At the turn of the twentieth century, most cities in America featured a patronage-based system of governance, but over the next few decades, patronage was replaced by civil service. Civil service restructured the relationship between elected officials and government employees, with employees benefiting from a variety of new protections. Yet in studying this change, scholars have largely ignored the role local employees themselves might have played in the transformation. We argue that city employees stood to benefit from civil service, and in places where they had agency and clout, they were important drivers of its adoption. We collected a dataset for more than 1,000 municipal governments, determining whether and when they adopted civil service and whether their employees were organized in an occupational organization. Our analysis of these new data shows the influence of city employees was an important contributor to the spread of civil service in American local government.

In most evaluation systems—such as those governing the allocation of prestigious awards—the evaluator’s primary task is to reward the highest quality candidates. However, these systems are imperfect; top performers may not be acknowledged and thus be underrecognized, and low performers may receive unwarranted recognition and thus be overrecognized. An important feature of many evaluation systems is that people alternate between being candidates and being evaluators. How does experiencing misrecognition as a candidate affect how people subsequently evaluate others? We develop novel theory that underrecognition and overrecognition lead people to reproduce those experiences when they are evaluators. Across three studies—a quasi-natural experiment and two preregistered, multistage experiments, we find that underrecognized evaluators are less likely to grant recognition to others—even to the highest-performing candidates. Conversely, overrecognized evaluators are more likely to grant rewards to others—even to the lowest-performing candidates. Whereas underrecognized evaluator behavior is driven by individuals’ perceptions that their experience was unfair, overrecognized evaluator behavior is driven by the informational cues people glean on how to evaluate others. Thus, in evaluation processes where people oscillate between being the evaluated and being the evaluator, we show how and why seemingly innocuous initial inefficiencies are reproduced in subsequent evaluations.