Within the field of economics, intrahousehold allocation is traditionally modeled between a husband and a wife. To make the model more appropriate for the context of the developing world by expanding the intrahousehold bargaining model to an intergenerational level, I analyze the relationship between adolescent mothers and their mothers with respect to transfers directed at improving the welfare of the adolescent's baby. Both women respond to a household survey consisting of personal and consumption data, and an experimental Vickrey auction reveals each individual's valuation of a product for the baby. The bargaining process is directly observed as they re-answer sections of the survey together. Joint valuation is also revealed when the purchasing decision is made collectively. Policy implications relate to the effectiveness of targeting transfers toward a female household head or a teenage mother. The NGOs Associaciao Crianca e Familia and Associacao de Moradores Joanes Leste will facilitate research in various neighborhoods of Salvador.