

# Artificial Intelligence, Digital Media, and African Peacebuilding

Reflections on Emerging Opportunities & Challenges for Scholarly Writing

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AFRICAN PEACEBUILDING NETWORK  
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# Artificial Intelligence, Digital Media, and African Peacebuilding

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## Technology is Tooling Us

When it comes to the use of technology in peacebuilding, it is important to consider that technology is not just a tool. This has been argued in different fields and previous scholarship. However, in relation to the technology-peacebuilding nexus, I propose peacebuilders adopt a slightly different approach. We should not assume that technology is inherently positive, for it does not automatically lead to positive social change. In fact, it is imperative that we pay careful attention to the negative, even violent uses of technology. The questions to ask instead are these: Is digital technology creating the conditions for more polarization, discord, and (eventually) violence? Or does digital technology offer new and exciting ways to connect, find common ground, and work towards positive social change?

We know from experience that both are possible and it is not just a matter of how we choose to use technology. Although it is useful to understand the role that technology can play as a tool for building peace, we should also recognize that technology cannot be limited to just being a neutral tool as some practitioners have suggested. It is important to further acknowledge that in some contexts, the relationship between digital technology and social change can be significantly problematic and challenging to unpack. As such, technology cannot be described as neutral when it fundamentally alters the human experience. Some research is beginning to show that digital technologies are changing our incentives, affecting how we construct discourse and altering how we build our identities. This is something peacebuilders must always be on the lookout for.

Considering the above proposition, let us examine how digital technologies can be applied to build social cohesion and ultimately, peace.

A broad examination of how technology is used to address global conflict reveals that although this is an emerging field that is eliciting much interest among donors and enthusiasm in practitioners,<sup>1</sup> some have argued that there remain challenging questions in academia on how to conceptualize and categorize it,<sup>2</sup> with others noting that it is a field in a liminal space, still ambiguous and with undefined boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the challenge on how to theorize this space, there have been efforts to identify areas in peace programming where technology can be significantly and meaningfully applied.

In 2013, Larrauri and Kahl<sup>4</sup> sought to address this need for conceptual framing and creating a theoretical grounding in this space. They began mapping a classification of the main functions of information communication technologies (ICTs) in relation to peacebuilding work. This classification would later be combined with others in the field<sup>5</sup> into an iterated framework that maps three affordances of technology in peacebuilding.<sup>6</sup>

This integrated framework puts forward three key classifications of technology affordances that are crucial to peacebuilding: Data, strategic communications, dialogue and networking. Data is framed as the ability of peacebuilders to gather, analyse and visualize data about peace and conflict in new ways, involving new or different actors. Here, conflict analysis is enhanced using technology to understand conflict contexts better and inform peacebuilding interventions.

Dialogue and networking functions of technology help build the capacity of peacebuilders to create new spaces for people to connect and discuss issues of peace by facilitating representation in online mediation, enhancing deliberation, mobilizing people and resources, and enabling collective action.

This framework is continually being updated with a rolling review of how technology is used to build peace globally even as new technologies such as artificial intelligence or virtual reality technologies emerge. While this space is continually evolving, this next section uses the above framework to offer some practical examples in Africa (where possible) of how technologies create the conditions for more polarization and conversely offer new and exciting ways to connect, find common ground and work towards positive social change.

## **Data**

Ten years ago, ProPublica<sup>7</sup> encouraged Facebook users to share the categories of interest that the social media platform had assigned to them, with an aim of trying to understand how Facebook categorizes such interests. Facebook users shared diverse categories, from “Pretending to Text in Awkward Situations” to “Breastfeeding in Public.” In total, this exercise gathered more than 52,000 unique attributes that Facebook had used to classify its users.

This exercise was done publicly, suggesting that there are still more unique attributes that Facebook uses that were not captured by ProPublica due to privacy considerations.

It further shows that digital technologies enable the gathering and categorizing of data from the public in a faster and easier way than previous methods of pre-digital technology. This can easily create conditions for data exploitation for polarization, as seen in the case of Cambridge Analytica, where this data was harvested and used to develop algorithms to understand users' personality traits, with a goal of influencing the outcome of presidential elections<sup>8</sup> in multiple countries by catalyzing polarization between communities.

