The study will analyze the potential of constitutional design in mitigating or exacerbating conflicts using the case study of the 1995 Uganda constitution. Focus will be put on the weaknesses and strength of constitution provisions; the constitution's position regarding Uganda's political issues and the challenge it faces in context of democratization, and peace building. Some of the areas for scrutiny include electoral and governance systems and power sharing designs. These will be analysed against the backdrop of the specific structural and cultural context of Uganda and some other countries in the great lakes region that are prune to conflicts. Since independence, Uganda has had four constitutions i.e. 1962, 1966, 1967 and the 1995 constitutions. These constitutions instead of resolving conflicts in Uganda have tended to trigger more conflicts. This is the paradox which this research intends to investigate. The study will offer conclusions useful to scholars and analysts in explaining the opportunities, weaknesses, and constraints of constitutions in managing conflicts.