pacífico," and has published several articles and books about Asia Pacific-Latin America, and China-Latin America relations in the cultural, economic, and political aspects.

**Ecuador**

**Institute of Higher National Studies (IAEN): various units**
Based in Quito, Ecuador

• The School of International Relations offers interdisciplinary teaching about international relations topics in three master’s programs, and a postgraduate training program. Though there is no specific training program about China, the analysis of its role in Ecuador and Latin America is part of the courses that compose the School’s Masters and postgraduate training programs. Researchers at the School also conduct research about China and have published articles and books on China-LAC relations.
• The School of Security and Defense is home to the Chinese Studies Center (Centro de Estudios Chinos), which was created in 2010 and relaunched in 2017. The Center organizes conferences
and seminars about China-Ecuador and China-LAC relations.

**Simón Bolívar Andean University - Ecuador: various units**
Based in Quito, Ecuador

- Although the Simón Bolivar Andean University, campus Ecuador, does not have a research center focused on Asia or China studies, efforts to develop research and teaching about Asian and Chinese topics include those of the Area of Social and Global Studies. The Area concentrates its teaching and research activities in cultural studies, Latin American studies and international relations, which are developed in master’s, doctorate and postdoctoral programs, as well as online courses such as “Cooperation and conflict in Asian international relations in the XXI century.”
- The Area of Environment and Sustainability concentrates its research and teaching work in postgraduate courses, research activities, and online courses about socio-environmental studies, with an emphasis on climate change, planetary ecological problems, equity, and sustainability. China studies are part of the Area’s research agenda.

**Litoral Polytechnic Higher School (ESPOL): Centro de Estudios Asia-Pacífico**
Based in Guayaquil, Ecuador

- Established in 2007, the ESPOL’s Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (Centro de Estudios Asia-Pacífico, CEAP) is an institutional center for community outreach, aimed at connecting entrepreneurs, the ESPOL community and other institutions in Ecuador with the economy, business and academic spheres of Asia Pacific countries and vice versa.
- The CEAP organizes virtual and in person events, as well as courses and seminars about Asia Pacific in general, and China in particular. It also organizes the “CEAP Research Program,” an annual call for research projects aimed at generating knowledge about the Asia-Pacific region.
- The CEAP edits a quarterly bulletin, Horizontes, which addresses cultural, economic, and social aspects of Asia Pacific countries.

**Peru**

**University of Pacific (UP): Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia Pacífico**
Based in Lima

- The Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia Pacífico, CECHAP) was established in 2013. Founded as the Center of Peru-China Studies, the center adopted its current name in 2017 to reflect the interest in creating knowledge about the Asia-Pacific region, while retaining China as its main focus.
- Since 2021, the CECHAP has begun to deepen and diversify its research agenda, inviting colleagues from the UP’s various academic departments to start new lines of research and teaching in line with their specialties. The CECHAP has conducted several research projects about China-Peru and China-Latin America relations, and frequently hosts events that analyze China’s presence in LAC.
- The CECHAP has made important efforts to establish networks alongside institutions in China to carry out joint activities.
- The CECHAP’s research encompasses several themes: China and sustainable development, infrastructure and connectivity in the BRI, comparative economic development between China and Peru, innovation and technology in China, and China-Peru relations.
• Researchers based at the CECHAP actively participate in publications of books, journal articles, and working papers about China’s presence in LAC.
• The CECHAP has also included teaching: a course about Contemporary China and relations with Latin America and Peru was launched in 2022.
• With the aim of promoting research about China-LAC, the CECHAP also launched a call for a postdoctoral researcher for a period of one to three years. Currently, two postdoctoral researchers are working at the Center.

Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP), Department of Humanities: Centro de Estudios Orientales
Based in Lima, Perú
• The Center for Oriental Studies (Centro de Estudios Orientales, CEO) was established in 1987, and it is based at the Department of Humanities. The CEO offers teaching, research, study, dissemination, and training on issues related to the cultures of Eastern countries in order to promote a better understanding and comprehend the implications of relations with Latin America and Peru. Knowledge production mainly focuses on humanities and social sciences. The CEO organizes seminars that include teaching about literature, society, history, art, and religions of Asia and China.
• Based on the high demand of students interested in learning about China, undergraduate and postgraduate courses were opened to provide teaching about politics, history, and contemporary society in China.
• According to information collected in consultations for this research project, the Vice-rectorate for Research, which promotes, finances, and coordinates research activities at the PUCP, is developing a project to create the Asian Studies Institute. Based on the trajectory of the CEO, this institute would expand research and teaching about Asia in the PUCP through the integration of topics of humanities with economics, culture, politics, engineering, and technology, among others.
• The PUCP is home to a Confucius Institute.

National University of San Marcos (UNMSM): Centro de Estudios Asiáticos
Based in Lima, Perú
• The Center for Asian Studies (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos, CEAS) was established in 2018, aimed at promoting the study of the Asian region, especially East Asia and India, based on the importance of this region for Peru. Research about China-Peru is mainly conducted based on political economy, as well as international relations approaches.
• The CEAS organizes events such as conferences, seminars, and symposiums to debate about the economic, political, social and cultural relationship between Peru, Latin America and Asia. The CEAS is composed by researchers, several of whom have completed postgraduate studies at Asian Universities, such as Korea, China, India and Japan.
• Among its activities, the CEAS also edits a bulletin with articles and news about East Asia and India.
• The deepening of certain lines of research, or development of new ones is challenging since access to public financing is scarce, even null.

Ricardo Palma University (URP): various units
Based in Lima, Peru
- The Institute for Classic Occidental and Oriental Studies (Instituto de Estudios Clásicos Occidentales y Orientales) is aimed at promoting the study, research, and dissemination of thought, art, and literature of Western and Eastern cultures. The Institute publishes the journal La lámpara azul.
- The URP’s Faculty of Humanities and Modern Languages is home for a Confucius Institute.

**Uruguay**

**University of the Republic of Uruguay (Udelar): various units**

Based in Montevideo, with campuses in other cities, Uruguay

- The Faculty of Social Sciences is composed of six departments that are responsible for research in different areas as well as teaching in undergraduate and postgraduate courses. Though the Udelar does not have a center or institute focused on China, efforts to conduct research about China-Latin America and China-Uruguay include researchers based at the Department of Economics, and at the Program for International Studies (PEI). The PEI is home to the Observatory of Uruguay’s Foreign Policy (Observatorio de Política Exterior Uruguay, OPEU), which was established in 2005; it systematizes and disseminates information about Uruguay’s foreign policy through a monthly report that includes analysis about China-Uruguay relations.
- Research about China in the Udelar is mainly financed by the National Research and Innovation Agency (ANII).
- The Udelar is also home to a Confucius Institute, which was established in 2016 as the first and only in the country.
- Though efforts at Udelar to address China’s presence in Uruguay and LAC have been increasing, capacity is scarce since there are few researchers developing specific projects on these topics.

**Catholic University of Uruguay (UCU), Department of International Business and Integration, Institute of International Business**

Based in Montevideo, with campuses in other cities, Uruguay

- The Institute of International Business (Instituto de Negociaciones Internacionales, INI) promotes research on issues related to international trade and economic integration, especially in regions considered strategic such as Asia-Pacific and Africa, but also Mercosur. Researchers at the INI also teach at the Bachelor of International Business and Integration.
- Apart from disseminating its research in journals, books, and other resources, the INI publishes quarterly reports on trade between China and Uruguay. Also, the INI is home to the Chair MERCOSUR-ASEAN, created in 2016 and aimed at providing training courses and organizing conferences and seminars.

**Venezuela**

**University of Los Andes (ULA), Faculty of Humanities and Education, Department of Universal History of the School of History: Centro de Estudios de África, Asia y Diásporas Latinoamericanas y Caribeñas “José Manuel Briceño Monzillo”**

Based in Mérida, Venezuela

- The ULA has a long trajectory in the study of China, since the study and teaching of Chinese history in the School of History of the Faculty of Humanities and Education began in 1974.
- The Department of Universal History of the School of History was home for the Asia and
Africa Study Group (Grupo de Estudios de Asia y África, GEAA), which was created in 1995 and replaced in 2001 by the Center for Studies of Africa, Asia and Latin American and Caribbean Diasporas (Centro de Estudios de África, Asia y Diásporas Latinoamericanas y Caribeñas "José Manuel Briceño Monzillo," CEAA). The CEAA’s activities include teaching and research on politics, cultures, philosophies, economy, history, and the scientific and technological events of the countries of Africa and Asia, with special emphasis on its relations with Venezuela. Among its lines of research, the CEAA promotes the study of China and its transformations.