Alternatively, data has been used to forecast violent conflict in various jurisdictions and to analyze historical violence to better understand how prevention of violent conflict can be achieved.

In 2022, Build Up - a peacebuilding organization that works at the intersection of violent conflict and digital technologies - monitored social media platforms for hateful content in the lead up to the 2022 general elections in Kenya.<sup>9</sup> By analyzing social media data from 2019, it was possible to identify hateful online patterns that had resulted in violence offline.

For instance, looking at online hate against women in 2019, it was possible to see that violence against women was being justified using traditional ideologies, cultural norms, and identities around masculinity. As a result, when COVID-19 hit in 2020 and the country went into lockdown, there was a surge of gender-based violence across Kenya as perpetrators were now locked indoors with their targeted victims.<sup>10</sup> The online hate manifested itself offline.



This use of data provides a glimpse into the issue of gender-based violence, and how the 2019 data analysis was signaling or forecasting offline violence in a conducive environment such as a lockdown. Within the same program, Build Up further analysed how misinformation and disinformation was spreading on social media. The identification of malicious conduit accounts that would gather information from credible sources and then manipulate it to advance their agenda, and later have the manipulated and falsified information consumed by their followers, was key to understanding how information moves and is consumed online in Kenya. This data would later be shared with peacebuilding and fact-checking organizations to inform their interventions around disinformation and misinformation.

Data has also been used to forecast violent events in electoral contexts. In 2019 while monitoring the South African elections, Gichuhi<sup>11</sup> and his colleagues at the PeaceTech Lab used historical violence data in the country from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), hate speech data,

online, and political speech offline to forecast the xenophobic attacks and share the forecasts with local law enforcement agencies.

As shown, data is vital for peacebuilders. However, few peacebuilding organizations in Africa have inhouse data expertise and capabilities. As a result, they are constantly playing catch up, responding to conflict belatedly and remaining limited in fully grasping social patterns in conflict and hateful rhetoric that can be seen from conflict data and applied to forecast critical events.

### **Strategic Communications**

Digital technologies enable peacebuilders to reach people with content and stories surrounding peace. The ability to share information with the public, and have them engage with it and exchange with each other, generates more information from communities, which ends up in collective learning, reflecting different ideologies that other people can learn from. Similarly, malicious actors are also acutely aware of this affordance. By viewing information as a theatre of war, they can reach multitudes with targeted and curated false and harmful information to sway opinions, win the hearts of many, and eventually mobilize them towards violence.

Today, digital technologies enable the microtargeting of the public at a price. In the lead up to the 2022 elections in Kenya, the majority of top advertising spenders on Meta (Facebook), in Kenya, were politicians.<sup>12</sup> While this is not problematic, the concern was that peacebuilding actors, human rights defenders, good governance, and social accountability practitioners were missing from the top spenders. This translated to Kenyans being bombarded with political messaging supporting the different candidates and political parties in that period. When the content is mainly on political competition, negative polarization can easily be catalyzed, leading to an “us” vs “them” mentality, frequently demonstrated in online discourse. It is therefore imperative to have a third voice or third space in highly polarized contexts, that can assist in depolarizing the public by raising other important elements of an election, such as how to make the process inclusive, efficient, and transparent. This shifts the conversation into something more inclusive<sup>13</sup> and points to a much-needed investment in the affordances offered by technology to deliver strategic communications by actors working towards society cohesion.

Malicious actors that choose not to use these functions offered by digital platforms - which come with some restrictions to safeguard platform users - opt for “gaming” the system by participating in coordinated inauthentic behaviors<sup>14</sup> to manufacture consensus.<sup>15</sup> In the same period of 2022, analysis of social media networks by Build Up revealed a group of 20-30 social media users-for-hire that would promote false narratives and hashtags on X in support or opposition of a political candidate or party.

From 3 am to 6 am, they would retweet each other through a network of inauthentic accounts, creating a flurry of activity (including getting the hashtags trending) and ultimately appearing on the trending section of X. When other Kenyans would get up in the morning and check X, they would see these specific hashtags trending and assume that many Kenyans were supporting it. In reality, it was a few actors behind this coordination to misrepresent what Kenyans were saying online.

