The rational individual model dominates economics and political science. But contrary to its assumptions, if actors are embedded in reciprocal exchanges over time, they come to consider the interests of others as their own, even to the point of identification and habituation. In theory, reciprocity networks should prepare actors to believe in and take actions against future collective threats and risks, even using information from international sources like the UN-IPCC. But on the other hand, networks of specific reciprocity could exclude the voices of non-members, reducing policy quality. The proposed project tests these hypotheses by comparing the effects of reciprocity networks in four national polities on the formation of global climate change policy. My existing research shows that the German and US polities lacked dense reciprocity networks except in one sector each, the laender (state governments) and labor unions, respective (Figure 1). But in Japan, the reciprocity network encompassed the majority of organizations in a (computer generated) "butterfly" pattern with government agencies bridging between two mutually-isolated "wings" of business and labor (Figure 2). If in the new research, Austria also has a strong reciprocity network, this would indicate a structural rather than cultural basis to reciprocity. As centralized corporatist polities, Japan and Austria provide many forums for direct negotiation among opposed stakeholders and ministerial officials to promote mutually acceptable policies that will actually get carried out. The liberal (pluralist) USA, though, while providing plenty of opportunities for citizen "voice," promotes stakeholder balkanization, not agreement. Germany has features of both systems. Does corporatism or liberalism, reciprocity or impersonality, provide the better standard? In theory, corporatist stakeholder forums should generate reciprocity networks and collective identities, thus enhancing a polity' s capacity for acting on future risks. But uncertainties abound. If reciprocity arises from deeply held trust in the group (culture), it may promote such capacity but not transfer to other cultures. If reciprocity arises from sanctions, such as the assuring presence of third parties as recent research suggests, such conditions could be constructed in other societies. If stakeholders reciprocate due to trust, they might more willingly incur the individual costs of proactive counter-measures. But they reciprocated due to enforcement by third party monitors, they might be less willing, and hence more likely to defect when not monitored. At the same time, reciprocity, whatever its causes, might not even have a salutary effect upon future risk policy. If restricted to specific others, reciprocity ties could exclude outsiders, thus reducing the possibility of designing effective policy. Testing these emergent hypotheses at the level of policy networks constitutes the heart of my research proposal. I would first develop organizational lists and then conduct observational studies of stakeholder forums and interview organizational leaders in the four countries. This qualitative data, coded for themes, would clarify the effect of reciprocity versus impersonality on climate change policy formation. With this data in hand, I would design a new comparative policy network survey able to address the hypotheses and conduct a pilot survey in the four countries and international arena.