- The CEAA also organizes academic events and extension activities such as the Cultural Weeks program in the city of Mérida.
- The CEAA edits a semestral journal as well, Humania del Sur.
- The below-mentioned AVECH was created in the framework of the CEAA.

Venezuelan Association of Chinese Studies / Asociación Venezolana de Estudios sobre China (AVECH)
Based in Mérida, Venezuela
(https://avech.org)
- The AVECH is a non-profit civil association, without political or religious affiliations. Based at the University of Los Andes and the trajectory of the Center for African, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean Diaspora Studies, it was established in 2018, aimed at exchanging academic and cultural experiences among its members, and collaborating with national and international higher education centers in the training of human resources at the level of teachers and researchers, in order to promote China studies in Venezuela.
- The AVECH has a Venezuela-China Observatory, as well as several types of publications that include articles, books, reports, a series called Cuadernos de China which brings together studies on China’s politics, international relations, economy, society, science, and technology, and Cuadernos de Cultura China, which focuses on studies of popular arts and manifestations, cultural heritage, and other contributions of Chinese culture.

Venezuelan Center for China Studies / Centro Venezolano de Estudios sobre China (CVEC)
Based in Caracas, Venezuela
(https://cvechina.wordpress.com)
- The Venezuelan Center for China Studies (Centro Venezolano de Estudios sobre China, CVEC) is a research center that brings together professionals and researchers that work on analyzing and understanding, based on transdisciplinary approaches, China’s presence in the global scenario, and the Latin American and Venezuelan scenarios. The CVEC has three main lines of research: International Relations, Economic International Relations, and Socio-Demographic Studies.
- The CVEC’s members publish the results of their research in articles, books, and op-ed articles. It also edits a semestral journal, Revista Estudios sobre China.
- In January 2022, the University of Communication of China (CUC), the Institute for a Community of Shared Future ISCF of the CUC, and CVEC jointly launched the “Center for Research for a community of shared future China-Venezuela,” aimed at jointly developing research projects and events.
Mexico

**Mexican Consortium of APEC Study Centers / Consorcio Mexicano de Centros de Estudios de APEC (CONMEX-CEAPEC)**

Based in Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico ([https://www.conmexceapec.org](https://www.conmexceapec.org))

- Established in 2003, the CONMEX-CEAPEC is a group of studies centers at the national level in charge of contributing, in coordination with the private sector and the government, to the generation of knowledge and strategies for cultural and business rapprochement between Mexico and countries in the APEC region. It promotes higher education and advanced research, as well as the facilitation of cultural exchanges, in the framework of APEC’s aim to develop cooperation in education and research among its members.

- It is composed of nine APEC Studies Centers, established at the Autonomous University of Baja California Sur (UABCS), the Michoacan University of San Nicolas Hidalgo (UMSNH), the University of Colima, the University of Guadalajara, the Technological Institute of Higher Studies of Monterrey (Guadalajara campus), the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Metropolitan Autonomous University (Azcapotzalco campus), the Veracruzana University, and the Autonomous University of Nayarit.

**National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM): various units**

Based in Mexico D.F., Mexico

- The UNAM is one of the most relevant institutions in Latin America regarding the study of China. It began to establish connections with the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1998. Since then, diverse institutes and departments at UNAM have developed specific lines of research regarding China studies.

- The University Program for Asian and African Studies (*Programa Universitario de Estudios sobre Asia y África*, PUEAA) convenes and coordinates activities of research, teaching, extension, and dissemination of Asian and African cultures. It is made up of a multidisciplinary and inter-institutional team. Apart from organizing conferences and seminars, the PUEAA offers the Asian Studies Diploma, and the Diploma on Feminist Epistemologies, Economy and Culture: Dialogues with Asia and Africa. The PUEAA’s Asia-Africa Observatory publishes reports, papers, and books about China and Asia. The PUEAA’s website also publishes a weekly bulletin with the latest news about Asia.

- The Faculty of Economics is home for the China-Mexico Studies Center (*Centro de Estudios China-México*, CECHIMEX), which was established in 2006. Known as a reference center on China studies in Latin America, the CECHIMEX has made a great effort in improving the knowledge of Chinese socioeconomics, emphasizing long-term relations with Mexico and Latin America, with a tripartite vision of the academic, public and private sectors. Though its research, teaching, and publications focus mainly on economic aspects, its activities and research also include topics such as agriculture, philosophy, history, engineering, language and culture, international relations, political science, among others.

- Apart from organizing conferences and seminars on China, the CECHIMEX offers the course “Understanding China” (*Entendiendo a China*), with multi-topic sessions that bring together academics, diplomats, and entrepreneurs with vast experience on China issues.

- CECHIMEX’s publications include op-ed articles, books, and reports, as well as a bimonthly journal, *Cuadernos de trabajo del CECHIMEX*. Also, the CECHIMEX elaborates economic statistics on China-LAC trade, and Chinese investment in LAC, such as through the Monitor
of Chinese FDI in LAC.  

- The above-mentioned LAC-China Network (Red ALC-China) was created as an initiative of the CECHIMEX.
- As part of its internationalization program, the UNAM has established a campus at the Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU). The UNAM-China, also known as CEM-China or CEM-UNAM/BFSU (Mexican Studies Center, or Centro de Estudios Mexicanos), was created in 2012 and aims to promote academic exchanges and the dissemination of the Spanish language and Mexican culture through programs in the humanities, social sciences, and arts.
- UNAM is also home to a Confucius Institute, based at the National School of Languages, Linguistics and Translation (ENALLT).

_El Colegio de Mexico (Colmex): Centro de Estudios de Asia y África_

-Based in Mexico D.F., Mexico

- The Center for Asia and Africa Studies (Centro de Estudios de Asia y África, CEAA) was established in 1964 as a pioneer Iberoamerican center dedicated to Asian and African studies. As a benchmark in the area of Asian and African humanities studies, the CEAA motivated the foundation of the above-mentioned Asian and African Studies Association (ALADAA).
- The CEAA is an interdisciplinary academic unit, mainly dedicated to research and teaching in the areas of philological studies, historiography, ancient history, and modern and contemporary history, international relations and national and international security, history of religions, thought and ideas, and specific anthropological and sociological studies.
- The CEAA offers a master’s program in Asian and African Studies, with China as an area of expertise, and courses of extension such as “Understanding China,” among others.
- The CEAA’s publications include books, papers, and annual reports. Since 1966, the CEAA also edits the quarterly journal _Revista de Estudios de Asia y África_.
- The Colmex was the first academic institution to establish an APEC Study Center, the CEAA, in the framework of the above-mentioned CONMEX-CEAPEC.

_Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), Academic Department of International Studies: Programa de Estudios Asia Pacífico_

-Based in Mexico, D.F., Mexico

- The Program on Asia Pacific Studies (Programa de Estudios Asia Pacífico, PEAP) was created to promote a better understanding of the Asia Pacific region in Mexico. As part of its teaching, the PEAP offers semester courses, summer courses, specialized seminars and conferences, and Asian studies chairs. The PEAP’s team also conducts research and publishes its work in books and papers.