This allows malicious actors to trick algorithms and bypass the safeguards built into the digital platforms that would, for instance, label content as an “advertisement” so that users consume it knowing that it is not organic content. This level of sophistication and coordination points to an industry of influence involving a few people hired to influence the online public towards negative polarization and conflict.<sup>16</sup>

On the affordance of strategic communications, peacebuilders in Africa are still learning the complexities of how social media platforms function, and how they can be manipulated to divide communities. There are, however, campaigns run by peace actors that try to use organic engagement on digital platforms to communicate with the public. A close inspection of these campaigns shows that they are often short-term and non-sustainable, being a reactive rather than a continuous program that can be applied even when there is less tension in communities. Peacebuilders have also struggled to successfully target their campaigns content toward perpetrators of harm and violence, where intervention is needed most.<sup>17</sup> As peacebuilders try to make their information accessible to the public and engage on topics of peacebuilding, the primary aim has been to go viral with their online campaigns. Virality has been viewed as a successful way to get the public behind a common cause; however, these can easily turn to activist campaigns that move away from peacebuilding. Campaigns, such as #thisflag in Zimbabwe, #EndSars in Nigeria, #RhodesMustFall in South Africa, and #Kony2012 in Uganda, that have been used to address conflict among other things - all considered to be successful in their reach – are activism campaigns that have applied strategic communications. It is, however, important to differentiate these from peacebuilding campaigns. While some emerged to address violent conflict, they involved direct action, protests, and advocacy to achieve specific social, political, or environmental changes. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, emphasizes addressing the *root causes* of conflict, fostering reconciliation, and building sustainable peace through dialogue, mediation, and community-level initiatives.

## **Dialogue and Networking**

Digital technologies enable the creation of new spaces for people to talk, connect, and organize.



While this affordance can facilitate representation in political processes, enhance better connections to allow for better deliberation between groups, and mobilization of people and resources, to inspire more empathy, promote collaboration and collective action, this is one area that peacebuilders in Africa are yet to ventured into.

In 2017 and 2019, Build Up implemented two projects on Facebook and X that tested protocols for addressing filter bubbles and polarizing behaviors that have become destabilizing factors in civic conversations in the USA and Kenya.<sup>18</sup> The team was able to show that exposing social media users to an opportunity to experience a new way to have conversations about issues and values that are important to them and in society, leads to users seeing others and themselves more holistically: as reasonable, multi-faceted, and value driven. After a conversation through these projects, the users are more likely to practice model civility and respect on Twitter and Facebook.<sup>19</sup> In these programs, the dialogue was taking place on the same platforms mired in constant division. It is, however, a challenging undertaking to cut through the noise polarizing the public, and have civil discourse on hot-button issues. In Kenya, those that were facilitating dialogue on social media expressed concerns that they might also be targeted by those trying to divide the public.

To address this challenge, digital deliberative technologies can be deployed in polarized contexts. Deliberative technologies enable a large-scale exchange of views between the public in an iterative discussion, allowing participants to evolve in their understanding.<sup>20</sup> They can further provide anonymity to enable full expression by participants while protecting them from bullying and harassment online. These technologies provide alternative spaces for dialogue and deliberation, away from the trends driving toxic polarization and populism on social media.

In Kenya, Build Up tested the use of deliberative technologies. Amongst these was Pol.is - a real-time system for gathering, analyzing, and understanding what large groups of people think in their own words, enabled by advanced statistics and machine learning. During a public participation process by the government to gather views from the public on how to improve the public participation bill, the project team deployed Pol.is. The process began with an awareness campaign on social media to inform the public that there was a bill up for deliberation, and their views were needed.

The public would then be offered a link that would direct them to Pol.is, to share their views and vote on whether they agreed, disagreed, or were unsure with the views submitted by other Kenyans. This resulted in over 500 Kenyan youth submitting their views on public participation bill and from these, the platform was able to show - through machine learning - the submissions that most people had consensus on.



These views were later compiled and submitted as a collective memorandum to the government.<sup>21</sup> This approach differed significantly from previous processes in the country, which involved a barrage of toxic content bullying and harassing others when trying to gather views from the public on social media.

The use of dialogue and networking tools by African peacebuilders is still new and yet to be fully embraced. More research is needed to fully understand what gaps exist beyond digital divides, that limit this adoption. Today, there are different possibilities as these tools begin to adopt Artificial Intelligence to enhance how users can make sense of the massive data in public discourse and move towards cohesion.

