This proposal is part of a broader dissertation project that investigates the nature of political bargains between presidents and parties in South American countries. I focus on two sets of specific questions. First, I seek to investigate which institutional and organizational characteristics lead Latin American parties to alter their policy positions in exchange for perks handed out by the president. For this I am developing a model in which the president and the parties have both policy and non-policy concerns (such as pork and patronage issues), and I plan to test it quantitatively for countries that have roll call data, and qualitatively in countries that where such data is not available. This proposal seeks funds for field research in Bolivia and Uruguay that will address a second set of questions. These start with the assumption that non-policy concerns are an important part of political bargains. Since it is reasonable to expect that the “neoliberal” reforms of the 80s and 90s have reduced the amount of resources controlled by the president, politicians might be facing now a very different bargaining environment from the one that existed prior to the reforms. Thus, I seek to determine i) the extent to which the reforms did in fact restrict the president’s resources, ii) whether a “poorer” president has hindered governability, and iii) how politicians have sought to adapt to this new environment in different countries, and which strategies were most successful.