_University of Colima: Centro Universitario de Estudios e Investigaciones sobre la Cuenca del Pacífico_

-Based in Colima, with campuses in various cities in the state of Colima, Mexico

- The Interdisciplinary Studies Program on the Asia Pacific Basin was created in 1989, positioning the University of Colima as one of the first institutions to create a program of studies on the Asia Pacific Basin in Mexico. Based on that trajectory, the University Center for Studies and Research on the Pacific Basin (Centro Universitario de Estudios e Investigaciones sobre la Cuenca del Pacífico, CUEICP) was established in 1995, and an APEC Study Center (Centro de Estudios APEC, CEAPEC) was created in 1998 in the framework of the CUEICP, becoming the CUEICP-CEAPEC.
• The CUEICP-CEAPEC is an academic center dedicated to conducting research in economics and international relations with an emphasis on the Pacific Basin. It also provides training courses and disseminates its research through books and papers. Also, it edits the journal Revista PORTES.\textsuperscript{175}
• The Faculty of Economy offers since 1999 a Doctorate on Transpacific Relations, which includes specific courses on China.\textsuperscript{176}

**Autonomous University of Nuevo León (UANL): Centro de Estudios Asiáticos**
Based in Monterrey, Nuevo León, México
• Established in 2006, the Center for Asian Studies (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos, CEA) has become a benchmark in the northeast of the country regarding the promotion of studies about Asian countries.\textsuperscript{177} Since 2014, the UANL has had a representative office in Shanghai.
• The CEA conducts research on the economic, social, political, international relations, and cultural aspects of Asian countries, with emphasis on China, Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia. It also organizes conferences and seminars, disseminates its research results through the publication of articles and books, offers language courses, and provides consulting and advisory services to entities in the public and private sectors.
• UANL is also home to a Confucius Institute.

**Meritorious Autonomous University of Puebla (BUAP): various units**
Based in Puebla, Mexico
• The Faculty of Law and Social Sciences provides teaching about Asian countries in the framework of the Bachelor in International Relations. Regarding the study of China, the Bachelor offers an elective course.
• The Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades “Alfonso Vélez Pliego,” ICSyH) was established in 1991 aimed at developing research, and postgraduate studies in the framework of its master’s and doctoral programs.\textsuperscript{178} The ICSyH is home for the World Socioeconomic Processes Working Group, an interdisciplinary research group that conducts research and teaching based on the integration of historical and critical perspectives about international cooperation, South-South international migration, development, globalization, and geopolitics with an emphasis on Latin America. These lines of research include China’s presence in the region.\textsuperscript{179}

**University of the Americas Puebla (UDLAP), School of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations and Political Science**
Based in Puebla, Mexico
• Though the UDLAP does not have a center or institute focused on China studies, the Department of International Relations and Political Science offers undergraduate and postgraduate training programs such as master’s and a doctorate, which include courses about Asia and China.
• Some researchers based at the Department are also experts in China studies, and conduct research based on individual initiatives and interest, funded by the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT). Research projects have included mainly case studies regarding FTAs between China and LAC countries, as well as ties in the military and security sectors.

**Veracruz University (UV): Centro de Estudios China-Veracruz**
Based in Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico
• The China-Veracruz Study Center (Centro de Estudios China-Veracruz, Cechiver) was
established in 2008, aimed at conducting research on Chinese culture, the impact of Chinese economic policies in Mexico and Latin America, and bilateral relations. The Cechiver also promotes academic exchanges, and the realization of conferences, forums and seminars, as well as offers training through courses, diplomas, and a virtual master’s program in Economy and Society of China and Latin America.

- Apart from publications that include books and papers, the Cechiver edits the semestral journal *Orientando: Temas de Asia Oriental, Sociedad, Cultura y Economía.*

**University of Guadalajara (UDG), University Center of Social Sciences and Humanities: Departamento de Estudios del Pacífico**

Based in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico

- Established in 1990, the Department of Pacific Studies (*Departamento de Estudios del Pacífico*, DEP) conducts interdisciplinary research on economy, environment, society, culture, and politics of the Asia Pacific region, as well as the processes of integration and cooperation in the area.

- The DEP edits the quarterly journal *México y la Cuenca del Pacífico (MyCP).*

- The DEP also offers the Master of Global Politics and Trans-Pacific Studies, a postgraduate program with focus on transpacific studies. It offers three specializations focused on China, Japan, and North America.

**Michoacán University of San Nicolás de Hidalgo (UMSNH), Institute of Economic and Business Research**

Based in Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico

- The Institute of Economic and Business Research (*Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Empresariales, ININEE*) is home to one of the 7 APEC Research Centers in Mexico. The ININEE offers master’s and doctoral programs in International Business. It also conducts research and participates in conferences, seminars, and training courses organized by the CONMEX-CEAPEC, as well as by other universities that are also members of the Consortium.

**Institute of Technology and Higher Studies of Monterrey (Tec de Monterrey): various units**

Based in Monterrey, with campus in various cities, Mexico

- The Institute used to have thematic areas that included an Asia Pacific Research Center, located in the Guadalajara campus, which is part of the CONMEX-CEAPEC, but it has been absorbed by other research groups and schools. For example, the School of Business is home to the Strategy and Management of Organizations in Emerging Economies Research Group, which does not focus on China studies, but brings together researchers aimed at increasing the competitiveness of companies and organizations in the institutional environment of countries with emerging economies and in particular in Latin America. Some of the Group’s researchers conduct research and teaching about China studies.

- The School of Social Sciences and Government is home to the Democracy, Corruption and Global Issues Research Group, which also brings together researchers focused on China, both for research and teaching activities.

**Autonomous University of Baja California (UABC), School of Accounting and Administration: Centro de Estudios China-Baja California**

Based in Mexicali, Baja California, Mexico
Based at the School of Accounting and Administration, the China-Baja California Studies Center (Centro de Estudios China-Baja California, CECHBC) was established in 2020. It brings together scholars that produce academic research from a multidisciplinary perspective, focusing on economic, business, fiscal, scientific, academic, and cultural aspects of Mexico-China relations, with an emphasis on the State of Baja California. The CECHBC organizes conferences, elective courses such as Entorno de Negocios en China, and seminars, has a podcast on China, and publishes bulletins once a week.

**Autonomous University of Baja California Sur (UABCS): Centro de Estudios Asia Pacífico**
Based in La Paz, Baja California Sur, Mexico
- The UABCS is home to an Asia Pacific Studies Center, as part of the CONMEX-CEAPEC. It organizes seminars and conferences on Asia Pacific topics, including China.

**Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM), Department of Policy and Culture**
Xochimilco campus, Mexico D.F., Mexico
- Among the areas of research developed at the Department of Policy and Culture, the area of International Policy brings together professors and researchers that focus their work in China studies. The UAM not only provides undergraduate and postgraduate training programs that include the study of China, but is also home to researchers who conduct research projects focused mainly on geopolitics and international relations.

**Central America**

**Costa Rica**

**University of Costa Rica (UCR): various units**
Based in San José de Costa Rica, Costa Rica
- The UCR researchers’ work on China include research in different centers and institutes based at the university.
- The School of Modern Languages is home to the above-mentioned Latino (and Hispanic) Americanist Academic Network on Sinological Studies (Red Académica Latino - e Hispano-Americanista sobre Estudios Sinológicos), which has conducted several projects mainly focused on Chinese migrations.
- The UCR’s School of Modern Languages is also home to the first Confucius Institute in Central America, which apart from offering Chinese language and culture courses, organizes conferences about Chinese society and culture, current issues in contemporary China, relations between China and the world, and Chinese migrations to Costa Rica, among other topics. The Institute also organizes the China Studies Symposium.
- The School of Philosophy’s lines of research include the history of philosophy, religion, and culture of China, among others.
- The UCR’s edits the journal Revista Internacional de Estudios Asiáticos, a biannual, multidisciplinary, digital publication dedicated to the study of Asia and its overseas worlds.

**The Caribbean**

**Barbados**
Association for Barbados-China Friendship (ABCF)
Based in St. Joseph, Barbados
(http://www.abcf-bb.com)
- Established in 2019, the ABCF is a voluntary organization that brings together professionals working in other institutions and organizations, and who are motivated to join the association to exchange experiences and information about China-Barbados and China-Caribbean relations. As a voluntary association, all members are encouraged to produce content.
- Aimed at improving mutual understanding between China, Barbados, and the Caribbean, and contributing to a better understanding of the implications of China's presence in the subregion, its main focus is on facilitating personal contacts, cultural exchanges and exchanges of ideas, and the facilitation of business and study links among peoples, based on a "two-way street" relationship.
- Being a pioneer in the Caribbean, ABCF functions as a think tank, seeking to become a network for the entire Caribbean and, as such, a hub for the exchange of information with other institutions and organizations working on China-Latin America.
- ABCF’s research is disseminated through an annual magazine, "Exchanges," as well as news that is updated once a week. Its members also publish their research work in books and papers, and participate in seminars and conferences.