Applied to this paper, violent armed conflict (which is equated with terror-related violence) manifests in the use of destructive measures by an armed non-state actor, like Boko Haram, against “soft targets” (especially unarmed individuals and communities) and “hard targets” (such as strategic infrastructure and population centers), with the goal of causing fear, intimidation, coercion, and acquiescence on the part of the citizens and, more generally, forcing the state to compromise its core values. These extreme violent measures include suicide bombing, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping, abduction, and assassinations. By challenging the core values and organising principles of the state, terrorist violence tends to erode the legitimacy of the state and its constituted authority.

### **Enter Artificial Intelligence**

As dialogue and networking tools begin to adopt artificial intelligence functions, it is important to note that AI is also shaping conflicts and cohesion in Africa.

In my ongoing work of monitoring conflict trends in the Ethiopian online space, the use of artificially generated images and videos to push divisive narratives around the violent conflict in northern Ethiopia (The Tigray war) was witnessed on social media. In one instance, a social media user uploaded an AI-generated video of military tanks carrying missiles with the caption “Ethiopian Army” on TikTok, with a post under the video noting that the Ethiopian army is moving to northern Ethiopia to attack the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Videos like these are transforming how influence operations are being used in conflict. Fact-checkers are now grappling to understand how they can verify AI images and videos as the technology improves at a rapid pace. Additionally, the access and ease of AI tools is increasing while laws and policies to regulate the technology are slowly trying to catch up. The result is that social media, which massively reduced the cost of dissemination, is now paired with generative AI which has reduced content generation costs to almost zero. This combination means that violent conflicts can easily be infiltrated by content generated by AI to reach and further divide a wider public.

Despite this awareness of how AI tools are used to foster conflict, and their potential to promote dialogue and improve data analysis, it should not be a direct ticket for peacebuilders to immediately adopt these tools as plug and play. It is imperative to realize that AI exists within a global infrastructure, where the developers of the tools are situated; the data used to train the AI models is hosted; and where geopolitical goals are designed and pursued. Understanding these dynamics helps peacebuilders have an idea of why some AI tools work differently from others, before choosing to deploy them in their programming.

### **Information Asymmetry**

The release of AI tools to the public can be argued to have been done towards the end of 2022, with most of the tools thereafter coming from the United States of America. Two years later, the release of DeepSeek AI and Kimi AI models from China triggered a conversation from multiple actors pointing out how the new AIs are biased and favoring Chinese propaganda in their responses. Many of them have called on the public to avoid these AI models at all costs, further citing privacy concerns. These developments and conversations reveal that, first, the developers of these technologies are situated mainly in the USA or China (with a few spread-out in Europe) and second, there is a fierce global AI race that involves framing some AI tools as being better than others, and others as problematic or being biased. This is questionable since previous scholarship shows that all AI tools have some form of bias due to information asymmetry.

While some companies have tried to update their models to reduce bias, the challenge of information asymmetry globally persists. Africa Peacebuilding Network (APN) fellow Dr. Edwin Ngowi recently researched the most productive author on the Africa Peacebuilding Journal and found that he was not an African.<sup>22</sup> It was Allard Duursma, a European based in Zurich. While there is no problem in non-Africans researching Africa, the paucity of Africans researching the continent is reflected in the literature and the data used to train AI tools and models. This information asymmetry is not only present in peacebuilding but in other fields as well. If many research papers published are from the global North and in the major global languages, then the information used by AI tools to make sense of the world will replicate this asymmetry.

It is important to consider that this asymmetry extends beyond the volume of data or research from different parts of the world, as it impacts the metrics that are used in measuring research output. For instance, if one article has over 1000 citations, it is more likely to be referenced than 1000 articles that have 1 citation. As such, it is not enough that African researchers in peacebuilding simply increase their volume of writing if their material is not being consumed and cited, though it is still a start.

A practical example of how this bias shows up in the daily use of AI tools is seen when asking one of the commercial AI image generators to generate an image of a Kenyan peacebuilder and that of a French peacebuilder.

