How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? 1997 IDRF Fellow Michael Tomz offers a new perspective on this elemental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors explaining how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors. The theory engenders unique predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors’ expectations. Tomz tests his theory and the alternatives across three centuries of financial history by using a mix of archived data from nine countries covering all sovereign borrowers, statistical methods of analysis, case studies, and content analysis. The results show strong support for his reputational theory revealing that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Buy this book from Amazon.