Cuba

Center for World Economy Research (Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial, CIEM)
Based in La Habana, Cuba
- Founded in November 1979 as an autonomous academic institution, the CIEM is considered a reference center on world economic issues in the Latin American and Caribbean region. ①94

Center for International Policy Research (Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional, CIPI)
Based in La Habana, Cuba
- The CIPI was founded in 2010 as an academic institution dedicated to studies in the field of international relations. ①95
- Regarding the study of China, the CIPI’s research focuses on geopolitical issues, such as China’s role in Latin America, in the framework of its rivalry with the United States, and recent Chinese investments in Latin America in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Dominican Republic

Mother and Teacher Pontifical Catholic University (PUCMM): Center for the Caribbean Studies
Based in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
- The Center for the Caribbean Studies (Centro de Estudios Caribeños) was created in 1996. ①96 However, it was not until 2012 that it started to develop research activities, led by Dr. MuKien Adriana Sang Ben. Aimed at developing research, publications, and events from an interdisciplinary approach, among its lines of research, the Center conducts studies on migrations, with a focus on Chinese migrations to the Caribbean.
- The research project "Connected Worlds: The Caribbean, Origin of Modern World" (2019-2021) has been financed by the European Union. In the Dominican Republic, the project has been led by Dr. MuKien Adriana Sang Ben.
Trinidad and Tobago

University of the West Indies (UWI): various units
Headquartered in Jamaica, with campuses in other countries in the Caribbean

- The Saint Augustine campus, located in Trinidad and Tobago, is home to the Institute of International Relations, which was founded in 1966 and dedicated to conducting research and teaching in the field of international relations through its Postgraduate Diploma, MSc, and MPhil/PhD programs, among other short intensive training programs. Although it does not have a specific research center or training programs related to China, researchers based at the Institute have participated in the research project "Connected Worlds: The Caribbean, Origin of Modern World," led by the PUCMM, contributing research that analyzes Chinese migrations in the Great Caribbean.

- The Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES) is based at the Cave Hill campus, located in Barbados. The UWI-Global Belt and Road Research Network, based at the SALISES, is an interdisciplinary research group aimed at informing and evaluating the cooperation between China and the wider Caribbean region. It organizes seminars, symposiums, conferences, and policy forums, with academic institutions and research centers. Research is conducted based in three main thematic areas: investment, trade, and economy; Caribbean international relations; and environment, sustainable development, infrastructure, and technology. The network has also published two bulletins.

- Efforts to create jointly-administered initiatives with universities in LAC include the Chinese Wuhan University establishment of a Caribbean research center with the UWI in Trinidad and Tobago in 2014. However, this center never became operational.

- UWI is also home to a Confucius Institute.

Regional

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) / Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)
Based in Santiago de Chile, Chile, with offices in other LAC countries (https://www.cepal.org/en)

- ECLAC/CEPAL was established in 1948. Headquartered in Santiago de Chile, it is one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations. Among its multiplicity areas of work, ECLAC/CEPAL has made an important contribution to the analysis of China's economic presence in LAC, based on in-depth research that is constantly being disseminated through books, reports, bulletins, as well as in the quarterly journal Revista CEPAL.

- ECLAC/CEPAL has developed the most important system of information in the region about China-LAC economic and trade exchanges, with data and statistics that are constantly being updated, and it is consulted by governments, institutions, researchers, and other professionals.

- Jointly with the Latin-American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), ECLAC/CEPAL created the Latin America - Asia Pacific Observatory (Observatorio América Latina - Asia Pacifico) in 2012, a virtual space where relevant information about the economic and commercial relations between both regions is provided, including specific information about China-LAC relations. The Observatory organizes activities such as conferences, forums, seminars, and webinars, as well as publishes its research and statistics in books, papers, working documents, among other sources.
Latin American Council of Social Sciences / Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
Based in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina
(http://clacso.org)
- Established in 1967, CLACSO is an international non-governmental institution with
  associitative status in UNESCO. It connects 836 research and postgraduate centers in the field
  of social sciences and humanities, located in 55 countries in LAC and other regions.
- CLACSO’s Working Groups bring together researchers from different countries in LAC to
  conduct research and disseminate knowledge based on certain thematic or social problems
  of relevance for the region.
- Selected among the Global South Working Groups for the 2019-2022 period, the “China
  and the map of global power” (China y el mapa del poder mundial) Working Group brings
  together about 40 researchers from all over LAC and Europe. Being the first one to address
  China, this Working Group conducts research about China’s rise in the global system, and the
  consequences for the Global South, and LAC in particular.\(^\text{202}\)
- The China y el mapa del poder mundial Working Group publishes a bulletin, organizes and
  participates in conferences, forums, and seminars, among other activities.\(^\text{203}\)

Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO): various units
Headquartered in Costa Rica, with campuses in several countries in LAC
(http://www.flacso.org)
- The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales,
  FLACSO) is a regional, intergovernmental academic organization currently headquartered
  in Costa Rica, with campuses in several countries in Latin America. China has recently
  been admitted as an Observer State of FLACSO, an accession that allows the promotion of
  academic, diplomatic, and cultural cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Research and teaching about China is promoted at FLACSO’s multiple campuses, while three
  of them concentrate the most important efforts:
  - Costa Rica campus, based in San José
    - This campus is home for the FLACSO’s General Secretariat. As an initiative
      promoted by the Secretariat, the Chair on Contemporary China (Cátedra China
      Contemporánea) was established in 2021, in cooperation with the Chinese Embassy
      in Costa Rica, and the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy
      of Sciences.\(^\text{204}\)
    - The Chair’s activities include training courses, research, and academic exchanges,
      with a focus on four main lines of research: diplomacy and foreign policy,
      environment and climate change, technology and development, and economy
      and trade. So far, the Chair has organized two conference series,\(^\text{205}\) and a series of
      virtual regional courses about contemporary China.\(^\text{206}\)
    - The Chair also has a repository that includes publications such as books and
      papers, as well as videos and a blog.
  - Argentina campus, based in the City of Buenos Aires
    - Based at the Department of International Relations, the Chair on China Studies
      (Cátedra de Estudios sobre China) was created in 2019, aimed at carrying out
      research, teaching, and public debate to open up a comprehensive understanding
      of China as a global power.\(^\text{207}\) Regarding teaching, within the master’s degree in
      International Relations, each semester the Chair opens two training seminars
about China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the implications for its relations with other regions and countries, playing special emphasis on China’s relations with Latin America. The Chair also promotes research and specific study of China through other activities such as the organization of academic conferences and talks, publications, and participation in international conferences.

- The Chair has recently launched the virtual Diploma on Latin America and China Studies (Diplomado Superior en Estudios sobre América Latina y China), aimed at providing an interdisciplinary and multifaceted approach to analyze the links between Latin America and China. The first edition of the program will begin in September 2022. The Diploma has regional scope since it brings together specialists from the entire region with diverse perspectives and approaches to the relationship agendas between China and countries in Latin America.

- Ecuador
  - The Department of International Studies and Communication contributes to the generation of knowledge through the articulation of the fields of international relations and communication. It offers three master’s and one doctorate program, as well as promotes diverse areas of interdisciplinary research.
  - The Department of Development, Environment, and Territories conducts research and teaching about development, territorial dynamics, and socio-environmental systems from a multidisciplinary and critical view.

- Though neither Departments have a specific center dedicated to China studies, research and teaching activities have been developed to include China as a relevant area of study, such as through conducting specific research projects and theses, and offering teaching courses that address China’s role in Latin America and Ecuador.

- FLACSO Ecuador also edits a quarterly journal, Íconos.

**Latin American Association of Asian and African Studies / Asociación Latinoamericana de Estudios de Asia y África (ALADAA)**
(https://aladaainternational.com)

- ALADAA was established in 1976, within the framework of the celebration of the XXX International Congress of Human Sciences of Asia and North Africa, based at the El Colegio de México’s Center for Asian and African Studies (CEAA). It brings together graduates, students, teachers, researchers, and those interested in Asian and African ancient and modern studies.
- Among its activities, ALADAA organizes an international conference, virtual talks and seminars, summer schools on different topics about Asia and Africa, as well as published op-eds.

**Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research / Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES)**
(http://www.cries.org)

- CRIES was established in 1982 in Managua as a research network of research centers, NGOs, professional associations, and foundations. Though it became a regional think tank in 2016, its main goal continued to be promoting the participation of civil society in regional integration processes and in public debate on international relations topics, including both regional and subregional levels, and encouraging the empowerment of civil society networks and organizations in the formulation and implementation of public policies.
- It currently brings together more than 80 national and regional institutions and more than 150
researchers and practitioners. In order to maintain its mandate of conducting independent research, financing comes from multiple institutions in and outside the region.

- Among its lines of research, an important cumulus of knowledge is being produced about the incidence of external actors in LAC’s international insertion, which includes the presence of China in the region.

- CRIES’ research about the implications of China’s role in LAC is mainly conducted by internationalists. Though not being a center for experts in China nor sinologists, it makes important efforts to exchange information with researchers specialized in China, by inviting them to participate in publications, seminars, talks, and conferences, to enrich the center’s own work on topics related to China in LAC.

- CRIES edits a semestral trilingual journal (Spanish, English, and Portuguese) *Pensamiento Propio*.212 It also publishes a series of books, reports, and various Policy Briefs and Policy Memos. It also organizes workshops, seminars, and webinars.

### CHINA

**Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Institute of Latin American Studies** 中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Founded in 1961, it is the first and largest research center for Latin American studies in China.
- Six research units on politics, economy, international relations, society, and culture in Latin America, China-Latin America becoming an important focus.
- Publishes *Journal of Latin American Studies* 拉丁美洲研究, the premier journal in the field in China.
- Hosts the Chinese Association for Latin American Studies 中国拉丁美洲学会 (founded in 1984), the national association for scholars of Latin America.213

**China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations** 中国现代国际关系研究院: various units

Based in Beijing Municipality

- A top-ranked official think tank affiliated with the Ministry of State Security founded in 1965.
- Dedicated research units on Latin America and related topics such as BRI, globalization, G20, and BRIC countries.214

**China Institute of International Studies** 中国国际问题研究院: various units

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Founded in 1956, this is the official think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Dedicated research units on Latin America and the Caribbean and developing countries, aiming to carry out Track II and public diplomacy in the region to facilitate China’s cooperation with the region.215

**Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation** 国际贸易经济合作研究院: various units

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Founded in 1956, this is the official think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce.
• Dedicated research units on the Americas, China-Lusophone Countries Trade, and BRI.216

*Shanghai Institutes for International Studies* 上海国际问题研究院: *various units*

Based in Shanghai Municipality

- Founded in 1960, it is the official think of the Shanghai municipal government.
- Dedicated research units on the Americas and related international themes such global governance and global economy.217

*Peking University* 北京大学: *various units*

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Center for Latin American Studies 拉丁美洲研究中心, virtual center affiliated with the Department of History, one senior historian of Mexico and Latin America, who has written on the history of China-Latin American connections.218
- Guo Jie at School of International Studies 国际关系学院 has written extensively on contemporary China-Latin American connections.219
- Brazilian Cultural Center 巴西文化中心, virtual center affiliated with the School of Foreign languages.220

*Tsinghua University* 清华大学: *various units*

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Center for China-Latin America Management Studies (中国-拉丁美洲管理研究中心, founded in 2010) as part of School of Economics and Management (经济管理学院). Phase II of Tsinghua-Pontifical Catholic University of Chile cooperation funded by Bank of Chile, promoting research collaboration.221 Phase I (2007-9) supports faculty and student exchange programs on Conducting Business in China/Chile.222
- Latin America Center (拉美中心 founded in 2018 in Santiago, Chile) sponsored by LUKSIC Group deepens Tsinghua’s ongoing engagement with Latin America and promotes more collaboration on the ground.223

*Fudan University* 复旦大学: *various units*

Based in Shanghai Municipality

- Center for BRICS Studies (金砖国家研究中心 founded 2012) is the first such center in China that studies China-Brazil connections in the multilateral framework that also includes Russia, India, and South Africa. Maintains BRICS Information Sharing and Exchanging Platform together with the BRICS Business Council, and hosts summer workshops and schools.224
- Research Office for Latin American Studies (拉丁美洲研究室) as part of the Institute of International Studies (国际问题研究院), dates back to 1964, and was one of the earliest Latin American studies programs in China. Only one full-time researcher at present and limited collaboration with FLAUC.225

*Beijing International Studies University: Peru Research Center* 北京第二外国语学院中国秘鲁文化研究中心

Based in Beijing Municipality

- Collaboration with St. Ignatius of Loyola University in Peru to develop a university-based
research center on Latin America in China outside CASS, part of the Department of Spanish and Portuguese, outdated website.\textsuperscript{226}

\textit{Shanghai University: Institute of Global Studies} 上海大学全球问题研究院  
Based in Shanghai Municipality  
- Comprehensive research institute that includes Latin American studies and global themes.\textsuperscript{227}

\textit{Nankai University: Center for Latin American Studies} 南开大学拉丁美洲研究中心  
Based in Tianjin Municipality  
- Legacy program founded in 1991, now virtual center affiliated with the Faculty of History 历史学院  
- Four historians of Latin America who have also written on China-Latin America recently.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{Tianjin Foreign Studies University: Center for Latin American Studies} 天津外国语大学拉丁美洲研究中心  
Based in Tianjin Municipality  
- Founded in 2012, it is one of the few Latin American studies centers approved by the Ministry of Education  
- Integrating existing research capabilities in languages and business in studying China’s presence in the region.\textsuperscript{229}

\textit{Southwest University of Science and Technology: Center for Latin-American and the Caribbean Studies} 西南科技大学拉美研究中心  
Based in Mianyang, Sichuan Province  
- Approved by the Ministry of Education in 2011 as a key area studies program in a non-metropolitan city (neither municipality nor provincial capital).  
- Focus on China-Latin America, and Latin American economy, politics, and culture, extensive research output in monographs and journal articles.\textsuperscript{230}

\textit{Hubei University} 湖北大学: various units  
Based in Wuhan, Hubei Province  
- Research on Brazilian history dating back to 1964, Latin American Institute 拉美研究院 founded in 2017 but no further information.\textsuperscript{231}  
- Center for Latin American Studies 拉丁美洲研究中心 and Center for Brazilian Studies 巴西研究中心 listed on the university website without further information.\textsuperscript{232}

\textit{Anhui University: Institute of Latin America Studies} 安徽大学拉丁美洲研究所  
Based in Hefei, Anhui Province  
- Founded in 2013 with the assistance from the Surinamese embassy in China, later also received support from University of Florida’s Center for Latin American Studies.  
- One of the few university-based institutes with a substantive staff and up-to-date website, but few full-time researchers with solid linguistic training or disciplinary background in the field.\textsuperscript{233}

\textit{Hebei Normal University: Peru Research Center} 河北师范大学秘鲁研究中心  
Based in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province  
- Founded in 2013 with assistance from the Peruvian government and embassy in China.  
- Supporting the Confucius Institute at Ricardo Palma University in Peru, developing Peruvian
studies in China, consulting for Chinese businesses investing in South America, outdated website.234

GLOBAL NORTH

Australia

University of Melbourne, Faculty of Arts, Department of Spanish and Latin American Studies (SOLL)
Based in Melbourne, Australia

- The Department of Spanish and Latin American Studies undertakes research projects in areas such as Hispanic food studies, Spanish and Latin American cinema, Latin American popular culture studies, and research with Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities.235
- Though it does not have a center focused on China-LAC studies, researchers based at the Department conduct research about China’s relations with Latin America.