In its results, for the Kenyan depiction, the AI presents four images of individuals that seem to belong to a military regiment or a militia group (see images below). In two of the images, the individuals are seen to also be carrying firearms. While military actors can be peacebuilders, it is the full militarization of all the actors and the lack of diversity in the images to include other sectors in Kenya involved in peacebuilding that is problematic, even perhaps biased towards how the tool seems to view peacebuilding and conflicts in Africa. This perpetuates information asymmetry in Africa Peace Studies literature, as previously shown by Dr. Ngowi. In the case of France, however, the result is different. There is some racial and gender diversity, and the AI also presents white birds - supposedly doves - to depict peace, which raises the question whether the birds are peacebuilders. Nevertheless, there is no aspect of militarization despite France deploying thousands of troops in Francophone West Africa for peacekeeping missions and to support peacebuilding efforts.<sup>23</sup>



*Figure 2. Image results from a commercial AI image generator when prompted to generate an image of a Kenyan peacebuilder*



*Figure 3. Image results from a commercial AI image generator when prompted to generate an image of a French peacebuilder*

While these biases show up in image generation and can be seen and corrected immediately, peacebuilders need to think of ways these same biases can be hidden in volumes of text, when the AI is analyzing massive amounts of data from the public on their views about an inclusive democracy. Will it fully represent what the public needs and wants, or will biases from information asymmetry skew the data?

It is important to note that some of the biases are not due to information asymmetry but deliberate design.

## Deliberate Design

Artificial Intelligence model developers can choose not to diversify the information their machines analyze or opt to provide the models with information that is intentionally biased. This can be due to legal restrictions in their jurisdictions, geopolitical goals, investors' direction, among other things. In this instance, the power rests with the developers of the tools - to decide what they can and cannot accept. Such decisions and the critical information that is used to train AI models is usually not available to peacebuilders, and some of these intentional designs might work against peace processes when these tools are deployed to the public to address violent conflict. It is therefore important, where possible, to understand technology design choices before adopting and deploying these tools. Investing in researching the suitability of these tools for peacebuilding in African contexts is crucial. This is partly because studies have shown that African languages are rarely prioritized in the development of these tools - a deliberate design choice - yet these tools are available in African markets. In instances of violent conflict, communities can shift languages from English, French, or Portuguese to their native languages to signal their ethnic identities and their allegiances; they can further code their conversations to hide them from whoever they consider the enemy, among other reasons. Such changes in language and expression can limit the efficacy of AI tools in African peacebuilding because they do not have a corpus in the native languages to refer to.

A practical example of how deliberate design shows up when using AI is seen where one of the AI platforms designed in China is prompted to explain what the Tiananmen Square is and known for. The AI simply responds by noting that it cannot provide this information, and prompts the user to ask another question. A follow-up question to the same AI, asking it to explain what the Hector Pieterse Square, is and known for, yields substantial information, including specific dates and detailed reports about the events that took place in the square during the bloody 1976 Soweto Uprisings.

In this instance, one public square is based in China, the other in South Africa, but both represent a unique history of public resistance and violence against civilians. However, information about Tiananmen Square is censored from one of China's own AI models. Once again, we can easily detect the deliberate design being practiced, easily leading to the erasure of information on the Tiananmen Square.

Whether one technology company is outing another for being biased, or another is trying to prove how impartial it is, peacebuilders should know that it is almost impossible for these tools to be completely neutral as long as a few global actors disproportionately produce information in formats that can be used by AI, e.g. journals, books, and articles while other global actors try to play catch up in the documentation and production of their local knowledge and information, and as long as the issue of full transparency to address deliberate design is not achieved.

### **Interesting Applications**

It is necessary to note at this juncture that, this paper does not discourage or encourage the use of AI in peacebuilding in Africa. Instead, it poses two important questions for peacebuilders: first, are AI tools or other technologies creating the conditions for more polarization, discord and (eventually) violence? Second, do these new digital technologies offer novel and exciting ways to connect, find common ground, and work towards positive social change? While this is not immediately clear, as the relationship between AI technology and society is still being understood, there are some interesting applications that African researchers and peacebuilders can consider.

**First Principles:** Practitioners can use AI technologies to understand how the tools base their reasoning in African contexts, and decide whether the data they have been trained on is sufficient to warrant their use in addressing African conflicts. One way to realize this is to present conflict scenarios in an African context and asking the AI tool to provide solutions to address the conflict. The point here is to analyze how AI would approach the situation: whether it would consider and factor in local customs and traditions, when offering possible solutions. In each step that the AI veers away from local customs and traditions, the user prompts it to check if it is aware of local practices and choosing alternative approaches or if it is admitting there are aspects that it still does not know within these societies. This can further advance to some form of supervised learning where the practitioners train the AI models to try and provide peacebuilding outputs that factor local contexts in real-world use cases. These types of exercise are mainly exploratory to compare how the machine thinks and how a local peacebuilder would think, and whether a combination of both approaches that would benefit people embroiled in conflict.

