Countries throughout the world have passed regulations that promise
strong protections for workers and the environment, but violations of
these policies are more common than compliance. Enforcement plays a key
role in mediating between institutional design and outcomes. Why do
states enforce regulations in some places, and in some industries, and
not in others? How can states that lack many of the features considered
necessary to implement regulations—such as meritocratic and politically
insulated bureaucracies— overcome these constraints? Drawing on a
detailed study of labor and environmental politics in Argentina, this
book develops a framework for analyzing enforcement. The book shows how
informal linkages between state officials and groups in society allow
officials to gain the operational resources and political support
necessary for enforcement. This analysis builds on state-society
approaches in comparative politics, but in contrast to theories that
emphasize state autonomy, it focuses on key differences in the way
states are porous to political influence. By doing so, this work
develops a new way to understand the politics of flawed states, weak
institutions, and uneven policy implementation.

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Publication Details

Politicized Enforcement in Argentina: Labor and Environmental Regulation
Amengual, Matthew
University of Cambridge / Cambridge University Press
Publish Date
February 2016
Amengual, Matthew, Politicized Enforcement in Argentina: Labor and Environmental Regulation (University of Cambridge / Cambridge University Press, February 2016).