Europe

Ibero-American Research Network on East Asian Studies / Red Iberoamericana de Investigación en Estudios de Asia Oriental (REDIAO)
Based in Spain
(http://rediao.llf.uam.es/recursos.php)

- READIO was created in 2007 to promote cooperation among experts that conduct research about East Asia in Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries. This network emerged as an initiative of the Center for East Asian Studies of the Autonomous at the University of Madrid (CEAO-UAM) and was supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain. Though the CEAO-UAM is still in operation, and conducts research and teaching about East Asia, with emphasis on China and Japan, the READIO’s website is outdated.
- READIO disseminated the research carried out in various Ibero-American research centers by organizing conferences and seminars. It also edited an annual journal, Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios de Asia Oriental (RIEAO); however, the last edition was published in 2013.236

Spanish Network of Development Studies / Red Española de Estudios del Desarrollo (REEDES)
Based in Spain
(https://reedes.org)

- Established in 2011, REDES is an interdisciplinary academic network specializing in research and teaching on issues of development and international cooperation. Among its research groups, the Research Group on South-South Cooperation and Regional Integrations (Grupo de Investigación en Cooperación Sur-Sur e Integraciones Regionales, GI-CSS) is an online working group that conducts research on South-South cooperation, including China-LAC relations.237 The results of its research are disseminated in journal articles, working papers, and books.
- REDES organizes an international conference that takes place every two years and edits the journal Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios de Desarrollo.238

London School of Economics (LSE), Department of International Relations, Global South Unit (GSU)
Based in London, UK
(https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-relations/centres-and-units/global-south-unit)

- Based in the International Relations Department, the Global South Unit (GSU) is a research
and teaching initiative aimed at investigating the changing role of the South in shaping the global order. Its research and teaching activities include the analysis of China-LAC relations.

- The GSU’s Latin America and China Programme is dedicated to producing knowledge and disseminating information through publications and events. The program aims to contribute to a better understanding of China’s role in Latin America, considering four main axes: public sector, business/private sector, civil society, and academia.

- Teaching about China-LAC relations is conducted in the framework of the course “China and the Global South,” for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate students at the LSE’s programs, and at the master’s in International Relations, a joint LSE and Sciences Po’s program. The LSE-PKU Summer School’s course “China’s Belt Road Initiative: Development as Grand Strategy and the Emerging Global Order” also provides insights on China-LAC relations.

University of East Anglia (UEA), Faculty of Social Sciences, School of International Development
Based in Norwich, UK

- A world-leading center for cross-disciplinary research, teaching, and practice, ranked as one of the top-15 institutions in the world for development studies in 2022, the UEA’s School of International Development was established in 1973. The school is home to the Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility Research Group, aimed at analyzing different aspects of global environmental governance and of North-South trade relations and the implications of the rise of the BRICs, particularly China, for other developing countries. These efforts include addressing the impacts of China’s presence in LAC.

- Teaching about China’s role in LAC is not extensive; there is a lecture/module at the master’s program in International Development that includes case studies about China’s presence in LAC.

University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Humanities, Center for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA)
Based in Amsterdam, The Netherlands (https://www.cedla.nl)

- Since its creation in 1964, the CEDLA has promoted Latin American Studies both by conducting research and distributing the results of this research via academic education at B.A., M.A., and Doctorate levels, and publications.

- Regarding research about China-LAC, efforts have been made to address the impacts of China’s presence in certain sectors in LAC in times when these topics were an emergent issue. More recently, research initiatives include analyzing the role of China in LAC and its implications in the context of geopolitical rivalry with the U.S. However, these initiatives have been more individually- than institutionally-driven.

University of Cantabria, Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences: Chair of International Cooperation and with Ibero-America (COIBA)
Based in Santander, Spain

- Founded in 2006, the Chair of International Cooperation and with Ibero-America (Cátedra de Cooperación Internacional y con Iberoamérica, COIBA) is a research center, aimed at generating and dissemination knowledge through research, teaching, and technical assistance based on a transdisciplinary approach. COIBA’s work focuses on Latin America, with a line of research that analyzes China’s presence in the region.
• COIBA’s research is mainly concentrated in the work of the research group "Human Development and International Cooperation." Regarding China, the group analyzes China’s geopolitical and geoeconomic relations with LAC in the framework of China’s South-South cooperation.

• COIBA’s teaching includes a master’s degree in International Cooperation and Development (Máster Iberoamericano en Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo, MICID). This program includes courses that focus on China-LAC relations.

• Dissemination of knowledge includes publications of journal articles, books, op-eds, and others.

**German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)**
Based in Hamburg, Germany, with office in Berlin

• Established in 2006, after the restructuring of the German Overseas Institute, which was founded in 1964, the GIGA is an independent social science research institute aimed at analyzing political, social, and economic developments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as global issues. 243

• GIGA is part of the Leibniz Association. Funding is mainly provided by the German Federal Foreign Office, the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg (Ministry of Science, Research, Equalities and Districts), and the other federal states.

• Though GIGA does not have a research center focused on addressing China’s presence in LAC, researchers based mainly at GIGA’s Institute for Latin American Studies and the Global Orders and Foreign Policies Research Programme have developed studies about China-LAC relations.

• As part of GIGA’s journals, the quarterly *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* frequently includes articles about China’s role in LAC, as well as special issues that address these topics. 244

**Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Centre for Humanities: Center for Modern East Asian Studies (CeMEAS)**
Based in Göttingen, Germany

• Launched in 2012, the Centre for Modern East Asian Studies (CeMEAS) focuses on research and teaching in the field of East Asian Studies. 245 It is one of the multi-regional and multi-disciplinary research centers at the University.

• In 2021, Dr. Creutzfeldt joined the CeMEAS. Since he is an expert on China-LAC relations, his membership has contributed to expand the Center’s research agenda and includes the analysis of the China-LAC relationship.

**Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)**
Based in Frankfurt, Germany ([https://www.hsfk.de/en/](https://www.hsfk.de/en/))

• Established in 1970 as an independent foundation, PRIF is part of the Leibniz Association. Aimed at combining research with knowledge transfer into policymaking, media, and society, PRIF does not have a research program focusing on China-LAC. However, researchers based at the PRIF’s Interstate Conflict Research Program are pioneers in studies that address the impacts of China’s presence in LAC regarding aspects of center-periphery and geopolitical manifestations.

**Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)**
Headquartered in Bonn and Berlin, with offices in several countries
(https://www.fes.de)

- Established in 1925, FES is a non-profit German foundation funded by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. It has offices in 18 countries in Latin America, which collaborate with the Department for Latin America and the Caribbean in Berlin.
- Among the topics addressed by FES’ offices in LAC, both through co-hosted conferences and publications, China’s presence in the region has been a relevant area of study.
- In Latin America, FES edits the bimonthly journal *Nueva Sociedad* since 1972, currently based in Buenos Aires, Argentina. *Nueva Sociedad* has included articles, as well as special issues about China’s role in LAC.

*Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation*

Headquartered in Berlin, Germany with regional offices in Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and El Salvador
(https://www.boell.de/de)

- Tied to the German Green Party, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation is a think tank that promotes green projects. The Foundation participates in over 100 partner projects across 60 countries. It also supports undergraduate and graduate students in Germany and abroad.  
- The Foundation has international offices in several countries across the world, including in Latin America (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and El Salvador).  
- The Foundation’s office in Bogotá has covered a variety of topics related to ecology, democracy, and other cross-cutting themes, including China and Latin America and the Caribbean. As part of this latter sub theme, the office in Bogotá has published a series of papers from various authors on China-LAC topics, which aims to answer the questions “what is China’s influence on the Latin American economic model?” and “What are the consequences for the region of geopolitical competition between the US and China?” This currently includes papers titled “China: trapped in Colombia’s foreign policy,” “Brazil: Bolsonaro with an anti-China agenda,” “The new triangular relationship between the US, China and Latin America - the case of Mexico,” “Trade between Brazil and China” and “China and Latin America: the connection between El Salvador and the new silk road.”

*United States*

*The Inter-American Dialogue - Asia & Latin America Program*

Based in Washington, DC, with an office in Guatemala City, Guatemala
(https://www.thedialogue.org/programs/programs/china/)

- Based at the think tank Inter-American Dialogue, the Asia & Latin America Program seeks to bring together academics, policymakers, and private sector leaders from Latin America, the United States, and across the Asian region to analyze and produce information about Asia-Latin America relations. Among its activities, the Program organizes meetings, events, as well as produces publications that address areas of interest on both sides of the Pacific.
- The Program is widely recognized as a hub for knowledge production about China-LAC, since it is constantly developing research content that includes articles, reports, and other sources, either by researchers based at the Program, or in cooperation with other institutions. Research topics include China's provision of finance and investment in infrastructure projects in LAC, as well as developments in trade facilitation, and people-to-people exchanges.
- In particular, the Program is well-known for the efforts made to track China’s financial activity
in LAC. Since 2015, it has been working on a database on Chinese policy bank’s provision of loans to Latin America, the China-Latin America Finance Database, co-produced with the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. More recently, the Program’s team has elaborated a database on Chinese commercial bank’s lending to the region, the China-Latin America Commercial Loans Tracker.