**Virtual Respondents:** Another interesting area of experimentation and study, is working with virtual pools of respondents developed by AI tools, and which mimic real communities and demographics. These pools, if representative, can be useful in testing processes and methods that require large groups, to assess multiple pathways of response or engagement.

Consider a virtual pool of conflicting parties responding to a peace agreement that is about to be signed, and surveying how these parties would respond to the agreement if one party wanted changes to the agreement before signing. These would be purely simulations and not a replacement of how real human beings would behave. Nevertheless, they would enable a flexibility that would mainly be used to explore a broader range of hypotheses and questions about a conflict context by researchers and peacebuilding actors.

Scenario building: AI tools can also be used to imagine multiple scenarios that can be adjusted quickly using different variables. Peacebuilding practitioners can think of multiple scenarios in an African conflict context and use AI tools to imagine how these would unfold over time, introducing in each scenario peacebuilding efforts and further exploring the likelihood of these efforts working. As noted earlier, these are not replacements of the actual human engagement that comes with peacebuilding processes but begin to help researchers understand the relationship between AI tools and society.

## **Conclusion**

As digital technologies continue to evolve and grow, questions on the interaction between ICTs and communities in conflicts increase, especially on whether ICTs are creating conditions for more polarization or offering new and exciting ways to connect and find common ground. While the former question is already being answered as the world witnesses the proliferation of harmful content online, this paper has also aimed to show that - in relation to the latter question - digital technologies have the potential to significantly contribute to building sustainable peace.

As this space in Africa advances from its liminality to conventionality, and being more established, it is imperative that pedagogy is deeply considered, with guidelines and policies on best practices of applying ICTs in African peacebuilding processes. Emerging issues on privacy and security - related to big data, artificial intelligence, decision making, public opinion, and automation replacing face-to-face interactions, etc. - are all unfolding in the technological sphere and conflicting with sensitive violence prevention and mitigation processes that depend on dialogue, emotions and trust. These trends demand some research, that would generate solutions for and tackling effectively.

This paper has provided a framework for considering how ICTs intersect with peacebuilding efforts towards consolidating sustainable peace. A next step might be an in-depth exploration of how these approaches might be coupled with traditional, offline conflict resolution mechanisms that are predominantly used in Africa. This would ensure that peacebuilding efforts using ICT do not only focus on the online spaces and ignore the offline spaces.

Additionally, there is, need for scholarship on this topic to be driven from an African perspective to guide African peacebuilding efforts, advance the production of literature that documents empirical evidence and spur innovation that applies African indigenous knowledge, and applies decolonial approaches in the use of ICTs in African peacebuilding efforts.



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## ABOUT THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER

**Caleb Gichuhi** is an explorer of digital spaces and has researched and applied various advanced technologies to address election violence, good governance, extremism, conflict mitigation, and inclusive development. He is the Africa Lead at Build Up, where he manages digital conflict programs related to information ecosystems, and depolarization projects in Africa. He also teaches data analytics for sustainable peacebuilding at the United Nations Systems Staff College (UNSSC) in Turin.

He has over 10 years of experience working with UNDP, United States Institute of Peace- PeaceTech Lab, UN-habitat, ECOWAS, UNESCO, Ushahidi, and different local peace actors across Africa to respond to online dangers, such as hate speech, bullying and harassment, mis/disinformation, and violent conflict, by applying digital tools and engaging with technology companies. He has extensive experience in digital transformation and engagement, media literacy, analytics, digital media-monitoring, community building, and building data analytics tools,. Caleb also sits on the board of PeaceRep at the University of Edinburgh, and on the board of CommonThread Global is a steering committee member at the Council on Technology and Social Cohesion, and is a member of the Hub for the Study of hybrid communications in Peacebuilding at the University of Sheffield. Caleb is a Chevening fellow and holds a MSc in informatics, information and communication technology for development from the University of Manchester.