- Apart from the research agenda, the Program created the China-Latin America Young Scholars, a program that brings together young experts from Latin America, China, and the U.S. to engage in collaborative research. Also, the China-Latin America Working Group, which was established in 2011, engages experts and practitioners to analyze political and economic trends in the China-LAC relationship.

**The Wilson Center, Latin American Program**

Based in Washington, DC

(https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/latin-american-program)

- Based at the think tank The Wilson Center, the Latin American Program provides research analysis for policymakers, private sector leaders, journalists, and public intellectuals in the United States and Latin America about issues of global and regional concern. Aimed at mixing academic study with public policy, the program’s publications include reports, and issue briefs, while its activities cover the organization of events, the realization of podcasts and videos, among others.

- Among the program’s publications and events, China’s presence in LAC and its impacts is being addressed as an important area of study.

**Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China Local/Global**

Based in Washington, DC

(https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/chinalocalglobal?lang=en)

- Based at the think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and with the support of the Ford Foundation, the China Local/Global research project has developed a series of analysis about Chinese engagement in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia—with a focus on Chinese strategies in localities, and the extent to which Chinese actors adapt to local realities.

- In Latin America, the project has so far developed analysis of China’s role in different sectors in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Ecuador.

**Atlantic Council, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center: China-Latin America**

Based in Washington, DC

(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/adrienne-arsht-latin-america-center/china-latin-america/)

- Founded in 1961, the Atlantic Council is a think tank aimed at examining political, economic, and security issues, covering Asia, the Americas, and other regions, in addition to Europe.

- Among the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s programs, the China-Latin America program provides insights on China-LAC through multi-perspective analyses and events. Dissemination of knowledge includes interviews, issue briefs, reports, experts and policymakers’ insights, as well as the organization of events.

**Global Americans**
The think tank Global Americans conducts research and analysis on various topics about the Americas. Among its themes, Global Americans’ research and analysis cover Asia and Latin America, and publishes experts’ articles and research papers, as well as opinion pieces and editorials about China’s presence in LAC. Activities also involve organizing events. Recent publications include a research project conducted in cooperation with other institutions, aimed at understanding the dissemination of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the role of external actors, including China.

Being a regional division of ISA, the Latin America and the Caribbean regional division (ISA/LAC) is a hub for cooperation, collaboration, and networking among scholars and students of International Relations residing in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Aimed at reinforcing dialogue between scholars residing in LAC and promoting greater internationalization of the region’s IR community, ISA/LAC functions as a natural interlocutor between experts working on IR topics in LAC and China, respectively. Since research work about China-LAC is included among ISA/LAC’s themes of analysis but not as an exclusive one, ISA/LAC functions as a relevant nucleus for broader interactions among scholars and students dedicated to IR topics both in LAC countries and in China. ISA/LAC, and ISA in a border sense, have the potential to become an important hub for interlocution among Latin American and Chinese experts working on China-LAC, but also among experts working on China in the Global South.

Being the world’s largest professional association that brings together individuals and institutions dedicated to the study of Latin America, LASA promotes intellectual debate, research, and teaching about Latin America, the Caribbean, and their inhabitants throughout the Americas. Organized for the first time in 2022, the LASA/Asia 2022 was the first LASA Continental Congress on Asia and Latin America, aimed at opening an opportunity to collaborate and work on the theoretical and practical problems that arise in Asia and Latin America. This new initiative brings together two regions’ academic assets, to exchange ideas that address the same problems from different perspectives, based on three main tracks: Asia and LAC relations; Asia and LAC comparative studies; and Asia and LAC intellectual encounters. LASA/Asia is a promising platform for academic interactions and dissemination of knowledge on Asian and Latin American studies. However, it faces the challenge of building a more robust hub, aimed at bringing together experts residing in China and LAC, respectively, apart from just connecting those that address China-LAC relations outside the region.

Founded in 2017, the Global Development Policy Center (GDPC) conducts policy research
and engages in policy dialogue with policymakers, civil society, and the media. The GDPC’s Global China Initiative addresses Chinese overseas economic activity through different research programs; in the case of the LAC research program, it examines China’s impacts on LAC’s regional economies, environmental management, and human development.

- In partnership with the Inter-American Dialogue, GCI researchers created a database, the China-Latin America Finance Database, which tracks loans from the China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank to LAC governments and state-owned enterprises. The LAC program also produces an annual bulletin on China-LAC economic ties, as well as working papers, policy briefs, and other sources.
- This program’s research production is a reference for consultation both in the Global North and in Latin America.

**American University, Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS)**
Based in Washington, DC
([https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm](https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm))

- A multidisciplinary research center aimed at producing and disseminating knowledge about Latin America, the Caribbean, and Latino communities in the United States. The main research areas are inclusion, governance, security, international relations, environment, and regional and country studies.
- China’s role in LAC has been widely addressed in research projects, publications, and events. Recently, jointly with CRIES, CLALS has conducted a project about China in LAC that was founded by the Institute for War & Peace Reporting and the U.S. Department of State. The project analyzes China’s communication strategies in LAC, and its impacts on elite and public perceptions across the region.

**The George Washington University (GWU), Elliott School of International Affairs**
Based at Washington, DC ([https://elliott.gwu.edu](https://elliott.gwu.edu))

- Though the GWU does not have a center or institute that focuses on China-LAC studies, experts based at the Elliot School’s Institute for International Economic Policy and other research centers and institutes do conduct research and provide teaching at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels on China’s role in LAC.

**Johns Hopkins University (JHU): various units**
Based in Baltimore, MD, with campuses in Washington, DC, and facilities in China and Italy ([https://www.jhu.edu](https://www.jhu.edu))

- Though the JHU does not have a center or institute that focuses on China-LAC studies, multiple efforts have been made to promote the study of China’s presence in LAC and its various implications.
- Efforts to address China’s engagement with LAC include undergraduate and graduate training at the JHU’s Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, and at the School of Advanced International Studies. Also, there are distinguished researchers that work on China-LAC relations that either teach at the JHU or have contributed as visiting fellows. In addition, there are doctoral and postdoctoral students conducting projects in this area of study.

**University of Southern California (USC), Department of Political Science and International Relations**
Based in Los Angeles, CA ([https://dornsife-poir.usc.edu](https://dornsife-poir.usc.edu))

- The USC does not have a center or institute that focuses on China-LAC studies. However,
important efforts have been made to address China’s presence in LAC, and its impacts for development.

- Efforts to address China-LAC relations include teaching in the USC’s undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate programs in Political Science and International Relations. Also, there are distinguished researchers based at the Department that have been working on China-LAC relations for decades, as well as doctoral and postdoctoral researchers conducting projects on this area of study.

**University of Pittsburgh: China-Latin America Research Initiative (CLARI)**
Based in Pittsburgh, PA

- Joint effort launched in 2015 by Asian Studies Center, Center for Latin American Studies, and University Center for International Studies.
- Involving researchers in China, Latin America, and the United States, studying the past and present of China-Latin America relations and the broad Pacific World.  
- Dedicated research guide developed by the university library.
- Proximity to Latin American Studies Association, also based in Pittsburgh.

**William & Mary, Aid Data: Chinese Development Finance**
Based in Williamsburg, VA

(https://www.aiddata.org/cdfp)

- Being a research lab at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute, financed by multiple institutions, AidData was established to provide data on foreign assistance projects worldwide, and thus to keep track of development investments and outcomes.
- Among AidData’s programs, the Chinese Development Finance was created aimed at tracking the universe of Chinese government-financed development projects and categorizing them according to established international aid reporting standards. This track includes data on China’s development finance in LAC.
- Researchers based at the Chinese Development Finance program disseminate the results of their research by publishing journal articles and policy reports, as well as in conferences and talks organized by AidData.

**Florida International University in Miami (FIU): various units**
Based in Miami, FL

- Founded in 1985, the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy is based at Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, aimed at promoting the study of public policy and national security studies. Researchers and professors based at the Institute not only teach but also conduct research about topics related to China-LAC relations in multiple aspects, including Chinese tech penetration in the region and its implications for security.
- Based on China’s efforts to establish agreements with the U.S. specializing in Latin American studies, FIU and Qingdao University established a joint program in Spanish language studies.

**University of Puget Sound: various units**
Based in Tacoma, WA

(https://www.pugetsound.edu)

- Though the University of Puget Sound does not have a center or institute that focuses on
China-LAC studies, Dr. Monica DeHart, who is based at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and is the director of the Global-Development Studies Program, is an expert on China-LAC relations. Her teaching and research contributions have promoted the expansion of the University’s research agenda to the analysis of China-LAC relationship, particularly, China’s engagement with Central America.

**Brown University: various units**

Based in Providence, RI

- Brown University does not have a center or institute that focuses on China-LAC studies. However, important efforts have been made to address China’s presence in LAC, through different perspectives.
- There are distinguished researchers based at the Department of History and the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs who have been working on China-LAC relations for decades, as well as doctoral and postdoctoral researchers that have conducted projects about China-LAC engagement.

**University of California, Irvine (UCI), School of Social Sciences**

Based in Irvine, CA

([https://uci.edu](https://uci.edu))

- Though the UCI does not have a center or institute that focuses on China-LAC studies, Dr. Gustavo Olivera, who is based at the School of Social Sciences, is an expert on China-LAC economic relations; his membership has contributed to expand the school’s research and teaching, as well as promoted mentorship for undergraduate and graduate students.
NOTES

1 Links in the notes and references are current as of the date of publication but may change over time. United Nations Comtrade. 2022. UN Comtrade database. https://comtrade.un.org/


7 Because social and environmental issues are often the subject of NGO work, these institutions’ publications are cited in this section as opposed to other sections of the literature review.

8 See Ray et. al (2017) for a comparison of regulations from Chinese banks/the state and other multilateral lenders (17).

9 See Ray et. al (2017), figure 1.3, which shows the proportion of total LAC exports to China (and overall) in agriculture, manufacturing, and extraction. The data in figure 1.4 also shows that the largest proportion of mergers and acquisitions from China have been in extraction oil and gas.

10 For example, Jenkins (2019) sets forth that “there is insufficient evidence to make systematic comparisons between Chinese and other transnational companies in terms of their impacts on local communities” (294).

11 Chapter 4 in Ray et. al (2017), by Ray and Chimienti, describes the case of Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental, both Chinese state-owned companies. They find that, while these companies have performed relatively well so far, they are faced with new land concessions in the Ecuadoran Amazon that present new challenges for Ecuador’s social and environmental legal framework and the companies themselves.

12 See Ray et. al (2017), in which various chapters describe advances in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru in terms of environmental, labor, and indigenous protection regulations.

13 https://latsustentable.org/en/directrices-chinas/
Jenkins (2019) states that "the extractivist model of capital accumulation in the region long pre-dates the appearance of China on the scene. While external demands contribute to increased environmental pressures, the way in which these are tackled is an internal problem" (317).

In Ray et. al (2017) the authors use Colombia's coal extraction as a case study, citing poverty and a lack of state presence despite the industry's significant contribution to economic growth.


See Jenkins 2019; Dussel Peters and Armony 2017; and Ray et. al 2017.

Jenkins argues that it "seems unlikely that the total additional employment created by Chinese outward FDI (OFDI) and infrastructure projects in the region is anywhere near the 600,000 estimated by Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) once account is taken of the fact that a high proportion of Chinese FDI has come through mergers and acquisitions rather than greenfield investment and that most of the employment included for projects only lasts during the construction phase, with relatively few permanent jobs created" (290).

For example, with regards to manufacturing, Jenkins (2019) shows that, while manufacturing employment has been negatively affected by trade with China from 1995-2011, the percentage represented of overall manufacturing employment is still small, even for Mexico, which is the most severely affected by this (see Table 11.1, 286).

In addition, with regards to the impact of trade on employment, Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) note that "both final consumption and changes in labor productivity are the main factors in understanding job oscillations in the countries considered [Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico]... changes in labor productivity, final consumption and investment still play a more important role than Latin American foreign trade" (28).

In terms of Chinese infrastructure and other projects, both Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) and Jenkins (2019) note that these employment numbers do not reflect long-term jobs (as they mostly last through the construction phase), and employment in the post-project phases accounts for a much smaller proportion of overall jobs.

Wise (2020) notes that, between 2001-2018, Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica had higher average growth rates than the larger economies of the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), and finds the latter's decisions to pursue free trade agreements (FTAs) with China as "prudent," helping them gain access to the Chinese market (232).

Artuc, Lederman, and Rojas (2015) find that in Brazil and Argentina, negative employment effects in some industries are offset by positive effects in others, while in Mexico there was no such offsetting, "reducing employment in the long run" (based on a study of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Dussel Peters and Armony (2017) find Brazil and Mexico on opposite ends of the spectrum in
terms of the employment impact of imports/exports to China (based on a study of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico using data from the OECD Input-Output Tables (IOTs), 2015 edition).

25 Ray et al. (2017) argues, "While China should not be blamed for the bulk of Latin America’s environmental and social problems, it would be wise to mitigate the impacts of its overseas activities to maintain good relations with host countries and to reduce the risks of international investment" (3).

26 See Wise (2020), who suggests the “passivity” of six LAC countries with respect to competition from China, and the need for promotional policies that take advantage of the “China boom” (232). See also Gallagher (2016). While not referring to labor dynamics specifically, Gallagher makes a more general comment related to this and citing Santiago Levy and Justin Yifu about the need to focus on industrialization, innovation, and infrastructure, among others to foster inclusive sustainable development (154-5).

27 Apart from those cited, see also, for example, Dussel Peters (2018b) for case studies based on interviews with Chinese companies in Mexico, Huawei and Sinatex; see Ray et al. (2017) for various case studies on the social and environmental impacts of Chinese trade and investment.


29 http://www.sociales.uba.ar/institutos/centros/centro-de-estudios-de-argentina-china-ceach/

30 http://fleo.usal.edu.ar/fleo_carrera-estudios-orientales

31 https://www.innovat.org.ar/agencia/


33 https://www.conicet.gov.ar/directorio-del-conicet-17-y-18-de-febrero/

34 https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/se-lanzo-el-centro-chino-argentino-de-estudio-de-politicas-para-la-innovacion-y-la

35 https://ceaa.colmex.mx/maestria/estudios-de-asia-y-africa/areas-de-especializacion#area-china

LASA/Asia 2022, held in February 2022, was the first continental congress (https://asia.lasaweb.org/en/). Organized by LASA and the East Asian Network of Latin American Studies, the discussion followed three thematic tracks, including "Asia and LAC relations," "Asia and LAC, Comparative Studies," and "Asia and LAC intellectual encounters."


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| 79 | https://cursos.uncaus.edu.ar/cursos/3M5X5WKQKE |
| 81 | https://bolivia.fes.de/actividades/conversatorio-geopolitica-de-la-tecnologia-en-bolivia-el-desembarco-digital-chino |
| 82 | https://www.inesad.edu.bo |
| 83 | http://www.cides.edu.bo/index.php |
| 86 | https://www.bricspolicycenter.org/painelchina/index.php?&lg=en |
| 87 | https://www.cebri.org/br/nucleo/4/asia |
| 88 | https://direitorio.fgv.br/pesquisa/nebc-nucleo-de-estudos-brasil-china |
| 89 | https://beltandroadbrazil-direitorio.fgv.br |
| 90 | http://www.gebc.relacoesinternacionais.unicamp.br; http://www.gr.unicamp.br/ceav/content/ceav_apresentacao.php |
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| 97 | https://www.pucsp.br/geap/geap/gearp.htm |
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LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN-CHINA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS: STATE OF THE FIELD

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- http://cea.uanl.mx
- https://www.buap.mx/content/instituto-de-ciencias-sociales-y-humanidades
- http://wsp.buap.mx
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* Author names appear here as they appear in the publication referenced; we have chosen to do this in order to avoid imposing our own editorial choices on authors and how they render their names. For example, for scholars writing in Chinese, author names appear family name first; for scholars writing in English, we follow the name order of the publication. This means that for references where Chinese scholars are writing in English, family name often comes last; but in some instances, even when publishing in English, Chinese scholars maintain Chinese name order. In the in-text citations throughout this report, where there are multiple works by scholars with the same family name, we have included each author’s complete name (or, for multi-authored works, the first author’s complete name) to avoid confusion.


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